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We analyze a Pareto optimal income tax problem à la Mirrlees in which households consume three types of goods: energy goods, energy‐efficient investments, and nonenergy goods. The two main ingredients of our normative analysis are: (i) an indirect relationship between energy and the satisfaction of energy needs, as energy‐efficient investments transform energy into services, such as light, heating, and air conditioning; and (ii) imperfect information of the policy designer as regards the level of energy efficiency of households' housing and their labor market productivity. Each household differs with respect to these two latter characteristics, and the government designs a nonlinear income tax combined with energy and energy‐efficient investment nonlinear pricing that maximizes a weighted sum of households' utilities. We show that a benevolent social planner should distort energy prices in a way that depends on the difference between the saturation of energy needs and the complementarity between energy and the level of energy efficiency in the provision of energy services. A sufficient condition for energy consumption to be subsidized is that the rebound effect is small. Second, when individuals can invest in energy efficiency on top of energy consumption, these investments should always be subsidized and the marginal subsidy should always be higher than the one on energy consumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facing technological progress, how should a government reform income taxation? To address this question, optimal capital and labor income taxation is obtained for an economy of heterogeneous individuals. Technological progress raises optimal capital income tax rate and lowers optimal average marginal labor income tax rate if it is capital-biased by increasing relative capital productivity. Technological progress does the opposite if it is labor-biased by decreasing relative capital productivity. Neither capital-biased nor labor-biased technological progress affects optimal slope of labor income tax rate schedule. Technological progress does not affect optimal income taxation if it is unbiased by preserving relative capital productivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study analytical properties of the optimal income taxation model. In this model we consider the maximization of utility of an agent of the given type. The real meaning of the utility is the net profit of the legal entity. The mathematical consideration of the taxation optimization uses methods of probability theory, functional analysis and optimal control. The totality of all agents in the economy is represented by the probability space of their types. Optimal income taxation differs from commodity taxation, another branch of the optimal tax theory. Actual taxes are commonly linear or segmented, which naturally suggests us to consider such cases in this research. To be more precise, we describe the general piecewise linear taxation model with increasing linear coefficients. The latter is necessary for the tax function to be convex. An explicit description of optimal functioning of agents depending on their types is obtained. In particular, we consider optimal labour effort and optimal utility

We study the implications of an increase in the price of necessities, which disproportionally hurts the poor, for optimal income taxation. When the government is utilitarian and disutility from labor supply is linear, the optimal nominal taxes and transfers are unchanged as households supply more labor to secure their consumption expenditures. Quantitative analyses with convex disutility of labor supply reveal that, because of positive labor supply effects, keeping average tax rates constant suffices to optimally react to the asymmetric price shock. The poorest agents increase their labor supply the most. Thus, optimal income tax policy in response to asymmetric price changes does not prevent the disproportional decline in the indirect utility of poorer households. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We review methods used to numerically compute optimal Mirrleesian tax and transfer schedules in heterogeneous agent economies. We show that the coarseness of the productivity grid, while a technical detail in terms of theory, is critical for delivering quantitative policy prescriptions. Existing methods are reliable only when a very fine grid is used. The problem is acute for computational approaches that use a version of the Diamond-Saez implicit optimal tax formula. If using a very fine grid for productivity is impractical, then optimizing within a flexible parametric class is preferable to the non-parametric Mirrleesian approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, intended for researchers, introduces a stochastic method for calculating the optimal tax schedule based on taxpayer utility, population skill distribution, and wages. It implements and extends the classic approach to optimal income tax calculation introduced by J.A. Mirrlees. A genetic algorithm is applied instead of the numerical or analytical method of solving the problem. In the experimental part of the article, we took basic statistics for Germany in 2017 to infer about the distribution skills and wages of the working population. Their aim was to verify whether our approach would give similar results to those known from the literature on the subject. Thus, we have calculated the impact of the taxpayer attitude to work and budget external flows on the income tax schedule. Then, we measured the convergence of the search process across multiple runs of the algorithm. Analysis of obtained results brought us to the conclusion that they are similar to one known from the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 2008 economic crisis, labour market inactivity, unemployment and work informality in Serbia rose substantially, triggering a salient increase in Gini-measured inequality (by 4.3 pp), while income tax progressivity remained very low. Using the microsimulation and utility function estimation techniques on 2007 and 2012 household survey data for Serbia, we compare the social welfare effects of a hypothetical shift from flat to progressive taxation, before and after the crisis. We find that a shift from flat to progressive tax and the consequent behavioural response lead to a reduction in inequality, a rise in total labour supply and an increase in the overall social welfare in both years. Although the decrease in inequality is higher in 2012, the overall welfare effects are slightly