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The need for new insights to understand the effects of quoting slurs in linguistic communication has been evident over the past several years. Slurs seem to be capable of offending even when embedded in quotations or mentioned. This ability of the derogatory force of slurs to project out of embeddings like quotations is an instance of what I will call the 'projectible force' of slurs. This force is taken to be a particularly serious problem for content-based semantic theories, which claim that what makes slurring utterances offensive is their derogatory content. The inert content criticism claims that quotations should render the content of a slur inert as quotations draw our attention only to the properties of the word itself. However, quoted or mentioned slurs can still offend, so the truth-conditional account of slurs must be wrong. I take the inert content criticism to be a locus of confusion. This confusion can be eliminated if we (1) disambiguate two notions of offense, (2) replace our naïve understanding of quotation with a more precise theory of quotation, and (3) use the deliverances of such a theory of quotation to help explain the different kinds of offense that can result from different features of slurring utterances. While this is not an attempt to defend the truth-conditional account of slurs, I will deliver something that both truth-conditional and prohibitionist accounts of slurs have failed to deliver: an explanation of how slurs under quotation can cause moral offense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vicious discrimination is often experienced by LGBTQIA+ individuals, with the most cited type of discrimination being verbal harassment. This research focuses on the use of negative LGBTQIA-phobic and sexist slurs in social-media marketing advertising. In four experimental studies and two field studies, the authors show that the presence of offensive slurs in social marketing advertisements can provoke shock reactions, leading to higher cognitive elaboration on the target topic. These effects are moderated by social norms and have spillover effects on the intention to change behavior, as well as on the perceived helpfulness of the advertisement. The findings are highly relevant for practitioners seeking to create more poignant prosocial advertisements, but also for researchers who wish to better understand the role of offensiveness in triggering cognitive elaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marques (Philosophia,49(3), 1109–1125 2021) argues that Hom's Combinatorial Externalism (CE) faces a hitherto unknown problem when coupled with a standard Kratzerian account of deontic modality: CE plus Kratzerian modality would entail the negation of a thesis central to Hom's analysis of slurs, the null extensionality thesis (i.e., the thesis that slurs have empty extensions). Since modality is an integral part of Hom's take on slurs, and Kratzer's account of modality has the status of the standard take on modality, this would be bad news for CE. In this paper, I argue that, pace Marques, CE and a Kratzerian account of deontic modals do not clash with the null extensionality claim. Marques' discussion, however, helps us expose substantive, non-semantic assumptions concerning practical philosophy that seem to be implicitly built into CE's semantic analysis of slurs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The need for new insights to understand the effects of quoting slurs in linguistic communication has been evident over the past several years. Slurs seem to be capable of offending even when embedded in quotations or mentioned. This ability of the derogatory force of slurs to project out of embeddings like quotations is an instance of what I will call the ‘projectible force’ of slurs. This force is taken to be a particularly serious problem for content-based semantic theories, which claim that what makes slurring utterances offensive is their derogatory content. The inert content criticism claims that quotations should render the content of a slur inert as quotations draw our attention only to the properties of the word itself. However, quoted or mentioned slurs can still offend, so the truth-conditional account of slurs must be wrong. I take the inert content criticism to be a locus of confusion. This confusion can be eliminated if we (1) disambiguate two notions of offense, (2) replace our naïve understanding of quotation with a more precise theory of quotation, and (3) use the deliverances of such a theory of quotation to help explain the different kinds of offense that can result from different features of slurring utterances. While this is not an attempt to defend the truth-conditional account of slurs, I will deliver something that both truth-conditional and prohibitionist accounts of slurs have failed to deliver: an explanation of how slurs under quotation can cause moral offense.

