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Philosophers often rely on sciences of their own time. This is especially true for scientists writing philosophical works. In the case of Ernst Mach, the scientific references are mainly to physics, physiology, evolutionary biology and—in a somewhat different manner—the new discipline of psychology. Like so many authors in the late 19th century, Mach had extreme confidence in the methods of the natural sciences. However, this trait, often called scientism or positivism, can easily be used in polemical accounts that obscure other aspects of Mach's thought. Mach is well-known for both his analysis of sensations and his evolutionary conception of perception and knowledge. The tension between the ambition to clarify the empirical basis of perception on the one hand and the focus on the natural origins of human perception on the other hand is, however, considerable. A comparison of these two perspectives can contribute to an ontological understanding of experience that sheds new light on the much-discussed topic of sense data and at the same time clarifies the difference between experience and observation and the role of experimental science in this context. In some respects, Mach seems closer to William James than to his followers in the Vienna circle. The accusation of idealism made by Lenin in his influential critique of positivism overlooks the implications of this naturalist approach but offers the occasion to dwell on the ontological implications of something that can be called natural historicity. Comparisons with Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes and Kant situate the empiricist theory of perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the auto/biographies of high-caste middle-class Punjabi Khatri men, and those of cognate castes like Arora and Baniya, written in the first half of the twentieth century: men who were born in the second half of the nineteenth century or early twentieth century. While the discourse on caste under the colonial regime exploded, there was also an embarrassment about caste, or re-thinking its place in society among the upper-caste groups who invested in ideas of progress, improvement and scientism. It is argued that caste was referenced in the memoirs, life stories and self-reflexive writing when these men spoke of their familial backgrounds and admired the deep religiosity and devotionalism of their fathers even though some paternal practices were incongruent with the reformism of the sons. Caste is also in play when one traces the advantages of literacy, education, professional accomplishments, mobility, and reformist activities of men who came to have an important presence in public life. A number of these men had similar life trajectories, indicative of how some aspects of colonial educational and administrative structures could be utilized by them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Science and religion have been described as the "two dominant forces in our culture". As such, the relation between them has been a matter of intense debate, having profound implications for deeper understanding of our place in the universe. One position naturally associated with scientists of a materialistic outlook is that science and religion are contradictory, incompatible worldviews; however, a great deal of recent literature criticises this "conflict thesis" as simple-minded, essentially ignorant of the nature of religion and its philosophical and theological underpinnings. In this first part of a two-part article, I set out the wide-ranging background required for a proper understanding of the debate as a preliminary for the second part, in which Ian Barbour 's influential four-fold typology of science-religion relations is critically assessed, leading to the conclusion that the conflict model is not to be so easily dismissed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While religion constituted one of the main topics of interest for early social scientists, faith traditions have silently slipped from this central role. When religion now appears in psychological research, it is usually relegated to the position of either the object of psychological investigation (which psychology purports to "explain") or a static piece in the empirical puzzle (as one variable among many when explaining clinical or social outcomes). In either case, religion is generally no longer seen as an equal partner to the social sciences in our attempts to better understand of the human condition. However, there are and have been voices within psychology that see this as unnecessarily myopic. James Jackson Putnam (1846–1918), an early supporter of the emerging field of psychoanalysis, advocated that psychology take seriously philosophy, metaphysics, and religion. Putnam's objections to the narrowing of our view of human life in the spirit of scientism fell largely on deaf ears, and his call for psychology to include that which lies beyond the walls of empirical naturalism and reductionism remains relevant today. In as far as theoretical innovation in psychology is more of a creative recognition than true scientific discovery, philosophy and religion constitute tremendously rich, and unfortunately underappreciated, fonts of inspiration. Putnam saw in religion the "dim recognition" of "the creative spirit of the universe." We briefly reflect on the example of obsessive–compulsive disorder and the much older religious concept of scruples, including approaches to mindfulness. This example is suggestive of the richness of psychological insights to be found in religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Beytulhikme: An International Journal of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Berliner Journal für Soziologie is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The New Atheist movement has been called “fundamentalist” in its allegiance to science. While true that New Atheism is remarkable among the various historical formations of atheism for its championing of the sciences, it is not fundamentalist. Where it does share a resemblance to Christian fundamentalism is in their respective attachments to a salvific epistemology either of science or of faith. For New Atheists, science “saves” as it provides order against chaos. This paper focuses on the writings of the New Atheist Sam Harris, drawing attention not just to the ordering function of science generally but also the ways in which Harris deploys science to engulf 1) morality, 2) the Buddhist belief that the self is an illusion, and 3) Buddhist practices of meditation. This study illuminates some affective potencies of science (or other potential epistemologies) as an ordering, and therefore “salvific,” way of navigating the world.

