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America is said to be more polarized than ever before, and extensive research examines the causes and effects of political polarization. A less studied but more pronounced trend is that citizens perceive society and politics as sharply divided. We focus on news exposure as a key reason for these perceptions. We disentangle the unique effects of exposure to partisan outlets and to news coverage of polarization in general, whether in partisan or centrist news media. We rely on 9 months of online behavioral data (127,400,000 visits) from large samples in the U.S. and Poland (total N = 2,462 & 2,120), paired with a three-wave panel survey on participants' attitudes and perceptions. We measure individual exposure, over-time and unobtrusively, to partisan outlets as well as to news coverage of polarization through a fine-tuned BERT-based machine learning classifier. We find that both exposures increase perceived polarization, independently, in both countries. Yet, in both contexts, it is news coverage of polarization, regardless of whether it is ideologically left, right, or centrist news outlets, that is the strongest driver of perceived polarization. These changes are confined to personal-level polarization (perceived distance between oneself and members of the opposing party), while no measure significantly influences perceptions of society, more generally, as being polarized. These findings have important implications for our understanding of how the media’s increasing tendency to focus on conflict as a central reporting frame can be the driver of often exaggerated perceptions of partisan divisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contemporary U.S. media environment is characterized by a strong partisan divide. Both Democrats and Republicans express strong distrust in oppositional media and accuse them of showing partisan bias. Clearly, this public opinion climate is not helpful to a healthy democracy. Unlike the common wisdom, these news outlets do provide neutral political coverage. Based on propositions from expectancy violation theory and hostile media perceptions, we test the effects of exposure to neutral news from an out-party outlet on violation interpretation and attitudes toward oppositional media. An online experiment (N = 610) shows that exposure to neutral news from an out-party outlet leads to violation unexpectedness and valence for Democrats and violation valence for Republicans. We also find an indirect positive effect of exposure to neutral news on attitudes toward an out-party outlet through violation valence for Democrats and Republicans. Unlike what can be expected of hostile media perceptions, these effects are more noticeable for stronger partisans. Our study also reveals different patterns of partisan reactions to neutral news from in-party outlets. Theoretical implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growth of partisan media presents new challenges for political consultants. Informed by social identity theory and truth-default theory, this paper examines how U.S. voters react to politicians in combative news interviews. Experiment 1 (N = 320) establishes that an ingroup politician gains more trust among ingroup voters when interviewed by cross-partisan media accusing the politician of deception than when interviewed more congenially by co-partisan media. Experiment 2 (N = 131) finds that perceived media hostility increases Democrats’ and Republicans’ trust in a politician regardless of whether the interviewer accuses the politician of deception or is congenial. Experiment 3 (N = 126) replicates the findings when a Democrat is accused of deception on Fox News. The study tested a moderated mediation model, finding that Republican and Democratic voters do not react differently in the process. The discussion highlights the practical and theoretical implications of hostile media perceptions and ingroup–outgroup partisan bias in a polarized media environment with conflicting exposure to live fact-checking and deception detection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

French news channel CNEWS is regularly compared to Fox News due to presumed ties with the far right, and for promoting conspiracy theories and partisan propaganda. Using data from the ReCitCom project, I propose simple metrics for quantifying the partisanship of news audiences cross-nationally and identifying channels like Fox News in other media systems. I apply them to France and find that CNEWS has the most ideologically radical news audience within the French media ecosystem, and that the pattern is more pronounced with higher frequency of use. Comparatively, I show that the Fox News and CNEWS audiences have an equivalent ideological lean that justifies the comparison between the two outlets at the audience level. The two audiences are also disproportionately receptive to far-right candidates compared to other news audiences and their respective national samples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As misinformation has become a prominent topic in U.S. politics, Americans have become increasingly concerned about the problem that misinformation poses. Correspondingly, people have become weary of news media, with some actively avoiding news media and political information. While many situational and contextual factors contribute to news avoidance, this study considers how