Search

The paper clarifies Havel's perception of post-democracy through his various writings and speeches, in comparison with the concepts of post-democracy as proposed by C. Crouch, J. Rancière, R. Rorty, S. Wolin, J. Habermas, and Ch. Mouffe. Consequently, Havel's critique of the then Western parliamentary democracy and the very essence of his notion of post-democracy will be thoroughly illuminated. The historical and intellectual circumstances that shaped his thinking on the topic will be analysed as well. Some misinterpretations of Havel's thinking that have emerged in the meantime will also be clarified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay deals with the contemporary debate on the so-called crisis of democracy in light of the ideas of «post-democracy» and «de-democratization» and the link between this crisis and neoliberalism with respect to the relationship between politics, democracy, equality and collective action. The first paragraph is devoted to the lemma «postdemocracy» and traces its historical and theoretical roots to the semantic of «post». The second section shows how from a neoliberal perspective the crisis of democracy does not constitute a problem (as in the «post-democracy» perspective), but a solution to a problem, namely the «problem» of an «over-democratization» of society. In order to do so, this section reflects on the link between considerations expressed in the Report of the Trilateral Commission (1975) and the recent epistocratic political proposals. Finally, after a brief analysis of the criticism addressed to epistocracy, which are discussed in the third paragraph, the fourth one outlines some conclusions that reconnect the discourse on the crisis of democracy to the issues of equality and collective actions.

In taking stock of the ruling Fidesz party's project of 'illiberal democracy' in Hungary, this article first develops considerations based on Claude Lefort's democratic theory for critiquing 'illiberal democracy' and post‐democracy alike, situating the former in an early 2010s post‐democratic moment characterised by the emergence of a neoliberal crisis management regime in the Eurozone. 'Illiberal democracy' and 'market‐conforming democracy' are both problematic from this standpoint insofar as they subordinate the key Lefortian dimension of democratic contestation to either the primacy of the markets or a reified conception of the 'national interest' as represented by a single party. The analysis then traces the development of 'illiberal democracy' and its construction of key signifiers such as the 'national interest' in programmatic speeches made by Viktor Orbán, from its beginnings in the post‐democratic moment to subsequent crisis conjunctures in which it has redefined itself against ever newer threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Scienza & Politica is the property of University of Bologna, Department of Political & Social Sciences Alma Mater Studiorum and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of A&C - Administrative & Constitutional Law Review - Revista de Direito Administrativo e Constitucional is the property of A&C - Revista de Direito Administrativo & Constitucional (Instituto Bacellar) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In bringing together the literature on post-democracy and theoretical work on the politics of affective societies, this article explores how democratic education might benefit from a sustained examination of negative emotions and affects associated with democratic disenchantment. In particular, the analysis highlights what is gained by introducing a more pedagogically and politically robust approach toward 'ugly' and 'negative' feelings in the context of democratic education in schools, namely, a pedagogical approach that recognizes the gloomy ramifications of post-democracy in the daily life of teachers and young people and inspires transformative action that contributes toward practical 'democratic innovations' in the sphere of civil society. This article contributes toward ongoing efforts for the renewal of democratic education in schools by urging teachers and researchers to rethink pedagogically how to navigate productively the ugly and negative feelings of democratic disenchantment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The parallels and differences between current forms of populism and early 20th-century fascism have been the focus for much discussion. This article examines the relevance today of Karl Mannheim's analysis of fascism and of its relationship to democracy in the 1930s. He argued that the threat of fascism arose from the very nature of liberal democratic society, rather than being a product of external forces. He claimed that liberal democracy is transitional, rather than stable in character, and that the new emerging form of governance that was required to replace it shared a key component with fascism: a high level of social and economic planning. At the same time, he insisted that, as a pathological development, fascism served to illustrate the disastrous consequences that a failure to engage realistically with the process of societal development can have for upholding Western civilisational ideals. This article explores Mannheim's arguments against the background of current thinking about populism and 'post-democracy'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks into the critical potential, but also the limits of the current discussion on post-democracy and the crisis of democracy and proposes an examination of the concept of crisis. The thesis is that the current talk of a crisis of democracy suggests an uncritical, namely restitutive understanding of the crisis that could be appropriated for an apology of Western liberal democracy. In contrast, the text argues for a renewed focus on the self-reflexive and critical potential of the term. Based on a pragmatist concept of problem and action, "crisis" is defined as a certain kind of problem-solving problem and further determined on the basis of four criteria. The contribution this definition makes to the current debate is shown by the example of Jacques Rancière's diagnosis of post-democracy, which can be read as a diagnosis of crisis in the defined self-reflexive and critical sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are on the way to post-democracy – but where are we today? This article discusses the post-democracy thesis against the background of recent social problems such as the Corona pandemic, the rise of right-wing populism and the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. On the one hand, these problems indicate that Western democracies have taken a further step towards post-democracy. On the other hand, democratic potentials, such as a strengthening civil society and supranational democratic institutions, were also revealed in dealing with these problems. The article argues that in order to counteract post-democratic tendencies, both formal and informal democratic elements need to be strengthened and that it is more necessary than ever to build "bridges" between the two. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the crisis situation in the EU today, caused by the dominating influence of big companies and banks in public affairs on national and European levels in post-democracy (C. Crouch). In light of the political-economic and critical approach, the article analyses the power of global firms as a main factor in the New public management (NPM) during the current neoliberal capitalism. The postdemocratic consequences by the implementation of the NPM in the EU and its member states are: a) emptying political institutions of their democratic content; b) defective market economy due to existing monopolies, and c) attempts to privatisation of civil society. The conclusion comprises some ideas for the rehabilitation of politics and its democratisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Direito e Práxis is the property of Editora da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (EdUERJ) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Dominated by the 'weak postsocialist civil society' thesis, Central and Eastern Europe has generally been uninspiring for social movement scholars. In recent years, a growing body of scholarship has challenged this pessimistic notion, highlighting the emergence of grassroots activism. What remains under-researched, however, is the process of political subjectification of society's apolitical segments through contentious practices. Informed by pragmatic sociology, this article explores three case studies – of student, civic and environmental movements, respectively – that demonstrate how citizens constituted themselves as collective political subjects by performatively enacting their citizenship through resistance in post-democratic Montenegro (2010–2015). Through analysis of news media sources and interviews with activists, this article postulates three trajectories of political subjectification – political becoming, political bonding and political embodying – by which citizens (re)gain their civic autonomy, allowing them to challenge dominant power relations and to attain political legitimacy to think, speak and act as relevant political actors on the public stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adult learning and education (ALE) policies are studied in this essay in relation to various conceptions of democracy, and of post-democracy. The author observes that the dominant political discourses, notably in the European Union, have been influenced by technocratic conceptions of ALE. In this context, and invoking the imperatives of the knowledge society, ALE for cognitive democracy and for participatory forms of deliberative democracy tends to be diminished by elitist theories. This results in the subordination of ALE to formal democracy and proceduralism, as well as to hetero government carried out by specialists. The post-democratic dimensions in ALE policies have weakened the potential for promoting an educated democracy and the development of a knowledge democracy capable of recognising different educational epistemologies and various forms of knowledge. Understanding the processes that have led to an erosion of democracy in ALE public policies requires the study of the impacts produced by new meritocratic ideologies and expertocracy, induced by discourses around the global race for talent. It is concluded that more than a century of democratic educational thinking, of various shades, have been overtaken by the impacts of new managerialism on education, under the rigours of meritocracy, efficiency, and competitive performativity. These and other elements of the global education reform constitute research problems confronting educational communities and academic researchers. They are required to understand the politicity in their research agendas and to democratise it, seeking to strengthen their relative autonomy for critical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article intervenes in the debate on populism and democratic reform. Assuming that neither progressive populist counter-projects nor reforms broadening participation or deepening deliberation provide an immediate and realistic solution to the problematic political condition, the article engages with John Dewey's work and presents a democratic praxis focused on problem solving as the most promising remedy to the populist challenge. The analysis shows that Dewey conceptualizes human action as inherently focused on problem solving, which allows him to think democracy as an associated activity to articulate and solve problems through public inquiry. Drawing on the critique that powerful groups prevent democratic problem solving activities, I develop his argument that a problem-centred democratic project must attach itself to 'wants and interests that are actually operating'. Against this backdrop, the pragmatic way forward to the repression of populist authoritarianism lies in the expansion of democratic problem solving, which, I conclude, can be realized by interweaving intelligent action into the habits of democratic parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this special issue, we draw on pragmatist political and social theory and philosophy to illustrate the creative potential of this intellectual tradition for thinking about the numerous crises that haunt liberal democratic societies today. The introduction identifies five overlapping problem constellations (demise of public power, lasting consequences of inequality, pluralization of society, return of authoritarian practices and globalization of the world) that have driven the recent rise of undemocratic or authoritarian patterns of social organization and political rule. Against