New atheism is a new movement that has been active since the beginning of this century. This movement, founded by thinkers, such as Dawkins, Dennet, Sam Harris and Hitchens, has used fundamental concepts such as rationalism to justify its principles. The founders of this movement have tried to use this fundamental concept to make atheism appear rational, and belief in God completely irrational. They have done this by stating the merits and benefits of disbelief in God and the disadvantages and harms of belief in God. In this article, which is written in an analytical- descriptive way, we aim to critique rationalism. For this purpose, first we get to know what rationalism is. Then we will show how the new atheists have used this concept in favor of atheism and in rejecting theism. In the end, relying on the thoughts of philosophers, we will critique rationalism. Rationalism as another reading of scientism, rationalism as another interpretation of profit maximization, rationalism as the ground for separating knowledge from value, and rationalism as a school that does not pay attention to its goals are just some of the criticisms that have been made against this school. Taking these criticisms into account, all the problems that affect scientism, utilitarianism, and the view of separating knowledge from value will also affect this school. With this description, this school cannot be a good justification for the new atheism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue for a transformative revival or actualization of the very core of an integrative, methodologically secured form of intellect-mystical asceticism. This approach draws on traditional sources that are re-examined from a systematic—synthetic and transcultural—philosophical perspective and in light of the multi-civilizational global environment of the 21st century. The main traditional points of reference in this paper are provided by Nicolaus de Cusa and Ibn Sīnā, and I refer to a few others, such as Attar of Nishapur, in passing. I begin by developing a basic concept of intellect-mystical asceticism. It is distinguished from mystification, science, scientism, and modes of everyday communication and cognition. Then, I make the case for an updated, transcultural approach to intellect-mysticism that can foster the internal (social) and external (environmental) reintegration of the human noosphere and technosphere in future planetary development. In this context, a modern intellect-mystical philosophical notion of "knowing non-knowing" (wissendes Nichtwissen, docta ignorantia) is developed. It is inspired by Nicolaus de Cusa and contextualized from a systematic transcultural angle at the same time. Finally, I discuss the problem of the practical, or rather ascetic, realization of the related possibilities of intellect-mystical self-enfolding. Here, the preceding steps of the reflection are mapped onto an outline regarding distinct developmental stages of such a transformative intellect-mystical practice in Ibn Sīnā's Remarks and Admonitions (al-Ishārāt wat-Tanbīhāt). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientism proposes science to be an all-powerful human enterprise, able to answer not only all practical but also philosophical or moral questions. We are taking a psychological approach to scientism, studying uncritical trust in science and uncritical trust in scientists as a part of a unique attitudinal tendency. Our novel measure assesses both kinds of trust through short Thurstone scales allowing us to establish a clear threshold for endorsing scientism, thus effectively delineating it from science enthusiasm, which previous instruments were unable to do. We built and refined a novel scale through five stages in which we consulted relevant literature, experts, and laypeople. We demonstrated that uncritical trust in science and scientists are interrelated, yet distinct constructs. As expected, these two subscales positively correlated with dogmatism, scientific knowledge, and overclaiming, but not with knowledge overestimation. The results suggest the new instrument is reliable, valid, and suitable for the lay public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticises contemporary posthumanist theories of anthropocentrism by reading an early essay by Bertrand Russell alongside work by Rosi Braidotti and Jane Bennett. It argues that, despite appearances, scientism and posthumanism share key commitments in common, such that clarifying the problems with which Russell struggles regarding nature and significance can illuminate symmetrical problems in posthumanism. Against these alternatives, the paper draws on insights from Bernard Williams, contemporary Hegelian philosophy, and J. J. Gibson's work on animal agency to sketch a picture of what it means to take a human perspective. It is the perspective of one species among others, with a particular evolutionary history; it is also the perspective of a species that, because of certain developments in that history, knows itself as such. That opens us to forms of answerability to the world that do not touch the lives of unselfconscious animals. Some critics of the theoretical discourse on anthropocentrism have argued that taking a human perspective is morally unobjectionable. This paper goes further: it is necessary for grasping our relation to the rest of nature and so our responsibilities for it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As many theoretical psychologists turn to the humanities to construct a psychological science that does not shortchange human subjectivity, many humanities scholars have turned to the sciences to bolster their declining standing in the academy. In juxtaposing these trends, I consider how epistemic and methodological wars in the humanities echo those that have plagued psychology and so call into question their use to remedy an allegedly scientistic “mainstream” psychology. By failing to grapple with this most relevant controversy, theoretical psychologists may be jeopardizing their efforts to put a more human face on scientific psychology.