the feeling of being misinformed online might to contribute to related news attitudes and behaviors, like active news avoidance and news fatigue. Using panel data from a three-wave survey of U.S. adults collected during the 2020 U.S. presidential election, we find that feeling misinformed online is a widely felt phenomenon in the U.S. that is associated with increased active news avoidance and news fatigue overtime. We also find that strong partisans in the U.S. asymmetrically shift their news media use when they feel misinformed online; with strong Democrats relying more on non-partisan news media and strong Republicans using less news media overall, including less conservative news media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the relationship between partisan media consumption and changes in democratic values during the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. By integrating self-reported news consumption data with the partisan slant of news outlets, we explore how different media environments shape voters' attitudes about democracy. Our analysis of a two-wave panel survey conducted before and after the election reveals significant changes in democratic values among general voters, including both Biden and Trump supporters. The findings also highlight the complex effects of a polarized media ecosystem on political beliefs, demonstrating that partisan media flow influences democratic values beyond the traditional winner-loser dichotomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) is a controversial technique that has been suggested as a means of temporarily halting global warming. A study conducted on 441 individuals in the US in November 2023 investigated the impact of three video presentations either promoting or opposing research on SAI. Two of the videos were presented by scientific experts either promoting or opposing further research into this technology. The third was politicized, featuring Tucker Carlson on Fox News, and arguing that SAI would endanger Americans. We found that all three of the video presentations had a strong influence on general support for or against research, and that the politicized presentation not only reduced support for research but also reduced trust in science and technology to provide solutions to problems facing humanity. The findings suggest the strong impact of messaging on public opinion about research into SAI as a climate change intervention strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Politicians have discovered Twitter as a tool for political communication. If information provided by politicians is circulated in ideologically segregated user networks, political polarization may be fostered. Using network information on all 1.78 million unique followers of German Members of Parliament by October 2018, follower homogeneity across politicians and parties is measured. While the overall homogeneity is low, politicians of the AfD—a right-wing populist party—stand out with very homogeneous follower networks. These are largely driven by a small group of strongly committed partisans that make up around 7% of the party's but around 55–75% of the average AfD politician's followers. The findings add to the literature by showing potentially unequal distributions of network segregation on Twitter. Furthermore, they suggest that small groups of active users can multiply their influence online, which has important implications for future research on echo chambers and other online phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the framing strategies and language features of U.S. news coverage surrounding sexual violence and gender issues across the ideological media spectrum at two pivotal phases of the #MeToo movement: (1) during its initial rise as a hashtag-driven social movement in 2017 and (2) during the Kavanaugh nomination and confirmation in 2018. Using structural topic modeling, community detection, and feature extraction, we reveal a heightened employment of political framing during the Kavanaugh accusations. Topical prevalence and language use in news treatment also showed clear partisan differences, consistent with theories of moral foundation and issue ownership. Implications for research on news coverage of gender rights and framing of social movements are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nordic countries have experienced an upsurge of partisan alternative media positioning themselves as correctives of the mainstream, but only little is known about how many and who uses them. Building on original survey data from a representative sample of the adult Danish population (n = 2,455), this article presents the first study of the use of left-wing and right-wing alternative media in Denmark. Findings show that users are generally more likely to be older, male, and live in disadvantaged parts of the country, but that alternative media appeal across all levels of education and urban–rural divides. Results also show positive associations with use of national dailies and high political interest. Furthermore, use of alternative media is associated with taking ideological positions further to the left or right. Yet, the findings do not indicate that users generally take extreme positions. This study thus adds considerable nuance to the picture of alternative news users and also finds that alternative media with different degrees of alternativeness attract similar users.

