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Contextual learning combines examples taken from everyday experience. The purpose of this research is to identify whether learning contextually will improve students' achievement. A quasi-experimental design used. The engineering students were divided into contextual and non-contextual groups. The Neuro-Linguistics Programming (NLP) VAKD Preferred Representational Systems Test shows, majority of both groups use auditory digital learning styles. There is a significant difference at a significance level of .05, in the achievement test where the contextual groups performed better. The majority of the students in both groups are auditory digital learning styles, learning statistics contextually is an effective method for engineering students. Keywords: NLP VAKD, learning styles, statistics, contextual eISSN: 2398-4287© 2021. The Authors. Published for AMER ABRA cE-Bs by e-International Publishing House, Ltd., UK. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer–review under responsibility of AMER (Association of Malaysian Environment-Behaviour Researchers), ABRA (Association of Behavioural Researchers on Asians/Africans/Arabians) and cE-Bs (Centre for Environment-Behaviour Studies), Faculty of Architecture, Planning & Surveying, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia. DOI: https://doi.org/10.21834/ebpj.v6iSI4.2908

The computational theory of cognition, or computationalism, holds that cognition is a form of computation. Two issues related to this view are comprised by the goal of this paper: A) Computing systems are traditionally seen as representational systems, but functional and enactive approaches support non-representational theories; B) Recently, a sociocultural theory against computationalism was proposed with the aim of ontologically reducing computing to cognition. We defend, however, that cognition and computation are in action, thus cognition is just a form of computing and that cognition is the explanatory basis for computation. We state that: 1. Representational theories of computing recurring to intentional content run into metaphysical problems. 2. Functional non-representational theories do not incur this metaphysical problem when describing computing in terms of the abstract machine. 3. Functional theories are consistent with enactive in describing computing machines not in a strictly functional way, but especially in terms of their organization. 4. Enactive cognition is consistent with the computationalism in describing Turing machines as functionally and organizationally closed systems. 5. The cognitive explanatory basis for computing improves the computational theory of cognition. When developed in the human linguistic domain, computer science is seen as a product of human socionatural normative practices, however, cognition is just an explanatory, not ontological, basis for computing. The paper concludes by supporting that computation is in action, that cognition is just one form of computing in the world and the explanatory basis for computation.

words have usually been treated as a homogenous group, with limited investigation of the influence of different underlying representational systems for these words. In the present study we examined lexical–semantic processing of abstract verbs, separating them into mental state, emotional state and nonembodied state types. We used a syntactic classification task and a memory task to investigate behavioural differences amongst the abstract verb types. Semantic richness effects of each of the verbs' associates were then investigated to determine the relationship of linguistic associations to semantic processing response times for abstract verbs. We found a modest effect of abstract verb type, with mental state abstract verbs processed more quickly than nonembodied abstract verbs in the syntactic classification task; however, this effect was task dependent. We also found that memory was less accurate for the mental state abstract verbs. The semantic richness analysis of abstract verb associates revealed (1) that the concreteness of an abstract verb’s associates has a positive relationship to the verb’s response time and (2) a negative relationship between response time and age of acquisition for associates of nonembodied verbs. The results provide support for the proposal that abstract concepts engage complex representations in modal and linguistic systems.

Relational reasoning, or the ability to identify meaningful patterns within streams of information, has emerged as an important factor in a variety of complex tasks. One factor that has received relatively little research attention, however, is how relational reasoning may be influenced by the representational systems (i.e., verbal or nonverbal) that hold the information about which one is reasoning. Most studies have also focused only on analogical reasoning at the expense of anomaly, antinomy, antithesis, 3 additional forms of relational reasoning. All participants in the current study, 762 undergraduate students, completed shortened versions of the Test of Relational Reasoning (TORR; Alexander, 2012) and verbal Test of Relational Reasoning (vTORR; Alexander, 2015). These 2 tests both measure each of the 4 forms of relational reasoning, but the TORR uses a nonverbal representation system and the vTORR uses a verbal system. Patterns of performance within and between these relational reasoning tests, as well as measures of linguistic and spatial ability, test the hypothesis that representational system adds explanatory value for understanding relational reasoning. Results show that the 4 form framework of relational reasoning is present in the 2 measures, both separately and combined, but representational system exerts a more powerful effect than expected. Use of the shortened measures is also supported through evidence of score reliability and validity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)