While the tech sector has seized upon the food system as an area in which it can have a major impact, innovators within the agri-food tech domain are dogged by concerns about public acceptance of technologies that may be controversial or simply not of interest. At the same time, because they operate within an investor-dependent political economy, they must demonstrate that the public will consume the products they are creating. To both secure markets and legitimate their approaches to problem-solving, entrepreneurial innovators draw on three existing imaginaries of consumers, each of which articulates with a particular tendency they have pursued in problem-solving. Reflecting a tendency of solutionism, those promoting technologies that promise minimal processing and/or short or traceable supply chains invoke a health- and eco-conscious consumer. In keeping with technofixes, those promoting technologies of mimicry invoke a complacent consumer. Reflecting the tendency toward scientism in problem-solving and related projections of public knowledge deficits, those promoting potentially controversial technologies invoke a fearful consumer and embrace transparency to inform and assure such consumers. By promising future consumers who will willingly accept emerging technologies, each of these imaginaries seeks to resolve–for investors–potential problems of consumer acceptance generated by the particular approaches to problem-solving innovators have adopted. While STS scholars have shown how public-facing engagement exercises and policy work are often limited by deficit-driven imaginaries of the public, in these investor-facing spaces possible objections are both imagined and overcome without any interaction with actual publics.

This article examines the discourse of abstraction among Beijing intellectuals in response to the artist Wu Guanzhong's 吴冠中 (1919–2010) published essays on formal and abstract beauty from 1979 and 1980. By introducing Wu through a new critical lens that emphasizes his writings and institutional critique, the author addresses how abstraction was repurposed for early post‐Mao China. Where institutional elites in Beijing regarded painterly abstraction with unease, owing to its continued associations with the bourgeois‐capitalist art worlds of Paris and New York, this article shows how Wu performed an aesthetic intervention through writing, utilizing scientism and Maoist logic to filter abstraction through the still‐hegemonic language of radical materialism, which allowed abstraction to take hold as a renewed term of engagement in the early post‐Mao art world by 1983. This article is a shortened version of a chapter in the author's recently published book. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main response to the multiple crises besetting Western societis in the past decades has been the attempt of the academic and scientific as well as political circles to gain a sense of orientation—and of social cohesion—by two main modes of thinking: identity politics and evidence-based knowlegde. Regarding the latter, I argue that if scientific knowledge is reduced to facts, data and numbers, as the basis for political decisions without any alternatives, it would become a dogma propagating the truth—that is, a new religion. Politicians will no longer have to struggle with other perspectives, once there is a consensus about following the line that "the numbers or the facts speak for themselves." While many people would perhaps find in this new religion a guarantee of security in an insecure world, this sense would be illusionary. I argue that the role intellectuals should play in a spiritual crisis of this kind is paradoxically to cultivate a sense of more security by strengthening a culture of "insecureness" or docta ignorantia against the dogmas within science and religion. To create and encourage a new art of questioning and listening, and of learning to appreciate non-knowledge as the basis of coming together. This notion is found in the Greek and Christian as well as the Jewish tradition of European thought, and it continues in the works of modern thinkers such as Paul Ricoeur, Hermann Cohen, Martin Buber, Hartmut Rosa, and of philosophers who focus on the question of the ineffable. My aim is to present this quality of certainty within uncertainty by examples from different fields, including philosophy, art and psychotherapy, and to elaborate on the paradoxical question: does a troubled Geist need more trouble in order to help us find a sense of orientation through disorientation? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the establishment of state-run science museums in post-independence India, with a focus on the Visvesvaraya Industrial and Technological Museum in Bangalore. These museums were created to promote science and technology for economic and social progress, as well as to make science accessible to the public. The article explores how the national science policy of the Nehruvian era continues to shape the discourse on science in India, while also examining criticisms of this approach. The Visvesvaraya Industrial and Technological Museum reflects the priorities of Nehruvian scientism, emphasizing the principles of science and the mechanisms behind machines and inventions. Unlike European science museums, the VITM prioritizes education and the basic principles of science over historical artifacts, serving as a primary mode of visual communication on science due to the lack of access to television in India at the time. The article also discusses how the VITM addresses India's nuclear policy and space programs, presenting the nation as technologically advanced yet ethically driven. Overall, the science museum in India reflects the country's era of developmentalism and scientism, aiming to equip the masses with scientific knowledge and skills for industrialization and modernization. [Extracted from the article]

