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AbstractThe United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide a framework for global development priorities focused on improving human well-being while protecting the environment. Though a modern initiative, the conceptual roots of sustainability and many SDG themes can be traced back over a century. This paper examines the 19th-century Transcendentalist movement and the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, which established a philosophical and ethical foundation closely aligned with sustainable development values. The study begins with an introduction and a brief background on the UN SDGs, followed by an overview of Transcendentalism and Emerson’s contributions. Emerson’s core principles and values—emphasis on nature, simplicity, self-reliance, and moral obligation—are explored in detail, demonstrating their parallels with the 17 SDGs. The paper then argues that Emersonian philosophy provides a foundational framework for sustainability, offering a unique perspective on integrating these transcendentalist insights into sustainability education. This study shows how American intellectual traditions anticipated today’s environmental requirements, emphasizing transcendentalism’s long-term influence and impact on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. The study offers a unique viewpoint on sustainability by considering transcendentalism’s lasting effect and potential contribution to attaining the SDGs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although stories for children often feature supernatural and fantastical events, children themselves often prefer realistic events when choosing what should happen in a story. In two experiments, we investigated whether 3- to 5-year-olds (total N = 240 from diverse backgrounds) might be more likely to include fantastical events in stories about familiar fantasy characters. In Experiment 1, children saw stories about fantasy or real-world characters (e.g., a mermaid or an ordinary woman) and judged whether they would achieve goals using fantastic or realistic methods. Children were more likely to choose fantastic methods for the fantasy characters, and this tendency was more common in older children. In Experiment 2, children were asked yes/no questions about whether characters could use fantastic, realistic, and unusual methods to achieve goals. Children more often affirmed fantastic methods for fantasy than real-world characters. These findings contrast with previous work suggesting children avoid including fantastic events in fiction and suggest that children use precedent and familiarity to decide what can happen in a story. Public Significance Statement: This work helps us better understand how children see stories. Much previous work has found that young children are surprisingly prone to including realistic events in stories, even though so much of the fiction they encounter is fantastical. Our findings suggest children are more likely to include fantastic elements in stories when the stories are about familiar fantastic characters like fairies and superheroes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to the analysis of the validity of changes in the practice of the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court, which should be considered as a deviation from previously formulated legal positions regarding the effective way of protecting the law, using the mutatis mutandis principle. It is emphasized that scientists have the right to carry out a critical analysis of judicial practice in the context of its compliance/non-compliance with the doctrine. A distinction was drawn between the right to interpret laws by the court and the exercise of discretionary powers, in which the degree of discretion is assessed as unreasonable and excessive; the use of used lecture structures is argued. Attention is focused on the inadmissibility of the practical implementation of individual, arbitrarily selected elements of the scientific debate into judicial practice, in particular, concerning the principle of stare decisis and the justification with its help of the right to judicial rule-making - in the form of a precedent that de facto already exists in practice and is recognized by theory, but, being called precedent, is not identical with classical English precedent. The analysis was carried out according to three vectors corresponding to different periods and appropriated standards of judicial practice. The first is a change in the position from “a mistake in choosing an effective method of defense as an independent reason for refusing a claim” to “a refusal to resolve a dispute due to the ineffectiveness of the method of defense chosen by the plaintiff can actually be considered as a limitation of the right to access to court.” The second is the introduction of a flexible approach to understanding the principle of dispositiveness and moving away from an overly formal assessment of the “proper claim”, which “cannot be considered by the courts as an improper method of protection”. The third already marks the conclusion “about the interpretation” of the claim, mutatis mutandis - for the purpose of full protection of the right in one process. The conclusion states that the interpretation (interpreting) of the claim contradicts the principle of dispositiveness, and its flexible interpretation in favor of such an interpretation will violate the right of the other party, who will not be able to predict the result of such an interpretation when constructing and proving its own position. Courts’ excessive fascination with innovations - with the usurpation of the right to rulemaking and departure from the doctrine - is unlikely to contribute to justice. This is indirectly indicated by frequent deviations from previous legal positions, which do not contribute to legal certainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of the textual functioning of mythonyms in the poetic heritage of I.A. Bunin is raised. The relevance of the topic is due to the interest of linguists in the problem of artistic text-building, in particular the author’s preference in vocabulary selection, as well as the unresolved issue of modeling Bunin’s onomasticon. The purpose of the study is to describe the textual connections of mythological names, through which meaningful and conceptual information is explicated and a subtext is formed. The research material included the scientific edition (by Professor T.M. Dvinyatina) of I.A. Bunin’s poetry, from which 272 units were extracted by continuous sampling. The factual material was systematized and interpreted with the descriptive, taxonomic, quantitative methods, contextual analysis, modeling. Standing out against the background of different layers of the Bunin’s vocabulary, mythological names interact with each other, with other semantic subgroups of onyms, appellatives, attributive and verbal vocabulary. The author notes that mythoanthroponyms and theonyms have the richest syntagmatic connections. Contextual synonymy is found in demononyms, mythoanthroponyms, mythopersonyms, mythoponyms and theonyms; and contextual antonymy is found in mythoponyms and mythopersonyms. The intertextual nature and the precedent level determine the associative connections of Bunin’s mythonymicon units. It is concluded that the textual functioning of mythonyms is determined by I.A. Bunin’s intention to overcome the particularization of cultural worlds and create such an individual author’s mythopoetic space where images and plots already familiar to readers are constantly enriched with new meanings. The prospects of the work include the study of Bunin’s prose mythonymicon and the textual connections of mythonyms in it, which will allow to create a consistent onomastic model of Bunin-writer.