In this theoretical study, initially, we propose and argue in favour of sub-dividing the external representations into the following two major categories: the self-constructed external representations and the hetero-constructed external representations. We then link this distinction to the general meaning of representations. Some researchers mistakenly use representational mode, representational method and representational system as synonymous or identical concepts thus often confusing. This is the reason why we put effort in outlining the ‘fluid’ conceptual boundaries of these concepts by highlighting the relation between them. Hence, we outline and compare the dominant categorisations of external representations proposed by various researchers while examining the necessity for their improvement and their extension. Keywords: External representational systems, self-constructed external representations, hetero-constructed external representations, representational element, representational mode, representational method, representational code.

In this article, I argue that popular explanatory frameworks in perceptual psychology suggest the truth of color realism. I focus on perceptual judgments and their evidential basis: namely perceptual representation. I first draw a distinction between two sorts of normativities with respect to which we can evaluate representational capacities and systems: biological and psychological normativities. The former is defined in terms of evolutionary fitness, and the latter in terms of representational accuracy. Generally, representational systems achieve psychological and biological success (i.e., facilitate survival and reproduction and accurately represent the world) hand in hand, but in special circumstances, a representational system can be such that it serves the organism best while not generally furnishing the organism with accurate representations. I argue in this essay that an explanation how and why our ancestors developed color vision that cleaves its biological success conditions from its psychological success conditions cannot be given unless we are prepared to say the same about the visual perception of distance and other geometrical features of the world. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the anti-realist could begin to specify psychological success conditions for color representations. Hence, we ought to accept the biological utility of color vision as evidence that it is typically representationally successful, and regard our perceptual judgments about color as generally true.

The perception of quantities has been suggested to rely on shared, magnitude-based representational systems that preserve metric properties. As such, different quantifiable dimensions that can characterize any given stimulus (e.g., size, speed, or numerosity) have been shown to modulate the perceived duration of these stimuli-a finding that has been attributed to cross-modal interaction among the quantity representations. However, these results are typically based on the isolated effects of a single stimulus dimension, leaving their potential combined effects uncharted. In the present study we aimed to investigate the joint effects of numerical magnitude and physical size on perceived time. In four complementary experiments, participants categorized six durations as "short" or "long," which were presented through combinations of Hindu-Arabic numerals in three font sizes, as well as with simple shapes (rectangles) and unfamiliar symbols (Klingon letters), the sizes of which corresponded to the font sizes of the Hindu-Arabic numerals. Our results showed temporal underestimation for the smallest numeral in the set (3), with no effects of font size on perceived duration. The perceived durations were longest for the physically smallest geometric stimuli (i.e., a rectangle), and the font size of symbol-like stimuli (i.e., Klingon letters) was not found to have an effect on perceived time. Finally, presenting only one numeral (6) instead of the rectangle once again eliminated the relationship between physical size and perceived time, suggesting an overshadowing of physical-size-based influences on temporal choice behavior, presumably by perceived symbolism. Our results point at the complex nature of the interaction between different magnitude representations.

We revived Jung’s Archetypes to characterize what we see as an emerging confluence of evolutionary, embodied, and ecological responses to traditional cognitive models of mental representation. We p...

Advances in contemporary cognitive science suggest that our internal representational systems are powerfully shaped by interacting evolutionary, developmental, and neuro-computational processes. Al...

Our ability to effectively retrieve complex semantic knowledge meaningfully impacts our daily lives, yet the neural processes that underly successful access and transient failures in access remain only partially understood. In this fMRI study, we contrast activation during successful semantic access, unsuccessful semantic access because of transient access failures (i.e., “tip-of-the-tongue,” “feeling-of-knowing”), and trials where the semantic knowledge was not possessed. Twenty-four human participants (14 female) were presented 240 trivia-based questions relating to person, place, object, or scholastic knowledge domains. Analyses of the recall event indicated a relatively greater role of a dorsomedial section of the prefrontal cortex in unsuccessful semantic access and relatively greater recruitment of the pars orbitalis of the inferior frontal gyrus in successful access. Successful access was also associated with increased activation in knowledge domain-selective areas. Generally, knowledge domain-selective areas showed increased responses for both preferred and nonpreferred stimulus classes. The exception was place-selective regions (parahippocampal gyrus, transverse occipital sulcus, retrosplenial complex), which were recruited during unsuccessful access attempts for all stimulus domains. Collectively, these results suggest that prefrontal semantic control systems and classical spatial knowledge-selective regions work together to locate relevant information and that access to complex knowledge results in a broad activation of semantic representation extending to regions selective for other knowledge domains. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The ability to access the deep factual knowledge we possess has a meaningful influence on our scholastic, professional, and social lives. In this fMRI study, we investigate the neural processes associated with successful access to this knowledge as well as transient failures in semantic access (tip-of-the-tongue/feeling-of-knowing). Participants attempted to answer trivia-style general knowledge questions drawn from four different knowledge domains. Results suggest that prefrontal semantic control systems and classical spatial knowledge-selective regions work to locate relevant information and that access to complex knowledge results in a broad activation of semantic representation extending to regions selective for other knowledge domains.