Le débat sur les pratiques de soins non conventionnelles et leur intégration possible ou non dans les soins conventionnels reste un sujet inépuisable de polémiques et de controverses, particulièrement en France. Dans cet article, nous analysons dix arguments rationalistes sceptiques mobilisés par les opposants à la médecine intégrative. En symétrie des positions parfois caricaturales de ces arguments radicaux, nous utilisons nous-mêmes la satire et la caricature à visée pédagogique dans notre analyse. Nous pointons les stratégies rhétoriques sur lesquelles ces arguments reposent et les contre-arguments qui sont plus ou moins volontairement gardés sous silence. Notre discussion propose une analyse des principaux biais cognitifs mobilisés dans ces arguments en nous appuyant sur les outils de la métacognition. Cependant, notre démarche n'est ni un plaidoyer en faveur des médecines alternatives, ni une attaque contre la médecine conventionnelle, ni une diatribe contre le scepticisme scientifique. Elle est une invitation à une formation symétrique à l'esprit critique et à la métacognition chez les professionnels de santé. La remise en question et la prise de distance, sans relativisme, sont sans doute les meilleurs alliés de la pensée critique. The debate about unconventional healthcare practices and their possible integration into conventional medical care presents an inexhaustible subject of polemics and controversy, particularly in France. In this debate, some prefer to openly deny its complexity in favor of simplistic rhetoric: these are the pro- and anti-unconventional medicine activists. Their radical rhetoric provides an ideal realm of discussion in which to analyze the cognitive shortcuts and other reasoning biases they employ. An initial analysis of the arguments put forth by the antis reveals an asymmetry in the use of the critical thinking they claim: the latter is applied to so-called "pseudo-medicine" and very little to their "rationalist" arguments. In this article, we have chosen to compensate for this shortcoming by providing a critical analysis of the 10 most common "rationalist sceptic" arguments used by opponents of complementary medical practices put forth in the press and media. Given the caricatural nature of certain skeptical positions, we have chosen to use satire and caricature ourselves for didactic purposes. Each of the 10 arguments is presented as follows: 1) a summary of the radical assertion being defended, followed by 2) the partial arguments or rhetorical strategy put forward to justify it, and 3) the counterarguments which are more or less deliberately kept silent. We present a short caricatural summary of this argument: "Breaking news in the field of health care! Wired therapies are attempting to invade real medicine! We, rationalist physicians and defenders of true medicine, are concerned about the development of integrative medicine in France. We are sending this 10-point skeptical rationalist argument to the entire medical community and health professionals in order to put a stop to the development of integrative medicine and protect real medicine from heretics. We challenge every health care professional to take a stand; scientific medicine represents Good, because the Truth is on our side and the evidence guides our steps. If there were any evidence in favor of complementary and integrative medicine, we would be aware of it. In fact, these proponents are nothing more than charlatans whose claims are groundless. Let's be serious and proud to be Cartesian, because our country still stands up to all these would-be crooks. This proposal is based on the values of critical thinking, which aims to fight against misinformation in medicine and more generally in science. We have endeavored, as much as possible, to anticipate the objections that might be raised against our arguments." We then analyze each argument separately. In the last part of our article, we analyze in greater detail the main cognitive biases used in the 10 arguments cited, drawing on the tools of metacognition: confirmation bias, framing bias and overconfidence bias. We discuss the limits of our work, which does not claim to be free of bias and is open to constructive, well-argued criticism. We make it clear that, despite its misleading appearances, our work is in no way a plea for alternative health care practices that challenge conventional medicine, nor is it an attack on conventional medicine, nor a diatribe against