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This paper analyzes the current phase of backlash of economic globalization using a target zone approach in an environment populated by heterogeneous agents The target zone analysis suggests that there may be a positive expectation effect (a ?honeymoon?) when the social costs are credibly expected to remain below the benefits arising from globalization In such a situation, the latter proceeds even beyond the level that society would be willing to accept in the absence of a such a target When the costs are expected to exceed the benefits, instead, the opposite phenomenon (a ?divorce?) arises While in the case of exchange rates or interest rates, the passage from ?honeymoon? to ?divorce? might well occur with a discrete jump of the respective variable, rather than gradually, this is not the case when considering economic and social costs Graduality is obtained thanks to the introduction of the hypothesis of heterogeneous agents The proportion of those who think that the costs of globalization exceed the benefits increases with globalization and the ?honeymoon??, then, gradually turns into a ?divorce? Government's redistributive intervention to compensate the losers, however, could reduce the costs of globalization, thereby delaying or even preventing its crisis

This paper adopts a target zone approach to analyse and interpret the current phase of slowdown, if not retreat, of economic globalisation. A ‘honeymoon’ emerges when a credible limit is imposed on its economic and social costs. Conversely, if the upper cost threshold is not set credibly, a ‘divorce’ from economic globalisation emerges earlier than if no target is taken into account. Such a second case represents the recent events.

The recent euro area crisis shows some similarities with the fixed exchange rate crisis that affected the European Monetary System in 1992–93. I argue that the theoretical framework to be used in order to analyze them should also be similar. As a matter of fact, in both cases, the point of view of the government (that compares costs and benefits of its action) should be considered together with the point of view of speculators, who look at the state of the economic fundamentals in order to decide whether to launch an attack or not. This allows to represent and to interpret, among other things, both the initial “honeymoon” years of EMU and the recent euro area crisis.

Is the seniority structure of sovereign debt neutral for a government's decision between defaulting and raising surpluses? In this paper, we address this question using a model of debt crises where a discretionary government endogenously chooses distortionary taxation and whether to apply an optimal haircut to bondholders. We show that when the size of senior tranches is small, a version of the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds: tranching just redistributes government revenues from junior to senior bondholders, while taxes and government borrowing costs remain unchanged. However, as senior tranches become sufficiently large, default costs on senior debt transpire into a stronger commitment to repay not only the senior tranche, but also the junior one. We show that there is a lower threshold for senior bonds above which tranching can eliminate default on both junior and senior debt, and an upper threshold beyond which the government defaults also on senior debt. The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

When monetary and fiscal policy are conducted as in the euro area, output, inflation, and government bond default premia are indeterminate according to a standard general equilibrium model with sticky prices extended to include defaultable public debt. With sunspots, the model mimics the recent euro area data. We specify an alternative configuration of monetary and fiscal policy, with a non-defaultable eurobond. If this policy arrangement had been in place since the onset of the Great Recession, output could have been much higher than in the data with inflation in line with the ECB's objective.

This paper develops a model to interpret the 2012 eurozone crisis and the ECB’s policy response. In the model, bank lending is distorted by debt overhang, banks hold sovereign bonds, and the government guarantees the bailout of bank creditors. A self-fulfilling pessimistic view of the economy can trigger a banking and sovereign crisis: with pessimistic economic expectations, the value of sovereign bonds declines, the bank risk of default rises, and the debt overhang distortion worsens; this leads to a contraction in bank lending and to a decline in economic activity, which confi rms the initial pessimistic expectations. A commitment by the central bank to purchase the sovereign bonds at pre-crisis market spreads manages to eliminate the crisis equilibrium.

The paper shows that currencies of countries with persistent current account surpluses and high foreign-currency denominated assets, such as the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, are under persistent appreciation pressure, particularly when the centres of the world monetary system follow expansionary monetary policies. This limits the choice of exchange rate regime. Given flexible exchange rates, a negative risk premium on the domestic interest rate can emerge. Empirical estimations provide mixed evidence for a negative impact of net foreign asset positions and exchange rate uncertainty on interest rates of international creditor countries at the periphery of the world monetary system.