this backdrop, we conclude that the revitalization of certain dimensions of liberal democracy will not suffice to overcome these problems, which means that democratic practices need radical rethinking and reconceptualization. For this intellectual and political endeavour, we argue, pragmatism provides a suitable framework to identify problems that require resolution and define and mobilize collective problem solving capacities from already existing practices. All eight contributions to this special issue draw on pragmatist political and social theory and philosophy to illustrate to what extent, and to what ends, this intellectual tradition can revitalize the political and social discourse on the past, present and future of democracy. The articles are organized in two sections : (1) Pragmatist critique and the critical potential of pragmatism, (2) pragmatist politics and theories of democratic practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Academic Journal of Philosophy / Felsefi Düşün is the property of Pinhan Yayincilik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper I argue that there is an affinity between the ‘dissident’ in Havel’s essay “The Power of the Powerless” and the ‘spectre’ in Derrida’s readings of Marx. Both are manifestations of a specific modern temporality that Derrida calls “disjointed”, because it is haunted by a revolutionary force and claim for justice. Both also evoke the weak messianic power inherent in Walter Benjamin’s historiography and the spectral responsibility recognised by this power, that is, our responsibility for past and future generations. In post-totalitarian Czechoslovakia, the “nonpolitical” dissident community prefigured the renewal of moral experiences of responsibility and solidarity. In contemporary discussions of democracy, the figure of the spectre is a reminder of the significance of the Marxist legacy beyond its ideological doctrine.

In the article, post-capitalism is viewed not as a prospect of a progressive movement towards a brighter future, but as archaization – the establishment of social relations reminiscent of pre-capitalist ones. Concepts are considered, the authors of which point to the corresponding tendencies: parcelling of sovereignty, merging of economic and political power, blocking the paths of upward mobility, class and caste character of social stratification, and much more. The article substantiates that the reasons for these trends should be sought not only in neoliberalism. The author puts forward the thesis that some of the phenomena associated with modernist progress (increasing the share of the middle class in society, accelerating social mobility, etc.) were a historical exception because, thanks to the industrial revolution, the broad masses of workers acquired a significant “negotiation” advantage in the form of a well-sold labour force involved in material production. This advantage disappears as production becomes more automated and the creative economy grows. Creative “labour” is much more difficult to sell due to the unpredictability of the creative process itself. Economic elites, in turn, rarely invest directly in “human capital”, preferring to look for talents and “appropriate” them, rather than develop them on a massive scale. This leads to the corresponding transformations of the social structure. Nevertheless, the article argues that the terms referring to the past (neo-feudalism, etc.) are unlikely to be suitable for a correct assessment of the current situation. We are in a different situation when the omnipotence of the “neo-feudal” can quite be countered by a perspective in which the universal and purposeful acceleration of scientific and technological progress is accompanied by a growing demand for maximizing the realization of everyone's talents.

This article interrogates dominant definitions of "populism" found in the social sciences, focusing on the term's conceptual utility in understanding recent changes in Western polities. Though populism is typically treated as a deviant form of politics, this article finds that it in fact holds remarkable continuities with conventional politics, and indeed culture more generally. It argues that these more general cultural processes can be illuminated by cultural sociology, just as the more specific but still routine political processes can be illuminated by Civil Sphere Theory (CST). The article goes on to argue that when populism is understood as a formal mode of public signification, rather than a substantive ideology, the substance it signifies becomes crucial to determining its civility. It suggests that while populism can certainly have anti-civil effects, there is nothing inherent in it that precludes it from also acting to promote civil repair. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Archives of Criminology / Archiwum Kryminologii is the property of Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Legal Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The paper discusses the main trends in changing forms of political contestation of citizens in contemporary competitive and non-competitive political regimes. Social transformations led to the destruction of traditional social groups capable of joint political action. Along with social changes in the political sphere, the nature of the basic institution of political contestation - political parties - has changed, acting as political opposition. Contemporary political party reduces the scale of citizen involvement in political action, increasing the cost of political advertising, thereby becoming dependent on influential economic interest groups and state funding. The weakening of the political pressure of society through institutionalized channels led to the disappointment of the democratic system as a whole. Citizens in the contemporary world increasingly prefer noninstitutionalized and illegitimate forms of political action. However, observations of dispute practices in North Africa, the Middle East, Spain, the United States, France, and Russia in the 2010s demonstrate that the dominant position of institutional channels of influence on political and public decisions has been maintained. New opportunities of the Internet for organizing collective actions of citizens have not led to the formation of a new identity of dissatisfied people and the consolidation of effective online deliberation practices.

