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In this Paper, I address the question of whether and under what circumstances the deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) can reduce violence against civilians, specifically in the Sahel. My analysis - based on a literature review and case studies on Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria - suggests that rather than representing a solution, PGMs tend to become part of the problem. In most cases, PGMs actively carry out acts of violence against civilians or passively contribute to an increase in violence. According to my analysis, PGMs most tend to contribute to violence against civilians when: \ they are aligned with a government that shows little respect for human rights and makes little effort to curb violence against civilians by its own security forces; \ they take on offensive roles and cooperate with state security forces; \ they are a group of ethnically homogenous members that are armed by the state. Only when PGMs are socially embedded in the communities they aim to protect and are at least normatively controlled by local authorities, as well as defensively oriented and predominantly unarmed, do they - for example in Cameroon - contribute to a decrease in violence against civilians. The findings presented in this Paper have implications for German development policy. As outlined, PGMs can - under very specific circumstances - help to strengthen the resilience of the local population in armed conflicts. However, in view of the negative effects of most PGMs, transitional development assistance programmes must be tailored according to the risk arising from the presence of PGMs. Furthermore, since many of these groups prevail past the end of the armed conflict in question, they need to be considered in post-conflict reconstruction processes, especially in demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programmes and security sector reforms (SSR) to allow sustainable peace and development.Finally, the findings also have implications for Germ

The Juba Peace Agreement of October 2020 has not pacified conflicts in Sudan, and has instead actually created new alliances between armed groups and security forces. After decades of marginalisation, conflict entrepreneurs from the periphery are now shaping Sudan’s national politics and undermining the country’s potential to return to democratic transition. Insecurity in Darfur could escalate and contribute to fur­ther destabilisation of the country. International donors should pressure these con­flict entrepreneurs to relinquish power. They should also prudently promote projects to foster peace in Darfur at the same time. (author's abstract)

How do wartime legacies affect repression after the conflict ends? Irregular forces support the government in many civil wars. We argue that if this link continues after the war, respect for human rights declines. As "tried and tested" agents they are less likely to shirk when given the order to repress. Governments might also keep the militias as a "fall-back option", which results in more repression. Analyzing data from 1981 to 2014 shows that pro-government militias that were inherited from the previous conflict are consistently associated with worse repression, but newly created ones are not. Wartime pro-government militias target a broader spectrum of the population and are linked to worse state violence. New militias usually supplement wartime ones and use violence primarily against political opponents. This study highlights the detrimental impact of war legacies.

Das Juba-Friedensabkommen von Oktober 2020 hat nicht zu einer Befriedung der sudanesischen Konflikte geführt. Stattdessen hat es vor allem neue Allianzen zwi­schen bewaffneten Gruppen und Sicherheitskräften geschaffen. Nach ihrer jahr­zehntelangen Marginalisierung prägen nun Gewaltunternehmer aus der Peripherie die nationale Politik Sudans und unterminieren eine mögliche Rückkehr zu einem demokratischen Übergangsprozess. Die Unsicherheit in Darfur könnte eskalieren und zu einer weiteren Destabilisierung des Landes beitragen. Internationale Geber sollten einerseits Druck auf diese Gewaltunternehmer ausüben, damit sie die Macht abgeben, und andererseits umsichtig Friedensprojekte in Darfur fördern. (Autorenreferat)

Shortly after COVID-19 was classified as a pandemic in March 2020, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called on violent actors to initiate ceasefires so that energy could be focused on fighting the pandemic. Resonance was low, however - violence even increased in several countries around the globe. Overall, patterns of violence since the spread of COVID-19 have varied significantly over time, between and within Global South regions, and in terms of the most dominant violent actors. The nexus of the external shock of COVID-19 and armed violence is multifaceted and its manifestation highly context-specific. Comparing pre-pandemic patterns of violence with those exhibited in 2020 and 2021 allows us to disentangle pandemic-related from other drivers of violence. Changes in violence dynamics vary across time and space. While the number and frequency of violent events increased in sub-Saharan Africa after the onset of COVID-19, Latin America and the Caribbean along with the Middle East and North Africa experienced decreases. State and non-state violent actors were affected differently, and changes in their activities were not always linked to the pandemic per se. The main consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on violence relate to the worsening of structural drivers of violent conflict, such as increasing inequalities and the marginalisation of large segments of the population. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation should focus on policies that reduce inequality and improve the provision of public goods, especially access to food, healthcare, and education. Additionally, "building back better" must include improving political and socio-economic opportunities for women, youth, and ethnic minorities.

On January 3, 2020, the Iranian Quds Force commander, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, was assassinated by the United States in Iraq. He was considered the mastermind behind Iran's regional strategy, especially in Syria and Iraq. A year and a half later, the Islamic Republic continues to wield considerable influence in Iraq, and Iran-backed militias continue to violently pressure US forces to leave Iraq. However, Iran now faces a series of serious challenges that are directly and indirectly related to Soleimani's death. In the geopolitical and economic spheres, the influence of Iran's rivals in Iraq has increased, while Tehran’s room for maneuver has become increasingly limited. In the political arena, divisions among Iran-backed forces in Iraq have increased, while Iran's direct influence over the Iraqi government has been declining. At the same time, rising anti-Iranian sentiments among the Iraqi people have reduced Iran's social capital in the neighboring country. The combination of these factors seems to be limiting Iran's influence in Iraq. The EU should build upon this opportunity to sup­port a strong Iraqi government that pursues a multi-vector foreign policy. (author's abstract)

