Search

The archaeological record offers insights into our evolutionary past by revealing ancient behaviour through stone and fossil remains. Percussive foraging is suggested to be particularly relevant for the emergence of tool-use in our lineage, yet early hominin percussive behaviours remain largely understudied compared to flaked technology. Stone tool-use of extant primates allows the simultaneous investigation of their artefacts and the associated behaviours. This is important for understanding the development of tool surface modification, and crucial for interpreting damage patterns in the archaeological record. Here, we compare the behaviour and the resulting material record across stone tool-using primates. We investigate the relationship of nut-cracking technique and stone tool modification across chimpanzees, capuchins, and long-tailed macaques by conducting standardized field experiments with comparable raw materials. We show that different techniques likely emerged in response to diverse nut hardness, leading to variation in foraging success across species. Our experiments further demonstrate a correlation between techniques and the intensity of visible percussive damage on the tools. Tools used with more precision and efficiency as demonstrated by macaques, show fewer use wear traces. This suggests that some percussive techniques may be less readily identified in the archaeological record. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract The archaeological record offers insights into our evolutionary past by revealing ancient behaviour through stone and fossil remains. Percussive foraging is suggested to be particularly relevant for the emergence of tool-use in our lineage, yet early hominin percussive behaviours remain largely understudied compared to flaked technology. Stone tool-use of extant primates allows the simultaneous investigation of their artefacts and the associated behaviours. This is important for understanding the development of tool surface modification, and crucial for interpreting damage patterns in the archaeological record. Here, we compare the behaviour and the resulting material record across stone tool-using primates. We investigate the relationship of nut-cracking technique and stone tool modification across chimpanzees, capuchins, and long-tailed macaques by conducting standardized field experiments with comparable raw materials. We show that different techniques likely emerged in response to diverse nut hardness, leading to variation in foraging success across species. Our experiments further demonstrate a correlation between techniques and the intensity of visible percussive damage on the tools. Tools used with more precision and efficiency as demonstrated by macaques, show fewer use wear traces. This suggests that some percussive techniques may be less readily identified in the archaeological record.

In Becoming Human (2021), evolutionary psychologist Michael Tomasello provides a comprehensive account of the social intentionality which makes us human. One of the many themes discussed is the intentionality required for switching between perspectives. A number of interesting claims are made in these parts, including that great apes (and young infants) have no sense of perspective, no understanding of false beliefs, and do not know they could be wrong about how they experience things. While I am sympathetic to the general purport of Tomasello's theory of switching perspectives, I believe his theory mispresents the intentional skills that are involved in various pre-conceptual forms of switching perspectives, to the extent that it is worth a brief commentary. I first outline Tomasello's theory of perspectivalness, and subsequently develop an alternative, based on the phenomenological distinction between operative and thematic intentionality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: While humans exposed to a sequential stimulus pairing A-B are commonly assumed to form a bidirectional mental relation between A and B, evidence that non-human animals can do so is limited. Careful examination of the animal literature suggests possible improvements in the test procedures used to probe such effects, notably measuring transfer effects on the learning of B-A pairings, rather than direct recall of A upon cuing with B. We developed such an experimental design and tested 20 Guinea baboons (Papio papio). Two pairings of visual shapes were trained (A1-B1, A2-B2) and testing was conducted in a reversed order, either with conserved pairings (B1-A1, B2-A2) or broken ones (B1-A2, B2-A1). We found baboons' immediate test performance to be above chance level for conserved pairings and below chance level for broken ones. Moreover, baboons needed less trials to learn conserved pairings compared to broken ones. These effects were apparent for both pairings on average, and separately for the best learned pairing. Baboons' responding on B-A trials was thus influenced by their previous A-B training. Performance level at the onset of testing, however, suggests that baboons did not respond in full accordance with the hypothesis of bidirectionality. To account for these data, we suggest that two competing types of relations were concomitantly encoded: a directional relation between A and B, which retains the sequential order experienced, and a non-directional relation, which retains only the co-occurrence of events, not their temporal order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Short-term memory is implicated in a range of cognitive abilities and is critical for understanding primate cognitive evolution. To investigate the effects of phylogeny, ecology and sociality on short-term memory, we tested the largest and most diverse primate sample to date (421 non-human primates across 41 species) in an experimental delayed-response task. Our results confirm previous findings that longer delays decrease memory performance across species and taxa. Our analyses demonstrate a considerable contribution of phylogeny over ecological and social factors on the distribution of short-term memory performance in primates; closely related species had more similar short-term memory abilities. Overall, individuals in the branch of Hominoidea performed better compared to Cercopithecoidea, who in turn performed above Platyrrhini and Strepsirrhini. Interdependencies between phylogeny and socioecology of a given species presented an obstacle to disentangling the effects of each of these factors on the evolution of short-term memory capacity. However, this study offers an important step forward in understanding the interspecies and individual variation in short-term memory ability by providing the first phylogenetic reconstruction of this trait’s evolutionary history. The dataset constitutes a unique resource for studying the evolution of primate cognition and the role of short-term memory in other cognitive abilities.

