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Power transitions among major states have shaped the course of cooperation in the history of the international system. We study this relationship from a public opinion angle by examining the effect of a potential power transition on attitudes towards bilateral trade liberalization. Power transitions can spur political and economic conflict because the rising power gains greater influence over the course of world politics, including trade rules, allowing it to assert its national interest and the interests of its citizens. This implies that citizens in the rising power are more supportive of bilateral economic cooperation than citizens in the declining power. Empirical findings from parallel, survey‐embedded experiments in China and the United States lend support to this conjecture. Great Power competition, therefore, interferes with current international economic affairs – an aspect that has received less attention in previous research on trade politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China constitutes a challenge for the U.S. hegemonic aspirations. However, Washington reacts to it rather belatedly and with restrain. Up until the mid-2020s, the United States did not consider the preventive use of force as a means to deter its competitor. On the contrary, it maintained intensive economic ties with China, contributing to its further strengthening. The article argues that the U.S. policy towards China reflects the optimism within the U.S. leadership regarding the long-term preservation of the foundations of its international standing. In other words, the United States does not perceive itself a declining power; rather, it believes that China will not be able to compete with it in the forceable future. In this regard, the U.S. has pursued primarily a delaying strategy, combining restrained pressure with unwillingness to either escalate or make significant concessions. The U.S. optimism proceeds from the prevailing uncertainty in international relations about the relative balance of power among great powers and the unclear prospects of future shifts in national capabilities. Under these conditions, Washington relies on ideological convictions in the superiority of its political, economic and social model over its competitors and appeals to the past patterns of great power rivalry. This study covers the period from the late 2000s to the mid-2020s. The article begins with a theoretical justification of the origins of optimism of weakening powers. Then, it examines changes in balance of power between the U.S. and China based on traditional indicators of national capabilities. Following this, the article explores the arguments against the U.S. decline and summarizes official assessments of threats to U.S. global standing. Finally, it traces the comparative roles of accommodation, coercion and restraint in the U.S. policy towards China. The analysis envisages an adjustment in the conceptual understanding of the dynamics of great power rivalry. It demonstrates that the lack of reliable information does not necessarily lead to intensifications of rivalries (as suggested by the “security dilemma”), but can also limit confrontation.

This article examines the strategies the United States and China have adopted in their current competition associated with the proverbial power transition. The article argues that despite the dangers of a potential war resulting from power transition, the US-China relationship is likely to muddle through until the two countries find a way to coexist peacefully. The reasons are twofold: the United States, the status quo power, is not willing or prepared for a direct conflict with China even though it is determined to contain China's rise; and China, on the other hand, has shown no desire to replace the United States as a dominant global power and is working to consolidate its standing as a major power in the multipolar world. Though both powers claim that they are not interested in war, due to lack of trust, the policies they take are perceived as provocative and confrontational by the other side and have the potential to bring about an actual conflict between them, especially in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. As a result of intense competition between them, relations at all four levels-global, governmental, societal, and individual-have deteriorated since the Trump administration. The US-China rivalry has also put some third parties in a difficult situation in which they may feel compelled to choose sides. The paper suggests that the US-China rivalry is taking place in an era with nuclear weapons and AI technologies, which makes it even more challenging to manage the power transition now. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and China are engaged in an intense security competition that can be described as a new Cold War. What is driving the downturn in US-China relations? Many analysts attribute the cause to decisions made by individual leaders. In contrast, this paper argues that the main cause of the US-China rivalry is structural rather than individual. The changing distribution of power between the two nations is generating structural pressures that push them into strategic competition. Fear of being overtaken by China has prompted Washington to move away from a policy of engagement to a policy of containment. Compared to the last one, this new Cold War will be more dangerous because of China's greater power potential, East Asia's maritime geography, and the fervor of nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the literature on rising powers, we contend that India has historically perceived itself as a civilizational entity and benefited from the loopholes opened by power transition periods to connect its material capabilities with its normative ambition. Our methodology compares how India behaved after the Cold War (from 1991) with China's emergence (2008 onwards) through three variables: (i) the acquisition of economic and military power, (ii) the quest for globalized authority, and (iii) the deliberate pursuit of international leadership. We conclude that if the first was already present after the Cold War, the other two only followed more recently, when India employed a deliberate strategy to shape global issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Interventions Économiques is the property of Association d'Economie Politique and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The cycle of power is a theory of international relations developed by George Modelski during the Cold War in order to identify the mechanism of power transfer from one global power to another. To become a world power, a country must fulfil four conditions: a specific geography, a democracy and an open society, a leading economy, and the development of a global strategy. The last cycle of power in modern history was the American cycle, which began at the end of the Second World War and has continued until the present day, with the USSR and China as challengers. Therefore, the US-China rivalry can be seen as a case study to examine the theory of power transition and China’s potential to become a world power. China fulfils three of the four conditions proposed by George Modelski in his theory in order to become a world power, but due to the distribution of power in East Asia, China’s ability to become a world power remains extremely limited. Moreover, China’s incorporation into the international institutional architecture created by the United States is advantageous because it increases the likelihood of a peaceful transition of power between the two countries. However, despite China’s ability to create a cycle of power, it will continue to be a second-rank power in the international system, which can lead to political, social, or economic instability. As a result, it will be difficult for the Chinese leadership to create a cycle of power in the future while maintaining its political influence.

