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Although scholars have long understood the importance of psychology in international affairs, morality has often been overlooked as a factor in world leaders' decision‐making. This article seeks to fill this gap by introducing a new analytical tool: the moral portrait, a descriptive summary of a leader's moral values. The tool is built on the five cross‐cultural values of Moral Foundations Theory (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity) and the methodological approach of operational code. As a case study, the moral portrait of Russian President Vladimir Putin is inferred from his rhetoric, policies, and decisions. Putin's moral portrait, specifically his interpretations of the Fairness, Loyalty, and Authority values, can help explain many of his views and actions, including his decision to launch a full‐scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More often than not, violence between states in the field of international relations is understood in instrumental terms. States are thought to act purposively in the pursuit of some tangible object, treating those in their way as objects; the targets of that violence respond to such treatment phlegmatically, without any sense of outrage. Drawing on psychological research in 'virtuous violence', which argues that intergroup violence is primarily moralistic in character, we present results from three survey experiments in the United States and Russia and a re-analysis of a recent study, which demonstrate that moral condemnation of adversaries is extremely easy to invoke, hard to avoid, common across different cultural contexts, and a central feature of 'binding' morality, one of the most fundamental moral foundations. Our first survey experiment presents American respondents with a fictional state developing nuclear weapons. Strategic features of the situation – offensive capability, past history, and interest divergence – generate not only threat perception but, crucially, negative moral attributions that mediate between the two. In the next two survey experiments, we show that American and Russian respondents judge aggressive action against a third country, regardless of whether the aggressor pursues water necessary for its population or oil useful for its economy. Finally, our re-analysis of Rathbun & Stein 1 shows that moral condemnation strongly mediates the effect of binding morality on support for nuclear weapons use against terrorists. Our results suggest a future agenda on morality's role in international relations that highlights ethical dynamics beyond the taming influence of humanitarianism and cosmopolitan individualism. Morality can drive conflict, not just restrain it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The vital role of international broadcasting during times of international conflict has gained increasing attention; however, national variations in terms of communication strategies have rarely been explored in depth. This study fills this research gap by providing a comparative analysis of the communication strategies of Chinese and Russian state-sponsored international broadcasters. By examining CGTN's coverage of the South China Sea arbitration and RT's coverage of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, we find that the Chinese international broadcaster preferred official Chinese sources and a peace frame during a time of conflict, whereas its Russian counterpart tended to engage with Western countercultural speakers and present conflict frames. We further interpret the two media's different usage of sources and frames in the light of the media's organizational culture and the sponsoring states' national identities. The research advances the scholarship on the increasingly intensive information war between the East and the West through the way international broadcasters cover international conflicts. It enriches our understanding of the cultural and national dynamics underpinning the non-Western emerging countries' approaches of international communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In times of severe international crises, the domestic public typically becomes more loyal to its government, creating a so-called "rally-'round-the-flag" effect and boosting a political leader's popularity. The bulk of research on the link between international crises and presidential popularity rates deals mostly with the experience of the US and other Western democracies. We focus on the case of Russia as a non-democratic major power. Our empirical analysis investigates whether military conflicts with Russian involvement are followed by an increase in presidential popularity during the presidencies of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. The results of our monthly time-series estimation reveal that a boost in popularity, if there is one at all, is on average small in magnitude for less violent conflicts, whereas a substantially important increase in presidential approval ratings can be observed after international crises in which violence is a central element of conflict management from the very beginning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Russia and China are both leading states on the Eurasian continent, the dynamism of their relations to a large extent dominates the dynamics of geopolitical processes in the region. The growing and escalating stand-off with the West in both countries, notably due to the recent developments in Ukraine, appears likely to further the rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing on many issues of strategic interaction. The relevant question in that context is whether the Russian and Chinese perceptions of