There is substantial evidence of group-specific behaviors in wild animals that are thought to be socially transmitted. Yet experimental studies with monkeys have reported conflicting evidence on the extent to which monkeys learn by observing their conspecifics. In this study, we tested the feasibility of using pre-recorded video demonstrations to investigate social learning from conspecifics in rhesus monkeys. With training, monkeys gradually learned to respond correctly following videos of a demonstrator, however, follow-up experiments revealed that this was not due to learning from the demonstrator monkey. In generalization tests with videos that were horizontally reversed, monkeys continued responding to the location they had associated with each video, rather than matching the new choice location shown in the mirrored video. When the task was changed to make location irrelevant, such that monkeys could choose correctly only by selecting the same image selected by the demonstrator in the video, observer monkeys did not exceed chance in 12,000 training trials. Because monkeys readily learn to follow nonsocial visual cues presented on a monitor to guide image choice, their inability to learn from a demonstrator here indicates substantial limitations in the capacity for social learning from videos. Furthermore, these findings encourage deeper consideration of what monkeys perceive when presented with video stimuli on computer screens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Primate cognition research is reliant on access to members of the study sp ecies and logistical infrastructures to conduct observations and experiments. Historically founded in research centers and private collections, and spreading to modern zoos, sanctuaries, and the field, primate cognition has been investigated in diverse settings, each with benefits and challenges. In our systematic review of 12 primatology, animal behavior, and animal cognition journals over the last 15 years, we turn a spotlight on zoos to quantify their current impact on the field and to highlight their potential as robust contributors to future work. To put zoo‐based research in context, we compare zoos to three other site types: university‐owned or independent research centers, sanctuaries, and field sites. We assess the contributions of zoos across several critical considerations in primate cognition research, including number of investigations, species diversity, sample size, research topic diversity, and methodology. We identified 1119 publications reporting studies of primate cognition, almost 25% of which report research conducted in zoos. Across publications, zoo‐based research has greater species diversity than research centers and covers a diverse range of research topics. Although our review is merely a snapshot of primate cognition research, our findings suggest that zoos may present advantages to researchers regarding species diversity, and lack some of the methodological constraints of field sites, allowing greater ease of access to a diverse range of subjects for cognition investigations. We suggest that zoos have great potential as key contributors for future investigations in primate cognition. Finally, we shed light on the symbiotic relationship that can emerge between researchers and zoos, forming partnerships that bring unique advantages to both parties. Highlights: Zoo‐based research contributes ~25% of publications in primate cognitionZoos offer high species diversity in cognitive researchResearch in zoos encompasses a wide and balanced array of topics within primate cognition [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Simple Summary: Zoos are increasingly looking at technology-based enrichment as a way to improve the welfare of primates in their care. Touchscreen tasks are an option that have a long and established history of usage by primates in research settings as well as a history in zoos. However, the barrier-to-entry is high for new zoos interested in adopting the primate touchscreen method. There are no pre-built and zoo-specific hardware and software options available, so zoos must assemble touchscreen systems on their own and write their own software or use pre-existing research-based software that is not ideally suited to zoo settings and applications. To remedy this, we developed a pre-built portable touchscreen system named Apex along with easy-to-operate primate software named ApeTouch; both are available for zoos to acquire. Our system and software offer enrichment, research, and husbandry applications. To illustrate the utility of these tools, we report on a training study with four species of zoo-housed macaques using the Apex machine and ApeTouch software. We report on the development and testing of a portable touchscreen apparatus and accompanying software program for primate enrichment, cognitive research, and husbandry applications. For zoos considering using technology to bolster scientific efforts or enhance the welfare of primates in their care, touchscreen activities offer a solution that has a long and proven record of primate use in laboratory settings as well as a history of usage in the zoo world. We review the options that are available for zoos to build their own touchscreen systems and we offer as an alternative our pre-built apparatus, Apex, and primate software suite, ApeTouch, both of which are tailored for use in a zoo setting. The efficacy and utility of these tools are demonstrated in a training study with four macaque groups of different species that were previously naïve to touchscreens. All of the groups in the study learned to use the device and displayed a consistent engagement with the touchscreen tasks over 95 daily sessions of exposure. In the final stage of the training, two of the four groups displayed an above-chance level performance on a numerical sequencing task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intuitive Physics, the ability to anticipate how the physical events involving mass objects unfold in time and space, is a central component of intelligent systems. Intuitive physics is a promising tool for gaining insight into mechanisms that generalize across species because both humans and non-human primates are subject to the same physical constraints when engaging with the environment. Physical reasoning abilities are widely present within the animal kingdom, but monkeys, with acute 3D vision and a high level of dexterity, appreciate and manipulate the physical