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Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In Islamic Republic of Iran, femininity encounters a distinct conflict with the prevailing political system discourse. The rise of political Islam after the Islamic revolution has resulted in extensive limitations on women’s rights and the institutionalized suppression of their freedoms. In light of the constraints imposed by the I.R, social media platforms, particularly Twitter, have become vital spaces for accessing valuable information pertaining to competing political discourses, specifically those concerning women-related issues. This study examines the frequency and nature of women-related indicators generated by the opposition movement on Twitter from early 2020 to early 2022. The findings indicate that, relative to other groups, subversive oppositions place a stronger emphasis on women’s demands. Drawing inspiration from feminist discourse and advocating for the elimination of political Islam, subversives argue that women’s demands cannot be met without overthrowing the Islamic Republic. They focus on topics such as women’s rights violations and the individual’s right to choose whether or not to wear the hijab, thereby posing significant challenges to the I.R. These challenges were further intensified by the death of Jina (Mahsa) Amini, who died while in the custody of morality police, leading to widespread public demonstrations in the summer and fall of 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research focuses on new courses of action taken by Muslims in their fight against Islamophobia in global cities like London, Paris, and Madrid. Employing Putnam's Social Capital Theory, this article demonstrates that the most effective actions against Islamophobia are those carried out by organizations deploying both bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital reinforces primary solidarity, which allows Muslim movements to survive in hostile contexts, while bridging social capital generates links outside the group and adds diversity to the movement. Using qualitative methods such as specific observations, biographical interviews and focus groups, this comparative research identifies a typology of anti-Islamophobia actions in each city. In addition, it shows the ideological and generational tensions that can arise from the myriad ways Muslim leaders incorporate religion into their activism, and the types of alliances they build inside and outside the primary group. This research also shows how both youth and women's groups are trying to break away from these ideological confrontations by proposing new spaces of mobilization where it might be possible to turn a particular interest (the fight against Islamophobia) into a general one (the fight against extremist ideas and the defense of individual and collective rights). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Mawlid, a sacred holiday commemorating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, holds immense power in Morocco as a communal prayer event that animates citizens, transcending its religious significance to become a potent sociopolitical tool. This article delves into the multifaceted nature of Mawlid, examining its dynamic role as both a collective expression of faith and a means of governmental control. Through the example of the Qadiri Boutchichiyya Sufi order's annual Mawlid programming, it explores how the Moroccan government has skillfully harnessed Mawlid's enlivening energy to further its political agendas, utilizing it as a vector to transmit the kingdom's particular brand of Islam. However, while the government may seek to manipulate Mawlid for political gains, Moroccans are not mere pawns in this dynamic. On the contrary, the Mawlid's animating quality extends well beyond the public sphere and resonates deeply within the private lives of individuals. By delving into this intricate web of interactions, we can better grasp the vibrant and multivalent nature of religious expression in Morocco and its implications for the broader dynamics of faith-based governance in the country today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1979 and 2013, the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami was the largest Islamist political party in the country and the only one that ever played a prominent role in government. In 2013, the party had its registration revoked, effectively banning it from running in elections, and has since been stigmatized as a terrorist, or at the very least a terror-sympathizing, organization. This paper looks at the nature of the party and the roles it has played historically in Bangladesh politics. It also investigates the party's alleged links with religious extremism and terrorist activities in the country, and the roles the party has played in perpetuating religious nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to provide an overview of the fundamental ideas in Indonesian national political settings, as well as their significance in solidifying the four pillars of Indonesian identity. Based on a library study of the works of two great Indonesian Ulama, Sheikh Nawawi al-Bantani and Sheikh Hasyim Asy'ari, which were later analyzed using the content analysis method, the results revealed that the theological principles of the masters' actions in both the Qur'an and the hadith remained the basis of obedience, unity, brotherhood, and solidarity. Sheikh Nawawi al-Bantani generally supports components of national commitment, conservation, and natural resource management in the political Islamic framework, and he does not oppose the concept of truth. While Sheikh Hasyim Asy'ari emphasized characteristics of government management such as leadership maturity, unity, and brotherhood, which resulted in the formation of the four national pillars as a consensus among the nation's citizens.