Eurasia, of Eurasian regionalism, are truly compatible. In the past few years, Russia has made considerable attempts to foster its vision of an external international order on the continent, including the popularisation and substantiation of Eurasia as a concept with regard to its geopolitical surroundings. One of the main consumers of these ideas was supposed to be China. Have Russian endeavours accomplished their goals? In seeking to provide an appropriate response to this question, the authors have focused on an analysis of both states' expert and academic discourse on Eurasia and Eurasian regionalism. This article conceptualises Eurasia as a social construct, an element of foreign policy discourse that is intended to be mirrored in academic and expert discourse. A comparative analysis of Russian and Chinese discourses should ascertain – albeit at least in part – the extent to which Beijing has embraced Moscow's ideas on the development of Eurasian regionalism and the proximity of Russian and Chinese approaches to the international order of the continent or a particular part of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Iranian Studies / İran Çalışmaları Dergisi is the property of Journal of Iranian Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article provides a brief overview of the development of Russian-Turkish relations in the 21st century against the backdrop of changes in Turkey’s domestic political situation at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. Special attention is paid to the evolution of Turkey’s foreign policy strategy. It is noted that the Russian Federation is a particularly important partner for the Republic of Turkey. The relevance of the topic lies in the fact that currently, the relationship between the two countries continues to develop actively, despite external political challenges. At the same time, the history of Russia-Turkey contacts requires further study, as this period is not well represented in the existing literature. The novelty of this research lies in the use of new sources to study state relations. The authors of the article come to a justified conclusion that the Turkish government seeks to develop its relationship with the Russian Federation while maintaining ties with both Western and Eastern countries. This demonstrates their efforts to utilize the opportunities provided by Turkey’s geographical location, which serves as a “corridor” between various parts of Eurasia.

Since Russian president Vladimir Putin's 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, followed by his country's invasion of neighbouring Georgia the ensuing year, Russia has been one of the most powerful and visible challengers of a West-centric conception of international order. This has led to assertions that Russia is a revisionist state. However, such assertions largely gloss over the "intermediate" stages that Russia has occupied between the two extremes of status quo and revisionist power throughout the post–Cold War era. They also reveal an understanding of international order that is mostly uniform. Employing an English School framework, this paper shows how Russia only became a fully revisionist state in the lead-up to its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. And using a theoretical model which outlines the impact of contestation on international society, it outlines the consequences of Russia's recent descent into revisionism for the so-called rules-based international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution to the Forum seeks to discuss the epistemic and genealogical conditions that frame the unfolding of a set of academic discourses aimed at - more implicitly rather than explicitly - normalize and rationalize Russia's military intervention in Ukraine. First, we identify the process of understanding the Russian invasion on the example of dominant discourses. Second, we outline social conditions and drivers that facilitate their reproduction and acceptance rooting their genesis and persistence in the existing limitations on knowledge production. Finally, we briefly discuss the possible ways of moving forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Kafkas University, Journal of Economics & Administrative Sciences Faculty / Kafkas Üniversitesi Iktisadi ve Idari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi is the property of University of Kafkas, Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article aims to build upon the existing neoclassical realist analysis of Russia's foreign policy in Ukraine during 2022. By introducing a comprehensive analytical framework grounded in neoclassical realism, it seeks to delve into the influence of specific developments and priorities within Russia on its foreign policy conduct towards Ukraine. Contrary to the commonly perceived image of a more assertive and aggressive Russia, recent trends in both foreign and domestic policy reveal an internally conflicted, introspective, and reactive Russia, demonstrating its lack of preparedness to embrace an evolving international role. Through this analysis, it becomes apparent that Putin's uncertainty in effectively addressing the multifaceted challenges and inevitable tensions, whether of domestic or international nature, emerges as a direct consequence of Russian mismanagement in handling foreign policy matters related to Ukraine. Unraveling the complexities and contradictions shaping Russia's actions in the region, this article provides deep insights into the dynamics governing the Ukrainian crisis and its wider implications for global geopolitics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study focuses on the perception of the Russian military presence in