Working memory capacity and executive functions play important roles in the early development of drawing and language, but we lack models that specify the relationships among these representational systems and cognitive functions in toddlers. To respond to this need, the present study investigated the relations between drawing and language in very young children, and the role of working memory capacity, inhibition, and shifting in the association between these two representational systems. The participants were 80 children, 25–37 months old. The results revealed that in toddlers (a) all the measures of working memory, inhibition, and shifting loaded on a single factor of general executive functioning; (b) language and drawing are two distinct, but substantially correlated, representational systems; and (c) the development of executive function has a strong impact on language development, which in turn influences the development of drawing.

Our aesthetic response to the Universe, and the complexity of concepts through which we understand it, are inherently bound together in how we meaningfully interpret its nature. Over millennia the abstracted and intangible concepts of science have been developed and communicated through a rich array of representations across a variety of modes. The interpretation of such representations is a complex multidimensional and multimodal endeavor. This is particularly an issue in education where novices can struggle to engage with unfamiliar canonical representations. Learning in a discipline can be characterized as a process of developing disciplinary discernment in apprehending and using these representational systems. Using representations concerning the geometry of the Universe, evolution of the Universe, and cosmological expansion as examples, this paper provides an in-depth overview of the various multimodal representations through which concepts in cosmology are understood and communicated. In so doing this work unpacks the salient features of these representations in order to develop an underlying framework which we call the anatomy of representations (AOR). This study, in reviewing and analyzing representations in cosmology, explores this landscape of cosmology representations. This will allow for the characterization of how semiotic resources are mobilized, changed, and connections are made between various representational modes and levels, and an exploration of the landscape of cosmology and cosmology education. The AOR framework is intended as a guide for educators, including textbook authors, to support the development and interpretation of representations. (Less)

Software projects use mailing lists as the primary tool for collaboration and coordination. Mailing lists can be an important source for extracting behavioral patterns in the software development. A new approach for that is the use of Neurolinguistic theory to determine what is the Preferred Representational cognitive System (PRS) of software engineers in that specific context. Different resources and cognitive channels are used by developers in order to achieve software understanding. An important question on this matter is: What types of representational systems are preferred by software engineers? This paper presents a psychometrically based neurolinguistic method to identify the PRS of software developers. Experimental evaluation of the approach was carried out in three experiments to assess the Preferred Representational System of developers at Industrial and OSS (Apache server and Postgresql) mailing lists. For the OSS projects, the results showed that the PRS scores of the top-committers clearly differ from the general population of the projects. For industry, the experiment showed that the developers indeed have a PRS. Finally, for both scenarios, the qualitative analysis also indicated that the PRS scores obtained are aligned with the developers’ profiles, considering that alignment is essential to effective communication within the team and enhances the development process due to a better software comprehension.