We investigate experimentally whether the perceived offensiveness of slurs survives when they are reported, by comparing Italian slurs and insults in base utterances (Y is an S), direct speech (X said: "Y is an S"), mixed quotation (X said that Y is "an S"), and indirect speech (X said that Y is an S). For all strategies, reporting decreases the perceived offensiveness without removing it. For slurs, but not insults, indirect speech is perceived as more offensive than direct speech. Our hypothesis is that, because slurs constitute hate speech, speakers employ quotation marks to signal their dissociation from slur use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the derogatory uses of nicknames within closely-knit social settings such as villages, households, and schools. By examining ethnographic and psychological data on nicknaming practices, this paper contends that pejorative nicknames and slurs share structural and functional attributes. On the one hand, pejorative nicknames and slurs can elicit deep offence regardless of the speaker’s intentions or whether they occur within speech reports. On the other, pejorative nicknames can contribute to creating and reinforcing unjust intra-group hierarchies, hence mirroring the role of slurs within a smaller social scale. To explain these shared attributes, this paper argues (i) that both forms of verbal aggression index multiple dimensional qualities such as ‘negative valence’, ‘neutral arousal’, and ‘high dominance’ rather than discrete emotional categories such as ‘contempt’ or ‘anger’, and (ii) that the expression of high dominance in social interactions underlies their capacity to offend. Then, it translates this hypothesis into a Bayesian model of sociolinguistic variation inspired by Heather Burnett’s work on identity construction, thus integrating pragmatic reasoning into a psychologically informed framework for interpreting emotional cues. By studying both phenomena in tandem, this paper shows how understanding nicknaming dynamics within smaller speech-act communities can contribute to our comprehension of the derogatory impact of slurs in more intricate social contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper considers controversial utterances that were erroneously taken as derogatory. These examples are puzzling because, despite the audiences’ error, many speakers retract and even apologise for what they didn’t say and didn’t do. In recent years, intuitions about retractions have been used to test semantic theories. The cases discussed here test the predictive power of theories of derogatory language and help us to better understand what is required to retract a slur. The paper seeks to answer three questions: are the cases considered genuine retractions? If the speakers didn’t derogate by using a slur, how are the cases retractions of derogatory acts? Do these examples support expressive accounts of slurs? I argue that the examples provide evidence for an expressivist account of slurs: a slurring utterance (defeasibly) makes a derogatory speech act where the speaker expresses a commitment to a morally questionable appraisal state, such as disgust or contempt for a target group. A retraction of a derogatory speech act requires undoing the enactment of that commitment, which can be achieved with a genuine apology. This helps explain the conduct of audiences who misunderstand what the speaker says, and the speakers’ reactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Longstanding philosophical debate over the semantics of proper names has yet to examine the distinctive behavior of deadnames, names that have been rejected by their former bearers. The use of these names to deadname individuals is derogatory, but deadnaming derogates differently than other kinds of derogatory speech. This paper examines different accounts of this behavior, illustrates what going views of names will have to say to account for it, and articulates a novel version of predicativism that can give a semantic explanation for this derogation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is generally thought that the reclamation of slurs is restricted to the in-group. Bianca Cepollaro and Dan Lopez de Sa challenge this assumption by presenting cases in which slurs are successfully reclaimed by members of out-groups. I agree with the idea that the out-groups often participate in reclamation. In this paper, I present a view which accommodates the fact that sometimes out-groups successfully reclaim slurs. At the same time, the view preserves the central role of the in-group in reclamation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using semantic and syntactic methods, we prove the compatibility of the truth of universally quantified slurring sentences of the form [all Ss are Ns] or [all Ss are S*s] with the existential core of moral and semantic innocence. We also show that proving their mutual compatibility by means of logic leaves untouched the moral problem tied to their material truth. Finally, we trace the problem back to the failure to signal in the spelling of the slurring term’s meaning that the derogatory concept it denotes is not universally accepted.