Africa. The 1990s and early 2000s saw a long break in Russian-African relations, linked to Russia’s priority of establishing a dialogue with Western countries. Largely as a result, Russia managed to avoid getting involved in conflicts and maintain respectful relations with African countries. In recent years, however, Russia’s “return” to Africa has revitalized Moscow’s interests in the region. One of the key elements of this process has been the intensification of the activities of Russian private military companies (PMC) on the continent. This, in turn, is the relevance of the present study. The study conducted a qualitative content analysis of the publications of the most quoted media sources in African countries where Russian private military companies have been observed: Central African Republic, Mozambique, Sudan and Mali from 2018 to 2021. Based on an analysis of the African media, it can be seen that the first experiences with the arrival of Russian PMCs were initially accompanied by a predominantly neutral-negative tone in the local media. Later, however, there was a shift from neutral to positive, particularly in the case of Mali. It was also found that the framing of the Russian presence in African countries with experience of interaction with Russian PMCs is changing from a purely local context (struggle for resources, protection of the regime, etc.) to a more global one, implying that Africa is an arena of confrontation between major world powers. It is shown that the experience of Russian involvement in conflict resolution plays an important role in shaping a positive image of the Russian “military” presence in Africa. Thus, the transfer of significant areas under central government control, first in Syria and then in the Central African Republic after the appearance of the Russian military in these countries, is associated by Africans with the achievement of stability, which is in demand in African societies. Another important indicator on which positive perceptions are based is the perception of a crisis in relations between France and Africa.

Research in the field of regional conflict resolution rarely touches on the issue of justice. This paper aims to identify what understanding of international justice underlies Russia’s actions as a mediator/peacekeeper in the process of regional conflict resolution in the 1990s-2010s. The study also contributes to the understanding of Russia’s foreign policy by clarifying Moscow’s views on the essence and parameters of a just global order. The paper provides a study of the dominant Russian views on the essence of justice in international relations. It offers an insight into Russia’s peace-making and conflict resolution activities in the context of the three concepts of global justice and taking into account the factor of national interests. The study concludes that the dominant understanding of international justice in Russia is that which corresponds to Allen Buchanan’s concept of subjective justice. In Moscow’s view, international justice is a set of rules developed in the process of consensus driven negotiations between the great powers. According to this logic, a just settlement of the regional conflict is possible only on the basis of the consensus of the parties to the conflict and in accordance with the interests of the global and regional powers concerned. The fair interaction of the great powers in the settlement of the regional conflict and the impact that the conflict resolution could have on the development of the international order were of crucial importance for Moscow within the period under consideration. Moscow’s activity in the conflict resolution in the post-Soviet space generally corresponded to the model of justice as mutual recognition, but with absolute priority of Russian national interests. The strategy for resolving regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space could only be understood in the broad context of relations with Western countries and has changed in line with the development of these relations.

Russia is using the Black Sea as a diplomatic tool in its foreign policy to achieve its maritime and foreign policy objectives, which are also linked with the country's strategic culture. This research investigates the significance of the Black Sea in Russia's Maritime Strategy for achieving its foreign policy objectives by using the balance of interest theory. This research employs two conceptual schemas. Firstly, with the help of maritime diplomacy, it analyses a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives in the waters. Secondly, the research uses the concept of strategic culture, which helps explore the diplomatic importance of the Black Sea in Russian foreign policy through the perspective of history and attitudes of decision-makers. This research highlights the case of the Black Sea for Russian maritime strategy, which also has a great economic significance for the region and world. It also highlights the importance of the Black Sea in the Russian maritime doctrine (2022) and links between maritime strategic culture and foreign policy objectives. It concludes that Russia is successfully pursuing its cooperative, coercive, and persuasive maritime diplomacy in the Black Sea region by providing humanitarian assistance, blocking Ukrainian access, and operating a stronghold at Sevastopol port as its naval base. In conclusion, this paper argues that strategic culture plays a vital role in employing the three diplomatic dimensions for achieving maritime objectives in the Black Sea. Bibliography Entry Fatima Sherazi, Anees. 2023. "Role of Maritime Strategy in Russian Foreign Policy: A Case Study of Black Sea." Margalla Papers 27 (2): 115-124.