scientific skepticism. We argue for symmetrical training in critical thinking and metacognition among health professionals. Questioning and distancing oneself, without relativism, are indeed the best allies in such controversial debates. Uncertainty should be an integral part of the process of scientific knowledge, which is no longer conceivable in the binary and overly simplistic opposition between ignorance and certain knowledge, by overcoming both an acritical positivism and a radical scientific relativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: One of the most important issues raised by the outbreak of the COVID-19 Pandemic is its impact on political philosophy. The pandemic opened an antagonistic space regarding the existing components of political philosophy and challenge them. In fact, the COVID-19 Pandemic provided a critical platform for questioning the established norms and prompted discussions on the necessity of rethinking and re-evaluating them. The purpose of this article is to answer the fundamental question of how the COVID-19 Pandemic has created an antagonistic space for the elements of modern political philosophy. Methods: The method used in this article is the critical method. Critical theory seeks to develop and expand the understanding and awareness that penetrates beyond surface appearances to the depth of reality in order to increase the power of correct recognition of people, especially the powerless or subjugated classes. The critical aspect of this article allows the author to present the relations emerging from the COVID-19 in human societies as unacceptable and replaceable. This method helps to identify and challenge social and cultural issues in society and is effective in improving and developing human relations during pandemics. The information gathering method is both library-based and internet-based. Results and discussion: Among the most important challenges that COVID-19 has posed to the new political philosophy are the questioning of concepts such as rationalism, humanism and individualism, which have been temporarily challenged by the pandemic. It can be said that this virus embodies the friend/enemy distinction and Schmitt's narrative of the political in the context of the COVID-19 situation presented itself in the form of a confrontation between the coronavirus and humanity. Humanity, once perceived as dominant over nature and the world, has been rendered weak and powerless by the virus. Furthermore, rationalism and scientism of philosophy of modernity which held that humanity, through these principles, could intervene in all matters and solve its problems independently of the external world, have also been brought into conflict by the pandemic. COVID-19 has highlighted the weaknesses and limitations of human reason. Categories such as artificial intelligence have easily been able to fit themselves in the clothes of the enemy of human reason, and as Farid Zakaria points out, during the pandemic, we have come to worship artificial intelligence like a God. Therefore, despite the abundant services of science and rationality to mankind, COVID-19 has reminded us that they still have undeniable limitations and cannot be the sole solutions to human problems. Conclusion: The danger of COVID-19 highlights the risks of technological manipulation of human and natural resources, using calculative and computational reasoning as a tool for the economic benefit and overall utility of dominant powers. Environmental destruction is an act of violence against nature, leading to humanity's self-destruction through the creation of pandemics that challenge human life. Therefore, attempts to prevent or resolve the riddle of pandemics require something more than the calculative and computational knowledge of modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human Resource (HR) algorithms are now widely used for decision making in the field of HR. In this paper, we examine how biases may become entrenched in HR algorithms, which are often designed without consultation with HR specialists, assumed to operate with scientific objectivity and often viewed as instruments beyond scrutiny. Using three orienting concepts such as scientism, illusio and rationales, we demonstrate why and how biases of HR algorithms go unchecked and in turn may perpetuate the biases in HR systems and consequent HR decisions. Based on a narrative review, we examine bias in HR algorithms; provide a methodology for algorithmic hygiene for HR professionals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The forces of neoliberalism have profoundly reconfigured the landscape of educational policy and discourse, shifting focus from democratic values-based conceptions to exigencies for effective learning. The onset of the global recession of 2008, coupled with the ongoing effects of the global pandemic have resulted in the centring of crises discourses as fundamental to state strategies for educational policy. This paper adopts the theoretical conception of “late neoliberalism”, structured through assemblage theory, to discuss the significance of these impacts in Irish education, with references to the United Kingdom and international