Misinformation and misperceptions about COVID-19 have undermined democratic system. Partisan media are regarded as one of the culprits for facilitating the spread of misinformation. Grounded in the extended communication mediation model, this study analyzes a U.S. survey sample and examines the conditional indirect effects of partisan media use on COVID-19 related misperceptions. Findings show that using conservative and liberal media both have positive effects on misperceptions and message derogation. Conservative media use has a negative impact on perceived response efficacy, whereas liberal media use positively influenced it. Furthermore, the effect of liberal media use on misperceptions became negative when serially mediated by perceived response efficacy and message derogation. Lastly, discussion network heterogeneity was a significant moderator, such that the indirect effects of partisan media use on misperceptions became weaker among those with a more heterogeneous discussion network. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzing data from a survey of U.S. adults (N = 509), our study examines the role of partisan media in (a) shaping people's perceptions of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, (b) producing an echo-chamber effect, influencing users to believe that other people have an opinion similar to their own, and (c) creating a polarized public opinion environment, where people hold more extreme perspectives on BLM. Left-wing media consumption was positively correlated with favorable perceptions of BLM, while right-wing media consumption had a negative correlation, suggesting that partisan media could influence users' own perceptions of BLM. Also, left-wing media consumption was positively correlated with the belief that others held favorable views of BLM, while right-wing media consumption was negatively correlated with such a belief, suggesting that partisan media could affect one's beliefs about others' perceptions. Supporting its role in producing an echo-chamber effect, frequent right-wing media usage was associated with a smaller difference between one's own views and their assessment of others' views regarding BLM. Finally, there was a positive correlation between left-wing media consumption and having extreme perceptions of BLM, suggesting that the use of left-wing media could play a role in creating a polarized public opinion climate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzing data from a survey of U.S. adults (N = 509), our study examines the role of partisan media in (a) shaping people’s perceptions of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, (b) producing an echo-chamber effect, influencing users to believe that other people have an opinion similar to their own, and (c) creating a polarized public opinion environment, where people hold more extreme perspectives on BLM. Left-wing media consumption was positively correlated with favorable perceptions of BLM, while right-wing media consumption had a negative correlation, suggesting that partisan media could influence users’ own perceptions of BLM. Also, left-wing media consumption was positively correlated with the belief that others held favorable views of BLM, while right-wing media consumption was negatively correlated with such a belief, suggesting that partisan media could affect one’s beliefs about others’ perceptions. Supporting its role in producing an echo-chamber effect, frequent right-wing media usage was associated with a smaller difference between one’s own views and their assessment of others’ views regarding BLM. Finally, there was a positive correlation between left-wing media consumption and having extreme perceptions of BLM, suggesting that the use of left-wing media could play a role in creating a polarized public opinion climate.

The effectiveness of and its boundary conditions regarding fact–checking news exposure have significant normative and practical implications. While many of the prior studies have focused on the attitudinal consequences of fact–checking news delivered by neutral third parties such as fact–check organizations, relatively less is known as to the effect of fact–checking news delivered by partisan media. Based on the frameworks of motivated reasoning and the hostile‐media effect, we investigate the possibility of decoupling between attitudinal persuasion and perceptual backfire by fact–checking news by partisan media—that is, exposure to fact–checking news increases bias perception of such news yet nevertheless attitudinally persuades audiences. Based on a series of original experiments conducted in South Korea and in the United States, we find consistent support for our prediction, in that exposure to fact–checking news produces the corrective effects, yet at the same time perceived bias of the fact–checking news systematically varies as a function of the ideological slant of partisan media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With increasing evidence on deepening cleavages along geographic lines, we argue that the local political climate plays an important role in political decision-making and engagement. In this study, we aim to understand the role of political contexts in shaping different forms of political participation, whether centered in the local community or in digital spaces. We specifically consider two important contextual factors that potentially relate to participation: the partisan composition of the neighborhood environment and the nature of political representation at the state government level. We introduce two sets of competing arguments: Mobilization and Resignation vs. Activation and Complacency to explain different participatory mechanisms. Using both