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"Beyond the Fields" is a memoir written by Randolph Feezell, a scholar in the philosophy of sport. The book explores the intersections between Feezell's personal experience playing baseball and his experience teaching academic philosophy. Feezell reflects on his upbringing on a farm in Oklahoma and discusses themes such as race, religion, and the relationship between sports and intellectual pursuits. The memoir also delves into Feezell's disillusionment with sports and his realization of the philosophical elements in the field. Overall, "Beyond the Fields" offers a unique perspective on the purposes and meaning of sport in a fully lived life. [Extracted from the article]

University students are particularly vulnerable to depression. This study examines the correlations and predictive roles between self-deception, psychological capital, and depression among students from Chinese normal university. A 3-month follow-up mental health study was conducted with 260 Chinese normal university students, utilizing the Self-Deceptive Enhancement scale, Center of Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale and Positive Psychological capital Questionnaire. The Cross-lagged panel Model was employed to test the predictive relationship between self-deception, psychological capital, and depression. The prevalence of depression among these college students reached 35.0%. Correlation analyses showed that self-deception was positively correlated with psychological capital, while both self-deception and psychological capital were negatively associated with depression. The cross-lagged analyses revealed that self-deception negatively predicted depression (β = -0.16, p < 0.01); Psychological capital negatively predicted depression (β = -0.16, p < 0.01); The reciprocal predictive effects between self-deception and psychological capital were observed (β = 0.23 and 0.13, respectively, p < 0.05). The findings support the conservation of resources theory, underscoring the critical role of resource management in mental health. These results provide a theoretical basis for developing easy-to-administer interventions aimed at alleviating students' depressive symptoms by leveraging both self-deception and PsyCap as potential pathways for promoting psychological well-being. Furthermore, the study draws on Zhong and Ru's (2021) cognitive processing model of self-deception to explore the unique role of self-deception in psychological regulation, futher expanding its applicability in mental health contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The folk explanation of self-deception is that one mental subsystem deceives another. Deflationists appeal to motivated irrationality rather than deceptive subsystems to offer nifty accounts of many sorts of self-deception. However, I shall show that deflationists cannot explain the self-deception embedded within (1) impulsive, (2) vacillating, or (3) long-term akrasia. These akratic actions are respectively too short, too variable, or too long for motivated irrationality to do its dirty work. Nor can deflationists explain the self-deception required for motivating oneself to (4) suspend disbelief and lose oneself in fiction, (5) bother to make negligible contributions to very large projects, (6) accomplish daunting tasks by taking them one day at a time, or (7) cope with psychologically traumatic truths. In these four cases, the truth is undeniable, yet agents must also hold contravening false beliefs. Thus, the folk explanation of self-deception is preferable, despite its invocation of deceptive mental subsystems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-deception refers to an individual holding inflated beliefs about their abilities, and it plays a crucial role in human behavior and decision-making. The present study employed event-related potentials (ERPs) technique to explore the neural responses to the impacts of social comparison direction and comparison gap on self-deceptive behavior. They were instructed to predict their performance in the forward-looking paradigm. Behavioral responses and neural reactions during the decision-making process were documented. The behavioral results indicated that, in contrast to the downward comparison condition, participants engaged in upward comparison exhibited more occurrences of self-deception. However, within the context of upward comparison, participants demonstrated a higher frequency of self-deception in the large gap condition compared with the small gap condition. The ERP results showed that induced self-deception under conditions with a large comparative gap between participants and their paired counterparts stimulated larger P300 and smaller N400 amplitude than under conditions with a small gap. However, when participants were in the upward comparison situation, the late positive potential (LPP) amplitude induced by self-deception behavior in the condition of a large comparison gap between participants and paired opponents was larger than that in the condition of a small comparison gap. These results indicated that individuals in the large gap group feel strong unfairness and