This article analyzes the influence of status-aspiration in Russia's military involvement in Syria. By leveraging the literature on status and empirical evidence, I posit that Russia's ambition for prestigious power recognition, rooted in its search for ontological security, has played a significant role in shaping its involvement in Syria. The existing scholarly discourse has considered the status impact on Russia's foreign policies; however, this article differentiates itself by scrutinizing Russia's strategic objectives, rhetoric, and maneuvers throughout its Syrian intervention, while investigating the degree to which status-aspiration motivations coalesce with other elements to mold its participation in the conflict. By spotlighting the historical continuum, I further propose that military interventions have functioned as a vehicle for Russia to affirm its prestigious power status following the failure of nonmilitary strategies to secure recognition of a great power status in the 1990s. Aside from its contribution to the literature, this study also carries pragmatic implications for policymakers in forecasting and reacting to Russia's moves, thereby enriching the nuanced comprehension of its foreign policy conduct and its consequential effects on regional and global stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 and especially Russo-Turkish war (1877– 1878 are significantly important in the history of the Armenian question. The success of the national liberation movements of the Balkan people and the Russian policy in their protection have a strong impact on the Turkish Armenians, who begin to form a national self-awareness and a desire for radical changes in all spheres of socio-economic, political and cultural life. The foreign policy initiatives of the Armenians are crowned with considerable success, and their issue found a place in the post-war treaties of San Stefano and Berlin. After them, the Armenian question ceased to be an internal political problem of the Ottoman Empire and grew into a problem of international importance. For its solution, are the great powers intervened. The research interest in the present report is directed precisely to this initial stage of the formation and internationalization of the Armenian question as part of the great Eastern question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the historical development of the Armenian people, the San Stefano Peace Treaty is a turning point. After which, the Armenian national question entered the international scene. As a result the Western Armenians hoped their situation would soon change, as it was happening with the Balkan nations. Above all, the importance of the treaty lies in the fact that it is the first time in modern history that "Armenia" is officially mentioned, given that the Ottoman authorities are systematically trying to enforce the claim that the geographical name of this territory is "Kurdistan". The other important point is the public recognition of the fact that, apart from the Balkans, the situation in Asia Minor is also grave and problematic and requires serious attention and immediate reforms. The present report analyzes these significant events in the history of the Armenian Question and examines Russian foreign policy strategy regarding Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia is using the Black Sea as a diplomatic tool in its foreign policy to achieve its maritime and foreign policy objectives, which are also linked with the country's strategic culture. This research investigates the significance of the Black Sea in Russia's Maritime Strategy for achieving its foreign policy objectives by using the balance of interest theory. This research employs two conceptual schemas. Firstly, with the help of maritime diplomacy, it analyses a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives in the waters. Secondly, the research uses the concept of strategic culture, which helps explore the diplomatic importance of the Black Sea in Russian foreign policy through the perspective of history and attitudes of decision-makers. This research highlights the case of the Black Sea for Russian maritime strategy, which also has a great economic significance for the region and world. It also highlights the importance of the Black Sea in the Russian maritime doctrine (2022) and links between maritime strategic culture and foreign policy objectives. It concludes that Russia is successfully pursuing its cooperative, coercive, and persuasive maritime diplomacy in the Black Sea region by providing humanitarian assistance, blocking Ukrainian access, and operating a stronghold at Sevastopol port as its naval base. In conclusion, this paper argues that strategic culture plays a vital role in employing the three diplomatic dimensions for achieving maritime objectives in the Black Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to understand Russia's influence and foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region and argues that Russia has been slowly reestablishing its presence in various ways and predicts that it will continue to do so despite limited resources and its lackluster performance