This article introduces Islamic apocalyptic jurisprudence (theories of final law that will govern humanity in the End Times) to academic study. Section 1 considers why the topic has remained unexamined and suggests a basic taxonomy. Section 2 exposes the apocalyptic jurisprudence of two case studies, representing the "reversionist" and "progressivist" poles of Sunni discourses: the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ("ISIS"), and Dāwūd and his "Awaited Mahdī" movement in Egypt. Section 3 considers two further case studies, representing the "revanchist" and "idealist" orientations in Shi'i discourses: the Islamic Republic of Iran, and al-Ṣadr, a theorist of the Iraqi Ṣadrist movement. Throughout, the following aspects of the final legal system are considered: sources of law; conflicts between Islamic, Jewish, Christian, and international laws; the jurist's role; changes to classical Islamic legal theory, including qiyas and ijtihad; the legitimacy of legal schools; and new positive laws, policies, and rules of evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article charts changes in the views towards popular culture of the most prominent Turkish-Islamist movement that operated in the late twentieth century, the Millî Görüş ('The National Outlook'), a movement that altered Turkey's history and brought up its current Islamist leader – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Through a unique and intensive analysis of Millî Görüş texts and documents, the article follows significant changes in Millî Görüş discourse regarding three forms of popular culture – cinema, television, and spectator sports – from the 1970s – when these forms of popular culture were warned against – to the 1990s – when the movement recommended engaging with such culture. This article argues that these changes reflect a greater change in the movement's views on how Muslims should live their lives. Lastly, the paper suggests these changes may have occurred due to three main reasons: (1) deciding strategically to not resist the growing availability and appeal of popular culture; (2) the movement's wish to win the Turkish elections, which required them to appeal also to less pious Turks, and (3) the gradual appearance of alternative, 'Islamic' popular culture in Turkey – one which the Millî Görüş felt comfortable to promote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea of Tunisian ‘moderation’ as an essential constituent part of national identity has been historically used by autocratic governments as an instrument of securitization, investing the state with the unique authority to suppress movements – in practice, usually the Islamist opposition – deemed antithetical to this identity and thus threatening to the nation and its people. This paper explores how, after the Arab Uprisings in 2010–2011, diverse groups of Islamists responded to pre-existing discourses of Tunisian national identity as moderate. After the revolution, Tunisian Islamists and Salafis initially both contested the assumptions behind pre-revolutionary conceptualizations of national identity that had previously excluded them from the boundaries of normative citizenship by reframing the nature of the threat or attempting to redefine and expand the nature of moderation. Both groups encountered different outcomes in their attempts to recalibrate the notions of identity, religion and the state. These divergences can be traced to their differing ideologies, political situations and incentives. Nevertheless, the fact that each group engaged with – rather than dismissed – this discourse suggests the centrality of the state-moderation-security nexus in structuring past and present conceptualizations of Tunisian moderation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractSince gaining independence in 1991, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have faced various political challenges, including the existence of political Islam and Islamic extremism. This issue has had a slight impact on the entire region, albeit to different extents. Various perspectives have been proposed to elucidate why political Islam in this region has predominantly manifested as religious fundamentalism. Alternatively, the frustration-aggression hypothesis and Merton’s social strain theory provide illustrations of these approaches. Consistent with this concept, severe suppression and authoritarianism do not eliminate political dissent; instead, they can stimulate further disagreement and conflict. The study argues that the severe political suppression of both religious and secular opposition groups has caused them to withdraw from public view and has led to a rise in violence in the Central Asian Republics. This study employs a qualitative research method and a descriptive-analytical methodology to examine the correlation between political repression and the rise of Islamism in five countries in Central Asia. According to the results of the present study, it seems that governments in Central Asia prefer to understand political Islam in a manner that is too simplistic and characterised by a strict division into two opposing categories. Furthermore, they display a lack of acceptance of even moderate and liberal manifestations of Islamism. Inadvertently, this approach has facilitated the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in CARs. The government in this region should develop new ways to allow conversations for future generations of moderate and secular Muslims to combat Islamic extremism.