This paper explores the determinants of 10-year sovereign bond spreads over the German Bund benchmark in the Euro Zone from 2000 to 2013, relying on cross-country quarterly data panel analysis. The paper focal point is the role of contagion and euro break-up risks in widening the sovereign bond yield differentials among EU member countries. Using a novel synthetic index capable of monitoring the sustainability of currency unions, the paper finds that market expectations of a euro’s break up and contagion from Greece were fundamental drivers of sovereign risk premia in peripheral countries.

Financial crises are often associated with an endogenous credit reversal followed by a fall in asset prices and serious disruptions in the financial sector. To account for this sequence of events, this paper constructs a model where the excessive risk-taking of portfolio investors leads to a bubble in asset prices (in the spirit of Allen and Gale, "Bubbles and Crises", Economic Journal, 2000), and where the supply of credit to these investors is endogenous. We show that the interplay between the risk shifting problem and the endogeneity of credit may give rise multiple equilibria associated with different levels of lending, asset prices, and output. Stochastic equilibria lead, with positive probability, to an inefficient liquidity dry-up at the intermediate date, a market crash, and widespread failures of borrowers. The possibility of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling crises is showed to be related to the severity of the risk shifting problem in the economy.

* Revised: [10-04, 2010], Countries with higher implicit taxes on continued work are associated with lowerlabor force participation rates of the elderly. This paper constructs a politicoeconomicmodel that accounts for this feature based on multiple, self-fulfilling expectationsof agents. In this model, agents are identical at birth and can becomeskilled (or remain unskilled) through educational investment. When agents holdexpectations of larger social security benefits, it provides a disincentive to engagein educational investment, thereby resulting in an unskilled majority. In turn, thisunskilled majority supports larger social security benefits, which induces the retirementof the elderly and thus results in a lower labor force participation rate. Theopposite applies when agents have expectations of smaller social security benefitsin their old age.

Countries with higher implicit taxes on continued work are associated with lower labor force participation rates of the elderly. This paper constructs a politicoeconomic model that accounts for this feature based on multiple, self-fulfilling expectations of agents. In this model, agents are identical at birth and can become skilled (or remain unskilled) through educational investment. When agents hold expectations of larger social security benefits, it provides a disincentive to engage in educational investment, thereby resulting in an unskilled majority. In turn, this unskilled majority supports larger social security benefits, which induces the retirement of the elderly and thus results in a lower labor force participation rate. The opposite applies when agents have expectations of smaller social security benefits in their old age.

We investigate Matsuyama's (Econometrica, 72, pp. 853-84, 2004) model modi- fied only to include endogenous and forward looking labor supply decision. Young agents supply one unit of labor endowment elastically to a competitive labor market. While, old agents of ex-ante identical individuals are divided in equi- librium into depositors and entrepreneurs. Depositors lend funds in the form of interest bearing loans, while entrepreneurs borrow funds in the competitive credit market. We emphasize the interaction between credit and labor markets and show the possibility of occurrence of multiple steady states, local and global indeterminacy, and endogenous fluctuations. When young agents become optimistic about the future deposit rate then they decide to work harder and invest more. Countercyclical borrowing constraint will help agents to fulfill their initial optimistic expectations, because the next period credit volume and deposit rate can increase simultaneously. By conducting global bifurcation analysis, we show that credit cycles can occur through a self- fulfilling expectation mechanism. History-versus-expectations considerations can exist and escape from underdevelopment as well as fall into poverty can to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear-quadratic setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give rise to - through selffulfilling expectations - dramatical political instability, i.e. Condorcet cycles of length two even for very high majority rules.

This paper analyses the dynamic implications of an asset-pricing model with incomplete participation due to entry costs. It is shown that heterogeneity in entry costs can lead to the existence of multiple stochastic sunspot equilibria, whereby the number of agents in the market and asset prices fluctuate endogeneously over time in the absence of fundamental uncertainty. Such asset-price fluctuations occur despite the uniqueness of the deterministic equilibrium, and thus bear no link to the usual notion of steady-state indeterminacy. In addition to excess volatility, the equilibria exhibit predictable and conditionally heteroskedastic returns.

