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Research Summary: We extend the ownership competence framework by discussing how the features of the institutional environment influence the exercise of ownership competence. Two amendments are proposed. First, we add a new dimension to the framework, institutional competence ("where to own"), which denotes that individuals and firms have heterogeneous abilities to assess how an institutional environment affects the potential uses of a resource. Second, we argue that institutional uncertainty moderates the three original dimensions of the framework, impairing the exercise of ownership competence of some entrepreneurs and firms more than of others. We use examples from the literature to illustrate our arguments. We also discuss the implications of our analysis. Managerial Summary: The ownership competence framework is built on the idea that business owners have different abilities to deploy resources and create value. Starting from this contribution, we shed light on the specific role that the institutional environment plays in the exercise of ownership competence. We argue that the ownership competence framework must explicitly consider where ownership takes place in order to explain the actions of entrepreneurs and firms. We also claim that institutional uncertainty can influence value creation in more subtle ways than indicated in the original formulation of the ownership competence framework. All in all, this article paves the way for institutional aspects to be considered more explicitly in the strategic analysis of ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Total factor productivity represents a dimension of output that cannot be attributed to factors of production; it is unique to the firm, and central to its competitiveness. We posit that ownership structure plays a key role in productivity. However, ownership structure has an effect on productivity which changes with a firm’s age. Ownership structure that is optimal for new firms may not be optimal for older firms. We here consider the impact of ownership structure as defined by shares of individuals’ versus (broadly defined) institutional ownership. Our empirical counterpart draws on the UK company data for 2008-2017, obtained from the Orbis database. Our key explanatory variables are the joint share of the individual owners in equity and its square, but we also control concentration of ownership indices, along with a range of other firm-level characteristics. Applying fixed effects models along with instrumenting ownership with regional level variables, we found that new companies with majority individual owners and minority institutional owners outperform others. As firms age, however, these differences begin to disappear, with individual owners losing their control-related advantage. The results of the relative advantage of individual owners in the early stage is consistent with the property rights theory, which emphasises that residual control rights should remain with those whose investment is critical. It can be argued, however, that for whom the investment is critical changes as firm ages. Our managerial implications emphasise ownership competence in optimising ownership structure, which should evolve along the stages of the life-cycle of the firm.