In this paper we distinguish two dimensions in which the reclamation of slurs can succeed (or fail). By reclamation we refer to the linguistic practice whereby certain speakers employ slurs in order to express pride, foster camaraderie, manifest solidarity, subvert extant structures of discrimination, and so on. Reclamation can succeed, we propose, in at least two senses: in terms of felicity, insofar as a certain use of a slur counts as a move within a reclamatory practice; and in terms of accomplishment, insofar as it achieves the goals typically associated with reclamation. In the first part, we present the distinction between felicity and accomplishment. In the second, we show that it provides a deeper understanding of the worries and concerns to which reclamation may give rise within and outside the academic debate. This distinction thus constitutes a valuable addition to the theoretical toolkit for analyzing the phenomenon of reclamation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The terms idiot, imbecile, and moron are generally associated with notions of intelligence, having served both scientific and mundane roles across cultural‐historical contexts and in many different countries. This study seeks to explore the degree to which the use of these terms is an everyday part of our lives and to map out the meanings being attached to them. Methods: This study reports on their current usage in two arenas: within 29 academic papers published from 2016 to 2021, reporting on interviews or observations undertaken in educational contexts; and within 134 articles from four English language newspapers published in the first three months of 2021. Using a discursive and thematic approach to the analysis, it considers the degree to which these may be considered slur or taboo words, and whether they can be linked to discriminatory practices frequently experienced by groups with whom they are associated. Findings: It is evident is that people use the terms differently in different arenas. However, they see them as negative, associate them with stereotypical characteristics, are happy to apply them to others, but want to avoid having them applied to themselves. Conclusion: This study shows how widely these words are used across social contexts, and suggests that as with other historical terms for marginalized populations we need to regard them as slurs and treat them as taboo. Accessible summary: The study looked at the use of the words Idiot, Moron and Imbecile in 29 academic papers and 134 Newspaper articles.The terms were used by a many different people involved in education and in the news media.These three words are used to belittle others and people do not wish to have them used about themselves.Idiot, imbecile and moron are recognised as disapproving words, but they also act as slurs and so perhaps they ought to be forbidden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intuitively, a speaker who uses slurs to refer to people is doing something morally objectionable even if no one is measurably affected by their speech. Perhaps they are only talking to themselves, or they are speaking with bigots who are already as vicious as they can be. This paper distinguishes between slurring as an expressive act and slurring as the act of causing a psychological effect. It then develops an expression-focused ethical account in order to explain the intuition that slurring involves an effect-independent moral wrong. The core idea is that the act of expressing a morally defective attitude is itself pro tanto morally objectionable. Unlike theories that focus only on problematic effects, this view is able to shift the moral burden of proof away from victims of slurring acts and onto speakers. It also offers moral guidance with respect to metalinguistic and pedagogical utterances of slurs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Verbal derogation is not only a linguistic but also, and perhaps more importantly, a political phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that to do justice to the political relevance of derogatory terms, we must not neglect the social practices and structures in which the use of these terms is embedded. I aim to show that inferentialist semantics is especially helpful to account for this social embeddedness and, consequently, the political relevance of derogatory terms. I am concerned with specifying the linguistic and political aspects of terms that are at the core of derogatory language use. I explain them with the help of Brandomian inferentialism, which tends to be quickly dismissed or ignored in discussions about the meaning of derogatory terms. My inferentialist account is in line with Lynne Tirrell's broader inferentialist framework for understanding derogatory communicative practices. I provide the semantic details of her broader inferentialist view and thereby aim to show that inferentialist semantics is a promising theory which cannot be neglected in further discussion of meaning and politics in derogatory language use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper seeks to investigate the representation of a relevant number of gendered epithets in two prominent Romanian dictionaries, the most recent edition of DOOM (2021, Third Edition) and the current edition of DEX (2016, Revised Edition based on the first and second editions). Taking into account the prescriptive dimension which both these dictionaries share and the fact that they both retain their status as significant reference books in present-day Romania, the paper examines the way in which these current dictionaries choose to describe these words, arguing for the significance of the “metadata” (Nunberg, 2018; Pullum, 2018) component in the lexicographical representation of lexical items which can function as gendered insults.