national survey data collected during the 2016 U.S. election period and zip code and state-level contextual data, we employ three-level multilevel modeling to tease out how multiple factors operating at different levels are related to online or public forms of participation. In general, our findings reveal that individuals living in a state with political underrepresentation are more likely to engage in public forms of actions. Additionally, we examine subgroup analyses to show how contextual relationships with participation are different according to political orientations, such as party identification and political interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the potential role both untrustworthy and partisan websites play in misinforming audiences by testing whether actual exposure to these sites is associated with political misperceptions. Using a sample of American adult social media users, we match data from individuals' Internet browser histories with a survey measuring the accuracy of political beliefs. We find that visits to partisan websites are at times related to misperceptions consistent with the political bias of the site. However, we do not find strong evidence that untrustworthy websites consistently relate to false beliefs. There is also little evidence that visits to less partisan, centrist news sites are associated with more accurate political beliefs about these issues, suggesting that exposure to politically neutral news is not necessarily the antidote to misinformation. Results suggest that focusing on partisan news sites—rather than untrustworthy sites—may be fruitful to understanding how media contribute to political misperceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marked by both deep interconnectedness and polarization, the contemporary media system in the United States features news outlets and social media that are bound together, yet deeply divided along partisan lines. This article formally analyzes communication flows surrounding mass shootings in the hybrid and polarized U.S. media system. We begin by integrating media system literature with agenda setting and news framing theories and then conduct automated text analysis and time series modeling. After accounting for exogenous event characteristics, results show that (a) sympathy and gun control discourses on Twitter preceded news framing of gun policy more than the other way around, and (b) conservatives on Twitter and conservative media reacted to progressive discourse on Twitter, without their progressive counterparts exhibiting a similar reactiveness. Such results shed light on the influence of social media on political communication flows and confirm an asymmetry in the ways partisan media ecosystems respond to social events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some might expect the promise of ending a global pandemic via vaccination to interrupt conventional partisan media effect processes. We test that possibility by bringing together sentiment-scored COVID vaccine stories (N > 17,000) from cable and mainstream news outlets, N > 180,000 Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) reports, and six original surveys (N = 6,499), in order to investigate (1) whether partisan news outlets covered COVID vaccination in different ways, and (2) if differences in coverage increased vaccine hesitancy. We find that Fox News' (FXNWS) coverage was significantly more negative than that of other cable and mainstream sources, and is associated with increased negative public vaccine sentiment. In the aggregate, adverse event reports tended to increase following periods of heightened negativity on FXNWS. At the micro-level, self-reported FXNWS exposure is associated with increased vaccine refusal. Collectively, the results provide new insights into the public health consequences of vaccine politicization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many blame partisan news media for polarization in America. This paper examines the effects of liberal, conservative, and centrist news on affective and attitude polarization. To this end, we rely on two studies that combine two-wave panel surveys (N1 = 303, N2 = 904) with twelve months worth of web browsing data submitted by the same participants comprising roughly thirty-eight million visits. We identify news exposure using an extensive list of news domains and develop a machine learning classifier to identify exposure to political news within these domains. The results offer a robust pattern of null findings. Exposure to partisan and centrist news websites—no matter if it is congenial or crosscutting—does not enhance polarization. These null effects also emerge among strong and weak partisans as well as Democrats and Republicans alike. We argue that these null results accurately portray the reality of limited effects of news in the "real world." Politics and partisan news account for a small fraction of citizens' online activities, less than 2 percent in our trace data, and are nearly unnoticeable in the overall information and communication ecology of most individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social media metrics allow media outlets to get a granular, real-time understanding of audience preferences, and may therefore be used to decide what content to prioritize in the future. We test this mechanism in the context of Facebook, by using topic modeling and longitudinal data analysis on a large dataset comprising all posts published by major media outlets used by American citizens (⁠ N ≈ 2.23 M ⁠ , 2015–2019). We find that while the overall effect of audience engagement on future news coverage is significant, there is substantial heterogeneity in how individual outlets