We study the Green and Lin (2003) model of financial intermediation with two new features: traders may face a cost of contacting the intermediary, and consumption needs may be correlated across traders. We show that each feature is capable of generating an equilibrium in which some (but not all) traders 'run' on the intermediary by withdrawing their funds at the first opportunity regardless of their true consumption needs. Our results also provide some insight into elements of the economic environment that are necessary for a run equilibrium to exist in general models of financial intermediation. In particular, our findings highlight the importance of information frictions that cause the intermediary and traders to have different beliefs, in equilibrium, about the consumption needs of traders who have yet to contact the intermediary.

This paper considers a simple model of self-fulfilling expectations that leads to a multiple equilibrium of gender gaps in wages and participation rates. Rather than resorting to moral hazard problems related to unobservable effort, like in most of the related literature, our model fully relies on statistical discrimination. If firms believe that women will quit their jobs more often than equally productive men when shocks affecting household chores take place, our model predicts that this belief will increase the wage gap in favour of men which, in turn, will increase the female share of housework and exacerbate lower female participation in the labour market. Hence, both effects lead to a gendered equilibrium with large gaps, even though an ungendered equilibrium with no gaps is feasible. We examine the effects of gender-based and gender-neutral subsidies and find that the latter are more effective in removing the gendered equilibrium. Empirical analysis based on a time use survey for Spain is provided to test most of the implications of the model. Banco de Santander

In the early stages of the process of industry evolution, firms are financially constrained and might pay different wages to workers according to their expectations about the prospects for advancement offered by each firm’s job ladder. This paper argues that, nevertheless, if the output market is competitive, the positive predictions of the perfectly competitive model are still a good description of the long run outcome. If firms maximize the discounted sum of constrained profits, financing expenditure out of retained earnings, profits are driven down to zero as the perfectly competitive model predicts. Ex ante identical firms may follow different growth paths in which workers work for a lower entry-wage in firms expected to grow more. In the steady state, however, workers performing the same job, in ex-ante identical firms, receive the same wage. I explain when the long run outcome is efficient, when it is not, and why firms that produce inefficiently might drive the efficient ones out of the market even when the steady state has the positive properties of a Walrasian equilibrium. To some extent, it is not technological efficiency but workers’ self-fulfilling expectations about their prospects for advancement within the firm that explains which firms have lower unit costs, grow more, and dominate the market.

We show that dependence on foreign energy can increase economic instability by raising the likelihood of equilibrium indeterminacy, hence making fluctuations driven by self-fulfilling expectations easier to occur. This is demonstrated in a standard neoclassical growth model. Calibration exercises, based on the estimated share of imported energy in production for several countries, show that the degree of reliance on foreign energy for many countries can easily make an otherwise determinate and stable economy indeterminate and unstable.

This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying information, endogenous policy re-introduces multiple equilibria. Multiplicity obtains even in environments where the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise. It is sustained by the agents coordinating on different interpretations of, and different reactions to, the same policy choices. The policy maker is thus trapped into a position where both the optimal policy and the coordination outcome are dictated by self-fulfilling market expectations.

Foreign Trade and Equilibrium Indeterminacy Abstract: We show that dependence of production on foreign inputs (or non-producible natural resources) can significantly increase the likelihood of indeterminacy. Payment of imported foreign factors of production may act as a semi-fixed cost, amplifying production externalities and returns to scale, making selffulfilling expectations driven busyness cycles easier to arise. This is demonstrated using a standard neoclassical growth model. Calibration exercise shows that the required increasing returns to scale can be reduced by as much as 64% based on estimated share of foreign inputs in production for OECD countries.

Four main lessons stem from the works presented in this volume. First, the rational expectation hypothesis has to go thoroughly into more general concepts. If the REH in a muthian sense seems now invalidated, this result does not mean that there is not rationality in price expectations : in the one hand, expectations may be economically rational in the sense of the advantage-cost analysis, and, in the other hand, the exchange of informations between agents through the market may involve some other types of rationalities. Secondly, it appears important to respect the individual nature of expectations both at the theoretical and empirical levels : generally, the heterogeneity is not neutral either for reaching an economic equilibrium or for econometrical estimations of expectational processes. Thirdly, expectational behaviors change over time ; both the processes and the parameters which intervene in these processes are changing. Fourthly, while expectational processes are rather extrapolative (destabilizing) when the horizon is short (less or equal to one month), they are rather regressive (stabilizing) when the horizon is long (greater than one month).