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High-profile instances of brands accused of cultural appropriation suggest that even the most prominent brands fail to fully understand the complexities of this phenomenon. This work experimentally unpacks consumer perceptions of cultural appropriation and its impact on brand attitudes and purchase interest. The authors begin by developing and validating a scale for measuring perceptions of cultural appropriation. Next, a series of studies demonstrates that viewing this phenomenon through a historical lens can help determine when and why the use of cultural elements is viewed as appropriative. Specifically, an emphasis on historical power imbalance explains why liberal consumers are more likely to recognize cultural appropriation and why commercializing disadvantaged cultures is considered appropriation, whereas using elements from advantaged cultures may be more acceptable. The conceptualization further identifies brand actions and interventions that influence perceptions of cultural appropriation, including externally emphasizing historical power imbalance, how brands obtain cultural elements, and how brands represent the culture in their product offerings and marketing. These findings help marketers (1) avoid launching products that can be damaging to the brand and offensive to consumers and (2) understand how to better promote products in a way that prevents rather than amplifies these negative perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID‐19 pandemic has divided societies, especially regarding vaccine mandates. While research suggests that political ideology plays a crucial role in whether people support or oppose COVID‐19 countermeasures, the relationship between these attitudes and political ideology remains unclear, with varying results across different countries. The present research focuses on right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) in Germany, examining its role as a predictor. Prior studies highlight that, conservatives and right‐wing authoritarians, particularly in the USA, tend to hold more negative attitudes toward COVID‐19 countermeasures despite RWA's usual association with unwavering support for state authorities. Therefore, the present survey study (N = 1063) investigated whether trust in politics and science moderates this relationship. Contrary to expectations, the findings revealed that RWA consistently predicted support for vaccine mandates independent of trust levels. Results are discussed about the specifics of the German case and more general relationships between political ideology and the support of state authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sovereignism is said to be on the rise: defending a nation's political autonomy, international borders, and cultural identity and protecting the domestic economy from the perils of globalisation are core demands. What about Latin America? To what extent are sovereignist claims a key component of Latin American parties' platforms and rhetoric? How do these vary according to national contexts and ideological foundations? Is sovereignism truly novel in the region? This article, relying on qualitative analyses of party manifestos from six different countries, as well as on data from the Manifesto Project, aims to map Latin American sovereignism in its different dimensions (political, economic, cultural, international) according to country and party families. As our data show, claims for defending or achieving ‘sovereignty’ are a key component of the (mostly left‐wing) populist idiolect in the region. The Latin American extreme right tends to adopt a sovereignist rhetoric to justify a traditional pro‐market agenda. The article overall calls for a problematisation of the concept of ‘sovereignism’ by proposing a stronger cross‐regional perspective. There are different ‘varieties of sovereignism’ depending on whether state sovereignty is primarily viewed as something to be restored or, alternatively, to be achieved (as is the case in South America). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perceived economic inequality is positively associated with public support for policies to reduce it. However, providing information about economic inequality does not necessarily motivate people to support redistributive policies. This inconsistency may be due to how people interpret the information about inequality. We argue that the interpretation of information about inequality differs between individuals as a function of the characteristics of the source and people's ideologies. We conducted two experiments using an exploratory (N = 239) and confirmatory (N = 707) strategy. We found that attitudes toward redistribution increased when a seemingly neutral international institution (as opposed to a left-wing political party) provided information about economic inequality due to the credibility attributed to the source—but not due to power and familiarity. Moreover, the effect of providing information about inequality on support for redistribution (via source credibility) depended on people's ideologies: it was positive and statistically significant for people who held more (vs. less) system-justifying beliefs. These findings contribute to understanding the interplay between social psychological processes, communication strategies, and attitudes toward redistribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined how potential job candidates react to a hiring organization that requests diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) statements, which conservatives in the United States and elsewhere have criticized as being unrelated to job function and inappropriately political or ideological. Across three studies (two of which were pre‐registered), we compared reactions to requests for DEI (vs. teamwork or conservative values) statements as a function of race (Black vs. White), political conservatism and symbolic racism (Total N = 1108). When a DEI (vs. teamwork or politically conservative values) statement was requested, participants who were more (vs. less) conservative perceived the organization as less just, expressed less interest in the job, and expected poorer person‐organization fit, even when a job‐related rationale was provided. Further, participants who were more (vs. less) conservative evaluated a request for a statement consistent with conservative values more favourably. Thus, criticisms that DEI statements are overly political are not applied to other statements that might elicit similar concerns. Moreover, an internal meta‐analysis suggested that the relationships of conservatism to justice and interest (but not person‐organization fit) in response to requests for DEI (vs. teamwork) statements were not independent of racism. Findings were consistent with social dominance theory; racism may underlie seemingly race‐neutral backlash to DEI statements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the dynamics of public support for international development policies in the United States and South Korea, focusing on the distinctions between normative and substantial support. Normative support is based on agreement with the policy's importance due to shared values or beliefs, while substantial support involves a willingness to allocate resources for implementation. Utilizing surveys and logit analysis, the research highlights the complex interplay between universal factors like political ideology and self-interest and specific factors such as global citizenship. The study finds that a higher sense of global community significantly boosts normative and substantial support. This nuanced analysis offers valuable insights