respond to different kinds of topics. A handful of right-wing media outlets are more likely to respond to audience engagement metrics than other outlets, but with partisan politics topics and not with entertainment-oriented content. Our research sheds new light on how social media platforms have shaped journalistic practices and has implications for the future health of journalism in the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The YouTube video platform has provided fertile ground for creators outside the journalistic field to produce programs that combine elements of entertainment with information on public affairs. Behind the emergence of these practices lie important trends enabling alternative public discourses and altering the cultural production, but also an environment mainly characterized by the low trust in mainstream news organizations and high ideological polarization that seem to give shape to political entertainment contents—and especially their overt political partisanship. Based on observations of independent political entertainment YouTube channels in Mexico, this study delves into their apparently contradictory intersections with professional journalism and the constraints imposed on their practice by platform affordances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If citizens systematically respond differently to claims conveyed by memes, their effects on the broader information ecosystem may be underestimated. This US-based study (N = 598) uses a 2 (partisan news/meme format) x 2 (congenial/uncongenial message) design to examine perceptions of partisan memes’ influence on self and others, and the format’s effect on willingness to share disagreement in the context of partisan claims about corruption surrounding biofuels operations. Results indicate that meme format enhances individuals’ tendency to see messages as less influential on oneself than on others and individuals less intent to share disagreement with claims presented in meme format. This decrease is mediated by the decrease in perceived influence over self. These findings call attention to the role format differences may play in the psychological processes underlying political discussion as it becomes increasingly mediated and visual.

The spread of (hyper)partisan alternative media has sparked renewed scholarly interest in their political role, but the relation between these outlets and political parties has only recently received scholarly attention. This study explores this relationship using a novel design that directly compares the news agendas and source balances of two Danish alternative media to those of two national dailies, and to the political agendas of two political parties the alternative media have ties to. In total, 576 news articles and 1012 social media posts were analyzed. The study identifies four ways in which the alternative media favor the political parties but finds that the favoritism is markedly more pronounced in one of them. The case study contributes with the general theoretical insight that within the group of partisan alternative media it might be fruitful to distinguish between party-political and ideological partisanship and that alternative media can be more or less party-politically or ideologically partisan. The study concludes with a recommendation that future studies empirically investigate whether such distinctions are also relevant in other media systems as this is important for understanding the political roles different alternative media can play in the media and political systems they enter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is aimed at analyzing journalists' organizational working perceptions in the Ethiopian local media. The study covered six branches of Amhara Media Corporation (AMC). It applied explanatory sequential mixed research in the course of a survey, in-depth interview, document analysis and observation instruments. To gauge the levels of organizational trust (OT), organizational commitment (OC), job satisfaction (JS), social exchange (SE) and economic exchange (EE), a questionnaire survey was distributed to 220 randomly chosen respondents. Besides, in-depth interviews were conducted with eight purposefully selected media practitioners. The study's theoretical framework integrates the organizational theories of OT, OC, JS, SE and EE with the hierarchy of influences model. The findings revealed the levels of journalists' OT, OC and SE were moderate and their levels of JS and EE were high and low, respectively. Except for the working stream, journalists' OT level is unaffected by demographic and biographic variables. This study concludes journalists perceive AMC's organizational working atmosphere as partially positive, but the professional practice of journalism faced significant challenges and influences from the ownership it bases and establishes. The media managers are intentionally and directly assigned in AMC to maintain the political hegemony and status quo of the ruling party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the question of asymmetry/symmetry regarding the use of language in partisan media outlets in the US. Some research has suggested that conservatives and conservative media are unique in how they present information to their audience, positing that conservatives use simpler, more uncivil language. Others have noted that some of these matters, such as use of uncivil language, applies to both conservative and liberal outlets. The current study adds to this literature by examining whether the ideological leanings of news sources correlate with reading ease, level of negativity (sentiment), and level of formality (tone). Specifically, we examine whether only conservative