Search

This article explores how was identified and evaluated the emotional states of women who, seized by strong emotions, reacted in a violent and disorderly way executing "excesses" considered outside the bounds of law in Captaincy General of Chile during the 18th century. To do so, it examines judicial records involving violent behaviors, interpersonal disputes and family conflicts in which mood was scrutinized to explain what predisposed the person's actions. It delves into how women's passional excess or disturbed emotions were described, comparing it to the descriptions of men acting under similar predisposition to find out patterns behind this identification and the evaluation made by those involved in the altercation, judges, witnesses and lawyers. The article suggests that Chilean culture identified in "furor" and "fury", translated into reactions that denoted "voracity" and "discomposure", a seed of inner instability that was close to madness or that could be assimilated to it. This state of internal disturbance could affect both men and women, although the evaluation on its significance was in each case different. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the representation of wrath in relation to the topic of shipwreck in literary texts from 17th-century Spain. As seen in the emblematic genre of the time, as well as in novellas and theatre plays, wrath is represented as the shipwreck of reason. Lack of control and the destruction of the mind as consequences of anger are associated with the capsizing of ships in marine storms. From the Renaissance and well into the late 17th-century, a sound mind is figuratively equivalent to the tranquil voyage in which the ship is in control of the maritime space. By contrast, the reckless and uncontrollable mind is comparable to the ship tossed and destroyed by the tempest, unable to return from the abyss of the ocean depths. As demonstrated in the literary texts of the time, to let the mind be taken over by the passions, particularly wrath and love, was frequently correlated with madness and, thus, with moral decline, as under contemporaneous thought, insanity was connected to ethical degeneration and conversely, sanity with Christian virtues. Moreover, the symbolic implication of the shipwreck motif in Early Modern Spanish literature also reflected the medical notions of the time—namely those related to the bodily humors. Within these sociocultural coordinates, wrath and unrequited love are correlated to choleric and melancholic natures that can lead to madness and social unrest. In sum, the connection of wrath to nautical devastation is an effective means to convey social and political commentary and transmit didactic messages.

Si l’histoire tragique offre la représentation d’un univers historique animé par des passions violentes, elle construit aussi l’image d’une société où la colère change de nature et de fonction selon les catégories sociales. La tension existant entre l’aptitude de la colère à se mettre au service des grandes valeurs éthiques de la Renaissance et son incapacité à répondre aux exigences de l’humanité, de la raison, de la justice et de la mesure rend la colère tragique. La colère n’est ni bonne, ni mauvaise en soi mais elle est un des effets de la misère humaine, qui elle-même est la conséquence du péché originel. Dans l’univers créé par Belleforest comme dans celui décrit par Augustin, la cité des hommes et la cité de Dieu sont indistinctement mêlées. La colère de qui vit selon la chair est mauvaise, celle de qui vit selon l’esprit est bonne. L’éthique des Histoires tragiques pourrait bien témoigner de la forte empreinte laissée sur Belleforest par la méditation de la Cité de Dieu de saint Augustin.

The intuitively right answer to the question 'What am I?' is not 'an incorporeal spirit', but 'a human being'. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that 'the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.' And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a substance that does not need anything material in order to exist, insists nevertheless that the human mind-body compound is a genuine unity in its own right, not a mere soul making using of a body. This paper argues for the enduring philosophical importance of this notion of our 'compound' nature as human beings, and explores its significance across three principal dimensions - the psychological, the phenomenological, and the moral. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Estudios Sociales is the property of Universidad de los Andes and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Al-Adab / Al-ādāb is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Cet article vise à mettre à l’épreuve l’héritage greimassien de l’étude des passions, inaugurée dans le texte « De la colère » (Greimas, 1983, p. 225-245). On postule qu’il est possible de rechercher les traces et les modalités d’un processus de pathémisation des requêtes numériques, sous-jacentes à un matériau discursif essentiellement descriptif. C’est la notion d’attente numérique qui est au cœur du processus de pathémisation. C’est d’abord la « fenêtre d’attente » du moteur de recherche, en tant que composante médiatique, qui conditionne la disposition passionnelle du sujet numérique. C’est ensuite la reconnaissance de présuppositions modales, sous-jacentes aux requêtes, qui autorise à saisir les traces de la disposition affective de l’utilisateur. Enfin, la notion de schéma d’attente permet d’identifier sept schémas d’attente affectifs dominants, qui confirment bien l’emprise de la sensibilisation sur le sujet de l’attente numérique.

