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Abstract. Postmodernism (postmo) is associated with deconstruction, skepticism and philosophical criticism of the concept of universal truth and objective reality. For postmodernist thinkers, reason and logic are merely conceptual constructions and therefore are only valid within the intellectual traditions adopted by their users. These thinkers emphasize the differences in human experience and the plurality of truth, while dogmatic theology claims God and objective reality as the only truth. Based on this, this paper attempted to analyze the influence of postmo on theology in order to build a new paradigm for the development of theology. The method used in this article was literature study. The result of this study indicates that theology must learn from postmodernism. Theology must renew itself so that its arguments can be accepted. Abstrak. Postmodernisme (posmo) dihubungkan dengan dekonstruksi, skeptisisme dan kritik filosofis terhadap konsep kebenaran universal dan realitas yang obyektif. Bagi para pemikir posmodernisme, akal budi dan logika hanyalah konstruksi konseptual dan karenanya hanya sah di dalam pendirian tradisi-tradisi intelektual yang dipakai oleh penggunanya. Para pemikir itu menekankan perbedaan pengalaman manusiawi dan kemajemukan kebenaran, sementara teologi dogmatik mengklaim Tuhan dan realitas obyektif sebagai satu-satunya kebenaran. Berangkat dari hal itu tulisan ini mencoba menganalisa pengaruh posmo terhadap teologi untuk membangun sebuah paradigma baru demi perkembangan teologi. Metode yang digunakan di dalam artikel ini adalah studi literatur. Hasil dari kajian ini menunjukkan bahwa teologi harus belajar dari posmodernisme. Teologi harus membaharui diri sehingga argumen-argumennya dapat diterima.

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Familiebilder må studeres i lys av deres forankring i familiekonteksten for å kunne forstås i sin kompleksitet. Med utgangspunkt i, blant andre, Stanley Cavells refleksjoner rundt fotografi, skeptisisme og selverkjennelse, demonstrerer teksten hvordan familiefotografiet, til tross for at det er en genre styrt av en rekke begrensninger, også har et stort potensial for å uttrykke individualitet. Artikkelen viser også hvordan familiefotografiet har dette til felles med dagligspråket.

This article examines the nature and importance of the notion of absolute knowing in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The avoidance, undervaluation and misinterpretation of absolute knowing, especially in 20th-century interpretations of Hegel's work, are challenged on the basis of Hegel's own account of absolute knowing. Three characteristics of absolute knowing stand out: first, absolute knowing is not a ready-made blueprint that can be applied blindly, but is achieved only through a laborious process that has to be completed in person and not at arms length. Second, absolute knowing can only result from the strictest possible proof in the form of complete scepticism or what Hegel termed "sich vollbringende Skeptizismus". Third, that which is criticised by the proof must be sublimated into the absolute as part of the processal nature of absolute knowing. The process reveals that self-negation, indicating shortcomings, and self-attainment, representing self-awareness of the spirit, are two sides of the same coin, namely what Hegel describes as the movement of spirit. Hegel does not avoid the topic of truth and goes so far as to claim that those who do avoid it, in fact make a claim to truth themselves (in so far as they presuppose that the denial of truth is true) and in turn deny others. Some take Hegel's explicit reference to truth, with which his philosophy is preoccupied, to be bold and too arrogant. Consequently, the tendency recently has been to work eclectically with parts of Hegel's philosophy and dialectical approach, but largely to reject his system as a whole. Hegel was sensitive to the claims emanating from a sceptical approach to overarching truth and incorporated the critique expressed by that approach into his account of truth, along with his own critique of scepticism. Hegel s critique of modern scepticism's denial of truth (in this case modern philosophy since Descartes) does not mean he regards it as being without merit. In fact, Hegel not only accepts, but also recommends, that any claim to truth must be subjected to scepticism in the form of science (Wissenschaft). The very essence of science (Wissenschaft) is knowing, and what else is worthy of knowing but truth? Truth, therefore, does not undermine scepticism, but rather leads scepticism to its own limits and therefore its fulfilment. The process of leading scepticism to fulfilment is described in terms of a sublimation. Sublimation (Lauterung) is understood as an arduous process that rectifies, but does not exclude, the parts that it problematises. It is in this sense of sublimation that Hegel's famous statement that "truth is the whole " is to be understood. However, the exacting passage to truth cannot begin with the whole, as the whole has not legitimised itself, which leads Hegel to consider the way towards the whole as just as important as the destination. Natural (immediate) consciousness must therefore be allowed to present its claims to truth, after which scepticism is employed to question the claims. This process of constantly questioning certainty corresponds with the Socratic method and, unsurprisingly, finds expression in a dialectic. The dialectic is more than a mere back-and-forth exchange, but rather an unfolding of truth itself. Without such dynamism a fuller conception of truth would not take shape, and in any case would not be able to legitimise itself. To overcome the presuppositions of every stage, a certain leap over the position is required, a leap away from the position that is to be overcome, but at the same time a leap that recognises that very position. The process therefore involves active participation and expanding awareness, on the one hand, but, on the other, a measure of fate, by which Hegel means that the course of knowing is destined to lead to fulfilment (a "homecoming") in the guise of absolute knowing, a knowing that is in and for itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sammanfattning Genom en diskussion av en sketch ur en komediföreställning kommer jag att lyfta fram humorns och komedins relation till skepticismen som tema i Stanley Cavells filosofi. I The Claim of Reason utvecklar Cavell ett samband mellan skepticism och tragedi. Kopplingen mellan komedi och skepticism förblir mer antydd, och då i termer av ett slags symmetri med tragedi. Jag menar att när vi låter humor och komedin ta plats i relation till den skeptiska problematiken så kommer en asymmetri att visa sig mellan tragedi och komedi. Detta har att göra med komedin och humorns förmåga att innefatta och erkänna den smärta som finns i det tragiska. Jag diskuterar Cavells begrepp om erkännande (acknowledgment) och hävdar att begreppet behöver modifieras när vi talar om det slags erkännande som finns i en viss typ av humor.