The concept of participation has been defined in different ways over time and also the practices of political participation have been interpreted and classified in many different ways in the political procedures of the representative democracies. Similarly, the notion of conflict presents various critical points: even in some forms of democratic innovation, the conflict has been expunged or anesthetized. The growing centrality of the digital ecosystem represents a new variable: on the one hand, in fact, it offers spaces for mobilization and political action, on the other hand, it reveals itself as the outcome of a digital capitalism in which the dealignment of power between citizens and platforms is resolved clearly in favour of the latter. The emergence of what has been defined as “platform society” is connected with the affirmation of post-democracy. The public sphere - increasingly fragmented - is also evolving towards what has been defined as the “post-public sphere”. The transformations taking place can be better understood if framed in the “paradigm of the crisis”, made even more evident in the time of the pandemic. A review of many concepts then becomes necessary, within a scientific horizon that does not renounce to critically analyse its own tools.

The project of liberal democracy is inherently marked by tensions between its liberal and democratic pillar. This means that liberal democracy needs to constantly strive for a balance between conflicting principles. If it does not contain these centrifugal forces, liberal democracies risk becoming subverted from within due to one principle clearly dominating the other. In this article, we start from the idea of liberal democracy depending on balance to systematically assess multiple endogenous challenges to democracy. We identify four types of deformations and show how they are qualitatively distinct phenomena, yet systematically relate to each other. We furthermore discuss what the co-existence of several such deformations means for the notion of liberal democracy understood as a state of balance. In sum, the proposed framework adds to existing research by providing a systematizing and theoretically grounded assessment of ongoing subversive tendencies in liberal democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author conducts a comparative analysis of authoritarian liberalism’s concepts in contemporary political theory. The article deals with the main directions of interpretation of authoritarian liberalism in the framework of methodological approaches and conceptual models of neoliberalism, ordoliberalism, John Rawls' theory of political liberalism, Jan-Werner Mueller's “restrained democracy”, Jürgen Habermas' “legitimation crisis”, Colin Crouch's “post-democracy”, Michael Wilkinson's “de-democratization”, Crawford Macpherson's “participatory democracy”, Wolfgang Streeck's “democratic capitalism crisis”, Giandomenico Majone's «crypto-federalism». The basic analytical concept is the idea of authoritarian economic liberalism, fi rst proposed by H. Heller and K. Polanyi. For the purpose of methodological refl ection, an analytical review of methods and concepts based on modern political and constitutional theory and used in the study of the institutional specifi cs of authoritarian liberalism has been carried out. Authoritarian liberalism is conceptualized as the neoliberal ideology and practice of de-democratization and restriction of democracy, which results in regionalization of protest against the supranational regime of liberal democracy and political integration in Europe. If authoritarian liberalism focuses on economic liberalism, then authoritarian ways of implementing policies are subject to the interests of private property: authoritarianism strengthens economic liberalism, which, in turn, reinforces the EU's “authoritarian transformation”. In the context of the Euro-crisis, authoritarian liberalism restricts traditional forms of representative democracy, political struggle, and the legitimation of power, contributing to the reanimation of ethnic nationalism. In contemporary Europe, right-wing euroskeptics are gaining popularity. The authoritarian-liberal restriction of social democracy can lead not only to the strengthening of capitalism, but also to the revival of the reactionary forms of «new nationalism» and authoritarian illiberalism. The EU is developing today in the “neo-colonial paradigm” in accordance with the relations between the core and the periphery between creditor countries and debtor countries. Transnational solidarity suppressed by authoritarian liberalism can become a democratically legitimate tool for resolving a fundamental confl ict between market capitalism and representative democracy

The author conducts a comparative analysis of authoritarian liberalism’s concepts in contemporary political theory. The paper deals with the main directions of interpretation of authoritarian liberalism in the framework of methodological approaches and conceptual models of neoliberalism, ordoliberalism, political liberalism, J.