in Ukraine. The pivot to Asia for Russia is more important in the wake of the war against Ukraine, and it must be seen in the context of Russia's interest in confronting US power amid a crisis of the liberal international order. Russian foreign policy has not factored much into the deliberations of US strategists when they considered the Indo-Pacific region recently. US policymakers will need to pay more attention to Russia going forward because the Ukraine war is bringing Russia and China closer together. Given Russia's increasing reliance on China to help circumvent the impact of sanctions against Russia and to help counter its isolation from the West, the two powers are likely to collaborate further in the future. China's reliance on Russia as its junior partner in the region benefits both in countering US influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia has become an important player in the Eastern Mediterranean during the presidency of Vladimir Putin, setting up a military presence in the Crimea, South Caucasus, Syria as well as naval facilities in the Mediterranean. Moscow deepened its bilateral relations with NATO members Greece, France and particularly Turkey and has been able to profit from the new dynamics that have emerged in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. Russian policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean has been based on large-scale flexibility and its ability to combine elements of soft and hard power. Dependent on Russian grain and tourists and eager to cooperate with Moscow militarily, most non-EU countries of the Eastern Mediterranean have refused to institute anti-Russian sanctions of the sort imposed by the EU after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

This article, for the first time in domestic and foreign historiography, examines the coverage by the domestic press of the visits of the Bulgarian prince Ferdinand of Coburg to Russia at the end of the 19th century. After the death of Alexander III, Bulgaria began to take steps in order to restore relations with Russia. Personal diplomacy was of great importance in such situations. After the baptism of Prince Boris into the Orthodox faith, the first visit to St. Petersburg of the Bulgarian prince Ferdinand I took place. The main feature of the coverage of this visit in the press was that many publications had to rebuild their attitude towards yesterday's "false prince" and cover the arrival of Ferdinand of Coburg in the pages of their publications, taking into account the changed political realities. The first visit was followed by an invitation to the coronation of Nicholas II in Moscow in May 1896. The arrival in Russia in July 1898 of the Bulgarian prince with his wife Maria Luisa and the heir to the Bulgarian throne, the godson of Nicholas II, Prince Boris, became the apotheosis of these visits. Therefore, by the end of the 19th century, it seemed that an idyll had begun in Russian-Bulgarian relations. The article examines the very course of the visits, the main participants, as well to the Bulgarian prince (in particular on the basis of the diary entries of Nicholas II).

Copyright of Relações Internacionais is the property of Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Drawing on a constructivist approach to international history which emphasizes the impact of cultural factors in the definition of the national interest pursued by states through their foreign policy, this essay retraces some salient stages of the confrontation between Russia and Europe/the West with an eye to reciprocal representations and the identity/alterity nexus (Iver Neumann). This issue has acquired further topicality during the period starting from the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and culminating in the Russo-Ukrainian war that broke out in February 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author wants to test the impact of economic nationalism on the change in Russia’s foreign policy. The author will refer to neoclassical realism, which shows how to combine the issues of power distribution in international relations with the influence of the domestic level of the state on the process of creation of the foreign policy. In terms of neoclassical realism, economic nationalism is a variable that shapes the perception of the economic challenges facing Russia. The author also points out that economic nationalism is also related to the protectionist policy of the Russian Federation. Thus, it influences the shaping of processes within and outside the country. The author recognizes that in the process of creating the Russian foreign policy decisions, economic nationalism should be linked to other factors, especially security issues and Russia’s general strategic culture, in order to obtain the final set of premises that will determine Russia’s shifts in foreign policy. The tensions related to the role of the EU and NATO in the countries of Eastern Europe clearly influenced the level of cooperation between Russia and the West. Nevertheless, economic issues in this regard were also extremely important. Russia’s power position was based on the economic potential.