Sammendrag Filosofisk skeptisisme er et gjennomgangstema i Stanley Cavells tenkning. Formålet med denne artikkelen er å klargjøre noen sider ved Cavells konsepsjon av filosofisk skeptisisme, og å vise hvilken funksjon appeller til det Cavell, i kjølvannet av Wittgenstein, kaller «det hverdagslige» har i den formen for kritikk av filosofisk skeptisisme som Cavell utvikler.

The study of Islam among Western thinkers seems not monolithic. In the real of orientalists who use historical analysis to respond Islam with a negative value, such as regarding Islam none more than a Christian heresy. Meanwhile, a positive understanding toward Islam has done by some Islamolog, such as W. Montgomery Watt. The differences are more based on their worldview, phenomenological approach, and interpretations. Then, other understanding of Islam according to sociologists, secularists, humanists, and Western modernists. This article discusses the views of John Wansbrough toward al-Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad. The study focused on the work of John Wansbrough, entitled “Qur’anic Studies Source and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation”. There are three issues raised in this article: Wansbrough’s view on al-Qur’an, Muhammad prophethood, and Isra’ (nocturnal journey). Regarding to al-Qur’an, wansbrough sees that al-Qur’an has influenced by Jews and Christian, it is fusion of tradition, and even it is the creation of the post-prophetic. Therefore, the critism from other thinkers, such as orientalists as well as coming from Muslims themselves also received a sufficient portion. There are two methods utilized by Wansbrough, historical method and literary analysis. He used historical approach to study the contents of al-Qur’an, and literary analysis to analyze the revealed stories in the Qur’an.

In his astonishing sonnet, De Wareld, Bilderdijk captures the main contours of the philosophical legacy of the West, from ancient Greek philosophy up to his own position in 1786. He even anticipated key elements of the reformational philosophical movement of the 20th century in the Netherlands. These periods of philosophy embody reflection on perennial problems, such as unity and diversity and constancy and change, accompanied by theoretical stances such as atomism, holism, realism and nominalism. Dooyeweerd has shown that particular philosophical notions acquired diverse philosophical interpretations dependent upon the (supra-theoretic) basic motives guiding and directing theoretical thought. The concepts of nature and causality, for example, obtained a meaning in Greek philosophy that differs from their meaning in modern (post-Renaissance) philosophy. The same applies to the concept of substance, a concept that dominated Greek-medieval philosophy but then, within modern philosophy, had to give way to the concept of relations. However, the latter was now embedded in the dialectical tension between causality (nature) and freedom. Inspired by a thought-experiment of Galileo (1638) the great Enlightenment philosopher, Immanuel Kant, had to restrict the initial science ideal to sensory phenomena and the categories of understanding in order to open up a domain of practical freedom. Yet within the domain of sensibility Kant elevated human understanding to be the formal law-giver of nature. His idea of freedom was negative, in the sense that it is supposed to be free from natural necessity (causality). Thus he confused the underlying conditions of freedom with the nature of freedom. Freedom is only possible within the normed possiblities of human beings leaving room both for norm conformative and antinormative actions. Informed by the idea of being a law unto oneself (autonomy), Kant introduces two law-givers: understanding as law-giver for theoretical knowledge in a possible experience and reason as law-giver for (practical) freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]