world in much the same way humans do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Characterizing individual differences in cognition is crucial for understanding the evolution of cognition as well as to test the biological consequences of different cognitive traits. Here, we harnessed the strengths of a uniquely large, naturally-living primate population at the Cayo Santiago Biological Field Station to characterized individual differences in rhesus monkey performance across two social cognitive tasks. A total of n = 204 semi-free-ranging adult rhesus monkeys participated in a data collection procedure, where we aimed to test individuals on both tasks at two time-points that were one year apart. In the socioemotional responses task, we assessed monkeys' attention to conspecific photographs with neutral versus negative emotional expressions. We found that monkeys showed overall declines in interest in conspecific photographs with age, but relative increases in attention to threat stimuli specifically, and further that these responses exhibited long-term stability across repeated testing. In the gaze following task we assessed monkeys' propensity to co-orient with an experimenter. Here, we found no evidence for age-related change in responses, and responses showed only limited repeatability over time. Finally, we found some evidence for common individual variation for performance across the tasks: monkeys that showed greater interest in conspecific photographs were more likely to follow a human's gaze. These results show how studies of comparative cognitive development and aging can provide insights into the evolution of cognition, and identify core primate social cognitive traits that may be related across and within individuals., (© 2024 The Author(s). American Journal of Primatology published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.)

Humans and several other species of animals have demonstrated the ability to use familiarity to recognize that they have seen images before. In prior experiments, orangutans failed to show use of familiarity in memory tasks, even when other solutions were not available. We tested for evidence of habituation, a decreased response to repeated stimuli, as a behavioral indicator that repeated images were familiar to subjects. Monkeys and orangutans selected the smallest target out of four while computerized images were presented as distractors. Latency to complete the target-finding task was compared between conditions in which the distractor image was a familiar, repeating image, a novel, never-before-seen image, or no distractor was present. Rhesus macaques showed significant habituation, and significantly more habituation than orangutans, in each of four experiments. Orangutans showed statistically reliable habituation in only one of the four experiments. These results are consistent with previous research in which orangutans failed to demonstrate familiarity. Because we expect that familiarity and habituation are evolutionarily ancient memory processes, we struggle to explain these surprising, but consistent findings. Future research is needed to determine why orangutans respond to computerized images in this peculiar way. • Monkeys, but not orangutans used familiarity signals in prior tests of recognition. • Monkeys habituated more than did orangutans to images on a computer screen. • Orangutans are surprisingly insensitive to prior occurrence of images. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Cognitive processes driving multimodal communication can be studied profitably as an interaction between minds first and then brains. • A Modular Cognition Framework analysis applies a biological approach to the mind viewed as a collaborative network of domain-specific systems different but compatible with neural architecture. • Processing always combines general cognitive and domain-specific principles. • Similarities in gestures used humans and by chimpanzees call into question some qualitative distinctions between the two primates but such questions can be answered. • Non-verbal, multimodal communication in humans is also influenced by linguistic processing. • The central player in all human multimodal communication is the conceptual system distinguishing humans both quantitatively and qualitatively from other primates. Much attention has been paid to ways in which different categories of individual combine different modalities to communicate meanings to others. One major challenge that remains is to gain a deeper understanding of the cognitive processing responsible for the simultaneous deployment and integration of various different resources during multimodal communication. In response to this challenge, a Modular Cognition Framework analysis will be applied to the question of how people communicate using all the resources at their disposal. The discussion will include relevant features of this framework. Then research into similarities between humans and chimpanzee communication will be discussed followed by a comparison between verbal and non- verbal communication and a consideration of a distinct but similar approach. Emphasis will be placed on the role of meaning and on synergies between the conceptual system and the two systems responsible for linguistic structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We report on the development and testing of a portable touchscreen apparatus and accompanying software program for primate enrichment, cognitive research, and husbandry applications. For zoos considering using technology to bolster scientific efforts or enhance the welfare of primates in their care, touchscreen activities offer a solution that has a long and proven record of primate use in laboratory settings as well as a history of usage in the zoo world. We review the options that are available for zoos to build their own touchscreen systems and we offer as an alternative our pre-built apparatus, Apex, and primate software suite, ApeTouch, both of which are tailored for use in a zoo setting. The efficacy and utility of these tools are demonstrated in a training study with four macaque groups of different species that were previously naïve to touchscreens. All of the groups in the study learned to use the device and displayed a consistent engagement with the touchscreen tasks over 95 daily sessions of exposure. In the final stage of the training, two of the four groups displayed an above-chance level performance on a numerical sequencing task.