In modern conditions, one of the key concepts of the communication space is media, which actualises the dependence of the semiotic organisation of the text on the format properties of the communication channel. Accordingly, the tools for creating a media text, the method and medium of its dissemination in the communication space are undergoing transformation. The 'mosaicism' of the media environment is manifested in the change of the fundamental ideological guidelines and principles of creating a modern media message: the focus is shifting from the word to visualisation, sign, symbol, which are combined in a clip, fragmented presentation of information. The rapid development of interactive media and the creolisation of mass media discourse not only contribute to the creation of new cultural artefacts, but also new forms of precedent that require scientific understanding. The purpose of the study is to carry out a philosophical and cultural analysis of the phenomenon of precedent in the non-verbal practices of the contemporary media space. Research methodology: method of theoretical analysis, which allowed to present a scientific interpretation of precedent in the context of non-verbal practices of our time; descriptive method, which was used to describe the structural, semantic and functional features of the use of non-verbal precedent phenomena in the modern communication space; method of ontological analysis, which was used to study the essence and nature of precedent in the non-verbal dimension of the media space; hermeneutic method, which allowed to interpret and understand the f The generalisations presented in the article have led to the conclusion that the clip and 'mosaic' nature of the media environment actualises such non-verbal means of communication as visualisation, sign, symbol, which have reference, imperative, and set a model for the communicative act. It is proved that a precedent phenomenon of this order is distinguished from these phenomena by its special emotional and cognitive significance. In other words, attempts to differentiate this concept are based on the understanding and recognition of different degrees of 'rootedness' of a precedent text in the mind, and, consequently, different degrees of its culture-creating potential. The practical significance of the study is to substantiate the connection between the phenomenon of precedent in the non-verbal practices of modern mass media and the cognitive experience of the public consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The significance of the research lies in addressing the critical issue of judicial misinterpretation by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which is subsequently mirrored by subordinate courts, potentially infringing upon citizens' rights and freedoms. This study aims to thoroughly develop theoretical frameworks to enhance constitutional and legislative measures in Kazakhstan, thereby increasing the efficacy of legal norm interpretation and its impact on criminal justice administration. Utilizing analysis and comparative legal methods, this research examines various statutes and scholarly theories to ensure the theoretical and practical soundness, objectivity, and credibility of the findings. The investigation identifies legislative gaps, particularly in the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 480-V "On Legal Acts" and administration of criminal justice, proposing amendments for legislative enhancement and advocating for the incorporation of case law into the Kazakh legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Socialist courts are supposed to apply the law, not make it, and socialist legality denies judicial decisions any precedential status. In 2011, the Chinese Supreme People's Court designated selected decisions as Guiding Cases to be referred to by all judges when adjudicating similar disputes. One decade on, the paucity of citations to Guiding Cases has been taken as demonstrating the incongruity of case-based adjudication and the socialist legal tradition. Citations are, however, an imperfect measure of influence. Reproduction of language uniquely traceable to Guiding Cases can also be evidence of their impact on judicial decision-making. We employ a local alignment tool to detect unattributed text reuse of Guiding Cases in local court decisions. Our findings suggest that Guiding Cases are more consequential than commonly assumed, thereby complicating prevailing narratives about the antagonism of socialist legality to case law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Derecho del Estado is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