outlets use simpler, negative, and less formal language or if these trends appear for media outlets across the ideological spectrum. Our findings find support for the symmetry hypothesis. Indeed, our findings suggest that ideological extremity and partisanship strength correlate with use of easier-to-read language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined the role political villains play in individuals' political imagination, which can then lead to political violence. When there is a threatening villain, partisans should become more likely to construct elaborate narratives about the political world, which can lead them to believe the violence against the opposition is justified. Study 1 uses a survey to provide evidence that exposure to partisan news sources cultivates the perception that opposing candidate pose a grave danger to America, which leads to more narrative thought. In Study 2, an experiment demonstrates that imagining threatening villains creates more narrative thought, which is then related to support for political violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This content analysis examined how local television framed and sourced the 2019 Lebanese protests. Conflict and responsibility frames dominated the coverage in all media, with anti-protest TV more likely to highlight conflict, attribute responsibility to the protestors, and emphasize the negative economic consequences of the protests. Regarding sources, state actors were more likely to be used in anti-protest media, whereas protestor sources were more prevalent in pro-protest media and in stories about responsibility. As for regular citizens, they appeared significantly more in stories about conflict. Findings indicate that the media rely on the public and not always officials to relay their message if media owners support the protests. The contribution of this study lies in uncovering new patterns in media sourcing and framing during protests, which allows the discipline to better predict when and how frames and sources intersect beyond the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the relationship between selective and cross-cutting/non-partisan media exposure, perceived journalism framing, and U.S. public's perception of China and the United States during the U.S.–China trade dispute. A national survey of U.S. adult population indicated that more people perceived that the media escalated the conflict between China and the United States than promoted peace between the countries. Perceived peace journalism framing was positively related to perception of China, whereas perceived war journalism framing was positively related to perception of the United States. Partisan media use has higher influence on perception of the United States than perception of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using Gallup survey data and online news from 2015 to 2020, this study explored the degree to which audiences "meld" agendas from a wide array of news sources for the five most popular issues in the U.S.: the government and politicians, immigration, the economy, race relations, and healthcare. Overall, audiences of varying ideology had agendas that were congruent. Media agendas also appeared congruent, except on the issue of the economy. Conservative news media had a strong influence on audience issue salience. Horizontal (all partisan) and vertical (nonpartisan) media were in a virtual tie for influence among audiences. Despite an erosion in media trust, conservatives were receptive to issue salience from news media of all types, including liberal media. Liberals did not mirror elite media issue saliences, but were influenced by all other types of media, including conservative media. Moderates were influenced by the entire media landscape, to a somewhat even degree. Four out of the five issues studied here showed varying news media influence with no one media group nor ideology owning the agendas of an issue. The exception observed here was the issue of healthcare, which was influenced exclusively by liberal media for all three ideological groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While people’s proclivity toward congenial partisan media has been well documented, methods of resistance are less researched. This study explores the congenial media effect, the phenomenon of our gravitation to and acceptance of like-minded media, and whether a media literacy intervention can mitigate people’s acceptance of ideologically congruent partisan media. In an online experiment (N = 199), conservatives and liberals were exposed to differing media literacy interventions, one reviewing the traits of objectivity and bias, another which combined the former with an opportunity to reflect on participants’ own political beliefs. All were then exposed to amenable partisan content on the Supreme Court nomination of Brett Kavanaugh. Results demonstrated that neither intervention affected participants’ perceptions of bias toward the material, however, liberals were more critical in their evaluations, deeming the partisan content as less credible than conservatives. Additionally, for liberals exposed to the objectivity and bias intervention, lower perceptions of credibility were seen compared to liberals who received no intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympic Games held in South Korea drew much political attention due to its potential to resolve the ongoing political and military tensions on the divided Korean Peninsula. Given the divisive South Korean public discourse on warming ties with the North, this study uses framing theory to compare the frames employed by two partisan South Korean newspapers to cover the mega sporting event. Our analyses reveal significant framing differences between conservative and liberal sources, suggesting their potential effect on citizen attitudes and beliefs about the role of the Olympics. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the growth of new alternative media has brought greater editorial choice and diversity to political coverage in many advanced democracies. But their coverage of mainstream media and portrayal of professional journalism has been subject to little academic attention. This study examined the role alternative political media play in advancing public debate about the value and editorial standards of a national media system. Drawing on a longitudinal content analysis of UK alternative media between 2015 and 2018 (N = 3452), we found that mainstream media was often crticised—particularly in left-wing sites—and that disapproval of professional journalism intensified over time, most strikingly during the 2017 general election campaign. We also discovered that BBC news was often singled out for its political reporting, with criticism directed at its perceived bias and lack of impartiality. Overall, we argue it is the dominant characteristics of mainstream media in national media systems that help shape the editorial agenda of alternative media and the nature of criticism directed at professional journalism. We conclude that more comparative research is needed about how alternative media represent professional journalism, and whether they are influencing people's understanding of politics and public affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political interest is a key predictor of likelihood to vote. We argue that the political interest–vote intention relationship can be explained by well-established theories that predict behavior across domains (e.g., theory of reasoned action, theory of planned behavior). Relying on the integrated behavioral model, we propose a core mediation model with vote likelihood (i.e., behavioral intention) as the dependent variable. Two types of media use (conservative and liberal–moderate) are then assessed in relation to the core model. We explore the ways in which our results contribute to theory and outline a research agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To investigate factors associated with the stigmatization of people of Asian descent during COVID-19 in the United States and factors that can mitigate or prevent stigmatization. A national sample survey of adults (N = 842) was conducted online between May 11 and May 19, 2020. Outcome variables were two dimensions of stigmatization, responsibility and persons as risk. Hierarchical regression analyses were performed. Racial prejudice, maladaptive coping, and biased media use each explained stigmatization. Racial prejudice, comprising stereotypical beliefs and emotion toward Asian Americans, was a stronger predictor of stigmatization than maladaptive coping or biased media use. Fear concerning the ongoing COVID-19 situation and the use of social media and partisan cable TV also predicted stigmatization. Low self-efficacy in dealing with COVID-19, when associated with high estimated harm of COVID-19, increased stigmatization. High perceived institutional efficacy in the handling of COVID-19 increased stigmatization when linked to high estimated harm of COVID-19. On the other hand, high perceived collective efficacy in coping with COVID-19 was associated with low stigmatization. More indirect contacts with Asians via the media predicted less stigmatization. Efforts to reduce stigmatization should address racial stereotypes and emotions, maladaptive coping, and biased media use by providing education and resources to the public. Fostering collective efficacy and media-based contacts with Asian Americans can facilitate these efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is growing evidence that partisan media could be contributing to the increasing polarization among the public in the United States. Scholars have recently debated whether both liberal and conservative media are contributing to polarization symmetrically or if conservative media is the primary source of polarization. We offer tests of reinforcing spiral models from a national sample of US citizens' use of liberal and conservative media sources and political beliefs about three issues (immigration, law enforcement, and gun control) during the 2016 Presidential Election. Our results find evidence of similar effects for use of liberal and conservative media on political beliefs. By contrast, holding conservative political beliefs does more to contribute to a conservative media echo chamber compared to liberal beliefs contributing to a liberal media echo chamber. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated the network agenda setting (NAS) model with data gathered from Taiwan's 2012 presidential election. Networks of important objects and candidate attributes in the news were compared with the counterparts generated from public opinion. The overall correlation between the media and public network agendas was positive and significant, thus supporting the NAS model in a non-Western context. In addition, this study found that the NAS model offered more predictive power at the attribute than the object level. The effects of selective exposure in a partisan media system were also incorporated into the investigation. Results showed that partisan selective exposure did not lead to consistent findings about the accentuated association between like-minded media consumption and candidate evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By proposing a dual-perspective model of attitude formation related to Chinese products, the survey of 592 adults investigated