A biographical study through the lens of Mills' sociological imagination and Erikson's identity crisis provides a unique understanding of Dr Fauzi AR, a dedicated Islamist. Fauzi grew up in a devout Muslim family in Kauman, Yogyakarta, the heartland of the modernist Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah. He was educated in Muhammadiyah schools and eventually became a qualified medical doctor. He was politically active in the Islamic United Development Party and joined Laskar Jihad, a Salafi-Wahabi paramilitary group, during the inter-religious conflict in Maluku in 2000. This article argues that the political turbulence during the democratic transition in 1998--1999 led Fauzi to have an identity crisis, which spurred his desire to participate in jihad (holy war). Afterwards, Fauzi became a reformed "maverick post-jihadist," in that he was unpredictable yet competent. He was unorthodox in his methods, remaining active in mainstream political Islam through the United Development Party while also engaging in physical jihad, which is contradictory because participation in partisan politics is forbidden by the Salafi doctrine. He also remained a heavy smoker although smoking is forbidden by Salafi religious decree. He further defied Salafism by supporting his wife in an unsuccessful bid for a seat in the national parliament as a member of the secular-nationalist party Gerindra in the 2009 election. This case study of Fauzi AR reflects the complex and multifaceted nature of political Islam and Islamic movements in the post-Soeharto era, including those who resorted to extremism and violence to achieve greater Islamisation of society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime came to power in Sudan in1989, the international community was alarmed. Among other things, the treatment of Sudan's minorities was a chief concern. For instance, in his ten-hour visit to Sudan in 1993, Pope John Paul II warned against imposing Islamic law on the country's large Christian population. The concerns about the NIF regime's treatment of minorities were due to its ideological background, since particular interpretations of Islamic law discriminate against minorities. The paper examines the regime's policies toward the largest ethnic minorities in Sudan. It illustrates that the regime's treatment of minorities lacked coherence toward both Christian and Muslim ethnic groups. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the regime's minority policies were the result of shifts in alliances that followed internal divisions within the regime. As the Islamist leadership fractured, the ruling faction sought to coopt new allies, including ethnic groups, to strengthen its position in the face of relentless opposition from ousted Islamists. The paper draws on material collected through fieldwork as well as secondary sources to make its claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Majority respect for the political rights of minorities is an important value undergirding peace and political stability in societies. This study examines whether intolerance for minority political rights affects the likelihood that an individual has engaged in violent activities for political causes. Using public opinion data from 11 Arab countries, the study finds that Muslim residents who interpret Islam to mandate inferior political rights to their non-Muslims compatriots are more likely to have engaged in political violence in the past three years. Moreover, the effect of attitudes toward non-Muslim political rights on engagement in political violence is unaffected by subject support for Islamic government/rule, attitudes about democracy and Islamic government, interpretation of Shari'a and general intolerance of or bigotry against non-Muslims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Democratic backsliding in many world regions has prompted scholars to study how democracies can resist and push back against autocratization, and many accounts suggest that a unified, pluralist opposition is key to mobilize voters against democratic backsliding. However, pluralist ideology is not necessarily associated with higher awareness of and opposition to backsliding, as evaluations of democratic erosions are highly contingent on political context. We illustrate this point with the case of Indonesia, a country where a pluralist government coalition has deepened democratic erosion by harshly repressing an anti-pluralist Islamist opposition. Using data from a national survey, we document that Islamist Indonesians are systematically more likely than pluralist individuals to believe that democracy has worsened: Resistance to democratic erosion is thus concentrated in the most ideologically illiberal citizens. Rethinking the pluralist/anti-pluralist dichotomy has implications for how we conceptualize democratic backsliding and assess democratic resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This exploratory, diachronic study compares the politics of Islamisation, which have undergone different patterns of development in both Nigeria and Malaysia. Islamisation is defined as an ideological translation of Islamism into policies to "Islamise" the state and society by expanding the scope of the application of Islamic laws and principles. Islamisation in Malaysia has been implemented steadily and progressively since