While developments of a shared intellectual tradition, the enactivist approach and the organizational account proffer importantly different accounts of organismic normativity. Where enactivists tend to follow Hans Jonas, Andres Weber, and Francisco Varela in grounding intrinsic affordance norms in existential concern, organizational theorists such as Alvaro Moreno, Matteo Mossio, and Leonardo Bich seek a more deflationary account of these normative phenomena. Critiques directed at both of these accounts of organismic normativity motivate the introduction of the precedential account of organismic normativity, which I nevertheless locate within the enactivist approach, broadly construed. After detailing empirical evidence that would seem to vindicate the precedential account, I explore some of its implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The method of reflective equilibrium is typically characterized as a process of two kinds of adjustments: hold fixed one’s current set of commitments/intuitions and adjust rules/principles to account for them, then hold fixed those rules while making adjustments to one’s set of commitments. Repeat until no further adjustments are required. Such characterizations ignore the role of precedent, i.e., information about the commitments and rules of others and how those might serve as guides in one’s own process of deliberation. In this paper we develop a model that narrows in on a local part of a reflective equilibrium process in which a group of peer agents start with identical lists of commitments and work towards finding the rule that captures that set. If successful, we say they reach rest stop interpersonal convergence. The trouble is that, without precedent, reaching this convergence rests on implausible deterministic assumptions. We analyze how far the inclusion of a kind of soft precedent goes towards aiding the group in reaching said convergence when those assumptions are relaxed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the use of precedent by the European Court of Human Rights. It examines the various types of precedents in the practice of the Court and how they are utilized. It discusses different methods of development of case law, including overruling precedents, branching of the case law, and fragmentation of the case law. The article also proposes guidelines for the orderly development of case law.

n prezentul articol am realizat un studiu complex a aspectelor practice privind aplicabilitatea jurisprudenței CtEDO la judecarea căilor de atac în cadrul procesului penal. Lucrarea conține analiza aspectelor teoretice și practice ce vizează soluționarea problemelor procesuale prin apelare la practica Curții Europene a Drepturilor Omului, abordând în cadrul procesului penal importanța precedentului CtEDO și determinarea necesității de aplicare a acestuia. Articolul evidențiază importanța aplicării precedentului Curții Europene, ca izvor de drept în cadrul procesului penal, fiind analizate premisele și consecințele aplicabilității jurisprudenței CtEDO la judecarea căilor de atac.