This paper studies some pragmatic and discursive properties of hate words employed in the comment chains of two Italian right-wing politicians' social media accounts. The analysis focuses on hate speech directed towards two ethnic groups – African migrants and the Chinese – and an individual, the former minister of Agriculture Teresa Bellanova. Hate words are divided into two macrocategories: slurs and insulting epithets. Slurs are expressions that are consistently associated with derogatory attitudes against a group of people based on their origin/descent; insulting epithets are either offensive terms that do not attack specific identity traits or neutral words that, in certain contexts, can be offensive. Data indicate that the use of hate words is guided by pragmatic factors and discursive elements, and it changes according to the individual(s) or the groups being attacked. Hate speech on social media occurs mainly through insulting epithets, thus allowing the authors to avoid moderation and any responsibility for their utterance. The results support the idea that hate speech is a complex speech act that aims not only at derogating or expressing negative emotions but works within the framework of racist discourses as a means of creating and reinforcing political polarisation and in-group values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The #BlackLivesMatter movement has been met with resistance and hostility by many whites who do not see the need for assertions regarding the value and worth of Black lives. Those who seek to disrupt this emerging discourse tend to regard instances of white violence against Black people as individual incidents that do not reflect larger societal patterns. This paper addresses these assertions by drawing on discussions of slurs and other racially abusive language in the workplace. Using autoethnography, I provide rich descriptions of how hateful language circulates in whitespaces through both interpersonal interactions and through group-level consumption of racially problematic mass media creating organizations that are hostile to people of color, even in their absence. Major implications of this study include that the devaluation of Black and Native lives is pervasive within many predominantly white organizations and that this reality negatively effects both the life chances and the personal safety of people of color. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Slurring expressions display puzzling behaviour when embedded, such as under negation and in attitude and speech reports. They frequently appear to retain their characteristic qualities, like offensiveness and propensity to derogate. Yet it is sometimes possible to understand them as lacking these qualities. A theory of slurring expressions should explain this variability. We develop an explanation that deploys the linguistic notion of focus. Our proposal is that a speaker can conversationally implicate metalinguistic claims about the aptness of a focused slurring expression. This explanation of variability relies on independently motivated mechanisms and is compatible with any theory of slurring expressions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'prohibitionist' idea that slurs have the same linguistic properties as their neutral counterparts hasn't received much support in the literature. Here I offer a modified version of prohibitionism, according to which the taboo on using slurs is part of their conventional meaning. I conclude with explanations of the behaviour of slurs in embedded constructions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a lot of debate about the meaning of slurs, which are words that refer to a certain group of people in a derogative manner. Many scholars (e.g. McCready 2010; Croom 2011; Gutzmann 2015) consider slurs, unlike their ‘neutral’ counterparts, to have both descriptive and expressive content. In this squib, I discuss initial data on the use of Dutch slurs and related terms on Twitter. The Dutch data show that ‘neutral’ labels sometimes seem to behave like slurs to some degree and that some slurs can be used as swear words without (seemingly) conveying any descriptive property. Based on these observations, I suggest that slurs may be part of a continuum of labels, ranging in the degree to which they have descriptive versus expressive content, entailing a gradual distinction between conversational and conventional implicatures in the lexical domain. A gradual view on conventionality in the lexical domain would moreover pave the way for a less fundamental distinction between expressive and social meaning. It is concluded that the debate on slurs would benefit from a broader and more empirical approach to pejorative terms for (groups of) people, as their actual use and interpretation can show a mixture of (degrees of) descriptive, expressive and social meaning.

В последние годы среди англоязычных лингвистов и философов языка возрос интерес к слурам (slurs) – расовым,ксенофобным, гомофобным и другим ярлыкам, таким, как nigger, kike, faggot и др. Цель работы – доказать, чтоприписываемый западными исследователями слурам комплекс перлокутивных эффектов, получивший названиеOffense-generation pattern (модель порождения обиды) присущ не всем словам подобного рода, а только тем из них,которые табуированы. Таким образом, делается вывод, что наличие у слова свойств, составляющих модельпорождения обиды, обусловлено его табуированностью. Результаты исследования могут найти практическоеприменение в юрислингвистике при лингвистической экспертизе текстов по делам об оскорблении и унижении честии достоинства по признакам расы, национальности, религии, гендера и т.д.