the 1980s. It involves the "inculcation of Islamic values" in a wide range of aspects of society, including the economy. The Islamic penal code or hudud enactments were legislated in two states, but held in abeyance due to their unconstitutionality. In contrast, Nigeria observed the sudden and erratic implementation of hudud in 12 northern states in 1999, along with other bureaucratic adjustments. Adopting an interpretative case study approach of the comparative method of Arend Lijphart, we explain the two contrastive case studies of the ideological translation of Islamism by analysing the manner in which various political opportunities and structural constraints in the respective cases have shaped the Islamisation process. Data gathering was based on an extensive review of the related body of literature. Analysis was conducted using a social movement theoretical framework based on a structured, focused comparison. The dynamic conceptualisation of the state as a set of institutions, which is continually and dialectically reshaped by contentious processes, captures how the bureaucratisation and judicialisation of Islam have modified the nature of state structures and the structure of political opportunities, which in turn allows for additional channels of influence for Islamic activists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces a special issue of the journal Contemporary Islam that explores the topics of Islam, critique, and the canon. The authors discuss the importance of understanding how concepts related to power, authority, critique, and resistance have been understood by classical Muslim scholars. They argue against de-historicizing and decontextualizing Islamic ideas and emphasize the need for nuanced understandings of Islamic practices and movements. The collection of articles in this issue aims to complicate assumptions about the Islamic canon and engage with diverse perspectives and critiques within Islam and Islamic thought. [Extracted from the article]

Copyright of Journal of Oriental Studies (Al-Farabi Kazakh National University) / Kazahskij Nacional'nyj Universitet Imeni Al'-Farabi Vestnik Seriâ Vostokovedeniâ is the property of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The secularizing reforms of the republican elites in modern Turkey encountered Islamic resistance orchestrated by Naqshbandīs, who were declared enemies of the regime, repressed, and banned. The literature on how Turkish Islamists and the Naqshbandiyya have responded to republicans predominantly deals with either how they withdrew into a sort of diaspora or how they submitted and/or adapted to the republican regime. The consensus has been that Naqshbandīs played a role in inhibiting the infiltration of radical Islamic ideologies in modern Turkey. However, there is a lacuna in the literature on the Naqshbandī diaspora outside Turkey and its cooperation with transnational Islamic movements in building networks of resistance to secularism. Addressing this gap, this paper argues that some Naqshbandīs evaded republican surveillance and bans by creating an Egypt-based diasporic community, developing an Islamic cadre intended to eventually re-Islamize the Turkish state, its politics and society. Based on the memoirs and biographies of the prominent figures of the diaspora in Cairo, the study uncovers the connection between the Naqshbandiyya and other Islamic transnational movements, principally the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, at the ideological and institutional levels from the 1920s to the 1980s, to show how this cadre emerged and subsequently shaped the character of Islamism in modern Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the interplay between political thought and practice within Tunisia’s Ennahda party, first during its period in opposition, then after it took power in 2011, and finally in the aftermath of the 2021 coup. We trace the genealogy of political thought within the party from the point of its foundation. In doing so, we explore the gradual evolution of party ideology, from a da΄wa-based belief system between 1969 and 1981, to Islamic democracy between 1981 and 2011, to ‘Muslim democracy’ after the 2011 uprising. We examine this ideological evolution through the framework of three key elements: (i) Islam, (ii) Tunisia’s changing socio-political context, and (iii) the broader universal episteme. As we show, a significant turning point came in 2016, with the separation of the da΄wa from party politics, which revealed a burgeoning state/party conceptualization of politics. However, the 2021 coup challenged Ennahda’s concept of Muslim democracy, as well as all aspects of the party’s own sense of continuity as a significant socio-political actor, such as its institutional structure, leadership, membership, social base, political strategy, and ideology. Ennahda is now confronted by an authoritarian resurgence, which aims at containing the party, and at delegitimizing its participation within nation-state structures. Empirical evidence, based on content-analytical evaluations of personal interviews as well as the media’s coverage of Ennahda, shows that the party’s representatives are increasingly focusing on organizational reform in order to deal with the ramifications of the 2021 coup. Their aim seems to be to democratize both Ennahda and the Tunisian state itself.