Directed forgetting paradigms assess cognitive control by determining whether memory accuracy is superior in trials on which subjects were instructed to remember compared with accuracy in trials on which they were instructed to forget. We used a directed forgetting paradigm to compare the extent to which working memory and familiarity are subject to rehearsal-like cognitive control in rhesus monkeys. Monkeys studied a sample image, then saw one of two distinctive cues during a retention interval. The remember cue typically predicted a four-choice match to sample test, for which memory of the sample was critical. The forget cue typically predicted one of five perceptual discrimination tests, matched for accuracy to the memory tests, for which memory of the sample was irrelevant. On rare probe trials, the test type other than the type typically predicted by the cue was presented. When cognitive control of memory was possible, accuracy should have been higher on memory tests following the remember cue than on those following the forget cue. We found that accuracy was higher following the remember cue under conditions that favored working memory (small image set) but was not higher under conditions that favored matching on the basis of relative familiarity (large image set). Working memory, but not familiarity, is subject to cognitive control in rhesus monkeys. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of whether animals have some sort of self-awareness is a topic of continued debate. A necessary precondition for self-awareness is the ability to visually discriminate the self from others, which has traditionally been investigated through mirror self-recognition experiments. Although great apes generally pass such experiments, interpretations of results have remained controversial. The aim of this study was to investigate how bonobos (Pan paniscus) respond to different types of images of themselves and others, both before and after prolonged mirror exposure. We first presented presumably mirror-naive subjects with representations of themselves in three different ways (mirror image, contingent and non-contingent video footage) as well as representations of others (video footage of known and unknown conspecifics). We found that subjects paid significantly less attention to contingent images of themselves (mirror image, video footage) than to non-contingent images of themselves and unfamiliar individuals, suggesting they perceived the non-contingent self-images as novel. We then provided subjects with three months of access to a large mirror centrally positioned in the enclosure. Following this manipulation, subjects showed significantly reduced interest in the non-contingent self-images, while interest in unknown individuals remained unchanged, suggesting that the mirror experience has led to a fuller understanding of their own self. We discuss implications of this preliminary investigation for the on-going debate on self-awareness in animals.

In the Minimalist Program, the place of linguistic communication in language evolution and design is clear: It is assumed to be secondary to internalisation. I will defend this position against its critics, and maintain that natural selection played a more crucial role in selecting features of externalization and communication than in developing the computational system of language, following some core insights of Minimalism. The lack of communicative advantages to many core syntactic processes supports the Minimalist view of language use. Alongside the computational system, human language exhibits ostensive-inferential communication via open-ended combinatorial productivity, and I will explore how this system is compatible with – and does not preclude – a Minimalist model of the language system.

This study analyses 749 drawings by five female Bornean orang-utans (Pongo pygmaeus) at Tama Zoological Park in Japan. We searched for differences between individuals but also tried to identify possible temporal changes among the drawings of one individual, Molly, who drew almost 1300 drawings from 2006 to 2011. An analysis of the drawings was carried out after collecting quantitative and qualitative variables. Our findings reveal evidence of differences in the drawing style of the five individuals as well as creative changes in Molly’s drawing style throughout her lifetime. Individuals differed in terms of the colours used, the space they filled, and the shapes (fan patterns, circles, or loops) they drew. Molly drew less and less as she grew older, and we found a significant difference between drawings produced in winter, when orang-utans were kept inside and had less activity, and those produced during other seasons. Our results suggest that the drawing behaviour of these five orang-utans is not random and that differences among individuals might reflect differences of styles, states of mind, and motivation to draw.