The 14th Brazil Russia India China South Africa (BRICS) Summit hosted by China on the 23rd and 24th of June 2022 has significance for world politics and global governance. Emerging powers or rising powers have in recent times had significance in terms of global governance. The emergence of rising powers and the subsequent shift in power from the Global North to the Global South can be seen as the new transformations that are occurring in the international order. New groupings such as the G7, G20, BRICS, Malaysia, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkiye, Australia (MIKTA) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organizations have now become significant players in the realm of global governance. They can also be seen as catalysers for the shifting of influence in terms of global governance. In this article, the shifting influence of power from the North to the South will be analysed in the context of status competition. The article would subsequently assess the BRICS grouping in terms of its quest for influence in global governance. Additionally, the article would also assess if this choice to achieve influence in global governance could result in the emergence of conflict between established powers and rising powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies profound contradictions within and across nuclear deterrence strategies that evolved in response to the proliferation and modernization of nuclear weapons. To reconcile theory with practice, we summarize the theoretical assumptions and implications of nuclear strategy. Informed by these discussions, we develop a decision-theoretic model of deterrence based on power transition theory. We explore conditions for the stability of deterrence and link outcomes to policy decisions. The conditions for conflict emerge when a dissatisfied nuclear nation is threatened with conventional loss, when conventional and nuclear parity is achieved and if dissatisfied non-state actors acquire even minimal nuclear capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This empirical study examines the reactions of 114 political science graduates in Malaysia, through a questionnaire-based survey on the power transition crisis that took place February 23rd to 1 March 2020. Throughout these “seven long days”, there was little opportunity given to university students, who were concerned with the Malaysian political affairs, to share their views in light of the “Sheraton Move” polemics and the formation of a new government (Perikatan Nasional, PN). Various responses from the students in the survey have been recorded among these are: the attitudes regarding the polemics of PN’s “backdoor government”; the conspiracy of the opposition’s political parties to topple the Pakatan Harapan (PH) leadership; the prospect of Mahathir’s unity government; the proposal for parliament dissolution and re-election; and the lessons behind the crisis. This study establishes that the 60.6 percent of the respondents rejected the power transition as it was during the political crisis, as well as supporting the criticisms on the formation of PN as betraying the people’s mandate. Respondents (86.0 percent) also agreed that the Majesty King (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) had played an effective role during the turmoil and proposed re-election and dissolution of the parliament at the expense of justice for all. The lessons derivable from the “Sheraton Move” is that the real politics approach is not relevant in the context of modern democracy, in Malaysia; there is the need to retain the spirit of consociational politics and the importance of political education for the youth in Malaysia, in particular, the future new voters.