how Americans' evaluation and purchase intention of Chinese products can be influenced by China's image driven by a synergy of US politics and mass media. Younger people and minorities had better evaluation of and more intention to purchase Chinese products. A better country image of China contributed to more positive products beliefs and stronger purchase intention. Republicans engaged in partisan-motivated reasoning in their purchase intention, while Democrats converged with nonpartisan audiences. More social media use resulted in stronger purchase intention, while partisan media failed to make an impact on product beliefs and purchase intention. The findings suggested that although Americans' judgment and purchase intention of Chinese products is affected by individual's preexisting perception of China, only Republicans are prone to partisan-motivated reasoning of Chinese products. Social media use could lead to more acceptance of Chinese products, but conservative and liberal media seem to make little impact on this matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from a content analysis of partisan media and a public opinion survey administered in Hong Kong, this study incorporates selective exposure and deliberation literature into the network agenda-setting (NAS) model to test media effects on people's perception of the relationship between Hong Kong and mainland China. This study advances the NAS literature by examining the effects of different media types (i.e., pro- and counter-attitudinal media), considering the patterns of media consumption (i.e., engagement in selective exposure or not), and differentiating between the NAS effects on one's own opinion repertoire and the oppositional opinion repertoire (i.e., thoughts about how oppositional others perceive the issue). The findings of the study demonstrate that the network agenda of pro-attitudinal media was significantly correlated with both one's own and oppositional opinion repertoires for those who engaged in partisan selective exposure. For those who did not engage in partisan selective exposure, the network agenda of counter-attitudinal media was significantly related to the oppositional opinion repertoire and the findings for one's own opinion repertoire were mixed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If the individuals who are most likely to perceive media bias no longer encounter, via selective exposure, media content they might consider biased, why are perceptions of media bias so pervasive? We argue that many people who engage in politically motivated selective exposure also perceive "the media" in general to be biased. Relying on a survey of adults in the U.S. state of Wisconsin, which has witnessed particularly contentious and divisive political events since 2011, this study examines self-reported patterns of selective exposure to partisan media while accounting for the role of the local communication ecology in encouraging or discouraging partisan media selectivity. It also tests the idea that selective exposure is related to a generalized perception of media bias—the idea that "the media" in general are biased while self-selected media are not. Finally, the study tests a moderated mediation model showing the structure of relationships among political opinion extremity, selective exposure, and perceived media bias. Results suggest (a) a positive relationship between political opinion extremity and selective exposure, (b) opposite patterns of relationships between selective exposure and perceived media bias about self-selected and general media, respectively, and (c) evidence of moderated mediation among political opinion extremity, selective exposure, and perceived media bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through a feminist critical discourse analysis of newspaper columns from both secular/nationalist and religio-conservative outlets, this article illustrates how the issue of increased violence against women--which was made visible by the murder and attempted rape of a young university student, Özgecan Aslan--was instrumentalized by secular media outlets to critique the current government's conservative family policies based on Islamic principles, while conservative progovernment media outlets used the murder as a moral tale about both the importance of a devout, humble life devoid of consumerism, and other temptations of modern life that encourage lewd behavior. Although patriarchy was not addressed as a root problem for rape, Özgecan Aslan ended up becoming a polarizing and tragic symbol of the consequences of either Western modernity or conservative Islamism--depending on the ideological composition of the media outlet in question--further helping both sides legitimize their versions of patriarchy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing from intergroup contact theory and social identity theory, this study explored the indirect effects of out-group partisan media exposure (Fox News for Democrats; MSNBC and CNN for Republicans), and out-group interpersonal political discussions with members of the opposing political party on intergroup bias and intergroup competition through party identity as a mediator. We also accounted for the effects of in-group partisan media exposure (Fox News for Republicans; MSNBC and CNN for Democrats) and interpersonal political discussion with members of one's own party. The results suggested that interpersonal political discussion with "the other side" (out-group interpersonal discussion) and exposure to in-group media increased prejudicial attitudes and competitive intergroup behaviors, not only directly but also through enhanced party identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]