The study focuses on Facebook, one of the most popular social networking sites in our time, given its position in the digital world and the importance of the verbal component in it. The main objective of the research is to investigate whether in a corpus of utterances in Italian coming from two public Facebook groups, the incitement to hatred manifests itself through the use of slurs, the choice of which is delimited by precise criteria. The presence of the selected words is verified through automatic searches with the tools available on Facebook. Moreover, the analysis is aimed at discovering whether slurs always carry their denigratory potential, or whether they can also have a non-denigratory use. Some possible extensions of the research will also be defined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a new perspective on the relationship between slurring terms and their neutral counterparts with an inferentialist view of slurs. I argue that slurs and their counterparts are coextensional with contrasting senses. Crucially, the proposed inferentialist view overcomes the combination of two challenges: Kaplanian inferences and the substitution argument. The previous views cannot account for both of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Words are ubiquitous and familiar, and the concept of a word features both in common-sense ways of understanding the world, and in more theoretical discourse. Nonetheless, it has been repeatedly argued that there is no such thing as words. In this paper, I will set out a range of arguments for eliminativism about words, and indicate the most promising responses. I begin by considering an eliminativist argument based on the alleged mind-dependency of words, before turning to two challenges arising from linguistic theory in the Chomskian tradition. The first of these is issued by Rey in a number of places, including in his recent book (Rey, 2020). The second is Collins’s (2010, 2021a) argument based on the alleged explanatory redundancy of words. I will also consider an eliminativist challenge based on the difficulty of providing existence and persistence conditions for words. One general lesson which emerges is that these eliminativist arguments, if they work at all, could be turned against a whole swathe of non-linguistic objects; in other words, the case for eliminativism about words is no stronger than the case for eliminativism about ordinary objects in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a general model of the semantics of lexicalized social meanings, i.e. semiotic properties of certain expressions in a socio-political context. Examples include slurs, problematically charged expressions such as inner city, as well as terms such as mother, which also carry implicit ideological associations. Insofar as their linguistic properties are concerned, social meanings can be construed as context-structuring devices: without introducing specific at-issue contents, they evoke background assumptions which shape the context of conversation. An inferentialist model of discourse is developed to account for this effect, in which the discursive significance of an utterance is defined as the set of inferences it licenses relative to a discursive context. A discursive context is a set of propositions that can serve as auxiliary premises in material inferences, together with a salience ranking that makes some of these propositions more readily available and therefore more relevant to determining discursive significance. Social meanings are defined as functions on discursive contexts that modify the salience ranking, increasing the salience of certain assumptions and stereotypes. As a result, they impact the discursive significance of utterances indirectly and independently of at-issue contents. They are also largely independent of speaker intentions in virtue of the ideological nature of discursive contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to nearly all theorists writing on the subject, a certain derogatory content is regularly and systematically communicated by slurs. So united, the theorists disagree sharply on the elements of this content, on its provenance, and on its mechanism. I argue that the basic premiss of all these views, that there is any such derogatory content conveyed with the use of slurs, is highly dubious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I present data involving the use of the Romanian slur 'țigan', consideration of which leads to the postulation of a sui-generis, irreducible type of use of slurs ('identificatory'). This type of use is potentially problematic for extant theories of slurs. In addition, together with other well-established uses (derogatory, appropriated etc.), it shows that there is more variation in the use of slurs than previously acknowledged. I explain this variation by construing slurs as polysemous. To implement this idea, I appeal to a rich-lexicon account of polysemy. I show how such a theory can be applied to slurs and discuss several important issues that arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Slurs are both derogatory and offensive, and they are said to exhibit “derogatory force” and “offensiveness.” Almost all theories of slurs, except the truth-conditional content theory and the invocational content theory, conflate these two features and use “derogatory force” and “offensiveness” interchangeably. This paper defends and explains the distinction between slurs’ derogatory force and offensiveness by fulfilling three goals. First, it distinguishes between slurs’ being derogatory and their being offensive with four arguments. For instance, ‘Monday’, a slur in the Bostonian argot, is used to secretly derogate African Americans without causing offense. Second, this paper points out that many theories of slurs run into problems because they conflate derogatory force with offensiveness. For example, the prohibition theory’s account of offensiveness in terms of prohibitions struggles to explain why ‘Monday’ is derogatory when it is not a prohibited word in English. Third, this paper offers a new explanation of this distinction from the perspective of a speech act theory of slurs; derogatory force is different from offensiveness because they arise from two different kinds of speech acts that slurs are used to perform, i.e., the illocutionary act of derogation and the perlocutionary act of offending. This new explanation avoids the problems faced by other theories.