negative emotions. More importantly, the self-deception induced by the large gap group in the upward comparison situation used fewer cognitive resources than the small gap condition, whereas the individuals in the downward comparison situation did not show the difference in cognitive resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paradoxical nature of intentional self-deception has led many philosophers to view self-deception as predominantly non-intentional. I propose that approaching self-deception from an agency-theoretic perspective allows us to rescue the idea that self-deception can at least be driven by intention. By modeling the ‘acting as if’ method of self-deception with agential layering, developed by Nguyen [2020. Games: Agency as Art. New York: Oxford University Press], I argue that intention-driven self-deception is no more mysterious than other activities that involve self-effacing ends: ends we must pursue indirectly. That is, self-deception can occur when agents pursue the self-effacing end of forming what they take to be an epistemically unjustified belief by submerging themselves in a layer of agency in which they can act as if they already hold that belief. By intentionally adopting this pretense and shaping their agency around it, they forget that their agency is layered at all, and may thereby form a full-fledged belief. This model avoids objections to views that treat self-deception itself as intentional and does so while appealing only to resources already used to explain our everyday activities. I then apply my model to a core case of bad faith from Sartre to show that intention-driven self-deception can clarify how we are responsible for inauthenticity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that $\neg p$ ¬ p and yet is sincere in asserting that $p$ p. I argue that the agent qualifies as sincere in asserting the contrary of what they in the most basic sense believe in virtue of asserting what they are committed to believing. It is only by recognizing such commitments and distinguishing them from the more basic beliefs whose rational regulation is automatic that the tension between the self-deceived agent's actions and assertions can be explained in a core subset of cases of self-deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unrealistic optimism is considered as an optimism bias based on the individual's motives of self-exaggeration and protection and is defined as evaluating oneself more positively than others. An important example of nurturing one's own self through the concept of unrealistic optimism is the parent-child relationship. The parent's having unrealistically positive perceptions about his/her child is reported to play an important role in the parenting experience, nourishing the parent's own self and changing the interaction with the child. An individual's placing parenting at the center of their life is not only limited to seeing themselves as better than they are, but can also affect their evaluations of their child. Unrealistic parental optimism can lead to disappointment, inappropriate persistence and unpreparedness for personal threats. The expectations created by the evolutionarily adaptive ability to look on the bright side of events and the disappointments that may be experienced in line with these expectations are significant for psychological science to be examined in an important context such as child rearing. This review focuses on the motives of parents to exhibit unrealistic parental optimism, what kind of behaviors they exhibit in this context and the outcomes of these behaviors on children.

Ying Yang,1,2 Bowei Zhong,3,4 Wenjie Zhang,2,5 Wei Fan1,2,6 1Department of Psychology, School of Education Science, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, People’s Republic of China; 2Hunan Key Laboratory of Cognition and Human Behavior, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, People’s Republic of China; 3CAS Key Laboratory of Behavioral Science, Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, People’s Republic of China; 4Department of Psychology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, People’s Republic of China; 5Department of Preschool Education, School of Education Science, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, People’s Republic of China; 6Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, People’s Republic of ChinaCorrespondence: Wei Fan, Department of Psychology, School of Education Science, Hunan Normal University, No. 36 Lu Shan Road, Yue Lu District, Changsha, 410081, People’s Republic of China, Tel +86 15116291398, Email fanwei@hunnu.edu.cnPurpose: Self-deception refers to an individual holding inflated beliefs about their abilities, plays a crucial role in human behavior and decision-making. Individuals may inflate their abilities when subject to comparisons with others. This study examined the impact of social comparison on self-deception through the implementation of two behavioral experiments.Methods: In Experiment 1, we recruited a sample of 152 undergraduate students. Participants were falsely informed that they performed better (downward comparison) and worse (upward