This article explores the idea of political Islam as a discursive tradition within the context of Iranian Kurdistan. It challenges the prevailing essentialist and universalist approaches commonly used in the analysis of political Islam, advocating for a more adaptable and comprehensive interpretation. By conceptualizing political Islam as a discursive tradition, this study sheds light on the complex interconnections, configurations, and historical contingencies influencing Islamist discourses and movements. The paper argues that political Islam should be examined in relation to other phenomena and discourses, acknowledging its dynamic nature within specific temporal and spatial contexts. Focusing on an influential yet underexplored Islamist discursive tradition in Iranian Kurdistan during the 1970s and 1980s, the research acknowledges the hybrid nature of Islamist discourses, drawing from diverse traditions to fulfill particular objectives. In particular, it explores the perspectives of Ahmad Moftizadeh, a Sunni Kurdish Islamist and the founder of the Maktab Quran (MQ). This study investigates Moftizadeh's views on the Islamic government, positioning it within the framework of discursive tradition. It analyzes his core categories and inquiries within Islamist thought, notably emphasizing Moftizadeh's alignment of the Islamic government with the Islamic tradition of the Shura, highlighting its central role in the Islamist discursive tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the pivotal significance of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions in 2011, his prominent status among Muslim Brotherhood supporters, and his interactions with the Syrian government during this time, we have devised a research approach that combines comparative research methodology for analysis with library and documentary studies to gather information and address the research questions. The results of this study suggest that his political stance on the Syrian crisis contradicts the epistemological, ontological, anthropological, and methodological underpinnings that govern his Islamist discourse. This demonstrated that he has strayed from the primary frameworks of his political Islam discourse, despite his moderate stance prior to the aforementioned developments. Overall, it appears that Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi is swayed by political movements and groups, the absence of an accurate political vision, and the inflammatory atmosphere that followed the Arab Spring. Additionally, the historical experience of the Brotherhood in Syria, the opportunity presented by the Arab Spring, and the protests in Syria all play a role in shaping his perspective. He regarded it as an appropriate venue for overthrowing the governing authority in that country and instituting a system of governance based on the Brotherhood's discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the ideas of the most prominent Turkish-Islamist movement which operated in the late twentieth century, Millî Görüş ('The National Outlook'). The research focuses on the evolution of their view on Muslim migration to 'the West' (focusing on Germany as a case study). The article demonstrates a substantive change in the movement's discourse on the subject. During the early 1970s, prominent Turkish Islamist politicians and intellectuals warned Turks against migrating to Germany. They warned of migrating to a morally corrupt country, filled with 'Western' values which are alien to Islam, a country in which Turks will neither make a good living, nor manage to hold on to an Islamic lifestyle. Two decades later, during the 1990s, Turkish migration to Germany was presented by the Millî Görüş as a model of Islamic life, Germany was portrayed as an example of a country which allows Muslims religious freedoms they can only dream of in Turkey, and migrants were shown as exemplary Muslims. This article suggests a few causes for the Millî Görüş movement's discursive change on Turkish migration to Germany, from initially seeing it as a liability, but – eventually – as an asset. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sets out to address the root of religious-based intolerance cases in Indonesia arising out of particular groups of Muslims in Indonesia. It seeks to identify which group triggers those cases and offers a possible response for Indonesian Christians faced with this confronting reality. The case is made for a non-violent response that opens up the possibility of reconciliation with those whose political stance is opposed to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Islamic Research / İslâmi Araştırmalar Dergisi is the property of Turkey Economical & Cultural Solidarity (TEK-DAV) Foundation and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of International Annals of Criminology is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Arts Magazine is the property of Thamar University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This briefing evaluates the role of international intervention in prolonging the Libyan conflict, from financial, logistical, and military support. The briefing concludes that foreign interference interest was not necessarily the direct reason for protracting the Libyan conflict but played an essential role in strengthening the presence of the parties in the field. The regional countries showed different interests related to the Libyan conflict, including the interests of Egypt and the UAE, which harmonized with the eastern side led by Haftar's forces ideologically in their hostility to political Islam. Conversely, the interests of Qatar and Turkey with the western side and political Islam contributed to supporting this party. Accordingly, the international intervention did not take a unified position, whether supporting conflict or peace. This led to the dispersion of international support between the conflicting parties, creating an imbalance of power to settle the conflict militarily. Moreover, some foreign parties tried to spoil the peace by biasing mediations such as the Skhirat Agreement and broadcasting their goals through internal spoilers, such as Haftar when he started the Tripoli war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A biographical study through the lens of Mills’ sociological imagination and Erikson’s identity crisis provides a unique understanding of Dr Fauzi AR, a dedicated Islamist. Fauzi grew up in a devout Muslim family in Kauman, Yogyakarta, the heartland of the modernist Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah. He was educated in Muhammadiyah schools and eventually became a qualified medical doctor. He was politically active in the Islamic United Development Party and joined Laskar Jihad, a Salafi-Wahabi paramilitary group, during the inter-religious conflict in Maluku in 2000. This article argues that the political turbulence during the democratic transition in 1998–1999 led Fauzi to have an identity crisis, which spurred his desire to participate in jihad (holy war). Afterwards, Fauzi became a reformed “maverick post-jihadist,” in that he was unpredictable yet competent. He was unorthodox in his methods, remaining active in mainstream political Islam through the United Development Party while also engaging in physical jihad, which is contradictory because participation in partisan politics is forbidden by the Salafi doctrine. He also remained a heavy smoker although smoking is forbidden by Salafi religious decree. He further defied Salafism by supporting his wife in an unsuccessful bid for a seat in the national parliament as a member of the secular-nationalist party Gerindra in the 2009 election. This case study of Fauzi AR reflects the complex and multifaceted nature of political Islam and Islamic movements in the post-Soeharto era, including those who resorted to extremism and violence to achieve greater Islamisation of society.