The article analyzes the use of precedent by the European Court of Human Rights. It examines the various types of precedents in the practice of the Court and how they are utilized. It discusses different methods of development of case law, including overruling precedents, branching of the case law, and fragmentation of the case law. The article also proposes guidelines for the orderly development of case law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Actual Problems of Jurisprudence / Habaršy. Zan̦ Seriâsy is the property of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Humility holds a modest but important place among the judicial virtues. But in spite of its growing popularity, it does not yet have a place on the 'central judicial virtues' lists. This paper provides an argument that judicial humility, especially institutional judicial humility, should be considered a necessary judicial virtue at least in common-law jurisdictions. This is because it is a necessary ingredient in precedent-based decisions that are fully justified from the point of view of the law and of political morality. Further, while it is sufficient that individual judges make decisions that a humble judge would have made, the judicial community must in fact be humble in order to produce fully justified common-law decisions – humility is therefore necessary as a community-virtue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some recent work in legal theory argues that legal questions boil down to moral questions. On this view, lawyers and judges are ultimately interested in the moral effect of things done by legal institutions. This view has been called the 'new legal anti-positivism'. So far, it has not given a convincing account of precedent. That is, it has not explained how moral reasons can account for what judges do in practice when they follow past decisions. Any successful account must explain the central features of this practice: why lower courts follow higher courts, and not the other way around; the difference between ratio and obiter ; and the situations in which judges distinguish or overrule past decisions. This article gives a non-positivist account that meets this challenge, by giving a prominent place to the moral importance of roles. The account avoids some problems faced by existing non-positivist accounts of precedent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article considers two different interpretations of the reason model of precedent pioneered by John Horty. On a plausible interpretation of the reason model, past cases provide reasons to prioritize reasons favouring the same outcome as a past case over reasons favouring the opposing outcome. Here I consider the merits of this approach to the role of precedent in legal reasoning in comparison with a closely related view favoured by some legal theorists, according to which past cases provide reasons for undercutting (or 'excluding') reasons favouring the opposing outcome. After embedding both accounts within a general default logic, I note some important differences between the two approaches that emerge as a result of plausible distinctions between rebutting and undercutting defeat in formal models of legal reasoning. These differences stem from the 'preference independence' of undercutting defeat. Undercutting reasons succeed in defeating opposing reasons irrespective of their relative strength. As a result, the two accounts differ in their account of the way in which precedents constrain judicial reasoning. I conclude by suggesting that the two approaches can be integrated within a single model, in which the distinction between undercutting and rebutting defeat is used to account for the distinction between strict and persuasive forms of precedential constraint. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court has wide discretion to choose the cases it will decide. But how does the Court exercise this discretion? The Supreme Court’s rules explain that it may hear any case “important” enough for it to decide. Unsurprisingly, commentators have criticized this standard as “hopelessly indeterminate” and “intentionally vague.” The Court, however, has said more about how it decides whether to grant review. We need simply to look to its merits opinions. These decisions sometimes offer a brief, informative description of the decision to grant review. These oft-overlooked statements may, in aggregate, be suggestive of trends in the Court’s agenda-setting discretion. This Article presents a text and data analysis of thousands of Supreme Court opinions describing the reason for granting review, collectively illuminating which cases are important enough to merit certiorari. This view into certiorari helps reveal which cases earn the Court’s attention and how the Court’s priorities change over time. This analysis finds, for example, that the Court’s docket shifts in response to large events (e.g., depressions and wars) and to significant political developments (e.g., landmark legislation). And, perhaps more concerning, individual appointments also shape the Court’s docket. The Court should thus better explain its decisions to grant review in the mode of a common law of certiorari. Doing so can improve the interbranch dialogue over judicial reform, offer better information to litigants, and instill greater confidence in our Supreme Court.

This article discusses the Criminal Appeal Act Section 8 and its implications for retrials in criminal cases. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) has the power to order a retrial if it believes it is in the interests of justice. Section 8 of the Act sets a two-month time limit for re-arraignment after a retrial order, and failure to comply with this requirement can result in the retrial being deemed invalid. The article presents a case study where the appellant argues that their conviction should be quashed due to a failure to comply with Section 8. The Court of Appeal ultimately agrees with the appellant and quashes the conviction. The article also provides commentary on the importance of arraignment and compliance with Section 8 in retrial cases. [Extracted from the article]

Prezentul articol este un studiu complex al aspectelor practice privind impactul jurisprudenţei CtEDO asupra soluţionării cauzelor penale. Lucrarea conţine analiza aspectelor teoretice și practice ce vizează soluţionarea chestiunilor procesuale prin apelare la practica Curţii Europene a Drepturilor Omului, abordând în cadrul procesului penal importanţa precedentului CtEDO și determinarea necesităţii de aplicare a acestuia. Articolul evidenţiază importanţa aplicării precedentului Curţii Europene ca izvor de drept în cadrul procesului penal, fiind analizate premisele și consecinţele aplicabilităţii jurisprudenţei CtEDO.

This Article draws on research into precedent and the European Court of Justice to argue that it is distinctive in almost never retreating from a standpoint it has taken, or overturning an earlier judgement, by contrast with other Supreme Courts where this is a more common occurrence. The Article then considers the implications of this finding for research into the relationship between the Court and other actors, such as Member States, litigants and institutions. It suggests that in considering how the Court may be influenced and constrained this research takes insufficient account of its apparently limited capacity to change doctrinal direction. Evidence of doctrinal path dependence needs to be a more central part of discussions of the Court as a relational actor.