comparison) than average on a game. Subsequently, their level of self-deception was assessed by asking them to predict their performance in a future game, with more inflated predictions indicating greater self-deception. In Experiment 2, we gathered 126 undergraduate students to broaden the current study. This experiment examined the combined effects of comparison direction and comparison gap on self-deceptive behavior.Results: The findings showed that self-deception was more common in circumstances of upward comparison than in downward comparison or no comparison (Experiment 1). Furthermore, Individuals were more inclined to participate in self-deception when encountering a notable performance gap relative to others, particularly in scenarios involving upward social comparison (Experiment 2).Conclusion: The findings suggested that when confronted with threatening social comparative information, people tended to use self-deception to protect themselves. Members of the large gap group experienced strong feelings of unfairness and negative emotions, which led to self-protective behaviors and a greater likelihood of self-deception.Keywords: comparative direction, comparative gap, self-deception, self-protection, social comparison threat

This study explores the role of social support as a mediator in the relationship between self-emotional appraisal and motivation in people in science. It also examines the moderating role of self-deceptive enhancement in the relationship between self-emotional appraisal and social support. Survey responses from 6,943 people in science in Spain were analyzed (43% women), aged 20–96 (M = 48.8; SD = 9.94). Structural equation modeling was used to examine a moderated mediation model explaining the path between self-emotional appraisal and motivation. The analysis controlled for age, gender and organization type. The results show a positive link between self-emotional appraisal and motivation. Mediation by social support strengthens this link: For self-emotional appraisal to be effective, people in science need to feel others' support when tackling a problem. Moderation by self-deceptive enhancement strengthens the association of self-emotional appraisal with social support: The need to adapt one's self-image to others' expectations activates the pursuit of social support. The implications of self-emotional appraisal and social support for improving motivation are discussed, as is the role of self-deception in social support as perceived by people in science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper demonstrates how people can manipulate their beliefs in order to obtain the self-image of an altruistic person. I present an online experiment in which subjects need to decide whether to behave altruistically or selfishly in an ambiguous environment. Due to the nature of ambiguity in this environment, those who are pessimistic have a legitimate reason to behave selfishly. Thus, subjects who are selfish but like to think of themselves as altruistic have an incentive to overstate their pessimism. In the experiment, I ask subjects how optimistic or pessimistic they feel about an ambiguous probability and then, through a separate task, I elicit their true beliefs about the same probability. I find that selfish subjects claim to be systematically more pessimistic than they truly are whereas altruistic subjects report their pessimism (or optimism) truthfully. Given the experiment design, the only plausible explanation for this discrepancy is that selfish subjects deliberately overstate their pessimism in order to maintain the self-image of an altruistic person. Altruistic subjects, whose behavior has already proven their altruism, have no such need for belief manipulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to contribute to the discussion of pathological problems that occur in today's "phase transition phenomenon of relationship," this article focuses on "self-deception"—an example of a distorted relationship with oneself. It explores ways to overcome such issues through philosophical counseling. The specific measure is the Self-Dialogue seminar, a part of the Philosophical Counseling Clinical Education (PCCE) program. The second Section, therefore, begins with the question "How do we deal with the phenomenon of self-deception (on the part of the counselor or client) that we might actually encounter in philosophical counseling?" and discusses where and how philosophical counseling can intervene in the entire process of self-deception. In preparation for the possibility of encountering different levels of self-deception, the third section examines the contexts of three types of self-deceptions. The fourth section explores the possibility that a client or philosophical counselor can discover and change their own points of deception through the Records of Self-Dialogue seminar. Finally, the article argues that philosophical dialogue, if attained within a community predicated on individual equality and mutuality, can be a valid prescription for self-deception in the modern world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article claims that the Anthropocene Age reveals the tragic