The question of whether animals have some sort of self-awareness is a topic of continued debate. A necessary precondition for self-awareness is the ability to visually discriminate the self from others, which has traditionally been investigated through mirror self-recognition experiments. Although great apes generally pass such experiments, interpretations of results have remained controversial. The aim of this study was to investigate how bonobos (Pan paniscus) respond to different types of images of themselves and others, both before and after prolonged mirror exposure. We first presented presumably mirror-naive subjects with representations of themselves in three different ways (mirror image, contingent and non-contingent video footage) as well as representations of others (video footage of known and unknown conspecifics). We found that subjects paid significantly less attention to contingent images of themselves (mirror image, video footage) than to non-contingent images of themselves and unfamiliar individuals, suggesting they perceived the non-contingent self-images as novel. We then provided subjects with three months of access to a large mirror centrally positioned in the enclosure. Following this manipulation, subjects showed significantly reduced interest in the non-contingent self-images, while interest in unknown individuals remained unchanged, suggesting that the mirror experience has led to a fuller understanding of their own self. We discuss implications of this preliminary investigation for the on-going debate on self-awareness in animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated whether chimpanzees use the temporal sequence of external events to determine causation. Seventeen chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) witnessed a human experimenter press a button in two different conditions. When she pressed the "causal button" the delivery of juice and a sound immediately followed (cause-then-effect). In contrast, she pressed the "non-causal button" only after the delivery of juice and sound (effect-then-cause). When given the opportunity to produce the desired juice delivery themselves, the chimpanzees preferentially pressed the causal button, i.e., the one that preceded the effect. Importantly, they did so in their first test trial and even though both buttons were equally associated with juice delivery. This outcome suggests that chimpanzees, like human children, do not rely solely on their own actions to make use of novel causal relations, but they can learn causal sequences based on observation alone. We discuss these findings in relation to the literature on causal inferences as well as associative learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working memory (WM) is a core executive function that allows individuals to hold, process and manipulate information. WM capacity has been repeatedly nominated as a key factor in human cognitive evolution; nevertheless, little is known about the WM abilities of our closest primate relatives. In this study, we examined signatures of WM ability in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Standard WM tasks for humans (Homo sapiens) often require participants to continuously update their WM. In Experiment 1, we implemented this updating requirement in a foraging situation: zoo-housed chimpanzees (n = 13) searched for food in an array of containers. To avoid redundant searches, they needed to continuously update which containers they had already visited (similar to WM paradigms for human children) with 15 s retention intervals in between each choice. We examined chimpanzees' WM capacity and to what extent they used spatial cues and object features to memorize their previous choices. In Experiment 2, we investigated how susceptible their WM was to attentional interference, an important signature, setting WM in humans apart from long-term memory. We found large individual differences with some individuals remembering at least their last four choices. Chimpanzees used a combination of spatial cues and object features to remember which boxes they had chosen already. Moreover, their performance decreased specifically when competing memory information was introduced. Finally, we found that individual differences in task performance were highly reliable over time. Together, these findings show remarkable similarities between human and chimpanzee WM abilities despite evolutionary and life-history differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Utilization of visual referential cues by non-human primates is a subject of constant scientific interest. However, only few primate species, mostly great apes, have been studied thoroughly in that regard, rendering the understanding of phylogenetic influences on the underlying cognitive patterns difficult. Methods We tested six species of captive gibbons in an object-choice task (n = 11) for their ability to interpret two different pointing gestures, a combination of body orientation and gaze direction as well as glancing as referential cues. Hand preferences were tested in the object-choice task and in a bimanual tube task (n = 18). Results We found positive responses to all signals except for the glancing cue at the individual as well as at the group level. The gibbons’ success rates partially exceed results reported for great apes in comparable tests and appear to be similarly influenced by prior exposure to human communicative cues. Hand preferences exhibited by the gibbons in the object-choice task as well as in a bimanual tube task suggest that crested gibbons (Nomascus sp.) are strongly lateralized at individual but not at population level for tasks involving object manipulation. Discussion Based on the available data, it can be assumed that the cognitive foundations to utilize different visual cues essential to human communication are conserved in extant hominoids and can be traced back at least to the common ancestor of great and lesser apes. However, future studies have to further investigate how the social environment of gibbons influences their ability to exploit referential signals. Gibbons’ manual laterality patterns appear to differ in several aspects from the situation found in great apes. While not extensive enough to allow for general conclusions about the evolution of hand preferences in gibbons or apes in general, our results add to the expanding knowledge on manual lateralization in the Hylobatidae.

