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By constructing the consumers’ utility function, this article calculates the optimal order quantity and optimal expected profit of a fresh retailer under the centralized and decentralized inventory strategy in an omni-channel supply chain. In addition, the impact of consumers’ channel preference, consumers’ demand transfer behavior, and the "buy-online-pickup-instore" (BOPS) service on retailers’ inventory strategy are analyzed. The results show that opening a BOPS service is not always beneficial to retailers. However, it is always beneficial for retailers to eliminate the differences between channels. Under the centralized inventory strategy, the optimal order quantity and expected profit are only affected by the freshness-keeping cost, while under the decentralized inventory strategy, they are affected by various consumer behaviors. A reasonable inventory management strategy should be adopted according to the product type, inventory cost, consumer preferences, and order quantity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the upgrading of people's consumption patterns, the omni-channel supply chain becomes the mainstream form of e-commerce platform enterprise development. Aiming at two different e-commerce enterprises, we construct an evolutionary game model for enterprises' "online+offline" omni-channel construction strategy by self-build or cooperating with brick-and-mortar stores. It is based on the Stackelberg and Cournot competition model, combined with the omni-channel pricing strategy, using the theory of perfect rationality and bounded rationality, and combing the non-cooperative game and evolutionary game to realize. Moreover, the evolutionary game process is simulated. Through the dynamic changes of the system, the strategy selection behavior mechanism of the retail channel subjects is deeply analyzed. It is found that enterprises' strategy choices are influenced by both competitors and profits, and evolutionary stabilization strategies are not unique. In addition, changes in consumer loyalty, physical feelings, and sharing ratio during the evolutionary process will affect the stability rate of enterprises' behavioral choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the omni-channel supply chain by mobile internet, considering both cooperation and competition, this article establishes the pricing model before and after the integration of the omni-channel supply chain by mobile internet and the coordination strategy model under the mobile internet e-commerce logistics cooperation, so as to obtain the wholesale price decision and retail price decision and compensation decisions etc. of supplier S. Furthermore, it can also obtain the corresponding price of retailer T accordingly. Based on the analysis of the above two models, numerical simulations are carried out to compare the optimal decision-making volume before and after the integration of the omni-channel supply chain by mobile internet and the overall profit level. With the help of the numerical simulation results of the above models, the effectiveness of the integration of the omni-channel supply chain by mobile internet is demonstrated which achieving win-win and multi-win in both greater breadth and depth in the supply chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the upgrading of people’s consumption patterns, the omni-channel supply chain becomes the mainstream form of e-commerce platform enterprise development. Aiming at two different e-commerce enterprises, we construct an evolutionary game model for enterprises’ “online+offline” omni-channel construction strategy by self-build or cooperating with brick-and-mortar stores. It is based on the Stackelberg and Cournot competition model, combined with the omni-channel pricing strategy, using the theory of perfect rationality and bounded rationality, and combing the non-cooperative game and evolutionary game to realize. Moreover, the evolutionary game process is simulated. Through the dynamic changes of the system, the strategy selection behavior mechanism of the retail channel subjects is deeply analyzed. It is found that enterprises’ strategy choices are influenced by both competitors and profits, and evolutionary stabilization strategies are not unique. In addition, changes in consumer loyalty, physical feelings, and sharing ratio during the evolutionary process will affect the stability rate of enterprises’ behavioral choices.

This study proposes a BOPS (buy online and pick up in store) model for a two-echelon supply chain, considering the product return risk to reach an equilibrium result of two omni-channel integration modes, managed by the manufacturer or the retailer, respectively. Furthermore, this study analyzes the impacts of the service cost coefficient and the consumer loyalty of the offline channel on the optimal price, service decision, and profit of different integration modes. This study also compares the profits of enterprises under centralized and decentralized decisions. The results show that centralized decision making can improve the service level of the SA (Store Assistance) effort and the sustainable performance of the supply chain. Whether the BOPS channel is managed by the manufacturer or retailer, the service cost, the product return rate, and the offline channel consumer loyalty have an impact on the decision of product sale price, wholesale price, and SA effort service level. Offline customer loyalty is less sensitive in the BOPS channel managed by the retailer than that managed by the manufacturer. It is suitable for the manufacturer to manage the BOPS channel when offline customer loyalty is low. Otherwise, it is appropriate for the retailer to manage the BOPS channel. The profit of the supply chain under the decentralized decision is less than that under the centralized decision. When executing a wholesale price contract, different omni-channel integration modes can alleviate the double marginalization effect. It can fully coordinate the supply chain members, motivate retailers to improve the service level of the SA effort, and realize Pareto improvement to support supply chain sustainability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]