insanity that lies at the core of religious experiences informed by Hebrew and Christian scriptures. In brief, I claim that Western Christianity and its apparatuses produce beliefs, which are an integral part of persons' religious experiences, that give rise to an ontological rift between human beings and other species. This rift and its attendant beliefs are evident in how religious individuals and communities have (1) overlooked or disavowed the singularities and sufferings of other species, (2) used attendant instrumental epistemologies to justify the exploitation of Othered species (and Othered human beings) and the Earth, and (3) sought to force nature to adapt to human needs and desires. The article addresses the psychological dynamics and consequences of the ontological rift, which further exposes the madness that attends religious experiences that rely on apparatuses of the ontological rift. The article ends with a brief discussion of an antidote, namely, inoperativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This transcript of a podcast episode titled "Deschooling Dialogues" features a conversation between Alnoor Ladha and Orland Bishop. The discussion focuses on the concept of unlearning and deconditioning in society, particularly in the context of the dominant culture of the Anglophone West and its impact on globalization. Orland emphasizes the importance of reconnecting with inner wisdom and truth, as well as the need for initiation and ethical practice in utilizing personal powers. The text explores various topics related to spirituality, initiation rituals, karma, and the evolution of consciousness. It highlights the importance of initiation in certain traditions, such as the Dagara traditions in West Africa, where individuals undergo a transformative experience to become more connected to the spiritual world and their community. The text also discusses the consequences of violating initiation protocols and the potential for spiritual exile in the afterlife. It touches on the concept of karma and the need for individuals to cultivate the right use of the ego and spiritual responsibility. Additionally, the text discusses the loss of initiatory wisdom over time and the need for individuals to reconnect with ancestral wisdom for healing and progress. It also delves into the relationship between rationality and spirituality, the role of embodiment and reincarnation in wisdom traditions, and the evolution of consciousness in relation to monotheism and collective belief. The text concludes by discussing the esoteric dimensions of money and the potential for a future where money is used in alignment with higher purposes and collective agreements. The author argues that our current economic system [Extracted from the article]

People who, by intention or negligence, deceive themselves put other people at risk of being misinformed. The paper argues that this kind of misinforming other people is to be avoided for largely the same reasons for which lying is to be avoided – regardless of what exactly these reasons are. This makes the ethical evaluation of self-deception in part dependent on the ethical evaluation of lying. In order to bring out this result as clearly as possible, detailed characterisations of the concepts of attempted deception, lying, and self-deception are given. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel The Remains of the Day delves into the intricacies of memory, self-deception, and denial through the lens of its protagonist, Stevens, a devoted butler. This article meticulously examines the interplay of these themes within the novel, elucidating their profound impact on Stevens’ identity and worldview. By meticulously dissecting Ishiguro’s narrative, the paper elucidates how memory functions as a tool for constructing personal narratives, particularly evident in Stevens’ selective recollection of events to maintain his idealized butler persona. Furthermore, it explores Stevens’ unwavering commitment to duty, which leads to his blindness towards his employer’s moral failings and the subsequent isolation and regret he faces. Through a comprehensive analysis, this paper argues that Stevens’ self-deception and denial emanate from a quest for dignity and purpose, underscoring Ishiguro’s critique of sacrificing integrity for societal conformity. Moreover, it elucidates how Ishiguro’s exploration resonates with broader philosophical discourse on memory, identity, and ethical considerations, accentuating the imperative of acknowledging past errors for individual growth and societal advancement.

The article focuses on Eric Marcus's analysis and response to puzzles concerning belief and inference in his book "Belief, Inference, and the Self-Conscious Mind" (BISCM). Topics include an explanation of non-evidential doxastic self-knowledge, the unintelligibility of Moore-Paradoxical statements, and the unity of the rational mind.

The article focuses on scrutinizing Marcus's argument that ordinary human beliefs are necessarily known to their subjects including clarifying Marcus's premises about honest assertion and avowal of beliefs and addressing concerns about belief and self-deception.

