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Copyright of Estudios Filosóficos is the property of Estudios Filosoficos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Kant’s political philosophy is usually seen as a coherent part of his philosophical system. However, politics is not an integral part of his conception of pure reason. The aim of the article is to find the place of politics in Kant’s structure of pure reason. The paper attempts to provide an answer to the question why Kant did not undertake an investigation of politics as a part of his analysis of the structure of pure reason. It is argued that the central place of the problem of metaphysics was the cause behind this neglect. Transcendental dialectic in Critique of Pure Reason is the place where for the first time principles of the analysis of political ideas are presented. However, Kant did not see that with his transcendental dialectics he entered the realm of politics, he did not put forward an analysis of the nature of political ideas. The place of politics in Kant’s structure of pure reason can be determined by paying close attention to three main factors – conception of transcendental ideas, the primacy of practical reason and aesthetic ideas. Kant did not provide a unified account of these three elements, which are necessary to understand the place of politics in the structure of pure reason.

This paper defends a constructive interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, which is built in analogy with an experimental construction that Kant believes to characteristic of chemistry. I also argue for a way to reconcile the methodological perspective of the constructivist method with that of transcendental reflection. I therefore provide a constructive explanation for what Kant describes as being pure reason and the argument of the transcendental deduction. I propose to frame the different perspectives in such a way that the experimental construction is the ratio cognoscendi of pure reason, while pure reason is the ratio essendi of the experimental construction. O'Neill (1989, 2015) is one of the most important scholars that have argued for a constructivist reading of the Critique of pure reason (CPR). In this paper I develop and explore new aspects of this line of interpretation. One of the main criticisms raised against constructivist readings of Kant's philosophy is an alleged commitment to subjectivism or voluntarism (cf. Kleingeld & Willaschek 2019). This concern led some scholars to rename their position as constitutivist instead (Korsgaard 2009; Sensen 2013, 2017; Formosa 2011). Constitutivism, is intended to be a sort of constructivism capable of avoiding voluntarism. However, it becomes difficult, sometimes, to differentiate between the constitutivist and foundationalist positions, which are based on transcendental reflection and imply a sort of realist perspective on reason. The same preoccupation applies to the constructivist interpretation of the CPR. In order to deal with this issue, the following questions must be addressed: how can constructivism justify the necessity and universality of transcendental principles of pure reason without compromising the normative and procedural aspects of the construction? How to reconcile arguments based on the analysis of representations and faculties with a constructivist procedure? Or even, how may transcendental reflection, as a view of the possibility of a priori cognition, be rendered compatible with a constructive procedure? This paper is divided into three sections, followed by brief final remarks. The first section outlines the main characteristics of constructivism and relates them to Kant's positions about the nature of philosophy and its method. The second part argues for a type of experimental constructivism that might serve as a guiding analogy to understand the method underlying the CPR. Thirdly, I will show how the transcendental subject and pure reason are derived from this experimental construction. The conclusion briefly points out some advantages of this position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politologija is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, the main work of Louis Hjelmslev, is an account of his “Glossematics” which is a complex formal theory about the nature of linguistic knowledge and the structure of human understanding in general. The current paper starts with a brief evaluation of a newly released Persian translation of this work; the problem triggering a hermeneutic interpretation of Hjelmslev’s theory in the light of Kant’s “pure reason” in the second part of the current paper is a claim about the potentials of “Glossematics” to be revived as an operational theory of linguistic epistemology in the current mainstream of Linguistics. I have shown that, like any other structural theory of human understanding, basing the “necessity” of the formal propositions of “Glossematics” on the notion of “structure” is the theory’s Achilles heel making this initially intended “self-contained” theory change into a paradoxically “transcendental” epistemology. This transcendence in turn, puts Glossematics in the same boat with Nativist epistemological schools, which are all vulnerable to similar challenges. In conclusion, Hjelmslev’s theory of “Glossematics” is shown to be another “Objectivist” theory that is ruled out by the current findings in Cognitive Sciences.