This article is the result of research with a quali-quantitative approach. The purpose was to collect information and theoretical data to understand and explain how Neurolinguistic Programming (NLP) can through the new studies of Language and Literature Didactics (DLL) contribute to its development. The aim is to get teachers to connect with the world of students. NLP strategies have been adapted to language classes in a didactic way and the role of emotions in the development of the teaching-learning process is taken into account. The statistical data obtained through a descriptive survey helped to understand how teachers work with students and how they respond to the applied learning model. Therefore, it was concluded that this model does not respond to current needs. The proposal proposed provides new tools to the teacher to achieve significant learning taking into account the needs and interests of students. For this, the study is centered in the different techniques of the NLP, applicable in the classroom as: knowledge of the representational systems that exist to feel and know the world that surrounds us, how the levels of logical thought work and how they affect the behavior, rapport strategies to tune in group and even strategies to improve the spelling with the NLP. Este artículo es el resultado de una investigación cuyo enfoque es cuali-cuantitativo. El propósito fue recolectar información y datos teóricos para entender y explicar cómo la Programación Neurolingüística (PNL) puede a través de los nuevos estudios de la Didáctica de la Lengua y la Literatura (DLL) contribuir en su desarrollo. Se pretende lograr que los maestros lleguen a vincularse con el mundo de los estudiantes. Las estrategias de la PNL han sido adaptadas a las clases de Lengua de una manera didáctica y se toma en cuenta el papel de las emociones en el desarrollo del proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje. Los datos estadísticos obtenidos mediante una encuesta descriptiva ayudaron a conocer la forma en la que los maestros trabajan con los estudiantes y cómo ellos responden al modelo de aprendizaje aplicado. Por lo tanto, se concluyó que este modelo no responde a las necesidades actuales. La propuesta planteada brinda nuevas herramientas al docente para alcanzar un aprendizaje significativo tomando en cuenta las necesidades e intereses de los alumnos. Para esto el estudio se centra en las diferentes técnicas de la PNL, aplicables en el aula como: conocimiento de los sistemas representacionales que existen para sentir y conocer el mundo que nos rodea, cómo funcionan los niveles de pensamiento lógico y cómo afectan a la conducta, estrategias de rapport para sintonizar en grupo e incluso estrategias para mejorar la ortografía con la PNL.

I argue that the theoretical basis we need for distinctions in the semantics-pragmatics dispute is to be found by noting that languages are representational systems of symbols that scientists attribute to species to explain their communicative behaviors. We then have a powerful theoretical interest in distinguishing, (a), the representational properties of an utterance that arise simply from the speaker’s exploitation of a linguistic system from, (b), any other properties that may constitute the speaker’s “message”. I call the former properties “what-is-said” and “semantic”, the latter, “what is meant but not said” and “pragmatic. From this theoretical basis I argue that what-is-said is constituted by properties arising from (i) linguistic conventions, (ii) disambiguations, and (iii) reference fixings. Setting aside novel uses of language, I then frame the semantics-pragmatics dispute as one between these two doctrines. According to SEM, what-is-said (in my sense) is typically the truth conditional speaker-meaning (content) of an utterance. According to PRAG, in contrast, the truth conditional speaker-meaning (content) of an utterance, the message conveyed, is seldom, perhaps never, constituted solely by what-is-said (in my sense). I foreshadow the argument in Chaps. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 that the striking examples produced by Linguistic Pragmatists can be accommodated by SEM. Evidence for this can be found in the regular use of a certain form with a certain speaker meaning, a regularity that is best explained by supposing that there is a linguistic, probably conventional, rule of so using the expression.

Choosing how to represent knowledge effectively is a long-standing open problem. Cognitive science has shed light on the taxonomisation of representational systems from the perspective of cognitive processes, but a similar analysis is absent from the perspective of problem solving, where the representations are employed. In this paper we review how representation choices are made for solving problems in the context of theorem proving from three perspectives: cognition, heterogeneity, and computational demands. We contrast the different factors that are most important for each perspective in the context of problem solving to produce a list of considerations for developers of problem solving tools regarding representations that are appropriate for particular users and effective for specific problem domains.

While literature is a mode of representing animals within culture, through the Romantic period’s innovations to rights discourses and through its biopoltical apparatus the animality of animals meets and even exceeds our representational capacities. Animal standing before the law gains recognition through a discourse of sentimental connectedness as seen in the works of Jeermy Bentham, Anna Laetitia Barbauld, and Robert Burns. In a number of agriculturally themed literary works of the period, one witnesses a transformation of life into economic productivity through apparatuses of biopolitical control. In such moments, animals and humans fall under the biopolitical technologies and yet at times resist this mode of capture by expressing capacities that exceed our representational systems. As this chapter conveys, the Romantic period provides novel modes of capture and resistance which echo into today.