This paper contributes to an ongoing debate concerning the perceived judicial activism of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It argues that the output of the Court should be better viewed as the phenomenon of judicial law-making, not unlike in domestic jurisdictions. However, unlike many domestic legal systems, the European Convention on Human Rights framework promotes large quantities of judge-made law. This outcome results from a combination of objective factors that, taken together, enhance the process of judicial law-making by the ECtHR. Those factors include the applied mode of interpretation of the Convention, the approach to its construction, the weak textual basis, the existence of positive obligations, the lack of the doctrine of precedent, the extremely high case law and judicial turnovers, the concurrent legislative inactivity, the existence of the inter-state jurisdiction and the doctrine of autonomous meaning. At the same time, the judicial law-making is only hindered by the doctrine of subsidiarity, the principle of margin of appreciation and the Fourth Instance doctrine. As a consequence of this overwhelming dominance of the factors enhancing the process of judicial law-making over those that hinder it, the ECtHR produces large quantities of judge-made law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do global trade rules evolve? This article argues that agreements create precedent that shapes subsequent negotiations, and policymakers exploit this precedent. Specifically, states sequence agreements, using negotiations with likeminded or relatively less important partners to establish model rules for subsequent use where negotiations will be more challenging. By institutionalizing negotiating positions where stakes are low, negotiators seek to improve the odds of replicating preferred terms in later, more challenging deals. A two-stage regression analysis on trade agreement design from 1965 to 2016 and qualitative probes from the UK and New Zealand support the argument: agreements with less important partners are presented as strategic opportunities to innovate and set precedent. Legal language has a way of sticking around, and states know it. States sign agreements with an eye to the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Foco (Interdisciplinary Studies Journal) is the property of Revista Foco and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article introduces the phenomenon of intentionality in media texts with a precedent phenomenon in the headline. The author studied the way intentionality develops, functions, and structures itself. Journalists often incorporate precedent phenomena into the media text to demonstrate their intention and creativity. However, the intentional nature of online texts is a major text-forming feature that makes the sender choose particular linguistic means to affect the addressee. The intentional potential of using precedents from different subject areas in media texts showed the following trends: the corpus of precedents expands, and precedent units redistribute themselves relative to the core and periphery.

Introduction. Until today, the prevailing opinion is that precedent did not play a significant role in the legal system of Rome. However, a number of sources, in particular the papyrus entries of judgement which record the provincial legal practice in Roman Egypt in the period from the 1st to the 3rd centuries, say otherwise. The significant role of precedent in the legal system of Rome is also evidenced with the texts of M. Tullius Cicero, M. Fabius Quinctilian, Pseudo-Asconius, G. Julius Victor. Theoretical analysis. The study of these texts makes it possible to understand what terms the Romans used to denote an authoritative judicial decision, what semantic content they put into them, and how close this content is to the modern idea of a judicial precedent. To designate a court decision that becomes a model, and which judges will be guided by when considering other cases with similar circumstances, Roman talkers use the terms res iudicata, praeiudicium, and exemplum. The precedent, in its classical sense, contains the fundamental legal provisions formulated by the judge in relation to this case, which are usually denoted by the term ratio dicendi. The question arises whether the decision of the court in Rome could establish these legal principles followed by other judges. Empirical analysis. The answer to this question can be obtained by considering the case of the so-called Fulcinian Estate. Being the representative of Caecina in this case, Cicero warns the recuperators against accepting the arguments of his opponent, Piso, based on the legal consequences of their possible decision. Thus, in this case, the judges could issue a decision containing a new legal principle, formulate a generalized legal position in relation to this case. Results. Court decisions in the legal system of Rome had the power of authority. They possessed it for a reason, due to the generalized legal reasoning or legal principles formulated by the judges in relation to the situation under consideration. That is why they became precedents. There were many such court decisions in Rome, they had sufficient authority and contained certain legal principles that judges applied when considering cases with similar circumstances.