We explore the possibilities and limitations of models of the demand for military expenditures, as against additional kinds of cross-country analyses, with an empirical focus on the Indo-Pacific region. Our research bridges a gap between the Defence Economics and International Relations literatures by developing testable security alignment hypotheses and by testing these hypotheses in three ways: with demand modelling on total expenditures, with analyses on estimated stocks of imported armaments, and with qualitative analyses of trends in defence cooperation between states. We find consistent evidence across research methods of an increase in threat perceptions towards China since around 2012 and of balancing behaviour by US allies and by two non-allies. As compared to standard demand modelling, our hypothesis-based mixed methods approach allows for a clearer treatment of samples with mixed and shifting security alignments and of states that stabilise or reduce expenditures in the face of rising threat perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines the Chunqiu Era, also known as the Spring and Autumn Period, which occurred in ancient China from 770 to 476 BCE. The objective is to analyse this historical period within the framework of contemporary international relations (IR) theory. The primary objective of this research is two-fold: firstly, to examine the application of International Relations (IR) theories, specifically Power Transition Theory and Hegemonic Dynamics, within the context of ancient history; and secondly, to promote an interdisciplinary methodology that integrates archaeological, geographical, and philosophical perspectives in the analysis of this particular time period. The present study utilises an interdisciplinary approach, incorporating historical analysis, archaeological evidence, geographical data, and philosophical perspectives. This study examines the historical records and archaeological discoveries of the Chunqiu Era, employing Geographic Information System (GIS) technology to analyse various geographical aspects. Through the analysis of concurrent occurrences in adjacent civilizations and the integration of perspectives from other academic fields, this study aims to develop a holistic comprehension of the international relations during the Chunqiu Era. The study reveals the continuing significance of modern International Relations theories when applied to the Chunqiu Era, exposing recurring patterns of power shifts, challenges to hegemony, and diplomatic strategies. This statement underscores the significance of taking into account cultural, geographical, and temporal intricacies while modifying international relations theories to suit ancient circumstances. Furthermore, the research highlights the importance of incorporating multidisciplinary and cross-cultural studies to enhance the understanding of historical events. The research findings have far-reaching ramifications for both the academic community and society as a whole. This highlights the versatility of IR theories in accommodating various historical contexts, hence promoting their wider utilisation. Interdisciplinary techniques can offer valuable contributions to future research endeavours by augmenting historical study and fostering a deeper comprehension of interconnection. The present study contributes to the advancement of knowledge in the field of ancient Chinese history and underscores the need of incorporating multiple cultural viewpoints in the pursuit of historical research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Power transition is the top priority in energy transition. All existing power transition paths have been studied under the same system; thus far, no basic research has investigated what paths are involved and how they cooperate with each other under the interaction of different systems. Taking the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA), featuring a "one country, two systems" approach, as an example, this research identified and quantified the best path for the GBA's power transition and explored the mode of cooperation during the power transition among the three regions under the interaction of different systems. The results showed that a combination of multiple low-carbon technologies is the best option for the GBA's deep power transition, which can be characterized by the following components: "gas increase, nuclear increase, coal guarantee, and low proportion of renewable energy". In this scenario, the GBA can achieve a carbon peak of 167 million tons of CO2 in 2023. Before 2030, the GBA needs to first develop class H gas power, photovoltaic power and nuclear power while phasing out subcritical and below thermal power cogeneration, and subcritical and below coal power. After 2030, a significant increase will be needed in the installed capacity of distributed gas power to replace some class E and F gas power units. Distributed rooftop PV power generation will be the mainstream method of renewable energy generation. Power generation through waste incineration can also provide a prominent contribution to urban biomass power. Under the interaction of different systems, breaking the technical barriers among the three regions would represent a breakthrough for establishing a cooperative power transition. A "one primary system, two auxiliary systems" theoretical framework of cooperation is proposed, and the scope of its application is revealed. This study can provide a case reference for the establishment of a win–win cooperation mechanism for energy transition in different countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines four schools of thought about US strategy in Asia, particularly regarding China. These four viewpoints—here termed the responsible stakeholder, communist collapse, constructive cooperation, and managed competition schools—are determined largely by the answers to two questions. First, to what degree should US policies focus on integrating China into the international order, versus mitigating the consequences of China's rise? Second, should US policy makers seek a specified end state with China, or simply focus on achieving a stable steady state? Based