Since 2011 the Islamic Republic of Iran has significantly extended its influence in the Middle East. The expansion reached its apex in 2018. It has since entered a new phase in which Tehran, despite not suffering any strategic military setbacks, is hitting a wall. Iran's biggest fundamental problem is that a majority of its allies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen are primarily military and terrorist actors. They frequently succeed in armed confrontations. Yet they are subsequently incapable of ensuring political and economic stability. The best option for German and European policymakers is a strategy of containment so as to put an end to Iran’s expansion in the four countries mentioned above, but also to acknowledge in the short term that Tehran and its allies are in a position of strength. Part of such a containment strategy would be to impose the most far-reaching isolation and sanctions possible on Iran’s armed partners. This includes adding Lebanese Hezbollah, the Hezbollah Battalions, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq and other militias loyal to Iran, including their leaders, to all relevant terrorism lists. Should Iranian institutions and actors involved in its policy of expansion in the Middle East also be listed as terrorists? The close ties between the Quds Corps - which is in charge of Iran's policy towards its Arab neighbours - and unequivocally terrorist organisations such as Lebanese Hez­bollah suggest that this step is necessary. (author's abstract)

Die Islamische Republik Iran hat ihren Einfluss im Nahen Osten seit 2011 stark ausgeweitet. Doch hat diese Expansion ihren Höhepunkt schon 2018 erreicht. Seitdem tritt sie in eine neue Phase, in der Teheran zwar keine strategischen militärischen Rückschläge erlebt, aber an Grenzen stößt. Das größte grundsätzliche Problem Irans ist, dass seine Verbündeten im Libanon, Syrien, Irak und Jemen mehrheitlich und in erster Linie militä­rische und terroristische Akteure sind. Es gelingt ihnen zwar häufig, in bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen Erfolge zu erzielen. Doch erweisen sie sich anschließend als unfähig, für politische und wirtschaftliche Stabi­lität zu sorgen. Die beste Option für die deutsche und die europäische Politik ist die einer Eindämmungsstrategie, deren langfristiges Ziel das Ende der iranischen Expansion in den vier genannten Ländern ist, die aber kurzfristig auf der Einsicht beruht, dass Teheran und seine alliierten Akteure in einer starken Position sind. Ein Bestandteil einer Eindämmungsstrategie wäre eine möglichst weit­gehende Isolierung und Sanktionierung der bewaffneten Kooperationspartner Irans. Hierzu gehört die Aufnahme der libanesischen Hisbollah, der Hisbollah-Bataillone, der Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq und weiterer iranloyaler Milizen und ihres Führungspersonals auf alle relevanten Terrorismus­listen. Es sollte überlegt werden, ob iranische Institutionen und Akteure, die an der Expansionspolitik im Nahen Osten beteiligt sind, ebenfalls als terroris­tisch gelistet werden müssen. Die enge Bindung des Quds-Korps – das für Irans Politik gegenüber den arabischen Nachbarn federführend ist – an unzweifelhaft terroristische Organisationen wie die libanesische Hisbollah legt einen solchen Schritt nahe. (Autorenreferat)

The formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) under Abdelhamid Dabeiba in March 2021 was a breakthrough in efforts to overcome Libya's political division. But the settlement's flaws are already starting to show. So far, political actors have merely agreed to compete for access to state funds within a unified government. Dis­tributive struggles could soon test the government's cohesion. Meanwhile, substan­tive disagreements are being shoved aside; in particular, the government is trying to ignore the challenges in the security sector. Unless progress is made towards elections that are planned for December 2021, tensions between profiteers and opponents of the government risk provoking a new political crisis. But even the elections them­selves harbour potential for renewed conflict. (author's abstract)

Mit der Bildung einer Einheitsregierung unter Abdelhamid Dabeiba gelang im März 2021 ein Durchbruch in den Bemühungen, die politische Spal­tung Libyens zu über­winden. Doch die Kehrseite der Übereinkunft zeichnet sich bereits ab. Bislang haben sich die politischen Akteure lediglich darauf geeinigt, innerhalb der Regierung um den Zugang zu staatlichen Mitteln zu konkurrieren. Die Verteilungskämpfe könn­ten schnell zur Zerreißprobe werden. Derweil harren zahl­reiche substantielle Streitpunkte ihrer Bearbeitung. So versucht die Regierung die Herausforderungen im Sicherheitssektor zu ignorieren. Spannungen zwischen Pro­fiteuren und Gegnern der Regie­rung drohen eine neue politische Krise zu verursachen, falls Fortschritte hin zu den für Dezember 2021 geplanten Wahlen ausbleiben. Aber auch die Wahlen selbst bergen beträchtliches Konfliktpotential. (Autorenreferat)

This volume takes a critical look at gray areas between the state and perpetrators of violence in the "War Against Drugs", going beyond simple diagnoses of the failures of the state., Paramilitärs, Kriminalität, Verschwundene - der »Krieg gegen die Drogen« hat in wirtschaftlichen Boomzonen Kolumbiens und Mexikos Gewaltverhältnisse auf Dauer gestellt: Illegale und legale Ökonomie sind kaum mehr zu trennen. Alke Jenss bietet einen differenzierten Blick auf die Rolle des Staates: Bekämpft er die, die er zu bekämpfen vorgibt? Stellt der Staat tatsächlich Ordnung her oder produziert er vielmehr selbst Unsicherheit für Teile der Gesellschaft? Die Studie analysiert erstmals staatstheoretisch und vergleichend Gewaltdynamiken in beiden Ländern. Sie hinterfragt kritisch, welche gesellschaftlichen Kräfte die Stärkung des Militärs in ihrem eigenen Sinne vorantreiben und wer von Gewaltpraktiken betroffen ist.