This article examines the issue of the creation of case law in regard to interim measures in civil proceedings. Taking into account the rules for the formation of court precedents, the author assesses how court precedents are created by applying interim measures. The article draws attention to the peculiarities of the court system of Lithuania in the formation of court practice regarding interim measures. It is emphasized that, at this moment, there is no single institution in the Lithuanian legal system that forms the final case law on issues of interim measures, and on certain issues the case law is contradictory. The article also analyzes the right of the cassation court to create case law on interim measures. Lastly, the author offers suggestions on how to solve the issues discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A general practice of precedent is one that can plausibly apply to any well-functioning legal system. This practice, which can be grounded in the Rule of Law, needs to make it the case that courts always have a legal reason for following relevant precedent – even if the precedent is morally suboptimal, so long as it is not evil. Without this reason, a precedent may be treated as having no legal influence for the later court ('the Null Model'), and this runs counter to the Rule of Law. On top of this reason, courts may have a general legal obligation to follow precedent – stare decisis – but this risks entrenching morally bad decisions in the law. We need, therefore, a type of reason that lies in between the Null Model and stare decisis as a necessary step for any future justification of stare decisis. But how can courts have a legal reason for following morally suboptimal precedent? They can have that reason, I argue, in virtue of a specific judicial duty, positively laid down in a legal source, which aims to advance the Rule of Law in an institutionalised way. In this article, I aim to explain and justify that judicial duty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article draws on research into precedent and the European Court of Justice to argue that it is distinctive in almost never retreating from a standpoint it has taken, or overturning an earlier judgement, by contrast with other Supreme Courts where this is a more common occurrence. The Article then considers the implications of this finding for research into the relationship between the Court and other actors, such as Member States, litigants and institutions. It suggests that in considering how the Court may be influenced and constrained this research takes insufficient account of its apparently limited capacity to change doctrinal direction. Evidence of doctrinal path dependence needs to be a more central part of discussions of the Court as a relational actor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reflects on one of the challenges Gerald Postema’s account of the autonomy thesis poses to Raz’s pre-emption thesis in judicial practice and precedent. Certain flaws in the pre-emption thesis, as applied to courts, come to light upon analyzing the autonomy challenge, whereas some aspects of the former are better understood from the perspective of the latter. This work shows that, although these two theses seem to clash, the autonomy challenge leads instead to an alternative approach to the pre-emption thesis that allows exploring some disregarded relationships between judicial practical reasoning and precedent. Drawing from this Raz-Postema debate, I argue for an alternative reading of the autonomy challenge by introducing the hermeneutic strategy of courts (HeSCo) as a tool to analyze the role of officials as addressees of exclusionary legal directives and its explanatory force. The HeSCo ultimately unravels the paradox by holding the pre-emption thesis as central to the proper understanding of judicial practice and precedent.

The description of the history of early Rome (VIII-IV centuries BC) in the works of ancient authors is usually perceived as a mythological legend, which shifts the focus of scientific discussion to assessing the degree of reliability of the events being told. As a result, the normative-value and legal significance of ancient legends sufficient attention of researchers. The oral and therefore naturally plastic nature of archaic law creates additional difficulties for its modern study, in contrast to numerous and well-studied legislative texts. The author proposes to refer to modern types of legal understanding and turn down strict positivism with the aim of expanding the boundaries of legal analysis, rethinking the legend (on the example of Lucius Junius Brutus), recognizing it as a source of Roman law, and reconstructing its criminal law content. For this purpose, using socio-psychological, historical-legal, formal-logical and other scientific methods, the author singles out that part of the story that was not lost, but was steadily reproduced from generation to generation. The surviving core of the legend remained in history because it carried socially significant information modeling of behavior (behavioral stereotypes) of the ancient Romans. The article shows that children`s execution by the first republican magistrate not only legitimized the right of paternal power (patria potestas), but also proclaimed the priority protection of the public interest (civitas) that became the cornerstone of the Roman legal order. The legend set a special imperative for citizens, shaped their worldview and sense of justice. From the criminal law standpoint, this precedent fixed the standard of both prohibited behavior and retribution for it, i.e., a measure of justice, broadcast the requirements of the inevitability and personal nature of responsibility, laid foundation for the requirement of legal equality of all citizens before the law. Ultimately, the legend set the vector for the development of Roman criminal law, which led to the formation of its principles, many of which are accepted and developed in modern legal systems.

Copyright of Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny (0035-9629) is the property of Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article explores a protracted dispute in the exchequer of receipt that initiated lasting procedural reform. The argument revolved around contested narratives of exchequer history which had direct implications for officers' fees, rights and status. The ferocity of the dispute has rendered it one of the most‐studied episodes in exchequer history, yet historians have largely focused on procedural reform and dismissed the ardour of the protagonists. This article recontextualises the dispute within its political and physical context in the Palace of Westminster to argue that the feud was not merely personal but political. By drawing together officers' personal papers with exchequer records and architectural records of the palace, this article demonstrates the agency of individuals in influencing institutional reform. The protagonists operated within webs of overlapping loyalties between crown, institution and patrons which reflects the place of the Receipt in central government. Consideration of the warring officers in this context reveals that the outcome of the dispute was not in spite of their passions, but a product of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]