for enhancing public support for international policies, providing critical implications for policy-making and future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background In May 2020, news outlets reported misinformation about the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) related to COVID-19. Correcting misinformation about outbreaks and politics is particularly challenging. Affective belief echoes continue to influence audiences even after successful correction. Narrative and emotional flow scholarship suggest that a narrative corrective with a positive ending could reduce belief echoes. Therefore, this study investigated the efficacy of a narrative corrective with a relief ending for correcting misinformation about the CDC. Methods Between 29 May and 4 June 2020, we tested the effectiveness of a narrative to correct this misinformation. Participants in the United States (N  = 469) were enrolled via Qualtrics panels in an online message experiment and randomized to receive a narrative corrective, a didactic corrective or no corrective. Results The narrative corrective resulted in lower endorsement of the misinformation compared with the control and the didactic corrective. The narrative corrective had a positive indirect effect on perceived CDC competence and mask wearing intentions for politically moderate and conservative participants via relief. Conclusions Public health institutions, such as the CDC, should consider utilizing narrative messaging with positive emotion endings to correct misinformation. Narratives better address affective belief echoes, particularly for counter-attitudinal audiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self‐service technologies are widely used in business, and retailers and service firms invest significant resources to obtain and improve their Self‐Service Technology capabilities. To allocate resources efficiently, it is crucial for firms to predict Self‐Service Technology usage by their customers. However, predictors in the extant literature (e.g., customers' perceptions and personality traits) are not easy to objectively measure or obtain secondary data about. This research proposes and examines political ideology, for which fairly accurate and objective data can be obtained, as a novel predictor of customer Self‐Service Technology usage. In four studies in different contexts, the authors consistently find that political ideology is significantly related to customers' intention to use and actual use of Self‐Service Technologies; Liberals, on average, are found to be significantly more likely to use Self‐Service Technologies compared to conservatives. Moreover, process complexity is identified as a moderator of this effect. In addition, two mediators, customers' need for interaction and customers' perceived control, through which political ideology affects intention to use Self‐Service Technologies are uncovered. The manuscript concludes with a discussion of contributions and practical implications for managers and practitioners as well as avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This multi-wave study examined associations between political left-right ideology and attitudes towards Israel in Germany measured at the end of October and beginning of November 2023, as well as at the end of April and beginning of May 2024. Consistent with horseshoe theory, a curvilinear ∩-shaped relation was hypothesised between political left-right ideology (coded based on party preferences) and attitudes towards Israel. Data came from a large sample of more than 600 employed individuals in Germany, and results supported the hypothesis. The findings provide support for horseshoe theory following the October 7 terrorist attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study expands previous research that explored why conservative jurors are more punitive towards criminal defendants than their liberal counterparts, by examining criminal justice orientations as another potential mediator between political ideology and punitiveness. An experiment was conducted based on a sample of 433 juror eligible adults recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. After reading one of the two randomly assigned criminal trial scenarios that varied the strength of critical evidence, participants rendered a verdict and recommended a sentence. Results showed that individuals with more conservative attitudes were more likely to support a guilty verdict and harsher sentences for the defendant. Relationships were largely explained by individuals’ criminal justice orientations or value commitment regarding criminal justice operations. Results show that individuals’ endorsement of different criminal justice orientations may be an important mechanism underlying the link between conservatism and juror punitiveness. Findings, implications, and future directions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does global integration affect environmental activism? I develop a theoretical argument which highlights that global integration’s effect is conditional on political ideology. Countries’ integration in the world society leads to diffusion of environmental attitudes. However, people’s political ideology restrains this positive effect. The assumed incompatibility between economic prosperity and environmental reform exerts a strong influence on attitudes of right-leaning individuals, who end up acting less for promoting environmental protection. I test this argument using multilevel model techniques on data from 35 European countries from 1980 to 2020. The results support my argument and show that global integration has an effect only on left-leaning individuals. In light of these results, the paper offers insights on the expansion of the environmental divide – ‘action gap’ – among individuals with different ideologies. The study also highlights how concerns about environmental consequences are still linked to an ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the role of political parties in policy accumulation. We study this relationship in the area of social policy. Our analysis builds on a large data set covering the size of policy portfolios (policy targets and instruments) in three subfields of social policy for 22 OECD countries over 30 years. We find that the probability of social policy accumulation is not affected by the government's ideological position. Left governments do not produce more extensive social policy portfolios than right ones. Yet, this striking result does not contradict governments' political ideologies, as left and right parties accumulate for different reasons. While left parties address new social policy targets to broaden the scope of the welfare state, right parties adopt new policy instruments to condition social benefits. These findings hold regardless of how we measure governments' ideological position and despite strong endogenous policy growth dynamics, that is, countries with greater policy portfolios also display higher levels of policy accumulation. Our findings indicate that party political considerations can explain the reasons for but not the level of policy accumulation. Changes in government are thus unlikely to stall or slow down the constant accumulation of public policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the push and pull between pro-diversity advocates and conservative resistance, most organizations have implemented diversity initiatives in an effort to promote equitable and fair organizational practices. Past work has shown that these diversity initiatives may not be as effective as expected and may instead result in unintended negative consequences for the very individuals