Individuals deceive themselves about a wide variety of subjects. In fortunate circumstances, where those who manage to leave self-deception embrace reality, an interesting phenomenon occurs: the formerly self-deceived often confess to having ‘known [the truth] all along’. These post-self-deception judgments are not conceptually innocuous; if genuine, they call into question the core feature of prominent theories of self-deception, namely that self-deceived individuals do not believe the unwelcome truth. In this paper I argue that post-self-deception judgments do not track a belief, but rather a suspicion of the unwelcome truth. I do this by showing that post-self-deception judgments are themselves instances of self-deception where the individual is self-deceived that they believed the unwelcome truth. I then suggest that the motivational cause of the self-deceit is hindsight bias, specifically the kind known as foreseeability, and that as a result, post-self-deception judgments are not reliable because they do not accurately track previous self-deceptive experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article scrutinises Seneca's moral engagement with complex financial accounting as a speculative form of wealth and moneymaking that challenged social norms and subverted systems of value. The contribution discusses Seneca's construction of a form of greed and corruption that is often anticipated by psychological biases, such as loss aversion and self-deception. This degenerating process is exemplified by the misuse of financial ledgers, and specifically of the kalendarium, an account book associated with moneylending that Seneca describes as a suspect instrument of avarice that provoked the ruin of fortunes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy / Revue Canadienne de Philosophie Continentale is the property of Canadian Society for Continental Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Pascal famously argued that practical reasoning should lead people to try to form within themselves a commitment to religious practice and obedience, based upon a belief in God. I propose to take a less ambitious argument, which I call the Sensible Argument, and use it to present The Puzzle. I argue that there is a huge puzzle here, about the radical dissonance between the beliefs and practices of many of the purportedly religious. There are, I will argue, good reasons to doubt, concerning many (clearly not all or indeed most) purported religious believers, whether they are indeed believers, or at least whether their beliefs are strong; and religion seems to greatly increase the risks of deception, duplicity, and hypocrisy, as well as self-deception and inauthenticity. By turning towards a religious form of life, one will therefore be adding great morality-related risks. Arguably, if there is a God who deeply cares about individual moral behaviour, he would punish religious moral transgressors more than the secular ones. One is unlikely to be saved from hell (or other severe divine punishment) by becoming religious. If one is going to wager, it seems much more sensible to wager on the secular side. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Saul Smilansky presents us with a puzzle which, in combination with a small number of premises, is supposed to generate a reversal of Pascal's wager: the wagerer should bet on a secular lifestyle, and reject religion, as the surest way of pleasing God (if God exists). In this article, we argue that the puzzle, once unpacked, isn't particularly puzzling, that the premises aren't true, and that Smilansky's wager is open to both reductio and a reversal of its own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Psychological Science is the property of Psychological Science Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper demonstrates how people can manipulate their beliefs in order to obtain the self-image of an altruistic person. I present an online experiment in which subjects need to decide whether to behave altruistically or selfishly in an ambiguous environment. Due to the nature of ambiguity in this environment, those who are pessimistic have a legitimate reason to behave selfishly. Thus, subjects who are selfish but like to think of themselves as altruistic have an incentive to overstate their pessimism. In the experiment, I ask subjects how optimistic or pessimistic they feel about an ambiguous probability and then, through a separate task, I elicit their true beliefs about the same probability. I find that selfish subjects claim to be systematically more pessimistic than they truly are whereas altruistic subjects report their pessimism (or optimism) truthfully. Given the experiment design, the only plausible explanation for this discrepancy is that selfish subjects deliberately overstate their pessimism in order to maintain the self-image of an altruistic person. Altruistic subjects, whose behavior has already proven their altruism, have no such need for belief manipulation.JEL ClassificationsC91, D82, D83, D84.