This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronēsis) is a state of conviction (pistis) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise without virtuous dispositions to experience appropriate passions. Along the way, I argue that this reading allows us to explain the shortcomings of self‐controlled and akratic agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Teoría & Derecho. Revista de Pensamiento Jurídico is the property of Editorial Tirant Lo Blanch SL and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

King Herod’s infamous passion for his wife Mariam became a popular subject on European stages from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards: some sixteen plays were produced between 1552 and 1694 in German, Italian, Latin, Spanish, English and French. These plays developed an explicit reflection on theatre and the tragic form on the European stage, with Mariam establishing herself as a figure of heroic virtue against the king’s tyrannical jealousy. In France, these plays were part of the debate on the essence of classical tragedy, with Alexandre Hardy et Tristan L’Hermite in particular, while in England, the ancient story was adapted both on the stage of commercial and popular theaters and as a Seneca-inspired closet drama with Elizabeth Cary’s play The Tragedy of Mariam, published in 1613. In this introduction, the editors recall the historical background and the importance of the sources and their translations which contributed to making this episode of ancient history better known. Adopting a transnational perspective, they examine the reasons for this European fascination with the story of Mariam and Herod and highlight points of convergence; finally, they underline the importance of Mariam in the construction of a specifically female tragedy, highlighted in particular in Cary’s play. The final section presents the issue’s eleven articles, which take a comparative approach to analyzing the aesthetic and political stakes of Queen Mariam in the literary circles of early modern Europe.

The “tragic trend” that spread across Italy from the first decades of the sixteenth century was in full swing in the middle of the Cinquecento, when the genre left the circle of the Princes’ courts and the academies of men of letters to meet the powerful Venetian printing industry. Lodovico Dolce, who worked side by side with one of the main printers of the time, Gabriele Giolito, made a decisive contribution to the dissemination of ancient tragedies through the translation of works by Seneca, the rewriting of plays by Greek authors, and the composition of an original text, Marianna, published in 1565. This text takes up the formal characteristics that have now become traditional for Italian tragedy, while adapting the historical narrative to the new genre; at the same time, Marianna marks an important moment of transition in the broader concept of drama. The tragedy is, in fact, no longer just a work which serves as a didactic message addressed to the Prince, but becomes the means for discussing other fundamental contemporary questions: the power of feelings and the possibility to curb them, the conflicts between fidelity and morality, as well as the ability to endure adversity.

This article analyses the expression of women’s hatred towards their husbands and its consequences in a society ruled by patriarchal norms through a comparison between The Tragedy of Mariam (1613) by Elizabeth Cary and La Mariane (1637) by Tristan L’Hermite. In these two tragedies, female characters often express hatred: animosity dominates marital relationships. Yet conduct books published in the early modern period all condemn manifestations of hatred on the part of women, especially towards their husbands. In both plays, the women who express their hostility thus indirectly question a certain ideal of femininity. In this article, I study the causes of female hatred, its expression and the targets at which this hatred is directed. Wives’ hatred towards their husbands transgresses a social, marital and political order. However, the expression of this passion on stage is quite theatrical, as it is both audible and visible, thus representing an aesthetic issue. However, the two tragedies choose different treatments for this forbidden passion, presenting the queen as a model character despite her transgression, or as a complex and torn character.

This paper aims to incorporate Greimassian semiotics of passions in current cognitive science. Concepts such as passional codes, the canonical passional schema, and other central Greimassian notions in the domain of passions are mapped against ideas such as frames and layers of meaning within cognitive science. By integrating the two fields artificially kept apart, the authors endeavour to show how the resulting synergy could shed new light on the study of passions.