on a detailed analysis of existing commentary, we assert that most debates about US objectives vis-à-vis China revolve around these questions. This essay concludes that US policies are likely to incorporate aspects of all four theories, which will make it difficult—if not impossible—for the United States to adopt any clear and sustained strategy across administrations. Barring a major breakthrough or breakdown in US–China relations, Washington is destined for a muddled debate on China that will make it difficult to achieve strategic consensus. And this strategic confusion on China will have substantial implications for US regional strategy more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Relações Internacionais is the property of Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This empirical study examines the reactions of 114 political science graduates in Malaysia, through a questionnaire-based survey on the power transition crisis that took place February 23rd to 1 March 2020. Throughout these "seven long days", there was little opportunity given to university students, who were concerned with the Malaysian political affairs, to share their views in light of the "Sheraton Move" polemics and the formation of a new government (Perikatan Nasional, PN). Various responses from the students in the survey have been recorded among these are: the attitudes regarding the polemics of PN's "backdoor government"; the conspiracy of the opposition's political parties to topple the Pakatan Harapan (PH) leadership; the prospect of Mahathir's unity government; the proposal for parliament dissolution and re-election; and the lessons behind the crisis. This study establishes that the 60.6 percent of the respondents rejected the power transition as it was during the political crisis, as well as supporting the criticisms on the formation of PN as betraying the people's mandate. Respondents (86.0 percent) also agreed that the Majesty King (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) had played an effective role during the turmoil and proposed re-election and dissolution of the parliament at the expense of justice for all. The lessons derivable from the "Sheraton Move" is that the real politics approach is not relevant in the context of modern democracy, in Malaysia; there is the need to retain the spirit of consociational politics and the importance of political education for the youth in Malaysia, in particular, the future new voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of the 'Ovidius' University of Constanta. Political Science Series / Analele Universitatii Ovidius din Constanta, Seria Stiinte Politice is the property of Editura Ovidius University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The bidirectional resonant DC transformer has all the desired features to drive the development of the DC power distribution networks of the future. This power-electronics converter provides galvanic isolation between DC buses, has desired open loop properties, and follows the system’s power flow naturally, requiring only a power reversal algorithm to allow a bidirectional operation and smooth transitions. This paper proposes a solution to tackle the power reversal of the DCT with a dynamic algorithm, considering the system behaviour and the power converter characteristics. The proposed algorithm executes the power reversal in few switching periods and removes the DCT losses during no-load condition. Then, using low voltage prototype of DC transformer, experimental results along the paper demonstrate how this power reversal algorithm is applied under various operating conditions.

In 2020, humanity witnessed with perplexity the expansion of the largest pandemic outbreak in the last century. The coronavirus crisis would have tragic effects on society and healthcare throughout the world, but its consequences go far beyond these two areas. In the field of international relations, the pandemic has impacted the balance of power between the United States and China, whose relationship was already facing rising tensions. While the former was unable to control the spread of the virus in its territory, the second managed to curb it after the initial bewilderment. In order to evaluate the impact of COVID-19 on the balance of power between both countries, this paper will focus on three areas: economic power, ideological power, and international maneuverability. The results indicate that China has been relatively favored, but also that the United States still has opportunities to preserve its international leadership.

Thucydides Trap has become a familiar term in scholarly and even popular discourse on Sino-American relations. It points to the ancient rivalry between Athens and Sparta as an analogy for contemporary relations between China and the United States. This analogy warns about the increased danger of war when a rising power catches up to an established power. This essay raises concerns about (mis)application of historical analogy, selection bias, measurement problems, underspecified causal mechanisms, and so on that undermine the validity of the diagnosis and prognosis inspired by this analogy and other similar works. My objection to this genre of scholarship does not exclude the possibility that China and the U.S. can have a serious conflict. I only argue that this conflict can stem from sources other than any power shift between them or in addition to such a shift. By overlooking other plausible factors that can contribute to war occurrence, a monocausal explanation such as Thucydides Trap obscures rather than clarifies this phenomenon. Because it lends itself to a sensationalist, even alarmist, characterization of a rising China and a declining U.S. (when the latter in fact continues to enjoy important enduring advantages over the former), this perspective can abet views and feelings that engender self-fulfilling prophecy. Finally, as with other structural theories of interstate relations, Thucydides Trap and other similar formulations like power-transition theory tend to give short shrift to human agency, including peoples ability to learn from the past and therefore to escape from the mistakes of their predecessors.