contexts as appropriate, reflecting the globalising force of neoliberalism. In so doing, I also draw on perspectives from Leo Strauss’ considerations of political philosophy with its critique of liberal society in order to refocus attention on the undercurrent ideology of scientism, which is masked in attempts to establish veils of neutrality in the knowledge basis of educational policy reformation. I argue that the recent crises have intensified the scientistic ideology that underpins a number of policy moves drawing on examples from both national and international contexts. I conclude the discussion by drawing upon Biesta's critical analysis of the learnification agenda in order to present the challenge of becoming “redemocratised” in our orientations to educational discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the reading that Kurt Drawert, a writer who grew up in the former GDR, offers of Flaubert, and especially of Madame Bovary, in Emma. Ein Weg (2005). Drawert weaves numerous aesthetic and biographical connections with Flaubert. An exemplary writer in terms of his demanding aesthetic, Flaubert also offers, in Drawert’s eyes, an early critique of the failings of the capitalist world and of the violence of scientistic reason.

We explored the differing dimensions of science beliefs and how they relate to existential benefits such as meaning in life and feelings of significance. Across two studies involving American adults and American STEM workers (N = 1001), scientism and scientific reductionism were negatively associated with existential benefits. In contrast, optimism towards science was positively associated with existential benefits. Our findings suggest that a dogmatic view of science does not serve as a substitute for the meaning and significance that religion often provides. The results also highlight the importance of treating faith in science as a multi-dimensional construct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religion still has a great potential and perhaps even a monopoly on explaining life in terms of meaning and significance. In this paper, we argue that neither the development of science nor scientism poses a threat to religion. We suggest, however, that the political entanglement of religion may be a threat. In this paper, we discuss the paradoxical situation in which the political harm of religion is inextricably linked to its beneficial potential to give meaning and significance to life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In socialist China today, neoliberal economics has actually come to wield institutionalized hegemonic power in academic evaluations of economic studies, while in neoliberal America, there is ironically considerably more pluralism in the practice of academic evaluations of economic studies. The origins of this state of affairs lie not in just a simple matter of ideology or policy choices, but rather in different tendencies in the operative practices of two different systems of governance. While China leans strongly toward centralized bureaucratism, along with scientism and numericism, the United States leans more toward multicentered pluralistic practices. Regardless, what scholarship needs is pluralistic contention for sustained long-term development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dilthey has no place in sociology because his Verstehen method was accused of psychologism. He fell into the trap of scientism, a positivist ideal of science to which even the German sociological tradition wanted to belong. The paper attempts to extend the sociological canon to the interpretive categories of 'life' and 'thought' theorized by Dilthey, and to demonstrate the valid application of his method, particularly in understanding human suffering and social needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interplay between extension, research, and postgraduate education poses a continuous challenge for higher education institutions dedicated to fulfilling their societal role by nurturing professionals who can address contemporary needs and foresee societal futures. This article explores the misconception within educational institutions that relegate research solely to postgraduate realms, highlighting its potential as a means for professional qualification beyond the technical-scientific dimension. It emphasizes the importance of integrating theoretical and practical aspects committed to societal needs. The journey towards integrating extension activities into the knowledge production space faces numerous challenges due to the entrenched structures within the Brazilian higher education culture, which perpetuates a fragmented education model rooted in dilettante scientism. However, this text showcases efforts by various national institutions to illustrate how this integration is crucial in developing higher education that seeks not only academic excellence but also social commitment. This approach represents an investment in the future, equipping the next generation of researchers to tackle society is complex and pressing challenges with wisdom, empathy, and practical solutions. Thus, integrating extension into research and postgraduate studies is