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the early modern period, the appearance of ghosts carried both religious and pathological connotations in the wake of the twin movements of the Reformation and the Renaissance. According to this belief system, the supernatural was seen as a factor in creating an imbalance in bodily humours, including the black bile, thus resulting in a melancholic disposition. Based on contextual and historical data, this article historicises the religious and pathological identity of the Ghost in Hamlet, which reflects the early modern understanding of the supernatural. This study is separate from existing discussions that focus solely on the role of the Ghost in the play. However, the very nature of the Ghost, a great driving force behind the plot thrust, as understood by Shakespeare and his society, has been fairly neglected. This study, therefore, situates three distinctive aspects of the Ghost in early modern society, warranting attention in Shakespearean criticism. Firstly, the findings of this study underscore the nuanced religious persona of the ghost, encompassing both Protestant and Catholic perspectives, as understood in the early modern period. Secondly, its pathological and melancholic nature is discussed which finds its origins in the theory of humours. This aspect of the Ghost is strongly linked to creating an imbalance in Hamlet's melancholic humour and driving events to their tragic end in the play. Thirdly, it examines Shakespeare's exploration of the mind-body discourse through the Ghost's interactions with the Prince, reflecting the intellectual currents of the seventeenth century. Moreover, as the Ghost belongs to the past, this fact connects the appearance of the Ghost with the idea of the history of the passions--a still-burgeoning field of study in the humanities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rabbi Hasdai Crescas’ discussion of God’s joy (simḥah) in his Light of the Lord, Book I, Part 3, Chapter 5, had a marked influence on the discussion of God’s joy (la delettazione) by Rabbi Judah Abrabanel, alias Leone Ebreo, in his Dialogues of Love, Dialogue III. Leone, following Crescas, holds that God’s joy is active not passive; that it is mentioned in Psalms 104:31; and that it is also mentioned in BT Kebubot 8a. Moreover, Leone, like Crescas, cites Genesis 6:6, which attests to God’s sadness. Leone’s theories concerning God’s joy and love reflect his reading of Crescas.

This article presents some considerations on the mind-body relationship in Cartesian philosophy that allow us to glimpse what Descartes understands by human nature. For this, I show how the teaching of nature and the passions show us that the affections produced in the soul by the material world are undeniable and fundamental, because the information they provide helps us to preserve ourselves as individuals. Finally, I consider that the passions are closely related to the will, in such a way that some of our actions and decisions depend on this interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Hispania Sacra is the property of Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article examines Immanuel Kant's psychological and transcendental analysis of the factors that determine human actions in different ways and with different strengths. Based on the works, in particular, Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, as well as lecture notes and notes of the German philosopher, it was possible to study the interaction between the sensual determination of human actions -- stimuli, affects and passions, and the rational determination of human actions-motives, imperatives, and freedom. We investigate how Immanuel Kant preserves the basic meaning of freedom in the interweaving and interaction of various factors that significantly influence human actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Acta Universitatis Lodziensis: Folia Litteraria Romanica is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Lodzkiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval is the property of Sociedad Espanola de Filosofia Medieval and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the first half of Part 5 of the Ethics, Spinoza presents his directions for mitigating the passions through reason. He touts his account of the power of reason over the passions as ground-breaking and unique, while positioning himself squarely within the traditional debate of akrasia, or weakness of will. Spinoza claims he is the first to identify the affects through their characteristic effects, and demonstrate the way these effects can be countered by the mind's activity. It follows that Spinoza's claim for originality can be explained in (at least) two ways: first, passions themselves have been misunderstood, and second, previous philosophers have misunderstood the relationship between reason and the passions. In the first part of this paper, I place Spinoza's discussion of the passions and reason's power over them in a historical context. Next, I present Spinoza's definition of the affects, and his directions for 'destroying' the passions. In the third section I point to the differences between my interpretation and that of recent commentators. Finally, I discuss the way in which Spinoza's directions for mitigating the passions serve as the psychological basis for his moral theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Walter Charleton is an often-overlooked figure in the history of seventeenth-century philosophy, frequently thought of as a mere conduit for the ideas of others, rather than a significant thinker in his own right. As a self-described "eclectic," Charleton saw himself as avoiding dogmatism by selecting the best ideas from his sources and fitting them together into a new, coherent system. Here I argue his method allowed him to innovate on his sources, and led to attempts at overcoming the limitations of the systems he drew on. My focus is Charleton's Natural History of the Passions (1674) and what it takes from René Descartes's Passions of the Soul (1650). There are two benefits to this analysis. First, it will help contextualise Charleton's work and defend him against the accusation of lacking originality. Second, it will further our understanding of a hitherto understudied facet of Descartes's influence in early modern England. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The works of Anne Finch, a writer doubly exiled as a female poet and Jacobite, stand out as eminently teachable examples of a compelling political outsider view that provokes us to consider how we can better attend to perspectives of principled opposition. Her poems in response to what has been called the "first modern revolution," together with her odes upon the deaths of King James II and Queen Mary Beatrice, showcase the subversive power of indirect articulation, expressing values through emotions and affects in veiled forms such as allegory and alternate history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a response to Sanem Soyarslan’s objections to my reading of Spinoza’s free person (homo liber). She argues that on my interpretation the free person, unlike the wise person (vir sapiens), while subject to passive affects, does not experience bondage to the passions; and so only the latter, but not the former, can serve as a viable “model of human nature.” I argue that, in fact, the free person and the wise person are, for Spinoza, one and the same indiviual, and thus constitute a single ideal model that we can more or less closely approximate.