larger in 2007, due to the stronger labour supply response and the stronger disutility of work found in the latter year. This may suggest that a rise in inequality does not per se create a stronger case for progressive taxation, as the welfare effects are considerably driven by the structure of income-leisure preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent evidence suggests that globalization has reduced the barriers to international labor mobility and induced more cross-country social comparisons. In an open economy with tax-driven migration and consumption externalities (relativity), we derive an optimal tax formula that subsumes existing ones obtained under a maximin social objective and additively separable utility and sign the second-best (Mirrleesian) marginal tax rates for all skill levels. We establish the thresholds of the elasticity and level of migration to determine when relativity and inequality act as complements or substitutes in shaping the optimal top tax rate. Under both Nash and Stackelberg tax competition if the migration probability of top-income workers is approximately 50%, numerical calculation using parameter estimates from empirical studies shows that the country with labor inflow (outflow) implements over 10% lower (higher) marginal tax rates than suggested by the autarky equilibrium of Kanbur and Tuomala (2013). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the incidence of nonlinear labor income taxes in an economy with a continuum of endogenous wages. We derive in closed form the effects of reforming nonlinearly an arbitrary tax system, by showing that this problem can be formalized as an integral equation. Our tax incidence formulas are valid both when the underlying assignment of skills to tasks is fixed or endogenous. We show qualitatively and quantitatively that contrary to conventional wisdom, if the tax system is initially suboptimal and progressive, the general‐equilibrium "trickle‐down" forces may raise the benefits of increasing the marginal tax rates on high incomes. We finally derive a parsimonious characterization of optimal taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the optimal shape of the income tax schedule? We address this question in an environment featuring distinct roles for public and private insurance. In our baseline calibration to the United States, optimal marginal tax rates increase in income and can be well approximated by a simple two-parameter function. The shape of the optimal schedule is sensitive to the amount of fiscal pressure to raise revenue that the government faces. As fiscal pressure increases, the optimal schedule becomes first flatter and then U-shaped, reconciling various findings in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate how the social welfare gain of subsidizing work-related goods depends on whether the underlying income tax system is linear, piecewise linear or fully nonlinear, focusing on child care services as a paradigmatic example of goods/services that are complements with labor supply. Our quantitative analysis employs an empirically relevant labor supply model and shows that the welfare gain of an optimally chosen subsidy is negligible when the optimal income tax is restricted to be linear but about the same as under fully nonlinear taxation when the optimal income tax is restricted to be piecewise linear. Our findings enhance the policy relevance of the optimal tax argument in favor of providing subsidies to work-related goods and also shed light on the relative welfare gains of employing piecewise linear rather than fully nonlinear income taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We adopt a philosophical perspective of equality of opportunity and address the issue of whether outcome inequalities are legitimate when they come from differences in talent. We propose a cumulative definition of talent. In a dynamic setting, talent is a by-product of past-effort, current effort and innate talent, which becomes a residual as time goes by. It implies that talent can change from the status of a circumstance when people are young to an almost responsibility variable when people are getting older. We plug this definition of talent into the Mirrlees model of optimal non-linear income tax and we show that the conflict between the principle of compensation and the principle of natural reward boils down to the optimal income tax with Rawlsian weights in the second-best setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When a government is unable to commit to its future tax policies, information about taxpayers' characteristics revealed by their behavior may be used to extract more taxes from them in the future. We examine the implications of this ratchet effect for the design of redistributive income and savings tax policies in a two‐period model with two types of individuals who only differ in their skill levels. When commitment is not possible, it may be optimal to separate, pool, or partially pool different types in period one. The nature of the distortions to labor supplies and savings are investigated for each of these three regimes. The identification of the optimal regime is investigated numerically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An empirical approach to optimal income taxation design is developed within an equilibrium collective marriage market model with imperfectly transferable utility. Taxes distort time allocation decisions, as well as marriage market outcomes, and the within household decision process. Using data from the American Community Survey and American Time Use Survey, we structurally estimate our model and explore empirical design problems. We allow taxes to depend upon marital status, with the form of tax jointness for married couples unrestricted. We find that the optimal tax system for married couples is characterized by negative jointness, although the welfare gains from jointness are modest. These welfare gains are then shown to be increasing in the gender wage gap, with taxes here, as in the case of gender based taxation, providing an instrument to address within household inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper applies recent developments in the theory of optimal income taxation to the Hungarian personal income tax system. The main conclusion is that the optimal top marginal tax rate in Hungary is likely to be higher, perhaps substantially, than the actual rate. It is discussed how this result depends on the parameters describing labor-supply behavior, the income distribution, and the redistributive preferences of society.