What are intentions and how should states decipher them? For scholars, the debate about uncertainty and intentions lies at the heart of international relations. And yet there are theoretical and empirical issues with how scholars have defined, measured, and operationalized intentions to date in the context of understanding China's rise. This article reviews the English and Chinese language literature on intentions and revisionism and presents five propositions that should drive research moving forward. First, a theory of intentions requires a definition distinct from aspirations, motives, preferences, objectives, goals, and grand strategy. Second, states' intentions about ends should be analyzed independently from those about means. Third, assessments of whether a country's intentions are good or bad are subjective and vary based on from which country's perspective the analysis is undertaken. Fourth, states' intentions vary not only by issue area, but also within a particular issue area, just as international institutions, or territorial disputes. And lastly, while there may be uncertainty about intentions, that does not make them unknowable. Embracing these five propositions allow for a more productive research agenda and policy recommendations based on data-driven research instead of wishful thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the four main military strategies of the People's Republic of China towards the security architecture of East and South China Sea under President Xi Jinping. These strategies cover a region that has been under the US alliance system's security umbrella since the Cold War. This paper demonstrates that the People's Republic of China, under the current leadership, seeks to reorder the regional security architecture to its favour by leveraging military modernisation, influence operations and diplomatic-economic power to remove the influence of the US and its allies over the East and South China Sea. The present study argues that the successful conclusion of the rising power's strategies over the East and South China Sea will translate the current geopolitical rivalry into a power transition to the detriment of the established power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Smithsonian magazine (Jan-Feb) 2019 edition published facts about U.S. military intrusion in 14 countries including Afghanistan, as a consequence of the 9/11, 2001 attacks on its soil. U.S. invasion and its following bleak strategy raise questions on the rationale of this decision because Afghanistan had never been that powerful and capable of posing a security threat to U.S. Foreign invasion and following withdrawal that is pledged to be completed 9/11, 2021 have its specific reasons as well as implications in the region that need to be explored. Hence, the pretext of military invasion on the territory of Afghanistan and maintaining it for two decades is not very strong. However, after this long military presence the U.S. finally decided to withdraw from the state that could be strategically important. Little scholarly work has been done to explain the reasons of withdrawal of superpower from a small country after a long-time presence. South Asia is one of the important regions to study for several reasons firstly considerable size of the region's population, strategic location, contribution to the productive capacity of the world, and variations in political systems. The theory of neoclassical realism better explains the role of a domestic political system to distort the pursuit of security. It focuses on the behaviour of the United States in deciding on withdrawal. This study addresses a key research question that is, why the United States, being a superpower willingly withdraws its military presence from a much smaller country, Afghanistan that could have a strategic value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how power transition theory could provide insights into the trade war between the United States and China. The paper shows that the trade war between the United States and China is a manifestation of power transition in the international system. As a rising power with growing economic might, China seeks to increase its influence and position in the international system through various global initiatives. In responding to this, the United States tries to maintain its position as a global leader by imposing trade barriers to suppress the rise of China. This strategy intends to slow the U.S.’ decline as a global hegemon. This article aims to contribute to understanding the relations between power transition, hegemony, and trade wars.

The United States and its allies within the European Union have been unable to forge a common response to deal with the rise of China. Even though China’s growing global presence might undermine the international position of the United States, Washington’s European allies have sometimes refused to close ranks with their American ally. And more importantly, European engagement with China during the last decade has lacked internal consistency and cohesion, to the point that the European Union has rarely been the relevant actor when it comes to shaping Europe-China relations. This is the conclusion reached by this paper after analyzing the EU’s behavior on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative, the adoption of Huawei’s 5G technology and the consideration of China as a threat within NATO’s framework. The European Commission has been unwilling or unable to unite the member states around a common position on these four cases. However, the findings of this article also support the idea that an embryonic model of strategic autonomy was already underway during the last decade, and that the growing awareness within the EU about the importance and implications of China’s rise brings new geopolitical opportunities for the union. Received: 28 July 2021 Accepted: 05 November 2021