An impostor who claimed to be a refugee from Formosa (present-day Taiwan) named George Psalmanazar (1679?-1763) embodied two key aspects of addiction in eighteenth-century Europe: its connections to globalization and imperialism, and the complex interplay between the concept of "positive" addictions (such as addiction to study, devotion, or duty) and the growing attention paid to "negative" ones (addiction to superstition, sexuality, or intoxicating substances). Constantly changing his identity in response to his audience's expectations, Psalmanazar lived a life of continual performance--performance that hinged on trading one set of addictions for another. As he abandoned his falsified persona as an opiate-addicted, sexually licentious Taiwanese aristocrat, Psalmanazar embraced a postimposture persona as a pious scholar of religion who, like the holy men he studied, was "addicted to the reading ... [of] sacred writings." Strikingly, however, this second life as a humble scholar was sustained by regular opiate use.What had changed was how Psalmanazar thought about his use of the drug: no longer in the service of "vanity" or "extravagance" but instead in the service of God. With their blend of introspection and self-deception, Psalmanazar's Memoirs (1764) index the changing social and cultural roles of opiates and the concept of addiction in eighteenth-century Europe and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deflationists reduce self-deception to a motivated bias, eliminating the need for doxastic tension, divided minds, intentions, or even effortful action. While deflationism fits many cases, there are others that demand more robust psychological processes and complexity. We turn to the empirical literature on self-handicapping to find commonplace examples of self-deception with high levels of agential involvement. Many self-handicappers experience non-trivial doubts, engage in strategic and purposive self-deception, and possess knowledge that must remain unconscious for their project to succeed. This occurs with self-handicapping for the sake of self-esteem regulation. Such self-handicapping not only requires self-deception but also furthers it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the role of the Holy Spirit in interpreting Scripture, emphasizing the transformative understanding and obedience that comes from the Spirit's illumination of the text. It focuses on 1 Corinthians 2:6-16 and discusses the hermeneutical principles found in this passage. The author argues that true spiritual discernment involves both intellectual understanding and a heartfelt response that compels obedience. The text also discusses the use of Isaiah in Paul's letter to the Corinthians, highlighting the need for cleansing from idolatry in order to truly understand and know God's wisdom. Overall, the article emphasizes the importance of approaching Scripture with a reliance on the Spirit's guidance and a recognition of the text's self-delineating nature. [Extracted from the article]

In this paper, we explore the phenomenon of "self-deception" within the context of nursing, focusing on how nurses employ this coping mechanism when faced with dissonance, distress, and conflicting situations in clinical settings. Our primary objective is to examine the phenomenon of self-deception using Rodgers' evolutionary method of concept analysis. Focusing on nurses' experiences in challenging situations, our analysis highlights how self-deception is often employed as a coping strategy. According to our conceptual analysis, self-deception in nursing clinical practice highlights tensions between different paradigms and expectations in healthcare settings. These tensions stem from the power dynamics and subservience that nurses often face, which can hinder their ability to advocate for themselves, their patients, and the nursing profession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined whether high self‐deceivers form their overly positive perception of their traits through overestimating their performance of self‐presentation where they need to impress others as being extraverted/introverted, exhibiting more internalization of self‐presentation (IOSP) of the trait. Participants were instructed to give either an extraverted or introverted impression through an oral (Study 1, N = 39) or written (Study 2, N = 62) self‐presentation. Participants reported dispositional self‐deception, self‐presentation efficacy, and extraversion before and after self‐presentation. Independent raters provided other‐reported extraversion by examining the self‐presentation. Across the two studies, two‐way mixed ANOVA revealed that predicted change in extraversion occurred only for participants who made extraverted self‐presentation. With the change in extraversion as an index of IOSP, mediation analyses revealed indirect effects of dispositional self‐deception on IOSP via self‐presentation efficacy but not other‐reported extraversion. These results suggested that (a) people only internalize socially desirable traits like extraversion but not introversion, (b) writing to others is sufficient to cause IOSP, and (c) high self‐deceivers internalize extraverted self‐presentation not through actual performance but its subjective evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jan David, S.J.'s Duodecim specula (Antwerp: Jan Moretus, 1610), an innovative emblematic treatise in twelve chapters, focuses on various kinds and degrees of specular image generated by the human soul. Each chapter responds to an opening imago , designed and engraved by Theodoor Galle, that illustrates the operations