they are meant to support. In three novel experiments (total N = 3,664), we investigated whether and when the presence of pro-diversity messages in organizational job recruitment materials might facilitate versus hinder the hiring of underrepresented racial minorities. Participant race and political ideology were also investigated as predictors of hiring recommendations. Findings indicate that pro-diversity messages facilitate politically motivated hiring bias. Specifically, in the presence of pro-diversity messages, White and some Black, Indigenous, and people of color (BIPOC) conservatives tend to display a pro-White shift in their hiring recommendations, whereas liberals tend to display a pro-minority shift. The present research underscores the importance of organizational awareness regarding the potential for hiring managers to react, whether consciously or subconsciously, against pro-diversity efforts because of political ideology. The present research also highlights the need for organizations to move beyond just espousing pro-diversity values and actually investigate the impact diversity initiatives have on hiring, retention, and promotion of diverse employees. Public Significance Statement: The present research integrated theory from social, political, and industrial/organizational psychology to investigate the impact of pro-diversity messages on hiring decisions in the workplace. Findings revealed that the presence of diversity cues elicit politically motivated decision making, leading White and some BIPOC conservatives to make more pro-White hiring recommendations and leading liberals to make more pro-Black hiring recommendations. The findings highlight how diversity cues can ironically promote—rather than curtail—inequality, particularly among conservatives. The present research suggests that organizations should consider different approaches depending on the political climate and ideology of their managers, such as preventing demographic information from being disclosed during the hiring process or adding diversity-related metrics to performance evaluations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular press and academic articles alike suggest that political orientation is a primary determinant of vaccination willingness, vaccination, and vaccine word-of-mouth (i.e., sharing of information regarding vaccines). In the current article, we test the validity of these suggestions, and we also assess the differential roles of political ideology (e.g., liberal-conservative) and party affiliation (e.g., Democrat-Republican) as well as the mediating effect of vaccine hesitancy's dimensions. To do so, we perform a four-wave survey study with 223 participants that completed all waves. Our results support that political orientation indeed relates to our outcomes of interest. Our results also show that political ideology has a more pronounced effect than party affiliation, and the vaccine hesitancy dimensions of Health Risks and Healthy mediate many of these relations. From these results, we suggest many directions for future research and practice, including the integration of political discourse theories in studies on political orientations and vaccination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: We add depth and breadth to the study of the childhood personality–adult ideology link with additional data, measures, and measurement approaches. Background: Past research in (political) psychology has put forward that individual differences in psychological needs shape ideology. Most evidence supporting this claim is cross‐sectional. Two previous longitudinal studies showed preliminary evidence that childhood personality traits linked to negativity bias correlate with political ideology in adulthood, yet these studies have limitations. Methods: We report the results from two longitudinal studies (combined N = 13,822) conducted in the United Kingdom that measure childhood personality (5–11 years old) and political ideology from puberty (age 16) to early (age 26) and middle adulthood (age 42). Results: We find very weak and inconsistent evidence that childhood personality traits related to negativity bias are directly associated with general conservatism, social conservatism, or economic conservatism across different stages of adulthood. Across the board, Bayes Factors most often indicate strong evidence for the null hypothesis. Conclusion: We offer evidence that the results of previous research are not as robust or as consistent as scholars in the extant literature presume. Our findings call for more, not less, research on the link between childhood personality and political ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Worldwide, Likert scales are used to measure ideology of both public opinion and individual voters, with the utilization of a self-assessment numerical scale as the most widely accepted tool, despite the multifaceted nature of the concept. However, in contrast to this prevailing consensus, there is a lack of agreement regarding what particular scale should be used and about the benefits of the different scales. This paper seeks to provide insights into these questions by analysing Spanish public opinion ideology as measured by CIS surveys. In 1976, the Centre for Sociological Research (CIS), a leading public body for studies of Spanish society, defined the ideological self-placement scale as being from 1 to 10. Since then, a myriad of different scales has been applied by CIS in more than 1400 surveys (over 3.5 million interviews). In total, we identify 20 scales in studies with available microdata, with the number rising to 28 when all the CIS studies carried out are included. This research identifies which scale is used in each study and analyses whether this has an effect on the estimation of the ideological distribution of the population. After studying, from an empirical perspective, the relationship structures between the different scales, we conclude that the scale used does have an effect. We finish the paper by offering clear guidelines on how questionnaires related to ideology should be asked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines how individual and situational factors within the social media environment influence different types of news sharing, namely, informative, relational, and expressive sharing. Methodologically, this study uses survey data collected from a representative sample of South Korean media users by Nielsen Company Korea. We found the differential role individual and situational factors play in different types of social media news sharing. Our results offer a clearer portrait of how and why people share news via social media where the characteristics of both news stories and audiences are just one piece of the puzzle that determines news sharing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research suggests that societal threats often increase ideological support for the social system, but the attitudinal effects of COVID‐19 seem to have varied greatly. Here we present the results of a natural experiment involving New York City college students (Total N = 1300 observations). One group (n = 835) completed questionnaires before the onset of COVID‐19, while another completed them afterward (n = 465). Shortly after COVID (within 3 months of the outbreak), students scored higher on general system justification than before; this effect was driven by political conservatives. At the same time, students scored lower on economic system justification and right‐wing authoritarianism after COVID (vs. before); these effects emerged later (4–5 months after the outbreak) and were driven by liberals. A subsample completed the same