not merely an ideal but a necessity for an impactful and relevant academy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rupert Read's book, "Wittgenstein's Liberatory Philosophy: Thinking Through His Philosophical Investigations," offers a sequential reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (PI) and explores the wider cultural and political implications of his work. Read argues that Wittgenstein's philosophy can be seen as liberatory, freeing us from restrictive pictures and compulsions. The book covers various topics in PI, such as rule-following and the private language argument, and highlights the ethical dimension of Wittgenstein's thinking. Read also critiques ideologies like scientism and individualism, offering a conception of freedom that involves political and cultural critique. While this interpretation is not presented as the definitive way to read Wittgenstein, it provides a meaningful perspective on his work. [Extracted from the article]

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Charles Peirce is widely credited as the originator of semiotics, or the general theory of signs, and recognized as the founder of American pragmatism, albeit in that peculiar kind Peirce himself went on to distinguish as "pragmaticism." The semiotic and pragmatist strands in Peirce's thought come together in an appraisal of scientific diagrammatic representations. Peirce's pragmatic maxim entails that the consequences of a sign inform our entire conception of the sign, while his most considered semiotic system entails that a complex sign partakes of iconic, indexical, and symbolic aspects. We illustrate Peirce's insights by means of the celebrated Feynman Diagrams in Quantum Electrodynamics. We argue that Peirce's late, post-1903, semiotics provides an adequate characterization of such "hypoicons," and his pragmatic maxim explains how they can motivate and drive inquiry. We conclude that Peirce's pragmatic approach to scientific diagrams remains a viable position that skillfully avoids dogmatic scientism and nihilistic skepticism alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we claim that pragmatist philosophical practice is incompatible with scientistic philosophy. The kind of pragmatism used for making this case follows the spirit and method of philosophical pragmatists such as William James, John Dewey, Richard Rorty, and a related pragmatic tradition, Confucian Philosophy. Pragmatism starts from immediate experience, and refuses to cleave off the reality and salience of what is found in such experience in the process of thinking. Pragmatism also concerns itself with social problems, broadly conceived. In contrast to this focus on immediate experience, the influence of science in much philosophizing involves a kind of scientism through which the relevance, value, and even reality of experience is brought into question. It also concerns itself with a narrowly defined set of so-called philosophical problems. In this regard, pragmatist philosophical practice is fundamentally opposed to scientistic philosophical practice. We will start by modelling the kind of philosophical practice that stems from pragmatism, and the role of immediate experience in it. Subsequently, we will introduce two modes of philosophizing that diminish if not negate the role of experience. One is bald naturalist philosophizing, and the other is a priori scientific philosophizing. In the last section, we will show how main commitments of both of these traditions are incompatible with a pragmatist philosophy that remains committed to the original impulse of pragmatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the concept of metaphysical empiricism in French philosophy, focusing on its relationship with pragmatism and its deviation from the original purpose of empiricism. It examines the role of radical experiences, such as eroticism and literary exploration, in shaping philosophical thought and questions the normative nature of the critique of metaphysical empiricism. The article also discusses the potential categorization of Michel Foucault's work within metaphysical empiricism and emphasizes the need to avoid rigidly defining philosophical boundaries. A bibliography of relevant works is provided. [Extracted from the article]

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Copyright of Wittgenstein Studien. Neue Folge is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Wittgenstein Studien. Neue Folge is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Scientism has recently experienced a resurgence of interest in philosophy. One version of scientism often defended is ontological scientism—the view that any kind or property not mentioned in the theories of science has only a subordinate, secondary kind of reality. It is worth noting that a dominant tradition in the history of philosophy of science—classical American pragmatism—undertook decades of critical engagement with contemporaneous scientistic beliefs, many of which resemble those being debated at the present time. This antiscientistic philosophy has multiple points of relevance for contemporary debates and defenses of ontological