The article focuses on the perception of Russia's 'return' to Africa through an analysis of field research data from three African states: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, gathered in late 2021. In this article, the authors argue that the Russian 'return' to Africa, which is primarily seen in the provision of security services through the presence of Russian private military companies (PMCs), is perceived positively in West Africa. An important role is played in these perceptions by the Soviet legacy on the continent, which is remembered positively among Africans. Perceptions among the youths surveyed appear significantly influenced by the crisis in relations between West African countries and France, as well as the experience of Russian involvement in the field of securitisation since 2014. The net effect is that Russian engagement in West Africa, and specifically by PMCs, is welcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the mid-2010s Turkey-Russia relations gained a strategic dimension after the two nations began to work together in Syria and took bold steps to cooperate on defence and nuclear energy. This development was commonly regarded as a major shift in Turkish foreign policy. This article argues that the context in which the Turkey-Russia nexus operates is historically rooted. Since the nineteenth century, Russia almost has been the most critical threat to Turkey; and Turkey consistently sought to moderate this threat, mostly with Western assistance. But when Turkey either failed to subdue Russia or there was no significant threat, it would opt for rapprochement with Russia. An examination of the historical background of Turkey-Russia relations helps explain these nations' contemporary dynamics with one another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of International Relations Studies / Uluslararası Ilişkiler Çalışmaları Dergisi is the property of Ataturk University Coordinatorship of Scientific Journals and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The 2008 invasion of Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of Crimea and the involvement in the war in Donbas, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine have all marked the return to active Russian participation in separatist regions in the 'near abroad'. They took the international community by surprise. To be sure, the Russian Federation had played a role in all previous secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet space. Nonetheless, Moscow's post-2008 bold actions – open invasion, recognition of separatist regions and annexation of a neighbour's territory – have marked an innovation in Russia's foreign policy. This points to questions about how Moscow is legitimising these actions and whether the official narrative suggests a change in Russia's strategy towards secessionist conflicts in the 'near abroad'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes historical monuments as instruments of Russia's attempts to impose its aesthetic hegemony in the post-Communist world. Drawing on case studies from the Czech Republic and Estonia, it argues that this hegemony is precarious and vulnerable due to inability to deal with the inherent ambiguity and complexity of historical events and figures. The Russian approach regards historical truth in absolute terms and is underpinned by a zero-sum game understanding of historical narratives. It does not tolerate a multiplicity of perspectives on history and has no appreciation for postmodernist deconstruction of historical symbols. This conflicts with a more diverse, reflexive and inclusive politics of memory as an intrinsic element of cityscapes of Prague and Tallinn where some of the controversial monuments connected with the Soviet occupation have been removed. Russia's reaction to these changes reveals an inherently vulnerable nature of its aesthetic hegemony which is deeply dependent on recognition of the absolute nature of its historical truth that the monuments are supposed to embody. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At present, with the opportunities of the previous model of world economic development exhausted, only countries building alternative models of global cooperation will have good economic prospects. In this conditions the new role of Russia, China is traced. This article examines the experience and prospects of cooperation between Beijing and the Baltic countries, including within the framework of the well-known project “One Belt — One Way”.