This article explores a group of Thomas Weelkes's songs where the usually light-hearted, playful and often suggestive fa-la refrain is juxtaposed with melancholic lyrics. The contrasting passions in these texts provide inspiration for typically madrigalian musical expression, often involving chromatic writing for melancholic passages; however, the nonsense syllables in the fa-la refrains function differently. With no semantic text, the expression of these passages depends on the musical setting and the decisions taken by the performers, which might align or jar with prior expectations of fa-la refrains. Such passages are ambiguous and malleable, and the signification of the fa-las might change from stanza to stanza. Weelkes's experimentation with how fa-la refrains might communicate a range of passions engages with contemporary debates about the extent to which music's affective powers were reliant on, amplified by, or independent of text. Moreover, several of Weelkes's songs enact a therapeutic purging of melancholy attributed to non-verbal or instrumental music. Given Weelkes's interest in exploring sonic effects which are both onomatopoeic and utilize conventions of musical expression, these songs can be interpreted as not merely representations of the passions but as potential acts of musical therapy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to contribute to the discussion of Hume's theory of personal identity, by examining a conflict regarding the vivacity of the self in his writings about sympathy. Although the mechanism of sympathy supposes that self is the liveliest perception of thought, when we consider sympathy through the perspective of the 'desire of company', we find that self lacks vivacity and, without alterity, it would be in reality nothing. Our objective is to present the conflict and show that, far from being a contradiction in Hume's thinking, it is consistent with how the philosopher conceives personal identity as a product of imagination, that is, a perception that, like any other, exists within the flow of perceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Smithian (supposedly) irregular feelings reveal the internal structure of moral judgements by showing that they consist of two distinct elements. These elements belong to different dynamisms of human nature, are triggered by different causes, and produce different reactions in the agent. In the case of resentment, I call them animal resentment and moral resentment, respectively. Animal resentment closely resembles Hume's account of resentment and follows his theory of the passions. Moral resentment is different, for it is not caused directly by pain, but by the recognition of the evil intention of the aggressor. Finally, plain moral resentment – or resentment caused by an unjust action and approved of by the impartial spectator – blends these elements into a unity articulated by Hume's theory of the passions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines a particular aspect of Paolo Mantegazza's (1831-1910) work: the establishment of the Museo Psicologico as part of his anthropological project. The study begins by examining the general characteristics of Mantegazza's anthropological viewpoint, justifying the inclusion of comparative psychology as a subfield of anthropological psychology, with a focus on the key principles that served as the theoretical foundation for the establishment of the Museum. Subsequently, the proposal for the foundation of the Museum will be analyzed, including a description of the theoretical and methodological principles underlying the selection and arrangement of the objects to be collected. Finally, the paper will describe the Museo Psicologico at the time of its inauguration, providing an overview of its organization in the following years and an attempt to uncover the reasons behind its abrupt dissolution after the death of its founder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant's radical criticism of the passions has a central but largely overlooked moral-psychological component: for Kant, the passions promote a kind of self-deception he calls 'rationalizing'. In analysing the connection between passion and rationalizing self-deception, I identify and reconstruct two essential traits of Kant's conception of the passions. I argue (1) that rationalizing self-deception, according to Kant, contributes massively to the emergence and consolidation of passions. It aims to resolve a psychological conflict between passion and moral duty when in fact, it does not resolve but perpetuates this conflict. I then argue (2) that rationalizing does not necessarily aim to devalue moral duty, as Kant seems to suggest in the Groundwork. It can also aim to revalue the 'counterweight'. By analysing Kant's presentation of several individual passions in the Anthropology, I demonstrate that rationalizing here is concerned with elevating these passions and making them pass as morally (or at least prudentially) justified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, Nietzsche's concept of Will to power has been examined. The concept is central to Nietzsche's general philosophy. Because of Nietzsche's philosophy focuses on the question of "How should an individual live?" Will to Power is directly related to values and value creation. Therefore, in the article, first of all, it will be discussed how Nietzsche criticizes the values he inherited. Nietzsche's argues that Christianity, European