of the mirror in question. Three of the imagines, V. The Mirror of Others' Eyes , viii. The Mirror of Created Things , and X. The Mirror of Example , rather than displaying persons, actions, or things that fall under the purview of the respective mirror, instead depict the mirrored image that such a speculum is seen to reflect. Accordingly, as printed imagines that prove upon closer inspection to contain specular imagines or, better, that function as pictorial representations of particular kinds of image, these imagines imaginum (images of images) can be said to produce a trompe-l'oeil effect. They ask the reader-viewer to consider why s/he thinks s/he sees a present image when what is actually seen by the eye is a pictured image, a pictured picture, doubly mediated by the process of representation. My essay examines how and why this deceptive effect was marshaled by David as a figure of thought: by articulating the manner and meaning of these three specula in particular, he offers the reader-viewer a therapeutic antidote wherewith to combat the human propensity for idolatry and self-deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose - A separate study of the different behavioral biases does not allow for a full understanding of the complexity and stability of the heterogeneity of beliefs. Therefore, through a more global view of these anomalies, the authors wish to show that they can converge on a single concept, which is the heterogeneity of beliefs. Design/methodology/approach - It is therefore essential to stress that the importance of this study is mainly reflected in the methodological approach used in the construction and analysis of the map and not only in the results achieved. This contribution states that structural analysis, as a means of building the cognitive map, can facilitate the task of investors and other decision-makers, in the identification and analysis of the heterogeneity of beliefs that can therefore guide investors' strategy in decision-making. Findings - The authors have studied the behavior of the investor and its way of interpreting the information and the authors have emphasized the value of studying the concept of heterogeneity of beliefs in its complexity. So that part of the work seems to be relevant and crucial to filling, if you will, that void. In this sense, the authors have shown that behavioral abnormalities are multidimensional concepts: "self-deception", "cognitive bias", "emotional bias" and "social bias". Originality/value - In particular, this article will aim to achieve the objective of proposing a model for measuring the heterogeneity of beliefs. Thus, the authors want to show that the heterogeneity of beliefs can be measured directly through the different behavioral anomalies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that what speakers mean or express can be determined by their implicit or unconscious states, rather than explicit or conscious states. Further, on this basis, I show that the sincerity conditions for utterances can also be fixed by implicit states. This is a surprising result, which goes against common assumptions about speech acts and sincerity. Roughly, I argue that the result is implied by two plausible and independent theories of the metaphysics of speaker meaning and, further, that this is a robust basis on which to make an inference, with a fair degree of confidence, about the relationship between expression and implicit attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the use of enchantment in Miguel Cervantes' novel, Don Quixote. It explores how enchantment disrupts and disturbs both fiction and life, creating a sense of wonder and delusion. The protagonist, Don Quixote, is portrayed as an astonishing and unsettling figure whose beliefs are challenged by disruptions and interruptions. The article also discusses a tale within the novel that explores themes of reputation, honor, and the consequences of desire and self-deception. It suggests that this tale raises questions about the limits of testing and the dangers of enchantment and self-deception, drawing parallels to Don Quixote's own delusional perception of reality. [Extracted from the article]

This study examined whether high self‐deceivers form their overly positive perception of their traits through overestimating their performance of self‐presentation where they need to impress others as being extraverted/introverted, exhibiting more internalization of self‐presentation (IOSP) of the trait. Participants were instructed to give either an extraverted or introverted impression through an oral (Study 1, N = 39) or written (Study 2, N = 62) self‐presentation. Participants reported dispositional self‐deception, self‐presentation efficacy, and extraversion before and after self‐presentation. Independent raters provided other‐reported extraversion by examining the self‐presentation. Across the two studies, two‐way mixed ANOVA revealed that predicted change in extraversion occurred only for participants who made extraverted self‐presentation. With the change in extraversion as an index of IOSP, mediation analyses revealed indirect effects of dispositional self‐deception on IOSP via self‐presentation efficacy but not other‐reported extraversion. These results suggested that (a) people only internalize socially desirable traits like extraversion but not introversion, (b) writing to others is sufficient to cause IOSP, and (c) high self‐deceivers internalize extraverted self‐presentation not through actual performance but its subjective evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document is an introduction