Summary Representing others’ intentions is central to primate social life. We explored the role of dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) in discriminating between self and others’ behavior while two male rhesus monkeys performed a non-match-to-goal task in a monkey-human paradigm. During each trial, two of four potential targets were randomly presented on the right and left parts of a screen, and the monkey or the human was required to choose the one that did not match the previously chosen target. Each agent had to monitor the other’s action in order to select the correct target in that agent’s own turn. We report neurons that selectively encoded the future choice of the monkey, the human agent, or both. Our findings suggest that PMd activity shows a high degree of self-other differentiation during face-to-face interactions, leading to an independent representation of what others will do instead of entailing self-centered mental rehearsal or mirror-like activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background. Utilization of visual referential cues by non-human primates is a subject of constant scientific interest. However, only few primate species, mostly great apes, have been studied thoroughly in that regard, rendering the understanding of phylogenetic influences on the underlying cognitive patterns difficult. Methods. We tested six species of captive gibbons in an object-choice task (n = 11) for their ability to interpret two different pointing gestures, a combination of body orientation and gaze direction as well as glancing as referential cues. Hand preferences were tested in the object-choice task and in a bimanual tube task (n=18). Results. We found positive responses to all signals except for the glancing cue at the individual as well as at the group level. The gibbons' success rates partially exceed results reported for great apes in comparable tests and appear to be similarly influenced by prior exposure to human communicative cues. Hand preferences exhibited by the gibbons in the object-choice task as well as in a bimanual tube task suggest that crested gibbons (Nomascus sp.) are strongly lateralized at individual but not at population level for tasks involving object manipulation. Discussion. Based on the available data, it can be assumed that the cognitive foundations to utilize different visual cues essential to human communication are conserved in extant hominoids and can be traced back at least to the common ancestor of great and lesser apes. However, future studies have to further investigate how the social environment of gibbons influences their ability to exploit referential signals. Gibbons' manual laterality patterns appear to differ in several aspects from the situation found in great apes. While not extensive enough to allow for general conclusions about the evolution of hand preferences in gibbons or apes in general, our results add to the expanding knowledge on manual lateralization in the Hylobatidae. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstraction allows us to discern regularities beyond the specific instances we encounter. It also promotes creative problem-solving by enabling us to consider unconventional problem solutions. However, the mechanisms by which this occurs are not well understood. Because it is often difficult to isolate human high-level cognitive processes, we utilized a nonhuman primate model, in which rhesus monkeys appear to use similar processes to consider an unconventional solution to the difficult reverse-reward problem: i.e., given the choice between a better and worse food option they must select the worse one to receive the better one. After solving this problem with only one specific example-one vs. four half-peanuts-three of four monkeys immediately transferred to novel cases: novel quantities, food items, non-food items, and to the choice between a larger, but inferior vegetable and a smaller, but superior food item (either grape or marshmallow), in which they selected the inferior vegetable to receive the superior option. Thus, we show that nonhuman animals have the capacity to comprehend abstract non-perceptual features, to infer them from one specific case, and to use them to override the natural preference to select the superior option. Critically, we also found that three monkeys had a large learning and performance advantage over the fourth monkey who showed less generalization from the original one and four half-peanuts. This difference suggests that abstraction promoted problem-solving via cascading activation from the two food item options to the relation between them, thus providing access to an initially nonapparent problem solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is ongoing debate about the extent to which nonhuman animals, like humans, can go beyond first-order perceptual information to abstract structural information from their environment. To provide more empirical evidence regarding this question, we examined what type of information great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans) gain from optical effects such as shadows and mirror images. In an initial experiment, we investigated whether apes would use mirror images and shadows to locate hidden food. We found that all examined ape species used these cues to find the food. Follow-up experiments showed that apes neither confused these optical effects with the food rewards nor did they merely associate cues with food. First, naïve chimpanzees used the shadow of the hidden food to locate it but they did not learn within the same number of trials to use a perceptually similar rubber patch as indicator of the hidden food reward. Second, apes made use of the mirror images to estimate the distance of the hidden food from their own body. Depending on the distance, apes either pointed into the direction of the food or tried to access the hidden food directly. Third, apes showed some sensitivity to the geometrical relation between mirror orientation and mirrored objects when searching hidden food. Fourth, apes tended to interpret mirror images and pictures of these mirror images differently depending on their prior knowledge. Together, these findings suggest that apes are sensitive to the optical relation between mirror images and shadows and their physical referents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social interactions are the result of individuals’ cooperative and competitive tendencies expressed over an extended period of time. Although social manipulation, i.e., using another individual to achieve one’s own goals, is a crucial aspect of social interactions, there has been no comprehensive attempt to differentiate its various types and to map its cognitive and motivational determinants. For this purpose, we survey in this article the experimental literature on social interactions in nonhuman primates. We take social manipulation, illustrated by a case study with orangutans ( Pongo abelii ), as our starting point and move in two directions. First, we will focus on a flexibility/sociality axis that includes technical problem solving, social tool-use and communication. Second, we will focus on a motivational/prosociality axis that includes exploitation, cooperation, and helping. Combined, the two axes offer a way to capture a broad range of social interactions performed by human and nonhuman primates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Source memory, or memory for the context in which a memory was formed, is a defining characteristic of human episodic memory and source memory errors are a debilitating symptom of memory dysfunction. Evidence for source memory in nonhuman primates is sparse despite considerable evidence for other types of sophisticated memory and the practical need for good models of episodic memory in nonhuman primates. A previous study showed that rhesus monkeys confused the identity of a monkey they saw with a monkey they heard, but only after an extended memory delay. This suggests that they initially remembered the source - visual or auditory - of the information but forgot the source as time passed. Here, we present a monkey model of source memory that is based on this previous study. In each trial, monkeys studied two images, one that they simply viewed and touched and the other that they classified as a bird, fish, flower, or person. In a subsequent memory test, they were required to select the image from one source but avoid the other. With training, monkeys learned to suppress responding to images from the to-be-avoided source. After longer memory intervals, monkeys continued to show reliable item memory, discriminating studied images from distractors, but made many source memory errors. Monkeys discriminated source based on study method, not study order, providing preliminary evidence that our manipulation of retention interval caused errors due to source forgetting instead of source confusion. Finally, some monkeys learned to select remembered images from either source on cue, showing that they did indeed remember both items and both sources. This paradigm potentially provides a new model to study a critical aspect of episodic memory in nonhuman primates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability to reason about probabilities has ecological relevance for many species. Recent research has shown that both preverbal infants and non-human great apes can make predictions about single-item samples randomly drawn from populations by reasoning about proportions. To further explore the evolutionary origins of this ability, we conducted the first investigation of probabilistic inference in a monkey species (capuchins; Sapajus spp.). Across four experiments, capuchins ( N = 19) were presented with two populations of food items that differed in their relative distribution of preferred and non-preferred items, such that one population was more likely to yield a preferred item. In each trial, capuchins had to select between hidden single-item samples randomly drawn from each population. In Experiment 1 each population was homogeneous so reasoning about proportions was not required; Experiments 2-3 replicated previous probabilistic reasoning research with infants and apes; and Experiment 4 was a novel condition untested in other species, providing an important extension to previous work. Results revealed that at least some capuchins were able to make probabilistic inferences via reasoning about proportions as opposed to simpler quantity heuristics. Performance was relatively poor in Experiment 4, so the possibility remains that capuchins may use quantity-based heuristics in some situations, though further work is required to confirm this. Interestingly, performance was not at ceiling in Experiment 1, which did not involve reasoning about proportions, but did involve sampling. This suggests that the sampling task posed demands in addition to reasoning about proportions, possibly related to inhibitory control, working memory, and/or knowledge of object permanence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human cognition affords our species an excellent toolbox for solving problems. Many nonhuman animal species appear to share with humans some of these tools. However, human cognition also is fallible. Susceptibility to perceptual illusions, misrepresentation of probabilities, cognitive biases, faulty memory, and heuristics all present sources of error from which behavior is suboptimal in the pursuit of goals. Some nonhuman species share these perceptual and cognitive biases with humans. Examples of this are described for nonhuman primates, ranging from perceptual illusions to humanlike failures on games of probability such as the Monty Hall Problem. Sometimes the performances of nonhuman primates mirror those of humans, but there are exceptions. Given that other species do experience things erroneously and make errors in judgment, it is an exciting question of whether they also might generate any strategies to offset their fallibility. Two examples to suggest that they do are provided from research with chimpanzees. One is of strategic self-distraction in the face of tempting rewards in a delay of gratification task. The other is of information-seeking behaviors in different contexts where chimpanzees have different types of information. This research, and that of many other groups, shows the value of examining perceptual and cognitive errors across species, and how different individuals and different species may be equipped psychologically to deal with the possibility of these errors occurring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sensitivity to variance, or risk, has been considered elementary to economic decision-making, featured prominently in discussions of primate species-typical behaviors and phylogeny and heralded as a challenge