The rise of non-Western powers has led to competing claims about how these states act among each other and how they behave vis-à-vis established powers. Existing accounts argue that the rising powers are a heterogenous group of competing states and that they are socialized into the existing Western-centered order. This article challenges these claims, arguing that the rising powers are dissatisfied with the international status quo and that they have begun to form a bloc against the established powers. The authors contend that this dissatisfaction arises from their lack of influence on the international stage, their status in the international hierarchy and the norms that sustain the current international order. They maintain that the formation of a rising powers bloc is driven by the countries' economic growth and international dynamics, fostering their institutionalization as IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). To support this argument, the study combines spatial modeling techniques to analyze rising power voting behavior in the UN General Assembly over the period 1992–2011. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto is the property of Universidad de Deusto and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Sino-American Rivalry in the Second Decade of the 21st Century: A Comparative Analysis of Barack Obama and Donald Trump Policies The Sino-American trade war has become a symbol of rivalry for leadership in the international system. It also attracts growing attention to the problem of possible change to the regional and global hegemony. The debate with its possible ramifications is clear to academics, the media and political elites. However, it has focused on a limited scope of factors and mostly at the leadership level of, most notably, the United States of America. Considering its complexity, the issue of US policy towards China should be analyzed at various levels. These include the presidents, their collaborators, domestic politics and US strategy, and, finally, the international system as it experiences the relative change of power distribution. The main goal of this article is to analyze the recent US administrations’ strategy towards the People’s Republic of China. This is in the context of changes to the international system, focusing on the relative change of power distribution. The hypothesis driving this article states that the US strategy towards China is a response to the changing relative distribution of power in the regional and global system. It follows that American administrations differ rather in methods than in goals of foreign policy. This text is prepared with reference to the Power Transition Theory of A. Organski and J. Kugler, and the research is based on the US strategic documents’ analysis and statistical analysis of the power distribution in the system.

This article attempts to provide an alternative perspective on the US-China trade war by integrating power transition theory and the concept of soft power in examining the nature of the trade war and conditions that fuelled it. The discussion also includes the possibility of the emergence of a new global order led by China beyond the trade war. This study used a qualitative approach by analysing primary and secondary sources such as speeches of representatives from both China and the US, books, journal articles, newspaper articles and research by both national and international organisations. The findings revealed that the main trigger of the trade war was not trade deficits or unfair practices, as other literature has suggested, but rather a desire by the US to prevent the decline of American hegemony. We argue that there are three reasons why China cannot form a new global order and replace the US as a global hegemon within the next decade. First, following the trade war, there is growing wariness about Chinese firms and investments, globally. Second, China’s soft power is relatively ineffective, and its culture less appealing to Third World countries as compared to the US’s. Finally, unlike the US, China does not have a strong and expansive network of allies supporting its quest for global leadership.

Copyright of Rouya Turkiyyah is the property of Insight Turkey and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Sino-American trade war has become a symbol of rivalry for leadership in the international system. It also attracts growing attention to the problem of possible change to the regional and global hegemony. The debate with its possible ramifications is clear to academics, the media and political elites. However, it has focused on a limited scope of factors and mostly at the leadership level of, most notably, the United States of America. Considering its complexity, the issue of US policy towards China should be analyzed at various levels. These include the presidents, their collaborators, domestic politics and US strategy, and, finally, the international system as it experiences the relative change of power distribution. The main goal of this article is to analyze the recent US administrations’ strategy towards the People’s Republic of China. This is in the context of changes to the international system, focusing on the relative change of power distribution. The hypothesis driving this article states that the US strategy towards China is a response to the changing relative distribution of power in the regional and global system. It follows that American administrations differ rather in methods than in goals of foreign policy. This text is prepared with reference to the Power Transition Theory of A. Organski and J. Kugler, and the research is based on the US strategic documents’ analysis and statistical analysis of the power distribution in the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – According to the conventional wisdom, trade is not a zero-sum game, but a positive-sum game. By allowing countries to focus on producing the goods that they can produce relatively efficiently, free trade is largely beneficial for everyone involved. Then, why are the world’s two largest economies (i.e. the USA and China) currently engaged in a trade war, which is likely to hurt their own economies? What is the driving force for the trade war between the two economic giants? The purpose of this paper is to offer an explanation of the underlying cause of the US–China trade war. Design/methodology/approach – In an effort to make sense of the trade war between the USA and China, the paper draws the insights from the two international relations theories – i.e. hegemonic stability theory and power transition theory. Findings – As China continues to threaten US hegemony in the world in general and East Asia in particular, the Sino–US competition for hegemony will intensify over time. As a result, the trade war between the two countries may persist longer than many anticipate. Further, even if the trade war between the two superpowers ends soon, a similar type of conflict is likely to occur later as long as the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry continues. Originality/value – The central thesis of this paper is that “US fear” about its declining hegemony and China’s rapid rise as a challenger of US hegemony is driving a US-launched trade war with China. Since the underlying cause of the trade war between the world’s two largest economies is political (i.e. the Sino–US hegemonic rivalry) rather than economic (e.g. US attempts to improve the trade balance with China by imposing tariffs on Chinese goods), the paper contends that the full understanding of the trade war requires close attention to the importance of power competition between the two superpowers.