to a volume of the Annals of Philosophy journal that explores the concept of realism in philosophy. The author acknowledges the ambiguity of the term and its significance in shaping our understanding of the world. The volume aims to delve into the problem of realism through metaphysical and epistemological discussions, shedding new light on the general meaning of the real. The text also addresses criticisms from psychologists and philosophers regarding our ability to know the real world and our own minds, as well as the illusory nature of phenomena such as the self and consciousness. It presents diverse perspectives on realism and its implications for metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. The text concludes that while debates on realism persist, philosophy seeks to gain a better understanding of our beliefs and the world through careful analysis and investigation. [Extracted from the article]

Arguments against epistemic akrasia have been met with counterexamples from the higher-order evidence literature. Here, I present two counterarguments to address these challenges. Firstly, the attitude reclassification argument disentangles reason-responsiveness from the constraints of evidentialism and allows for the adoption of conflicting propositions by coherent doxastic attitudes. Secondly, the failure reclassification argument demystifies the loss of doxastic control in purported cases of epistemic akrasia by appealing to the more comprehensive and distinct phenomenon of self-deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a comprehensive review of the literature on questionnaires used to investigate factual and political knowledge. It discusses the structure of knowledge questionnaires, including the use of closed-ended and open-ended questions, and explores how people respond to these questions. The article also addresses issues such as the gender and racial gap in knowledge, misbehavior in online questionnaires, and the use of visual or verbal questions. It concludes that while much has been studied on this topic, there are still unanswered questions that require further attention. The document is a list of references and citations from various academic articles and books related to political knowledge and survey research, providing library patrons with additional sources to explore these topics. [Extracted from the article]

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This study tests the hypothesis that competitive strategic interactions foster overconfidence. We experimentally compare a strategic environment in which players have an incentive to overstate their own ability to deter competitors and avoid competition with a nonstrategic environment in which these incentives are removed. Subsequently, we measure the participants' confidence. Overconfidence persists in the former environment but vanishes in the latter. We provide evidence for three mechanisms that contribute to the persistence of overconfidence. First, participants who win uncontested update their confidence as if they had won in an actual competition. Second, by contrast, participants who do not compete do not update their confidence, thus creating an asymmetry in updating. Third, inflated ability messages are "contagious" because they affect positively how their receivers update their confidence. We provide empirical evidence on the role of these mechanisms to explain the Dunning–Kruger effect and gender differences in confidence. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4688. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an exploration of various philosophical concepts, focusing on the author's perspective in relation to Wesley J. Wildman's philosophy. The topics discussed include the nature of feelings, interpretation of objects, and the concept of the Ultimate. The article highlights areas of agreement and disagreement between the author and Wildman, offering a nuanced examination of these ideas. It also delves into the concepts of interpretation, value, and the experience of an incense burner. The author and Wesley have differing views on the nature of the Ultimate, with the author arguing for emptiness while Wesley believes in fullness. The article concludes by discussing the satisfactions that come with these conceptions of Ultimacy. [Extracted from the article]

In this paper, we argue that, in order to account for the apparently substantive nature of definitional disputes, a commitment to what we call 'Socratic essentialism' is needed. We defend Socratic essentialism against a prominent neo‐Carnapian challenge according to which apparently substantive definitional disputes always in some way trace back to disagreements over how expressions belonging to a particular language or concepts belonging to a certain conceptual scheme are properly used. Socratic essentialism, we argue, is not threatened by the possibility that some apparently substantive definitional disputes may turn out to be verbal or conceptual, since this pluralist strategy, in our view, requires a commitment to more, rather than fewer, essences. What is more, a deflationary, metaphysically 'light‐weight' construal of the essence‐ascriptions in question leads to a peculiar conception of the pursuit of metaphysicians as behaving like deceptive (or self‐deceived) grammarians pretending to be scientists. Moreover, this deflationary attitude, we argue, spreads beyond metaphysics and philosophy more broadly to apparently substantive definitional disputes in the sciences as well as other in other disciplines, such as art criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]