-W. Mueller’s ‘restrained democracy’, J. Habermas’ ‘legitimation crisis’, C. Crouch’s ‘post-democracy’, C. Macpherson’s ‘participatory democracy’, M. Wilkinson’s ‘dedemocratisation and delegalisation’, W. Streeck’s ‘democratic capitalism crisis’ and G. Majone’s ‘crypto-federalism’. The basic analytical concept is the idea of authoritarian economic liberalism, first proposed by H. Heller and K. Polanyi. This paper will sub-stantiate that in crisis and transformational periods the actualisation of authoritarian liberalism corresponds to the fundamental tension between market capitalism and representative democracy. The author conceptualises authoritarian liberalism as the practice of dedemocratisation and restrained democracy, which results in the regionalisation of radical protest against the supranational regime of political integration in Europe. Latent political authoritarianism strengthens economic liberalism, which, in turn, reinforces the further EU’s ‘liberal authoritarian transformation’. Authoritarian liberalism restricts traditional forms of representative democracy, contributing to the reanimation of populism and political radicalism. The authoritarian restriction of representative democracy can lead not only to the strengthening of market capitalism, but also to the revival of reactionary forms of ‘new nationalism’ and illiberalism. Today, the EU’s regime is transformed from a nominally rule-based structure supported by market discipline into a ‘discretionary order’ reinforced by bureaucratic power. The EU’s transnational solidarity can become a democratically legitimate tool for a de-escalation of tensions between market capitalism and representative democracy.

The crisis in Greece in the last decade has led to a wide economic transition, raising the question of whether Greece can be understood as a kind of a 'post-growth' society. The article has two aims. First, it examines how the Greek crisis has been discussed within the post-growth debate and focuses on three views: Greece as a post-growth anti-paradigm, Greece as an opportunity for democratic post-growth and austerity in Greece as a path for anti-Keynesian degrowth. Second, the article examines how ideas and projects with a post-growth orientation have influenced specific social initiatives born out of the crisis period in Greece. Some of these initiatives are reviewed (self-organized social and economic collectives, grassroots initiatives for solidarity, solidarity economy actions, etc.). As further discussed in the article, these initiatives were part of a broader 'countermovement' (Polanyi), and they faded together with other forms of labour and social protest, in accordance with events at the central political scene, and especially SYRIZA's adoption of Memoranda politics. It is observed that in the post-Memoranda era in Greece, although past strategies of social reproduction are either unavailable (the pre-crisis finance-led growth model) or no longer equally effective (the familistic social model) and fiscal discipline remains, the search for other alternatives, including social initiatives with a post-growth orientation, did not actually extend as was expected, due to some new growth opportunities, e.g. in the field of tourism. It is finally concluded that, although they constituted an important part of the Greek countermovement, born as responses to the crisis, these social initiatives did not manage to consolidate more permanent structures of social action that could successfully challenge the neoliberal agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Social Sciences Institute / Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi is the property of Bingol University / Rectorate and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

When it comes to the status of democracy, the current times present a curious chasm: On the one hand, the depoliticization of contemporary discourses and institutions has led to both the diagnosis of a factual 'post-democracy' and a normative legitimacy crisis of democracy; yet on the other, there has been a resurgence of normative democratic ideals and practical 'democratic innovations' in the sphere of civil society. This article evaluates the potential of these innovations to engender a genuine renewal of democracy. I find that, despite their emancipatory underpinnings, most participatory and deliberative innovations fit a description of (mere) citizen activation – an elite-led engineering of citizen engagement that, beyond the control of citizens themselves, not only fails to lead to empowerment, but can even work to perpetuate existing structures. In recognition of the ambivalent nature of the post-democratic condition, I argue academics and democratic practitioners must accept a new, more responsive role in relation to citizens and the wider society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the European Commission's information policy during the heavily politicised Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Through the methodologically innovative use of Freedom of Information requests, it moves beyond official discourse to reveal how internal deliberation among Commission officials is preoccupied with monitoring and containing civil society mobilisation against the deal. Underpinned by elitist conceptions of democracy, public opinion emerges as a problem to be solved through strategic public relations, despite the Commission's discursive commitments to greater transparency and political dialogue with citizens. The findings challenge the widely-held notion that a 'communication deficit' between European Union institutions and their publics is at the root of the perennially elusive formation of a European public sphere. Instead, approaching TTIP as a key frontline in the struggle over post-democracy, I conclude that antipublic ideas encoded in the Commission's information policy are reflective of historically engrained institutional ambivalence towards public-political participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a country with a diversity of languages, religions, ethnicities and cultures, Indonesia is particularly vulnerable to the hostile play of identity politics. Lies produced during the Post-Truth period exploit many emotional sentiments and provoke interest groups to act based on primordial impulses that support certain political