Humans readily form social impressions, such as attractiveness and trustworthiness, from a stranger’s facial features. Understanding the provenance of these impressions has clear scientific importance and societal implications. Motivated by the efficient coding hypothesis of brain representation, as well as Claude Shannon’s theoretical result that maximally efficient representational systems assign shorter codes to statistically more typical data (quantified as log likelihood), we suggest that social “liking” of faces increases with statistical typicality. Combining human behavioral data and computational modeling, we show that perceived attractiveness, trustworthiness, dominance, and valence of a face image linearly increase with its statistical typicality (log likelihood). We also show that statistical typicality can at least partially explain the role of symmetry in attractiveness perception. Additionally, by assuming that the brain focuses on a task-relevant subset of facial features and assessing log likelihood of a face using those features, our model can explain the “ugliness-in-averageness” effect found in social psychology, whereby otherwise attractive, intercategory faces diminish in attractiveness during a categorization task.

According to the grounded perspective, cognition emerges from the interaction of classic cognitive processes with the modalities, the body, and the environment. Rather than being an autonomous impenetrable module, cognition incorporates these other domains intrinsically into its operation. The Situated Action Cycle offers one way of understanding how the modalities, the body, and the environment become integrated to ground cognition. Seven challenges and opportunities are raised for this perspective: (1) How does cognition emerge from the Situated Action Cycle and in turn support it? (2) How can we move beyond simply equating embodiment with action, additionally establishing how embodiment arises in the autonomic, neuroendocrine, immune, cardiovascular, respiratory, digestive, and integumentary systems? (3) How can we better understand the mechanisms underlying multimodal simulation, its functions across the Situated Action Cycle, and its integration with other representational systems? (4) How can we develop and assess theoretical accounts of symbolic processing from the grounded perspective (perhaps using the construct of simulators)? (5) How can we move beyond the simplistic distinction between concrete and abstract concepts, instead addressing how concepts about the external and internal worlds pattern to support the Situated Action Cycle? (6) How do individual differences emerge from different populations of situational memories as the Situated Action Cycle manifests itself differently across individuals? (7) How can constructs from grounded cognition provide insight into the replication and generalization crises, perhaps from a quantum perspective on mechanisms (as exemplified by simulators).

This paper examines the traditional musical notation from the viewpoint of the general problem concerning the types of visual representations. More specifically, we analyze this system in relation to the distinction between graphical and linguistic representations. We start by comparing this notation with the representational systems which are most commonly associated with such categories: on the one hand, pictorial representations as an example of a graphical representation; on the other hand, verbal writing usually associated with a linguistic representation. Then, we examine the traditional musical notation in relation to different ways of drawing the distinction graphic–linguistic, and we evaluate the applicability of such criteria to the former system. Finally, we present some general remarks about the legitimacy of this distinction both with respect to representational systems in general and to the specific case of the traditional musical notation.

RESUMO:Partindo da narrativa biográfica de uma estudante de Santarém, no estado do Pará, Brasil, da literatura bioantropológica e bioarqueológica sobre dimorfismo sexual e da perspectiva queer, ponderaremos sobre a necessidade de se rever os sistemas representacionais médico-científico e jurídico-normativo.ABSTRACT:Based on the biographical narrative of a student from Santarém, in the State of Pará, Brazil, on the bioanthropological and bioarchaeological bibliography on sexual dimorphism, and on queer perspective, we will consider the need to review the medical-scientific and the legal-normative representational systems.

Episodic memories are multifaceted and malleable, capable of being transformed with time and experience at both the neural level and psychological level. At the neural level, episodic memories are transformed from being dependent on the hippocampus to becoming represented in neocortical structures, such as the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and back again, while at the psychological level, detailed, perceptually rich memories, are transformed to ones retaining only the gist of an experience or a schema related to it. Trace Transformation Theory (TTT) initially proposed that neural and psychological transformations are linked and proceed in tandem. Building on recent studies on the neurobiology of memory transformation in rodents and on the organization of the hippocampus and its functional cortical connectivity in humans, we present an updated version of TTT that is more precise and detailed with respect to the dynamic processes and structures implicated in memory transformation. At the heart of the updated TTT lies the long axis of the hippocampus whose functional differentiation and connectivity to neocortex make it a hub for memory formation and transformation. The posterior hippocampus, connected to perceptual and spatial representational systems in posterior neocortex, supports fine, perceptually rich, local details of memories; the anterior hippocampus, connected to conceptual systems in anterior neocortex, supports coarse, global representations that constitute the gist of a memory. Notable among the anterior neocortical structures is the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) which supports representation of schemas that code for common aspects of memories across different episodes. Linking the aHPC with mPFC is the entorhinal cortex (EC) which conveys information needed for the interaction/translation between gist and schemas. Thus, the long axis of the hippocampus, mPFC and EC provide the representational gradient, from fine to coarse and from perceptual to conceptual, that can implement processes implicated in memory transformation. Each of these representations of an episodic memory can co-exist and be in dynamic flux as they interact with one another throughout the memory's lifetime, going from detailed to schematic and possibly back again, all mediated by corresponding changes in neural representation.