This exploratory, diachronic study compares the politics of Islamisation, which have undergone different patterns of development in both Nigeria and Malaysia. Islamisation is defined as an ideological translation of Islamism into policies to “Islamise” the state and society by expanding the scope of the application of Islamic laws and principles. Islamisation in Malaysia has been implemented steadily and progressively since the 1980s. It involves the “inculcation of Islamic values” in a wide range of aspects of society, including the economy. The Islamic penal code or hudud enactments were legislated in two states, but held in abeyance due to their unconstitutionality. In contrast, Nigeria observed the sudden and erratic implementation of hudud in 12 northern states in 1999, along with other bureaucratic adjustments. Adopting an interpretative case study approach of the comparative method of Arend Lijphart, we explain the two contrastive case studies of the ideological translation of Islamism by analysing the manner in which various political opportunities and structural constraints in the respective cases have shaped the Islamisation process. Data gathering was based on an extensive review of the related body of literature. Analysis was conducted using a social movement theoretical framework based on a structured, focused comparison. The dynamic conceptualisation of the state as a set of institutions, which is continually and dialectically reshaped by contentious processes, captures how the bureaucratisation and judicialisation of Islam have modified the nature of state structures and the structure of political opportunities, which in turn allows for additional channels of influence for Islamic activists.

The disbandment of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in 2017 marked a significant shift in the dynamics of Islamist movements within Indonesia’s political landscape. Although officially banned, the HTI continued to operate in the shadows, employing various camouflage methods. This article analyzes how political dynamics led HTI to its outlawed status and how it adapted in pursuit of its goals amidst the challenges faced. By adopting a political opportunity structure and Islamist ideology as the theoretical framework with the case study as the method, this study scrutinizes HTI’s post-disbandment endeavors at the national level and delves deeper into cases in West Java, Yogyakarta, and East Java. The primary findings of this study reveal that the disbandment of HTI reflected the peak of incongruence between the anti-system ideology they embraced and Indonesia’s political structure. HTI’s ideological drive to exploit electoral events in 2016-2017 eventually put them at a threshold that the ruling authority perceives as a severe threat. HTI struggled to maintain its movement, mixing overt and covert operations, and facing significant pressures and constraints. Its strength is rooted in an Islamist ideology that integrates political and religious beliefs, supported by a disciplined structure. This resilience, seen as adaptive resistance, leverages tactical ingenuity and militancy in response to external pressures and the socio-cultural context in which they operate. Nevertheless, the disbandment has rendered it nearly impossible for HTI to reestablish its expansion in Indonesia’s political arena.

According to prevalent narratives, firstly, the Iranian revolution was the outcome of the dominance of the religious-traditional part of the society over the modern part. And secondly, it was the same religious-traditional section that took power and had their sway over the Iranian society after the victory of the revolution. This article wants to challenge both of these narratives. From this article’s perspective, the religious-traditional section of pre-revolutionary Iran itself can be divided into political and non-political parts. The discourse of “political Islam” was different from those of traditional and conservative ones which prevailed among large parts of the religion-oriented population of Iran. But the second and more important point is that even the pre-revolution discourse of political Islam did not remain the same, after the revolution and with the establishment of the Islamic Republic in the 1980s. It was found that during the post-revolutionary era, a new discourse was emerging as a result of the conjuncture of the event of war and “Imam Khomeini’s charisma”. This discourse shaped an ideology that gave legitimacy to the Islamic Republic in the sixties, inevitably demanded obedient and conservative subjects and could not remain the same discourse that nurtured rebellious revolutionary subjects prior to the revolution.

In the period of the formation of a new world order, it is extremely important to understand how the societies of certain states are separated from their governments. The concept of civilization expands its meaning and allows the unification of the societies of various states into a single civilizational form of self-determination. At the same time, social crisis factors that manifest themselves in one society are united within the framework of civilization, which forms mechanisms for their collective manipulation. Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine made it possible to understand the alignment of societies in world civilizations and to understand their internal “rules of the game”.