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The article focuses on the formation of the international law principle of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions in the context of an international armed conflict, given the relevance of the issue of damage and destruction of property as part of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The author examines the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions through the prism of international human rights law - as such, where the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions (property rights) has been enshrined in the international law system, and also through the prism of international humanitarian law and international criminal law - as such, which are special in relation to the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions in the context of international armed conflict. The article examines the principle of inviolability of property rights at the national level, in particular, in legislative and judicial sources, and its impact on the formation of the relevant international law principle. In particular, the author analyses the philosophical development of the concepts of "sacredness" of property rights and inviolability of property rights, as well as the natural essence of this right for a person. The author examines in detail the rules of conventional and customary international humanitarian law on the right to peaceful enjoyment of property/property rights depending on the type of acts that may be committed against property and the type of property against which certain acts are directed in the context of an international armed conflict or legal regime of occupation. The provisions on the protection of civilian objects, as well as the non-absolute nature of the protection of property rights in international armed conflict in cases of urgent military necessity, are carefully considered. Based on this analysis, the author identifies the key fundamental provisions on the basis of which the international legal principle of the right to peaceful enjoyment of property in the context o f international armed conflict is formed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uti possidetis originating from Roman jus civile which later transformed into a principle of interstate relations dealing with a transformation of former administrative borders into international boundaries of the newly independent states in Latin America was also effectively applied upon decolonisation in Africa in XX century. This article considers the relevant state practice of the African states and the OAU’s position on application of uti possidetis principle. The article also analyses the Burkina Faso vs Mali case which is one of the substantial cases on application of uti possidetis pinciple.

The paper deals with analysis of critical views on uti possidetis principle by various doctrines of international law. Four key arguments of critical approaches to uti possidetis principle are reviewed therein: (i) the principles’ conflict with self-determination; (ii) its limitation to decolonisation processes; (iii) its controversial nature due to existence of two forms, uti possidetis de jure and uti possidetis de facto and (iv) lack of grounds to be accepted as a norm of customary international law. The relevant counterarguments are produced against critical views on uti possidetis principle.

The foregoing analysis argues that uti possidetis ’ originates from jus civile of Roman Law. The principle’s main purpose in Roman Law was the preserving of the status quo and stability of property possession. From the rule of private Roman Law uti possidetis transformed into a principle of international law dealing with state or territorial sovereignty issues. Only in the 18-19th centuries it became a principle of interstate relations in Latin America and then in African and Asian continents. It is argued that the principle of uti possidetis juris is a specifi c mechanism and process of international law, which serves for the purposes of transferring the sovereignty from preceding sovereign to the new state.

The "holistic" character of sustainable development1 has the advantage of being applicable to many fields due to the multiple and varied aspects that the concept implies. The polymorphic nature of sustainable development, its flexibility and variability means that it might have specific features in each field that employs it. Thus, the meaning of the notion of sustainable development is adjustable, different and can be shaped according to the particularities and specificity of the object it applies to; for this reason, its field of application is extremely varied. Naturally, the legal dimension of the concept will not have the same significances regarding its use in various agreements and normative acts. As a result, in all agreements, documents and normative acts in which it can be found, sustainable development will have various meanings according to the regulation field that employs it. Within conventions and normative acts that insert it in their content, sustainable development is seen as principle, right or obligation, action framework, process or procedure. Despite all this, it is important to mention that its main role is to be an achievable aim. Thus, the state has several obligations that need meeting to reach the sustainable development of society; consequently, we can speak of an obligation of means imposed to its receivers. The states should struggle to attain sustainable development by adopting measures identified as necessary for this purpose. From this point of view, in an implicit manner, sustainable development has effects that directly constrain its receivers: by setting a target to be reached, states are imposed measures they need to take. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]