I re-question the Enlightenment by bringing together Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Peter Sloterdijk's Critique of Cynical Reason. The year 2021 celebrates the 240th and 40th anniversary of the respective Critiques, and it is opportune to read the common thread that binds them--the Enlightenment. This essay has three parts: I first read the Critique of Pure Reason in light of Kant's Enlightenment essay to underscore reason's ill-fate as found in the public sphere; I then introduce Sloterdijk's Critique of Cynical Reason along with his general philosophy, highlighting the cynical state he characterizes reason's public presence with. In the conclusion, I draw affinities between the two Critiques to form a certain dialogue in the presentation of both philosophers to understand the concept on stage: the Enlightenment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existence of the physical body is something that can be proven with the help of sensation. Is it possible to prove the existence of this substance using pure reason, without the help of sensation? Also, there are proofs that demonstrate the impossibility of vertically aligned ascending causes. In other words, the chain of vertically aligned ascending causes must terminate at a being that is not the effect of anything else. However, is it possible for the chain of vertically aligned descending effects to go on ad infinitum? Mulla Sadra was of the opinion that there are purely rational arguments that can prove the existence of the physical body and the termination of the chain of vertically aligned descending effects at this being. In fact, in his magnum opus, the al-Asfar al-Arba'ah, he presented four demonstrations to corroborate this claim. Some of these demonstrations rest upon the necessity of the Hyle and some of them on the generosity of the Necessary Being. Some other demonstrations rest upon the necessity of the existence of beings other than the Intellects. Many of these demonstrations are founded upon the idea that an essentially necessary being is necessary from all points of view. All in all, most of these arguments possess the necessary requirements of demonstration, both from the point of view of their structure and the point of view of their content. Therefore, their conclusions are certain and, logically speaking, acceptable.

Özgürlük kavramı, Kant’ın pratik felsefesine damga vurmuş önemli bir kavramdır. Özgürlük kavramına büyük önem veren Kant, bir toplumun ilerlemesinin o toplumdaki özgürlüğün ne ölçüde yayılıp geliştiğine bağlı olduğunu belirterek özgürlüğü insan türünün ve tarihinin başat idesi olarak belirlemiştir. Kant gerek etik gerekse politik görüşlerinde, özgürlüğü kendisine ölçü olarak alarak görüşlerini bu kavram çerçevesinde geliştirmiştir. Kant ahlak metafiziğini etik ve hukuk olarak ikiye ayırırken hem etik hem de hukuk alanında özgürlüğü temele yerleştirmiştir. Kant’ın felsefesinde özgürlük kavramı, onun ahlak felsefesinden hukuk ve politik felsefesine doğru bir gelişim göstermiştir. Özgürlüğü ahlaksal bağlamda isteme ile ilgisinde, hukuksal alanda ise eylemlerimizle ilgisinde ele Kant, özgürlüğün her iki alanda da nasıl gerçekleştiğini aydınlatmaya çalışmıştır. Ahlak alanında özgürlüğü içsel anlamda ele alan Kant, ahlaki özgürlük görüşünü ahlak yasası bağlamında ele alıp temellendirmiştir. Ahlak yasası dışarıdan bir zor ve dayatma olmaksızın kişinin kendi aklının koyduğu bir yasadır ve kişinin istemelerini bu yasaya göre belirlemesi kişinin içsel özgürlüğünü oluşturmaktadır. Hukuk alanına gelindiğinde ise özgürlük içsel alanla ilgili olmayıp kişinin başkalarını etkileyen davranışlarıyla, yani kişinin eylemlerinin dışsal ve hukuksal boyutuyla ilgilidir ve hukuksal alan her zaman bir dışsal zorlamayı da beraberinde getirir. İçsel özgürlük dışsal hiçbir zorlamayı barındırmazken, dışsal özgürlük ise belli bir düzeyde zorlamaya dayanmak zorundadır. Bu çalışmada, Kant’ın bahsettiği bu iki tür özgürlük görüşünün neliğini ve bunların birbiriyle ilgisini ortaya koymak amaçlanmaktadır.

Copyright of Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Con-Textos Kantianos (CTK) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)