This article reframes previously identified misconceptions about repeating decimals by describing these misconceptions as limited understandings of how mathematics concepts are referenced. In particular, misconceptions about repeating decimals and their quotient of integer representations are recast as limited understandings of mathematics as a discipline that derives its content from representational systems and the denotations they provided. Under this framework, arguments (e.g., proofs) that convert repeating decimals to their quotient of integer representations provide content for “rational number,” which is represented in multiple ways, each offering distinct opportunities for mathematical activity. The notion of an argument as content is illustrated as arguments providing access to a concept. One Grade 8 student’s struggle with understanding rational number is used to illustrate this framework and its implications for teaching and learning.

Following the conclusions of the previous paper (Uhlir, this issue), this paper adopts a theory that is based on the notion that the essence of language is uniquely human, with no homologue elsewhere in nature, and advances the possibility that human language is discontinuous not only within communication systems but also within representational systems. Linguistic data from disparate sources in Homo sapiens are contrasted with evidence from animals. After briefly discussing the dialectics between the mosaic approach to language and the holistic approach to an integrated left hemisphere, the paper culminates in a proposal of a general zoosemiotic theory of “Representational Systems” and a special anthroposemiotic theory of “Meta-representational Systems”.

This paper offers a brief critical review of some of the so-called “Talking Animals” projects. The findings from the projects are compared with linguistic data from Homo sapiens and with newer evidence gleaned from experiments on animal syntactic skills. The question concerning what had the so-called “Talking Animals” really done is broken down into two categories – words and (recursive) syntax. The (relative) failure of the animal projects in both categories points mainly to the fact that the core feature of language – hierarchical recursive syntax – is missing in the pseudo-linguistic feats of the animals.

This paper aims to situate the Late Formative urban center of Izapa, Chiapas, Mexico into the greater discussion of early Mesoamerican writing systems. The elites of Izapa produced elaborate carved stone monuments in an era that bore witness to the fluorescence of three great hieroglyphic programs—the Zapotec, the Epi-Olmec, and the Maya—and, yet, only a handful of glyphs appear in Izapa's monumental corpus. In a discussion that includes Izapan iconoglyphs, possible nominal phrases, and the calendrical inscriptions on Izapa Stela 27, Stela 9, and Miscellaneous Monument 60, this study juxtaposes Izapan visual culture with representational systems to the east and west, and ultimately explores the narrative domains of greatest salience to Izapa's elite: image and cyclical time.

In this chapter, I draw on neuroscientific work to provide support for an alternative account of the relation between moral judgment and motivation. Much recent discussion focuses on the dispute between motivation internalists, who hold that there is a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, and motivation externalists, who deny this. In contrast, I argue that this relation is best seen as a normative one: moral judgment ought to be accompanied by the appropriate motivation. I support this view by developing a descriptive account of moral psychology informed by research in neuroscience and psychopathology, which I call affective engine theory. According to affective engine theory, moral judgment is influenced by two distinct representational systems: affective mechanisms and general representational mechanisms. This descriptive account supports a disjunctive conception of moral judgment, which distinguishes between different kinds of moral judgments on the basis of the influence of different representational systems in their etiologies. I argue that such a conception of moral judgment is both descriptively and normatively adequate. Such considerations provide reasons to reject motivation internalism. However, rather than simply adopt externalism, I argue that the relation between moral judgment and motivation is governed by a normative ideal of moral agency. Such an ideal is required precisely because, as the empirically-informed account of moral psychology defended here makes clear, humans are prone to certain kinds of practical failures that result from a disconnect between distinct representational systems. Together, these arguments demonstrate how research in neuroscience can contribute to normative theorizing: attention to the neuroscientific details highlights the complexity and heterogeneity of moral thought and can therefore guide the construction of normative accounts that are descriptively adequate.