This article aims to theoretically clarify two points. First, even though the government shows favouritism to the poor and wants to exempt low-income taxpayers and to secure the necessary income tax revenue by taxing only high-income taxpayers, the government nevertheless ends up taxing the poor. This is in opposition to favouritism and arises because of the government’s inability to observe the individual taxpayer’s income levels. Second, even without observing each taxpayer’s income level, if favouritism is sufficiently strong, then the government can discontinuously resolve such unintentional taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What structure of income taxation maximizes the social benefits of redistribution while minimizing the social harm associated with distorting the allocation of labor input? Many authors have advocated scrapping the current tax system, which redistributes primarily via marginal tax rates that rise with income, and replacing it with a flat tax system, in which marginal tax rates are constant and redistribution is achieved via non-means-tested transfers. In this paper we compare alternative tax systems in an environment with distinct roles for public and private insurance. We evaluate alternative policies using a social welfare function designed to capture the taste for redistribution reflected in the current tax system. In our preferred specification, moving to the optimal flat tax policy reduces welfare, whereas moving to the optimal fully nonlinear Mirrlees policy generates only tiny welfare gains. These findings suggest that proposals for dramatic tax reform should be viewed with caution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze to which extent social inequality aversion differs across nations when controlling for actual country differences in labor supply responses. Towards this aim, we estimate labor supply elasticities at both extensive and intensive margins for 17 EU countries and the US. Using the same data, inequality aversion is measured as the degree of redistribution implicit in current tax-benefit systems, when these systems are deemed optimal. We find relatively small differences in labor supply elasticities across countries. However, this changes the cross-country ranking in inequality aversion compared to scenarios following the standard approach of using uniform elasticities. Differences in redistributive views are significant between three groups of nations. Labor supply responses are systematically larger at the extensive margin and often larger for the lowest earnings groups, exacerbating the implicit Rawlsian views for countries with traditional social assistance programs. Given the possibility that labor supply responsiveness was underestimated at the time these programs were implemented, we show that such wrong perceptions would lead to less pronounced and much more similar levels of inequality aversion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights: [•] Optimal non-linear income taxation in an OLG model with social comparisons is analyzed. [•] Comparisons with other people's current and past consumption are important. [•] Comparison with own past consumption is not important for the optimal income tax structure. [•] Comparisons with other's consumption tend to substantially increase optimal labor income tax rates. [•] Such comparisons may either increase or decrease optimal capital income tax rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Tax competition between two governments who choose nonlinear income tax schedules to maximize the average utility of their residents when skills are unobservable and labor is perfectly mobile is examined. We show that there are no equilibria in which there is a skill type that pays positive taxes to one country and whose utility is larger than the average utility in the other country or in which the lowest skilled are subsidized. We also show that it is possible for the most highly skilled to receive a net transfer funded by taxes on lower skilled individuals in equilibrium. These findings confirm the race-to-the-bottom thesis in this setting. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article presents a survey of how optimal income taxation is influenced by labour market considerations. We begin with the standard supply-side optimal income tax model of Mirrlees, and outline the various extensions to that model. We then consider how optimal taxation is affected by various demand-side considerations in a full-employment setting, including endogenous wage rates, human capital investment, extensive-margin labour variation and its applications, minimum wages, and occupational choice. Various sources of involuntary unemployment are next considered, such as inability to work, long-term search unemployment, and temporary search unemployment. The latter raises the need for unemployment insurance as well as redistributive taxation. We conclude with a catalogue of unresolved issues. (JEL codes: H21, H23, J2) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of population aging on the steady-state solution to an Ordover and Phelps (J. Public Econ. 12:1-26, ) overlapping generations optimal nonlinear income tax problem with two types of worker and quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. A decrease in the rate of population growth, which leads to an aging population, increases the relative price of consumption per person in retirement, which tends to decrease optimal consumption for retirees of both skill types. Nevertheless, it is also shown that the optimal marginal income tax rates are independent of the rate of population growth. In addition, the steady-state interest rate unambiguously declines when the rate of population growth declines. Resulting adjustments in production plans have an ambiguous effect on the aggregate wage rate. This article identifies factors contributing to an increase in the aggregate wage when the population ages, namely normality of consumption in retirement, complementarity between capital and labor in production, and a large capital deepening effect relative to the increase in dependency owing to demographic change. Depending on the sign of this wage effect, ambiguities may arise in the direction of change in the optimal steady-state consumption and production