scientism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the sixty years of his career, Robert Bellah has occupied an enigmatic position in the field of American sociology. Despite his triumphant academic career and his standing as a prominent advocate of sociology in the public sphere, he felt increasingly dissatisfied with the direction of sociology and believed he was underrecognized and misinterpreted by many of his peers. Drawing on Matteo Bortolini's A Joyfully Serious Man, this article reviews various biographical circumstances that may account for Bellah's ambiguous status as a sociologist. It then argues that the most significant source of tension with the sociological profession was Bellah's aversion to science as manifested in many of his writings, where he engaged in a relentless critique of positivism and scientism. This negative side of Bellah's epistemology, i.e. what he defined as bad or dangerous knowledge, is often overlooked both by Bortolini in his book and by commentators who try to derive a usable epistemology from Bellah's oeuvre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper unpacks the assumptions underpinning England's new Core Content Framework (CCF) in respect of the educational research required for teacher expertise, with particular attention to the sources referenced in the final part of the CCF and claims that these constitute the 'best available educational research'. Drawing on sociological studies of educational knowledge, and assessments of the quality of educational research in England, in addition to the philosophy of expertise as related to teaching, it is argued that the CCF is currently orientated towards a scientism that (i) marginalises longstanding traditions of educational thought, and (ii) technicises and instrumentalises teaching practice. The predominance of a scientistic model of educational knowledge is demonstrated through a profile of the sources identified in the CCF, with a focus on the journals in which referenced material is published and an overview of subject matter via an analysis of keywords and titles. With an overwhelming preference for this 'New Science' as opposed to other traditions of educational knowledge, the CCF encourages an image of teaching as a decontextualised series of interventions with narrow objectives, and thus implicitly marginalises wider educational goods and purposes and deprofessionalises teachers work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Oscar Oeser was a polymath import to the Antipodes, primarily known as a social psychologist and as the founding Professor of Psychology at the University of Melbourne. But he was also a very effective network builder, and an important conduit for overseas ideas – not least with respect to urban and rural planning. With interest in urban planning surging in the immediate post-Second World War period, Oeser undertook a joint project with the Head of Architecture at Melbourne, Brian Lewis, along with a number of other notable figures. The project involved surveying and re-imagining the down-at-heel suburb of Prahran. It was ambitious in its empirical scope, and it showcased Oeser's sensitivity to the 'human elements' in planning that prefigured current participatory models. Nonetheless, the Prahran project's impact was muted and ambiguous, its data selectively co-opted by local politicians and public servants to serve a pragmatic modernist agenda. Oeser's subsequent planning work featured innovative approaches to designing remote rural communities and indigenous housing. Oeser's overall legacy in planning was thus a historically contingent one: it tells us something about what might have been as much as what was. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Electronic Turkish Studies is the property of Electronic Turkish Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Contemporary English physicist, Stephen Hawking, by authoring The Big Plan and introducing the M-theory, brought the long-running conflict between science and religion to a new level. Despite Hawking's claim of the ‘death of philosophy’, he has used some philosophical principles in his M-theory. This paper, using the descriptive-analytical method, seeks to evaluate these principles. The most important philosophical foundations on which M-theory is based are: (1) Scientism, as the most fundamental basis of M-theory; (2) Instrumentalism, ccording to which laws and theories are merely some instruments for predicting phenomena, lacking any physical reality; (3) Denial of causality, which has been inferred from the ‘uncertainty principle’ and the ‘principle of accident.’ After explaining these foundations, some significant objections have been directed to them, the most important of which are: scientism neglects the limitations of the empirical-experimental method and excludes other epistemological sources; instrumentalism, besides denying the scientific realism, results in accepting contradicting theories; Denial of causality, which is due to a misunderstanding of this philosophical concept, destroys any real connections between the objects in the world. Finally, it is concluded that these fundamental criticisms really challenge M-theory’s validity.