Slurs are pejorative expressions that derogate individuals or groups on the basis of their gender, race, nationality, religion, sexual orientation and so forth. In the constantly growing literature on slurs, it has become customary to appeal to so-called “neutral counterparts” for explaining the extension and truth-conditional content of slurring terms. More precisely, it is commonly assumed that every slur shares its extension and literal content with a non-evaluative counterpart term. I think this assumption is unwarranted and, in this paper, I shall present two arguments against it. (i) A careful comparison of slurs with complex or thick group-referencing pejoratives lacking neutral counterparts shows that these are in fact very hard to distinguish. (ii) Slurs lack the referential stability of their alleged neutral counterparts, which suggests that they are not coreferential. Developing (ii) will involve introducing a new concept which I regard as essential for understanding how slurs behave in natural language: referential flexibility. I shall support my claims by looking at historical and current ways in which slurs and other pejorative terms are used, and I shall argue that both etymological data and new empirical data support the conclusion that the assumption of neutral counterparts not only is unwarranted but obscures our understanding of what slurs are, and what speakers do with them.

While prototypical uses of slurs express contempt for targets, some reclaimed uses are associated with positive evaluations. This practice may raise concerns. I anticipate this criticism in what I dub the Warrant Argument (WA) and then defend the legitimacy of this kind of reclamation. For the WA, standard pejorative uses of slurs are problematic for assuming unwarranted connections between descriptive properties (e.g., being gay) and value judgements (e.g., being worthy of contempt). When reclaimed uses of slurs express a positive evaluation of their targets—the WA goes—reclamation fails to challenge the unwarranted link between descriptive properties and value judgements, and merely reverses the evaluation polarity from negative to positive. So, the WA concludes, reclaimed uses of slurs evaluating targets positively for belonging to a certain group make a similar moral error as derogatory uses of slurs (sections 2-3). The WA could lead us to condemn reclamation. To resist this conclusion, I draw a parallel with affirmative action, arguing that it can be morally permissible to balance an existing form of injustice by temporarily introducing a countervailing mechanism that prima facie seems to violate the norm of equality: even if the WA were right, it wouldn’t constitute an argument against the moral permissibility of reclamation in the case of most slurs (section 4). This line of argument in defense of pride reclamation may also serve to debunk the myths of reverse racism and reverse sexism (section 5).

This paper concerns the topic of slur reclamation. I start with presenting two seemingly opposing accounts of slur reclamation, Jeshion’s (2020) Polysemy view and Bianchi’s (2014) Echoic view. Then, using the data provided by linguists, I discuss the histories of the reclamation of the slur ‘queer’ and of the n-word, which brings me to presenting a view of reclamation that combines the Polysemy view and Echoic view. The Combined view of slur reclamation proposed in this paper postulates meaning change while fleshing out the pragmatic mechanisms necessary for it to occur.

Although slurs are conventionally defined as derogatory words, it has been widely noted that not all of their occurrences are derogatory. This may lead us to think that there are “innocent” occurrences of slurs, i.e., occurrences of slurs that are not harmful in any sense. The aim of this paper is to challenge this assumption. Our thesis is that slurs are always potentially harmful, even if some of their occurrences are nonderogatory. Our argument is the following. Derogatory occurrences of slurs are not characterized by their sharing any specific linguistic form; instead, they are those that take place in what we call uncontrolled contexts, that is, contexts in which we do not have enough knowledge of our audience to predict what the uptake of the utterance will be. Slurs uttered in controlled contexts, by contrast, may lack derogatory character. However, although the kind of context at which the utterance of a slur takes place can make it nonderogatory, it cannot completely deprive it of its harmful potential. Utterances of slurs in controlled contexts still contribute to normalizing their utterances in uncontrolled contexts, which makes nonderogatory occurrences of slurs potentially harmful too.