to deterministic foraging theory. Most risk sensitivity studies involve dichotomous choices and small spatial scales, providing only limited bases for predicting how variance information might be used across contexts. We examined foraging risk sensitivity in four chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes) which were presented containers associated with particular mean food rewards/variances. Preferences were measured via indoor dichotomous choice tests. Subsequent tasks, designed to assess how well these preferences held up across situations, involved a differing food type, rank-ordering arrays of containers, and/or recovering them in a large outdoor testing area. In addition, some variations involved memory for containers previously observed being hidden. Risk preferences varied by subject, experimental context, reward type, and mean reward quantity. In rank-ordering experiments, under the reward contingencies utilized, mean food quantity was a better predictor of selection order than variance. These results bring into question arguments that species-typical primate risk traits-in the sense of enduring, generalized dispositional features of organisms-have been firmly identified and suggest that many popular experimental strategies are alone inadequate for reconstructing risk-related traits in primate/human evolution. Models from classical foraging theory, which do not address variance, have likely been successful because they include crucial variables with robust predictive value. Determining the importance of variance to naturalistic decision-making, on the other hand, will require further testing in a wide range of experimental and observational contexts. Significance statement: Studies of risk-sensitive foraging traditionally include two options (of differing variances) that involve the same food type, are close to one another, and are visible to the decision maker. We examined risk sensitivity in four chimpanzees and included experiments that involved four choice options, differing food rewards, increased distance between options, and/or choosing between items visually hidden at the time of decision-making. We found that chimpanzees exhibited sensitivity to variance and could utilize mean quantity and variance associations-even in some cases when the items were not visible. However, differences within or between individual apes in the strength or direction of risk preferences occurred when experimental context (e.g., reward type, visible/hidden) was varied. These results suggest that identifications of primate species-specific risk preferences are premature and that studies of risk should be conducted in a wider range of contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1970s, researchers have focused on visual joint attention as a way to observe and operationalize joint attention (JA). I will argue that this methodological choice has neglected other modalities and as a consequence might be missing important elements in the account of the development of JA and the evolutionary history of JA. I argue that by including other modes of interaction, such as touch, we open the possibility of finding that non-human primates and younger human infants engage in basic forms of JA. Moreover, I argue that touch, as a proximal mode of perception, is the ontogenetic precursor of social communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ongoing research explores whether animals have precursors to metacognition-that is, the capacity to monitor mental states or cognitive processes. Comparative psychologists have tested apes, monkeys, rats, pigeons, and a dolphin using perceptual, memory, foraging, and information-seeking paradigms. The consensus is that some species have a functional analog to human metacognition. Recently, though, associative modelers have used formal-mathematical models hoping to describe animals' 'metacognitive' performances in associative-behaviorist ways. We evaluate these attempts to reify formal models as proof of particular explanations of animal cognition. These attempts misunderstand the content and proper application of models. They embody mistakes of scientific reasoning. They blur fundamental distinctions in understanding animal cognition. They impede theoretical development. In contrast, an energetic empirical enterprise is achieving strong success in describing the psychology underlying animals' metacognitive performances. We argue that this careful empirical work is the clear path to useful theoretical development. The issues raised here about formal modeling-in the domain of animal metacognition-potentially extend to biobehavioral research more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated whether nonhuman great apes (N=23), 2.5-year-old (N=20), and 3-year-old children (N=40) infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation by adapting the blicket detector paradigm for apes. We presented chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), orangutans (Pongo abelii), gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), and children (Homo sapiens) with a novel reward dispenser, the blicket detector. The detector was activated by inserting specific (yet randomly determined) objects, the so-called blickets. Once activated a reward was released, accompanied by lights and a short tone. Participants were shown different patterns of variation and covariation between two different objects and the activation of the detector. When subsequently choosing between one of the two objects to activate the detector on their own all species, except gorillas (who failed the training), took these patterns of correlation into account. In particular, apes and 2.5-year-old children ignored objects whose effect on the detector completely depended on the presence of another object. Follow-up experiments explored whether the apes and children were also able to re-evaluate evidence retrospectively. Only children (3-year-olds in particular) were able to make such retrospective inferences about causal structures from observing the effects of the experimenter's actions. Apes succeeded here only when they observed the effects of their own interventions. Together, this study provides evidence that apes, like young children, accurately infer causal structures from patterns of (co)variation and that they use this information to inform their own interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]