The development of information and communication technologies and formation of the global information society actualizes the study of new directions in the evolution of diplomatic practice in the digital environment, including in the context of intercultural communication. The modern information revolution is characterized by the widespread and ever-growing use of social networks, blogs, wiki resources and other media platforms (labelled under the common term of Web 2.0 technologies). At the same time, the widespread use of Web 2.0 technologies and the increasing amount of time people all over the world spend there has a wide and profound impact on political and intercultural communication and diplomatic practice. A new phenomenon of digital diplomacy is gaining prominence among foreign policy tools of states and international organizations. Digital diplomacy can be defined as the use of social networks and Web 2.0 technologies in public diplomacy and international interaction by states and international organizations to achieve foreign policy goals and reach foreign audiences. According to the traditional view of digital diplomacy, which has developed in the academic literature, and is reflected in the works of authors such as M. Castells and J. Nye, it helps to strengthen network ties at the level of civil societies in different countries and thus reduces international conflicts. However, cultural differences and digital polarization can impede the potential of digital diplomacy. Today, almost all states and international organizations in the global arena are involved in the practice of digital diplomacy, and Russia is no exception. Russia actively participates in the digital diplomacy practice, by using social media and Web 2.0 tools as soft power instruments to introduce and explain foreign policy initiatives and reach foreign and domestic audiences, as stated in the Doctrine of the Information Security of Russian Federation of 2016. For Russia's foreign policy, relations with the EU countries and EU institutions are of particular importance, including in the digital sphere. However, even though both Russia and the EU countries make extensive use of digital diplomacy tools, the practice of horizontal network interaction mediated by digital technologies does not contribute to strengthening trust between countries and reducing conflicts. The authors consider incidents and allegations in the sphere of digital interaction and, based on the theory of digital polarization, conclude that the use of digital tools in horizontal interactions within digital diplomacy exacerbates intercultural differences between countries and increases conflict instead of improving mutual understanding.

The article evaluates cooperation between the Central African Republic and the Russian Federation from the perspective of forming a tactical alliance. The article conceptualises the term tactical alliance and the aims of both partners, and analyses how these aims were fulfilled under the umbrella of the tactical alliance. The authors evaluated four dimensions of this alliance: 1) military and security cooperation, 2) weapons delivery, 3) resources exploitation and 4) international support. The article comes to the conclusion that a tactical alliance was formed by the unofficial cooperation that started between the CAR's government and private companies backed by Moscow in 2017, while later (in 2019) the cooperation was officially established between the states and their representatives with its peak in December 2020. While the alliance may be seen as rational, the authors expect that this type of opportunistic alliance might not survive after the initial reasons for its formation disappear, especially provided that the partners are asymmetrical and geographically far from each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Kufa Legal & Political Science is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since the Soviet Union's (USSR) collapse, Russia's domestic and foreign policies have changed. With the loss of "superpower" status, Russians struggled to define their "national identity," which influenced the country's new foreign policy. This struggle affected Russia's ties with its sovereign neighbours, the former Soviet states termed the "Near Abroad" (blizhnee zarubezhe). The struggle specifically led to a series of territorial, leadership, economic, diaspora, and military conflicts with some countries in the Near-Abroad. The question of the legitimacy of territories and borders in Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), the Trans-Dniester area (Moldova), and Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk areas of Ukraine is largely a result of the struggle. This paper discusses the factors affecting Russian domestic and foreign policy towards the Near-Abroad nations, which have influenced Russia's behaviour in contemporary international politics. Firstly, this essay analysed Russia's identity crisis and foreign strategy. The effect of Marxism-Leninism on Soviet foreign policy and the new Russian State was also discussed. This paper also analysed Vladimir Putin's pragmatic strategy in the Near-Abroad, focusing on Ukraine. This paper submits that Russia's determination to see the Near-Abroad states as largely within its sphere of influence and geopolitical interests hinders the establishment of equal ties with these countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Armenian question was one of the most difficult and complicated national matters in the Ottoman Empire. After the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) and the subsequent Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, the Armenian question gained international recognition. In this way it permanently entered the realm of contradictions between the great powers and became part of the larger Eastern question. By including clauses in the peace treaty that affected the safety of Armenians, St. Petersburg demonstrated a leading role in the Armenian question with the intention to use this in order to expand and consolidate its influence in the Ottoman Empire. However, Tsarist Russia's policy on the Armenian question was very reluctant and contradictory. On the one hand, St. Petersburg's leaders wanted to use the pro-Russian sympathies of Armenians to increase their influence among the Christians in the Empire and thus interfere in the Ottoman’s internal affairs. On the other hand, the Tsarist government did not intend to engage in the fate of Armenians. Ultimately, Russia’s behaviour became one of the main reasons for the catastrophic end of the Armenian question during the First World War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]