questionnaires both before and after COVID‐19 (n = 107), enabling us to investigate intraindividual change. The within‐participants analysis revealed that students exhibited an increase in general system justification and a decrease in economic system justification, which was driven by those who exhibited a liberal shift. Together, these results indicate that the ideological effects of the pandemic and the governmental response to it were complex and polarizing, with liberals and conservatives moving in opposite directions at different times and on different attitudinal dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past research suggests that disease outbreaks drive prejudice towards minorities as they increase economic and disease threats. Based on an open-ended survey question distributed to 7,902 German residents over the course of one year of the Covid-19 pandemic (April 2020 to April 2021), we investigate the link between life-threatening events and ethno-racial prejudice. We find that pandemic-related threats only drive respondents' tendency to scapegoat ethno-racial groups if they hold left and center leaning ideologies. However, for far-right supporters who are the most likely to attribute the spread of Covid-19 to ethno-racial groups, pandemic-related threats do not affect that attribution. We further find that threat theories are of limited relevance for explaining which ethno-racial groups are targeted: respondents held Chinese accountable at the beginning of the pandemic but quickly shifted their attention to immigrants – a salient figure in pre-Covid-19 rightist rhetoric. We show that ideology, more than pandemic-induced threat, continues to drive prejudice and demonstrate the under-utilized advantages of using open-ended survey questions for understanding the dynamics of intergroup prejudice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenon of chief executive officers (CEOs) speaking out on contested social issues is a recent one, as CEO sociopolitical activism was seen as overly risky, and even taboo, for most of American business history. Yet, CEOs are increasingly choosing sides in societal debates despite the inherent risk of alienating stakeholders who disagree with the CEO's stance. Even more puzzlingly, conservative CEOs sometimes espouse liberal stances in such debates, which runs counter to the otherwise consistent evidence in the upper echelons literature that CEOs are guided by their own values in their actions. Our study addresses this paradox by examining the antecedents of CEO liberal activism, with an emphasis on the interplay between the CEO's ideology and the prevailing ideological tilt of the employee population in driving CEOs' activism decisions. Drawing on the concept of managerial discretion, or latitude of action, we theorize that a pronounced organizational ideology constrains a CEO's ability to act in accordance with their own values—particularly in the highly symbolic domain of activism. We also argue that conservative CEOs are relatively more focused on instrumental rationales for activism, whereas liberal CEOs tend to prioritize more intrinsic rationales, a consequence of which is that conservative CEOs more heavily weight organizational ideology in their activism decisions. We test our theory in the context of a highly publicized letter signed by nearly 100 CEOs of public companies in opposition to North Carolina's controversial 2016 "bathroom bill." Relying on a variety of novel data sources, we find robust support for our theory. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.17160. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Drawing on research in the social psychology and political science literatures, this research aims to examine how political moderates perceive, and are perceived by, their co-workers with differing political ideologies in an organisational context, with a focus on the perceptions of social status. Design/methodology/approach: To test the hypotheses regarding the social status perceptions of and by political moderates in the workplace, the authors conducted an online experiment in which working adults read a hypothetical workplace scenario and then assessed the social status of a co-worker based on the political ideology of that co-worker. Findings: The results largely supported the two hypothesised asymmetries of social perceptions of and by political moderates in an organisational context. Specifically, political moderates were perceived to have higher social status by their moderate and conservative co-workers than by their liberal co-workers. In addition, political moderates perceived moderate co-workers to have higher social status than conservative ones. Originality/value: This research investigates the influence of political ideology on social status perceptions in organisations by focusing on the previously underexamined political moderates. The findings illustrate the importance of political moderates, who tend to espouse a moderate level of resistance to social change, in the process of developing a functional hierarchy and balancing change and stability in organisations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While existing consumer research on political ideology often focuses on ideological differences in preferences for high-status, typically observably superior products, little is known about how political ideology may shape preferences for observably inferior products in non-status-signaling domains. Observably inferior products are product options that are dominated by alternatives along observable dimensions. We propose that, in non-status-signaling domains, conservatives are more interested in observably inferior products than liberals. This happens because conservatives (vs. liberals) have a stronger belief that things, including products, are in balance, whereby positives offset negatives. As a result, when presented with observably inferior products, conservatives (vs. liberals) are more likely to engage in compensatory reasoning and attribute positive qualities to these products, boosting their appeal. Activating belief in balance and preventing compensatory reasoning through cognitive load attenuate this effect. Salience of status-signaling motives serves as a boundary condition. Five studies and four follow-ups provide converging evidence using data collected in the laboratory and in the field, hypothetical and actual product choices, a variety of product categories and participant populations. These findings contribute to research on political ideology, compensatory inferences, and inferior products and provide insights with respect to managing product manufacturing, inventory, and waste. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even when controlling for big versus small government philosophies, this paper reports quantitatively significant cleavages in the probabilities of supporting increased federal antipoverty efforts that persist between conservatives and liberals, and Republicans and Democrats. However, predicted conditional probabilities show that support for increased welfare spending or federal responsibility in raising the standard of living of the poor is not overwhelming, even among liberals and Democrats, although support for increased federal assistance to the poor is fairly strong, even among conservatives and Republicans. Hence, we consider assertions that conservatives and Republicans do not care about the poor to be extreme and unsupported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research note draws from the social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE), uncertainty-identity theory, and intergroup threat theory to investigate the conditions under which members of online political networks are likely to endorse extremism. Using a national survey of 717 U.S. adults who self-identify as members of an online group comprising politically like-minded others, we find that when perceived group threat is high, group cohesion relates to radicalism intentions. Moreover, additional analysis suggests this relationship was particularly concentrated among conservatives. We argue that this may relate to the different ways in which conservatives and liberals manage uncertainty and threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change has become an increasingly polarizing issue in the United States and across the globe, a divide reflected in the sustainable behaviors of liberals and conservatives. Previous studies have investigated the psychological underpinnings of this polarization in the sustainability domain; however, findings have been fragmented across disciplines. The current work aims to integrate and synthesize academic research at the intersection of political ideology and sustainable behavior to propose a framework that explains polarized responses to climate change. This framework, represented by the acronym BREAK, suggests that several key factors can shed light on the underlying causes of the division regarding climate change. These factors include Balance, Reactance, Essence of the problem, Adherence to ingroup norms, and Knowledge. The author also employs this framework to propose strategies for reducing climate change polarization and outline potential avenues for future research. Overall, this review can help policy makers, practitioners, and academics in their endeavors to increase sustainable behavior across the political spectrum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seung Yeon Lee,1,2 Ji Hye Ham,3 Hyun-Kyung Park,4 Deok Hyun Jang,5 Won Mo Jang6,7 1Department of Administration, Seoul National University Hospital, Seoul, South Korea; 2Office of External Affairs, Seoul Metropolitan Government-Seoul National University Boramae Medical Centre, Seoul, South Korea; 3Seoul Public Health Research Institute, Seoul Medical Center, Seoul, South Korea; 4Health Insurance Research Institute, National Health Insurance Service, Wonju, South Korea; 5Research Analytics & Communications, Gallup Korea, Seoul, South Korea; 6Department of Public Health and Community Medicine, Seoul Metropolitan Government-Seoul National University Boramae Medical Centre, Seoul, South Korea; 7Department of Health Policy and Management, Seoul National University College of Medicine, Seoul, South KoreaCorrespondence: Won Mo Jang, Department of Public Health and Community Medicine, Seoul Metropolitan Government – Seoul National University Boramae Medical Center, Seoul, 07061, South Korea, Tel +82-2-870-2165, Email thomasj@snu.ac.krPurpose: After the declaration by the World Health Organization signaling the conclusion of the COVID-19 pandemic, most countries lifted mandatory mask-wearing regulations. This study aimed to investigate factors such as risk perception and political ideology associated with continued adherence to mask-wearing among specific populations, particularly when it is no longer deemed necessary.Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional study including a sample of 1001 respondents stratified by sex, age (≥ 18 years), and region from January 31 to February 2, 2023, after the mandatory mask regulation was lifted in South Korea. Multivariate logistic regression models were applied to estimate the relationships between risk perceptions, political ideology, and mask-wearing maintenance, adjusting for factors such as sex, age, occupation, and trust in the government.Results: Our results indicated significant associations between age, self-reported household economic status, political ideology, affective risk perception, and perceived effectiveness of the government’s COVID-related measures with indoor mask-wearing. Specifically, liberals were more likely to keep mask-wearing indoors than conservatives (adjusted odds ratio [aOR]: 2.19; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.33– 3.59); and those who perceived a greater affective risk of COVID-19 (aOR: 2.47; 95% CI: 1.96– 3.10), along with those who perceived the government’s countermeasures as inadequate, were more inclined to maintain the habit of wearing masks indoors (aOR: 1.90; 95% CI: 1.19– 3.03).Conclusion: Our study highlighted the multifaceted factors influencing mask-wearing behavior in the post-COVID-19 era. Even after adjusting for various confounding factors, such as age, sex, and trust in the government, an association remained between affective risk perception, political ideology, and mask-wearing behavior. However, further research for psychological mechanisms is needed to foster a culture of preventive behaviors proportional to the risk of infection.Keywords: risk perception, mask-wearing behaviors, political ideology

As a pharmaceutical intervention, vaccines remain a major public health strategy for mitigating the effects of COVID-19. Yet, vaccine intake has been affected by various cognitive and cultural factors. We examine how a selected set of factors (i.e., knowledge, concern, media, peer influence, and demographics) shaped COVID-19 vaccination intention in the early phase of the pandemic (Fall 2020). Using a survey conducted in three US states (Idaho, Texas, and Vermont) just prior to the rollout of the first vaccines against COVID-19, we find that COVID-19 concern was the primary driver of vaccination intention. Concern was shaped mainly by two factors: political ideology and media sources. Yet, ideology and media were much more important in affecting concern for those who leaned politically conservative, as opposed to those who leaned liberal or remained moderate. The results from our structural equation models affirm that the information politically conservative respondents were receiving reinforced the effects of their ideology, leading to a greater reduction in their concern. We discuss the potential implications of these findings for future pandemic preparedness.

Social scientists have long been interested in how attitudes and values influence fertility intentions and behaviors. The role of political ideology has, on the contrary, been overlooked. Right-wing people tend to be more religious, to hold more traditional views on gender roles and on the importance of the family. Therefore, right-wing people may be more likely to hold positive fertility intentions that individuals with other political orientations. In addition, political ideology may have an effect on fertility intention independent of other attitudes. Using two rounds of the European Social Survey, we show that people that position at the extreme right of the political ideology scale are more likely to intend to have a child during the three years following the interview. This association holds even after accounting for several socio-demographic and economic factors, values and attitudes. Heterogeneity tests show that the association is restricted to younger individuals (aged 20–34), with higher levels of education (at least upper secondary), and individuals in Eastern Europe. In Southern Europe right-wing individuals show significantly higher predicted probabilities of a positive fertility intention compared people that locate themselves in the political center. The statistically significant associations are also sizeable (differences in terms of predicted probabilities vary between 4 and 9 percentage points). These results point to the importance of considering a neglected factor in fertility research and contribute to the growing field of Political