This special issue examines the consequences of the ongoing power transition in the world economy for global regulatory regimes, especially the variation in rising powers' transition from rule‐takers to rule‐makers in global markets. This introductory article presents the analytical framework for better understanding those consequences, the Power Transition Theory of Global Economic Governance (PTT‐GEG), which extends the scope of traditional power transition theory to conflict and cooperation in the international political economy and global regulatory governance. PTT‐GEG emphasizes variation in the institutional strength of the regulatory state as the key conduit through which the growing market size of the emergent economies gives their governments leverage in global regulatory regimes. Whether or not a particular rising power, for a particular regulatory issue, invests its resources in building a strong regulatory state, however, is a political choice, requiring an analysis of the interplay of domestic and international politics that fuels or inhibits the creation of regulatory capacity and capability. PTT‐GEG further emphasizes variation in the extent to which rising powers' substantive, policy‐specific preferences diverge from the established powers' preferences as enshrined in the regulatory status quo. Divergence should not be assumed as given. Distinct combinations of these two variables yield, for each regulatory regime, distinct theoretical expectations about how the power transition in the world economy will affect global economic governance, helping us identify the conditions under which rule‐takers will become regime‐transforming rule‐makers, regime‐undermining rule‐breakers, resentful rule‐fakers, or regime‐strengthening rule‐promoters, as well as the conditions under which they remain weakly regime‐supporting rule‐takers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine the ways in which the global financial crisis that began in 2007, and whose effects arguably condition policymaking to the present day, affected the ongoing global power transition as manifested by the unilateral decisions undertaken by official agencies comprising national regulatory states. The theory of that power transition articulated in the overview paper of this Special Issue is reinterpreted to take into account the circumstances of that crisis. Empirical evidence on the propensity to discriminate against foreign commercial interests by the BRICS, Turkey, the European Union, and the United States during the years 2008 to 2017 at, and behind, the border is employed to identify a group of six potential rule‐shapers and two possible sham rule‐takers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes China's and India's role as emerging rulemakers in one of the most contested fields of international cooperation: labor mobility. It shows how both countries have seized the trade venue to negotiate labor mobility clauses that go well beyond the original preferences of established powers. Whereas India's more vocal claims have faced resistance, China's success in concluding far‐reaching bilateral deals with Western countries is explained with stronger domestic regulatory capability and capacity. Maintaining a technocratic approach in trade negotiations, supported by the centralization of relevant competences in the trade ministry and consistently synchronizing external commitments with domestic reforms, China has been able to convey its market power into regulatory influence. As a result, the global standard for negotiating mobility in trade agreements has risen – notwithstanding the enduring stalemate at the multilateral level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dissatisfaction is a major concept in power transition theory, which postulates that a rapidly rising power tends to be dissatisfied with the international system and would thus attempt to reform or replace it, whereas the hegemonic power would, by default, be satisfied with and work to maintain the status quo. This paper, however, offers an alternative outlook on the reigning-rising power dynamics by examining the conditions for and implications of hegemonic dissatisfaction and rising power satisfaction. It argues that although China, as a potential systemic challenger harboring grievances against the existing global regimes, has been a recurrent subject for studies, it is the United States, the established hegemon, that appears increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo. The U.S. dissatisfaction is informed by a set of internal and external factors often justified with a reference to China as a challenger, and is manifested in a number of anti-system strategies, including unconventional diplomatic rhetoric, as well as withdrawal from various international institutions or attempts to undermine them. The U.S. discontent, as contrasted with China’s satisfaction as a rising power, has a number of potential geopolitical and economic implications at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, endangering the viability and sustainability of the universally accepted political and economic regimes.