plans. However, when the dependency effect is sufficiently strong, it is possible to sign the direction of change in all production and consumption plans. Moreover, regardless of the direction of change in optimal consumption plans, the absolute value of the changes in consumption plans are smaller for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled when utility is time-separable and preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion. Adopting, instead, a quasilinear-in-consumption specification of preferences sharpens the comparative statics of consumption allocations, but introduces ambiguity into the effect of the rate of population growth on the optimal marginal income tax rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop an extended version of Roemer's Equality of Opportunity (EOp) criterion that accounts for income differentials between as well as within types, where types are defined by circumstances that are beyond people's control (parental education, in this study). A microeconometric model of labour supply in Italy is employed to identify income tax-transfer rules that are optimal according to the extended EOp criterion. Overall, the results do not conform to the perhaps common expectation that the more conventional Equality of Outcome criterion is more supportive of 'interventionist' (redistributive) policies than the EOp approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the optimal income taxation of couples. We determine the resulting intra-family labor supply allocation and its implication for the choice of the tax unit (individual versus joint taxation). We provide a general condition for full joint taxation to arise. We also study how the spouses' respective labor supply decisions are distorted when the condition does not hold. In particular, we show that, depending on the pattern of mating, the celebrated result according to which the spouse with the more elastic labor supply faces the lower marginal tax rates may or may not hold in our setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives. Starting from the idea that tax equity requirements, administration costs and the tendency towards tax evasion determine the design of tax systems, it is important to identify a satisfactory efficiency/equity deal in order to build a tax system as close to optimum requirements as possible. Prior Work Previous studies proved that an optimum tax system is that through which it will be collected a level of tax revenues which will satisfy budgetary demands, while losing only a minimum 'amount' of welfare. In what degree the Romanian tax system meets these requirements? Approach We envisage analyzing the possibilities of improving Romanian tax system as to come nearest to optimum requirements. Results We can conclude fiscal system can uphold important improvements in what assuring tax equity is concerned, resulting in raising the degree of free conformation in the field of tax payment and, implicitly, the degree of tax efficiency. Implications Knowing to what extent it can be acted upon in the direction of finding that satisfactory efficiency/equity deal may allow oneself to identify the blueprint of a tax system in which the loss of welfare is kept down to minimum. Value For the Romanian institutions empowered to impose taxes, the knowledge of the possibilities of making the tax system more efficient can be important while aiming at reducing the level of evasion phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When educational policy is supplemented by a redistributive income tax, and when individuals differ in their ability to benefit from education, the optimal policy is typically rather regressive. Resources are concentrated on the most able individuals in order to get a 'cake' as big as possible to share among individuals through income taxation. In this paper, we put forward another reason to push for regressive education. It is not linked to heterogeneity in innate ability but to the property that welfare may be a convex function of an individual's wage. For simplicity, we assume a linear education technology and a given education budget. To give the equal wage outcome the best chance to emerge, we also assume that individuals have identical learning abilities. Nevertheless, it turns out that in the first-best wage inequality is always preferable to wage equality. Even more surprisingly, this conclusion remains valid in the second-best when the feasible degree of wage differentiation is sufficiently large. This is in spite of the fact that wage equalization would eliminate any need for distortionary income taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The marginal social value of income redistribution is understood to depend on both the concavity of individuals’ utility functions and the concavity of the social welfare function. In the pertinent literatures, notably on optimal income taxation and on normative inequality measurement, it seems to be accepted that the role of these two sources of concavity is symmetric with regard to the social concern about inequality in the distribution of income. Direct examination of the question, however, reveals that this is not the case. Concavity of utility has a simple, direct effect on the marginal social value of redistribution, as might be expected, whereas concavity of the social welfare function has a more subtle influence, one that in some cases may not be very significant. The implications of this difference are examined for some standard forms of utility and welfare functions, including particular versions that appear in the optimal income taxation literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article integrates the theory of welfare stigma and the theory of optimal income taxation. We study optimal income taxation and an optimal welfare program within a unified framework while taking welfare stigma into account. In our framework, the government is assumed to have two policy instruments, namely general income taxation and a welfare program. Individuals are assumed to be heterogeneous along two dimensions, namely wages (skill) and welfare stigma. The government cannot observe the two characteristics of individuals. Each individual is assumed to take the income tax schedule and the parameters of the welfare program as given and make labor supply decisions to maximize his utility. The government is assumed to choose both an optimal income tax schedule and an optimal welfare program so as to maximize a social welfare function subject to its own revenue budget constraint and individuals' behavioral response to the income tax schedule and the parameters of the welfare program. As the model cannot be solved analytically, we take a numerical simulation approach. Our simulations show that (1) it is optimal for the government to offer both a negative income tax schedule and a welfare program, which is consistent with the theoretical result obtained by An in a much-simplified version of our model, and (2) the actual welfare program in the United States might be less generous than the optimal welfare program. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Optimal policy rules--including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, public goods, and externalities--are typically derived in models with homogeneous preferences. This article reconsiders many central results for the case in which preferences for commodities, public goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable, standard second-best results in basic settings are unaffected, except those for the optimal income tax. Optimal levels of income taxation may be higher, the same, or lower on types who derive more utility from various goods, depending on the nature of preference differences and the concavity of the social welfare function. When preference differences are unobservable, all policy rules may change. The determinants of even the direction of optimal rule adjustments are many and subtle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social insurance for the elderly is judged responsible for the widely observed trend towards early retirement. In a world of laissez-faire or in a first-best setting, there would be no such trend. However, when first-best instruments are not available, because health and productivity are not observable, the optimal social insurance policy may imply a distortion on the retirement decision. The main point we make is that while there is no doubt that retirement systems induce an excessive bias towards early retirement in many countries, a complete elimination of this bias (i.e. a switch to an actuarially fair system) is not the right answer for two reasons. First, some distortions are second-best optimal. This is the normative argument. Second, and on the positive side, the elimination of the bias might be problematic from a political perspective. Depending on the political process, either it may not be feasible or alternatively it may tend to undermine the political support for the pension system itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem faced by a taxation authority choosing a tax schedule for families is modeled as a multi-dimensional screening problem. A description of the possible constrained Pareto-efficient mechanisms is given. The implications of a standard redistributive assumption on the sign of marginal tax rates is explored. In contrast to unidimensional taxation models, the redistributive assumption does not imply that marginal tax rates are everywhere non-negative. The qualitative features of optimal tax schedules are discussed. It is concluded that taxation based solely on total family income is rarely optimal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the design of disability insurance scheme when agents differ in their privately known productivity. We extend the Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) two period model to allow for agents differing ex-ante in their productivity and characterize the optimal nonlinear tax transfer that maximizes a utilitarian welfare function when per-period earnings and age are observable while individuals’ productivity and health status are not observable. We show that the induced tax/benefit scheme should exhibit a marginal income tax that decreases with age for some agents. A marginal subsidy on the young high productive income may be desirable. While the disability scheme always involves the old low productive agents to be indifferent between working and claiming disability benefits, this result is not always true for the old high productive agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Differentiated tax rates on labor and capital income are found to be optimal in this study, where agents choose occupation based on lifetime income net of tuition costs. Efficient revenue raising in a case where the government cannot observe educational effort implies that the government should trade off efficiency in production for efficiency in intertemporal consumption. The subsequent wage difference between high- and low-skilled occupations is increased compared to a production efficient outcome, which is in contrast to previous results in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As recently argued by Diamond (1998), one of the key factors explaining the progressivity of an optimal non-linear income tax is the distribution of productivity among workers. Migration is one source of changes in the productivity distribution. How changes in the population’s ability distribution affect optimal income tax schedules has received little attention. Changing the distribution generally affects both the objective function and the government budget constraint. We first consider the comparative statics of the fraction of highly-skilled workers with maximin and maximax welfare functions (so that only the second effect is present) and a quasi-linear utility function. We also present some results for a utilitarian social welfare function. We then study the interaction between mobility and redistributive taxation. We consider mobility by either the skilled or unskilled population under majority voting where governments take the population as fixed. If individuals choose to relocate independently, having identical ability distributions is always a stable equilibrium when the unskilled are the mobile group. However, this is not always the case when the skilled are mobile. If groups of individuals can choose where to locate, having identical ability distributions across regions is only an equilibrium when the mobile type has an overall majority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]