Demography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dissolution of nonprofit organizations has been increasingly documented by scholars in recent decades. Within this body of literature, how nonprofits' community environments affect their dissolution has not been extensively studied. This research combines a range of data sources to conduct a longitudinal analysis (2007–2015) of how two community factors influence the dissolution of nonprofit organizations across U.S. counties: demographic heterogeneity and political ideology. The study finds that counties with higher demographic heterogeneity and more liberal ideology generally experience higher levels of nonprofit dissolution, although these effects vary slightly across nonprofits' service fields. The findings extend the literature on nonprofit dissolution and offer implications for nonprofits to promote organizational sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political orientation profoundly influences individual and social decisions. Yet adequate and culturally adaptable tools to quantify it are missing. In personality research, it is common to use questionnaires to capture the multifaceted nature of a construct. Thus, surprisingly, most studies assess political orientation using single‐item scales that fail to account for cultural contexts beyond two‐party systems. Using a bottom‐up approach in which the core content of political orientation was defined by a German sample (N = 117), the current preregistered study developed a contemporary German questionnaire of political orientation (CGPOQ). The CGPOQ consists of 20 items that together form three main factors: "Tradition and National Security," Gender and Sexuality," and "Global Thinking." The factor structure that was determined by exploratory factor analysis (N = 1,089) was validated by confirmatory factor analysis in an independent sample (N = 303). Good fit was demonstrated by comparing the CGPOQ with several convergent (self‐identification, older conservatism questionnaire, voting intention, social dominance orientation, right‐wing authoritarianism) and divergent (religiosity, empathy) measures. The results indicate that the CGPOQ is a valid and reliable instrument for measuring political orientation in a German population. Furthermore, it challenges the assumption that political orientation relies on the same two dimensions across cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rumors, conspiracies, and health‐related misinformation have gone hand‐in‐hand with the global COVID‐19 pandemic, making it hard to obtain reliable and accurate information. Against this background, this study examined the different psychosocial predictors of believing in conspiratorial information related to general health in India. Indian participants (N = 826) responded to measures related to conspiratorial thinking, trust, moral emotions, political ideology, bullshit receptivity, and belief in conspiratorial information in an online survey. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were used to determine the validity of the instruments used with an Indian sample. Results revealed that lower subjective socioeconomic status, lower trust in political institutions, greater negative moral emotions, greater conspiratorial thinking, and right‐leaning political ideology predicted beliefs in health‐related conspiratorial information. In highlighting these potential psychosocial determinants of conspiratorial beliefs, we can move toward combating conspiracies effectively and developing necessary interventions for the same. Future work can focus on assessing the moderating effects of political ideology on conspiratorial beliefs in India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Older adults have been statistically proved to be at a higher risk of getting severely infected by the coronavirus COVID-19, evoking sweeping narratives of compassionate ageism surrounding them in different discourses. By analysing the media content, scholars from different areas have alerted us about the amplified ageism aroused by the pandemic crisis. However, we are still short of empirical evidence to learn how ageism is constructed in diverse sociocultural contexts in the wake of this global pandemic crisis. This study provides the case of Hong Kong to reflect on how ageism, as a set of social inequalities, is constructed. By examining 814 articles collected from the three most popular newspapers with different political orientations in Hong Kong, this study uses quantitative and qualitative content analysis to examine how older people have been generally represented. Then it further compares how these representations have been influenced by the media's liberal or conservative preferences. Third, it examines the relationship between the political orientation of newspapers and how different forms of ageism are constructed. The findings indicate that despite the liberal or conservative inclination of the three newspapers, they portray the older population as frail, dependent and deprived not only at the biomedical level but in all aspects of life. This study also reveals that the newspapers with a populist inclination in both camps have shown more hostile attitudes in representing compassionate ageism. In contrast, liberal and conservative-leaning media affirmed the government's dominant role in taking full responsibility for caring for the older population. The findings indicate that the polarised ageism frame cannot fully explain the underpinnings of ageism and implied policy processing in different contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on the goals-plans-action (GPA) model, we explore how individuals encourage hesitant family members to get vaccinated for COVID-19. We test models analyzing how multiple goals mediate associations between (a) perceived threat to the family member’s health, (b) anticipated resistance, and (c) participants’ political ideology, with their (d) planning effort and (e) message features. Participants who perceive a greater threat, anticipate greater resistance, and are more liberal put greater emphasis on the primary goal, which in turn predicts greater effort, directness, and reason giving. Liberal participants also place less emphasis on secondary goals, and thus exert more pressure. Theoretical implications linking the GPA model with fear appeals and intergroup communication frameworks and practical implications for families and public health campaigns are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does political partisanship extend to childhood? To what degree are children, a largely non‐political population, impacted by parents' and communities' political orientations? We examined children's behaviours and attitudes during a politically divisive event – the COVID‐19 pandemic. Children (4‐ to 12‐year‐olds; N = 313) of liberal (vs. conservative) parents reported greater preventive COVID‐19 behaviours, such as mask wearing and physical distancing, and responded more positively to these health behaviours. At the community level, children living in Democratic‐voting (vs. Republican‐voting) U.S. counties more strongly endorsed preventive COVID‐19 behaviours. Political orientation was a better predictor than education, income, religiosity, population‐density, and infection rates. Mediation and moderation analyses revealed that the parent–child political link was driven by children's perceptions of their parents' guidance, behaviours, and concern about COVID‐19, and that this link was attenuated in Democratic‐ versus Republican‐voting counties. Political orientation appears to play an unexpectedly prominent role, both at the intimate family and broader community level, in determining children's behaviours and attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Companies are increasingly engaging in corporate activism, defined as taking a public stance on controversial sociopolitical issues. Whereas prior research focuses on consumers' brand perceptions, attitudes, and purchase behavior, we identify a novel consumer response to activism, unethical consumer behavior. Unethical behavior, such as lying or cheating a company, is prevalent and costly. Across five studies, we show that the effect of corporate activism on unethical behavior is moderated by consumers' political ideology and mediated by desire for punishment. When the company's activism stand is [incongruent/congruent] with the consumer's political ideology, consumers experience [increased/decreased] desire to punish the company, thereby [increasing/decreasing] unethical behavior toward the company. More importantly, we identify two moderators of this process. The effect is attenuated when the company's current stance is inconsistent with its political reputation and when the immorality of the unethical behavior is high. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractAlthough jurisdictions across the U.S. have implemented pretrial justice reforms with varying support from lawmakers across the political divide, there is limited research exploring public opinion of pretrial justice. This study explores possible partisan dimensions of pretrial justice attitudes, focusing on perceptions of detention as crime control, defendants being undeserving of detention, and detention punishing defendants. Given recent research highlighting the influence of racial resentment on attitudes toward criminal justice, we use path analyses to test whether racial resentment mediates any relationship between political ideology and pretrial justice attitudes. Relative to conservatives, liberals are less supportive of using pretrial detention for crime control and more concerned that pretrial detention punishes defendants. These associations operate directly and indirectly via racial resentment; conservatives report higher racial resentment, and racial resentment is associated with attitudes regarding each dimension of pretrial ­justice. Addressing modern racism is critical for bipartisan pretrial justice reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the relationship between political ideology and integrative complexity in terms of COVID-19 news coverage. Briefly, integrative complexity is a psycholinguistic construct that examines cognitive structure. Based on a sample of COVID-19 news articles sourced from liberal, moderate, and conservative news networks, the results show liberal and moderate networks displayed higher complexity scores than conservative networks. The results further confirm a complexity pattern seen in previous research — liberals and moderates tend to demonstrate more complex rhetoric than conservatives. Moreover, the conservative networks' lower scores may be explained by the predominance of misinformation in their coverage of COVID-19. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a pharmaceutical intervention, vaccines remain a major public health strategy for mitigating the effects of COVID-19. Yet, vaccine intake has been affected by various cognitive and cultural factors. We examine how a selected set of factors (i.e., knowledge, concern, media, peer influence, and demographics) shaped COVID-19 vaccination intention in the early phase of the pandemic (Fall 2020). Using a survey conducted in three US states (Idaho, Texas, and Vermont) just prior to the rollout of the first vaccines against COVID-19, we find that COVID-19 concern was the primary driver of vaccination intention. Concern was shaped mainly by two factors: political ideology and media sources. Yet, ideology and media were much more important in affecting concern for those who leaned politically conservative, as opposed to those who leaned liberal or remained moderate. The results from our structural equation models affirm that the information politically conservative respondents were receiving reinforced the effects of their ideology, leading to a greater reduction in their concern. We discuss the potential implications of these findings for future pandemic preparedness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultural interactions have been at the forefront of political strife in recent years as authoritarian regimes have come to power across the globe. This warrants investigation by social science researchers in the fields of social psychology, political psychology, and cognitive psychology. This study drew upon those three fields to explore the relationships between political orientation and (1) authoritarian traits, (2) attitudes towards intergroup relations and cross-cultural interactions (CCI), and (3) identity factors, largely through the lens of Social Identity Theory. Participants comprised 2,582 undergraduates at a public university in the U.S. The Diverse Learning Environments survey assessed views on social identity, intergroup relations, political and religious ideology, and social and political issues. Correlational analysis and ANOVA were conducted to determine relationships between variables and differences between groups. Results indicated that the more strongly respondents rated their political orientation as conservative, the more authoritarian traits they tended to report, the less likely they were to engage in CCI, and the more likely they were to hold negative views of those from different backgrounds than themselves. The more respondents rated their political orientation as liberal, the more open they were to diversity and more likely they were to engage in CCI. Identity factors appeared to be more important to conservatives than to liberals in that strength of political ideology was related to common identity characteristics for conservatives but not for liberals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An experiment (N = 209) investigated whether terms about the scientific method impacted processing fluency similarly to other forms of jargon. Political ideology emerged as a significant moderator of the effects of method jargon on processing fluency. Specifically, liberals reported a more negative processing experience after exposure to the jargon condition, in line with expected general effects of jargon, while conservatives did not report a similarly negative experience. This preliminary result adds to accumulating evidence that suggests political ideology poses a challenge for science communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore if misinformation from political elites (i.e., members of the US Congress) and extreme partisan information from media outlets generate greater engagement than accurate information and non‐extreme partisan information. We also investigate how exposure to these information types leads to negative emotions (e.g., anger) in individuals and its association with attitude polarisation. To this end, we analysed fact‐checked tweets from political elites, tweets from media outlets and replies to those tweets. Together, these tweets received more than 100 000 replies and were shared more than two million times. We also conducted two online experiments. Our field studies reveal that misinformation and extreme partisan information are associated with higher levels of negative emotions and greater engagement than accurate information and non‐extreme partisan information. Our data also show that—while negative emotions in response to extreme partisan information are higher among social media users at the ideological extreme