culture and the modern world have suffered a great loss of values. These are values that pacify people and make them increasingly sickly. On the other hand, Nietzsche's will to power emerged as a treatment or healing attempt. In the article, more emphasis was placed on the life-affirming feature of the concept of will to power. The assertion of "other worlds" against life, the denial of life, or a pessimistic view of life are ways of thinking that Nietzsche never accepted. The will to power unlike classical approaches, asserts the indispensability of passions with an approach that affirms the human body. Therefore, in the article, the importance of the mutual relational existence of the passions of pleasure and pain in terms of being the individual himself is revealed. Because life is a field of struggle that progresses with resistances. What an individual needs to do is to develop new perspectives and make comments in every situation. Thus, according to the ethical results that emerge from the will to Power, life is essentially the will to Power and everything is positive. Being oneself depends on growing one's power by putting one's passions (mainly pleasure and pain) into a mutual struggle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Discourse on Happiness is Émilie du Châtelet's most translated work, but there is no systematic interpretation of her account of the nature and means to happiness in the secondary literature. I argue that the key to understanding her account lies in interpreting the various roles of the "great machines of happiness." I show that Du Châtelet provides a sophisticated hedonistic account of the nature of happiness, in which passions and tastes are the means to self-perpetuating, increasing, and long-lasting sources of pleasure. In addition, I argue that the remaining "great machines of happiness" are not logically necessary conditions for happiness, but rather character traits that support our tastes and passions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Agora (0211-6642) is the property of Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Servicio de Publicaciones and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A revisionary reading of Descartes's epistemology has emerged in the literature. Some commentators have argued that Descartes subscribes to passionate epistemology, which claims that epistemic progress in the Meditations requires contributions from the meditator's passions. This paper argues that the passions cannot perform any epistemic work in the Meditations. As such, the meditator's passions do not require us to revise our canonical understanding of the Meditations as an exercise of pure thought. Furthermore, we need not abandon the standard claim that ethical practice emerges in the tree of philosophy only after metaphysics and epistemology have been established. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eliza Haywood was an acclaimed eighteenth-century writer, actress, translator, publisher, bookseller, journalist and the editor of The Female Spectator (1744-1746). Being aware of the difficulties females had to endure at the time, she challenged them, exploring other alternatives in her newspaper. This article will explore the different literary techniques Eliza Haywood employs in her periodical to be able to offer her own common-sense and astute moral instruction to her readers, teaching them to turn the hardly appealing fates that their families had arranged for them into ones they could benefit from. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Horyzonty Wychowania is the property of Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines D. von Hildebrand's view of the heart, as well as The Heart, published in 1965. It shows how the heart, without any pompous and sentimental vision, is the center of an intense affective activity, as important as the intellectual, for the lived knowledge of the values and goods that structure reality. It starts from the mystery of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, the noblest sign of human nature, to reach the tender affectivity, which implies knowing how to grasp the objective situation, and understand if there are authentic reasons for a particular behavior. To reach it, it is necessary to cross the Sacred Heart of Jesus where there is knowledge and wisdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current rise of populism is often associated with affects. However, the exact relationship between populism and affects is unclear. This article addresses the question of what is distinctive about populist (appeals to) affects. It does so against the backdrop of a Laclauian conception of populism as a political logic that appeals to a morally laden frontier between two homogenous groups, 'the people' and 'those in power', in order to establish a new hegemonic order. I argue that it is distinctive of populism that it breaks with the dominating feeling rules by overtly appealing to affects and reclaiming them for the realm of the political. The article explores three groups of affective phenomena: discontent, anger, and fear; empathetic, sympathetic, group-based, and shared emotions; and collective passions of enthusiasm and love. It shows how an appeal to these affects relates to the political logic of populism itself by contributing to the concretization, collectivization, and unification of affects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]