interests. The negative turbulence related to identity politics due to the chaotic circulation of hoaxes and misinformation is feared to lead to a Post-Democratic situation. Taking the case study of the two most influential elections in Indonesia: the 2017 Jakarta provincial election and the 2019 presidential election, this paper will explore how the Post-Truth phenomenon incorporates the issue of identity politics to generate a Post-Democratic situation in Indonesia. Secondary data analysis from the news and social media will be employed to further explain how identity politics is distorted in the media, and how it can generate social and political turbulence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Statistics was established and accompanied the existence and formation of state in the modernization process. Understood and used as a science born not within the civil society, but within the heart of the modern state, statistics has functioned for centuries as a very ideological social knowledge process controlled only by the state. This paper based on neo-Weberian approach points out that what had been wide- known in modern times as being political becomes nowadays more bureaucratic due to various political processes such as the European Union integration or New Public Management reforms, challenges that directly affect the place of national official statistics within the European governance system1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Japan's imposition of export controls against Korea in July 2019 and its following countermoves, including the termination of the General Security of Military Information Agreement, the governments of both countries have presented their own narratives of the origin of this trade war, both of which mirror theories of international politics. Nonetheless, these narratives mask several domestic origins. Most importantly, this paper demonstrates that behind the trade war, there has been a preoccupation of the two governments with mutually irreconcilable version forms of historicism. One is Korea's pro-naturalist historicism, seeing Korean history as being preordained by the universal laws of human progress and defining Japan as a historical reactionary. The other is Japan's anti-naturalist historicism, upholding internationalism as a new driving force of history that will transform Japan from a war criminal state into a proper subject in international society while criticizing Korea as being a drag on this transformation. This paper argues that, resulting from decades-long neoliberal politics that have disturbed the state-society balance, the national structure of post-democracy has encouraged each government to push historicism to its limit as an alternative source of political legitimacy in lieu of democratic accountability. Concretely, it shows that post-democracy has determined (1) the historicist framing of emerging conflicts, (2) the government's legislative struggles to realize historicist policies, and (3) the incontestability of historicist hostility by other ideas in each country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our paper is proposing a futurological study on urban evolution between XXI-XXII centuries, within what we prefer to call "a global order of metropolises and megalopolises". We shall approach briefly, a typology of future cities, as based on mega-constructions and Vertical Architectonic Ensembles (VAAs) as groups of skyscrapers and, in a future improved scenario, made from thyssenkrupps (mega-buildings surpassing the present level of the highest skyscraper, inclusively Burj al-Khalifa). New technologies, new materials of buildings and new architectonic conceptions will begin to re-define the concepts of urbanism and city. Within the present paper, we shall try to define concepts as Urbanocene, global order of metropolises, the First Chain of Serenissimas, the Second Chain of Serenissimas, the orbital city, the hanged gardens, by using some references to historical periods of time (Babylon, getic antic cities- dava-, medieval castles). Perspectives about mobile and re-combining cities are spectacular, innovating on the "city" concept itself, abandoning the idea of a fixed, terrestrial city, in favor of detachable, re-composing, hybrid cities, a trend of XXII century that will redefine fundamentally the urban habitat, in our opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of participation has been defined in different ways over time and also the practices of political participation have been interpreted and classified in many different ways in the political procedures of the representative democracies. Similarly, the notion of conflict presents various critical points: even in some forms of democratic innovation, the conflict has been expunged or anesthetized. The growing centrality of the digital ecosystem represents a new variable: on the one hand, in fact, it offers spaces for mobilization and political action, on the other hand, it reveals itself as the outcome of a digital capitalism in which the dealignment of power between citizens and platforms is resolved clearly in favour of the latter. The emergence of what has been defined as "platform society" is connected with the affirmation of post-democracy. The public sphere - increasingly fragmented - is also evolving towards what has been defined as the "post-public sphere". The transformations taking place can be better understood if framed in the "paradigm of the crisis", made even more evident in the time of the pandemic. A review of many concepts then becomes necessary, within a scientific horizon that does not renounce to critically analyse its own tools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]