than those at the ideological centre—there is no difference in the two groups' level of negative emotions in response to misinformation. The online experiments demonstrate that exposure to misinformation and extreme partisan information elicits stronger negative emotions than exposure to accurate information and non‐extreme partisan information. These negative emotions, in turn, contribute to attitude polarisation. Our work makes practical and theoretical contributions concerning social media information sharing, negativity and political polarisation. We also provide future research avenues with associated research questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Grit—passion and perseverance toward long‐term goals—is generally associated with conscientiousness and consistency and thus presumed to be ideologically conservative in nature. Yet, an understanding of how liberals and conservatives differ in grittiness remains elusive. In this research, overall grit did not differ between liberals and conservatives, rather ideology played an essential role in driving which dimension of grit (perseverance; passion) was emphasized. Contrary to conventional wisdom, grit‐based perseverance (passion) was more influential to liberals (conservatives). Across two studies and a pilot study (appendix), the authors find that while ideology had no direct influence on moral consumer choices, grit‐based perseverance (passion), related to consumers' liberal (conservative) ideology, significantly increased (decreased) intentions to make moral consumer choices. These findings delineate the relationship between political ideology and grit, and the impact on moral consumer choices. The current research offers important implications for practitioners as well as numerous avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: With increased political polarization, Americans are displaying more animus across, and affinity within, ideological identity groups. We argue this dynamic incentivizes firms to minimize ideological misalignments across their workforce by locating new establishments in areas that are ideologically proximate to their current operations. We further argue that the desire to minimize ideological distance to new establishments is stronger in knowledge‐intensive industries and young organizations. We find support for these arguments through the analysis of over 220,000 new establishment openings from 2009 to 2014. Critically, we find the effect of ideological distance on location is stronger when societal polarization is high. Our theory, and findings, contribute to several literatures and advance our understanding of the impact of polarization on strategy. Managerial Summary: Being a liberal or a conservative is central to many Americans' identity. As political polarization rises, individuals increasingly trust and favor others who share their ideological identity, while distrusting and avoiding those that do not. This study investigates how these societal trends affect where firms choose to locate new facilities. Because social ties and trust across workers support collaboration, resource‐sharing and organizational performance, we argue that managers will seek ideological alignment within their firms by locating new establishments in areas that are ideologically proximate to existing operations. Analysis of over 220,000 new establishment openings from 2009 to 2014 supports this contention, and shows that the tendency to avoid ideologically distant locations is stronger when societal polarization is higher. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many institutional investors are active political donors, but the impact that their political partisanship has on corporate practices and policies has mostly eluded academic examination. As political donations can reflect investors' views and values, we theorize that the nature of investors' political donations can shape managerial decision-making in important ways. We test this idea by examining changes in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, an area where managers have a high degree of discretion over how they account for investors' views and values. Our theory introduces two focal constructs: political position, which captures the average political affiliation of actors within a group, and political dispersion, which captures the variance in political positions across group members. After hypothesizing a positive relationship between liberal-positioned investors and a firm's CSR activities, we argue that political dispersion among investors mitigates this positive effect. To account for between-group dispersion, we also suggest that liberal-positioned investors have a stronger positive effect on CSR in firms with more conservative managers. Our analysis of 19 years of shareholder political donations data for 2,062 U.S.-based firms supports our theory. This paper lays new groundwork for research on shareholder politics in management, and contributes to research on investor influence, political ideology, and CSR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the classic questions in political psychology has been whether feelings of self‐worth are relevant for politics. In this review, we summarize seven decades of research attempting to address this question, focusing on three sets of political outcomes: (1) political ideology, (2) political interest and engagement, and (3) intergroup relations. We rely on the distinction between self‐esteem (feelings of adequacy and satisfaction with oneself) and narcissism (feelings of entitled self‐importance and superiority over others). We argue that this distinction allows us to integrate the literature and explain the mixed effects observed in past research on self‐evaluation and politics. Our review points to a key role of narcissistic status pursuit and psychological defensiveness in predicting potentially problematic political attitudes and behaviors. We discuss practical implications these associations might have for democratic functioning and for understanding political leaders. We conclude by identifying outstanding questions and promising new research directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What shapes our emotional responses to socio‐political events? Following the social identity approach, we suggest that individuals adjust their emotional responses to socio‐political stimuli based on their ideological out‐group's responses, in a manner that preserves the comparative and normative fit of ideological in‐group–out‐group categories. In Study 1 and Study 2 (pre‐registered), Jewish‐Israeli leftists and rightists were exposed to their ideological out‐group's alleged emotional response to a stimulus associated with Israeli‐Palestinian relations, which was either stereotypical (leftists expressing low anger and rightists expressing high anger) or non‐stereotypical (leftists expressing high anger and rightists expressing low anger). Across studies, participants reported more positive affect towards their ideological out‐group when its response to the stimulus was non‐stereotypical versus stereotypical, yet their own response to the stimulus became more "extreme" (towards the low end of the anger scale for leftists, and towards the high end of the anger scale for rightists), shifting farther away from their ideological out‐group norm. Our findings suggest that in highly polarized contexts, where "leftist" and "rightist" identities are largely defined in comparison to one another, the "positioning" of ideological groups relative to one another plays a role in shaping their responses to their shared socio‐political reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]