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Children's normative knowledge develops early. While prior studies focus on rule compliance and violation, only limited research explores children's views on rule changes, especially in non-Western cultures. This study investigates how Chinese children aged 4–7 (N = 154) reason about rule changes, and compares their responses with US counterparts in the work of Zhao and Kushnir. Chinese children considered both "who" created the rules and "what" consequences the rule changes may bring about when judging changeability. For game rules, like US children, Chinese children considered both individual authority (including adult and peer authority) and collective agreement when judging who can change game rules. Compared to US children, Chinese children more often believe that the adult rule-maker's child could also change the rule. Furthermore, although both Chinese and US children thought one could not change moral rules, Chinese children were less likely than US children to think one could change conventional rules. Exploratory analyses of children's justifications suggest that Chinese children emphasize consequences more than US children when judging whether rules can be changed. This study offers valuable insights into the development of normative reasoning and cultural influences on children's views on rule malleability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have yielded many discussions on how to endow autonomous agents with the ability to make ethical decisions, and the need for explicit ethical reasoning and transparency is a persistent theme in this literature. We present a modular and transparent approach to equip autonomous agents with the ability to comply with ethical prescriptions, while still enacting pre-learned optimal behaviour. Our approach relies on a normative supervisor module, that integrates a theorem prover for defeasible deontic logic within the control loop of a reinforcement learning agent. The supervisor operates as both an event recorder and an on-the-fly compliance checker w.r.t. an external norm base. We successfully evaluated our approach with several tests using variations of the game Pac-Man, subject to a variety of “ethical” constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To investigate children’s awareness of authority to changerules, we showed children (ages 4-7) videos of one childplaying a game alone or three children playing a gametogether. In the group video, the game rule was initiated either:by one of the children, by three children collaboratively or byan adult. They then were asked whether the characters in thevideos could change the rules. Children believed that thecharacter could change the rule when playing alone. Theirresponses to the group video depended on how the rule wasinitiated. They attributed authority to change rules only to thechild who initiated the rule, unless the rule was createdcollaboratively. We also asked children whether they couldchange norms (school/moral/artifact norms) in daily life; andfound moral/artifact distinction in children’s endorsement ofnorm changing. These results suggest that children recognizeflexibility in changing rules even in preschool years.

In international human rights law 'jurisdiction' is the centre of the debate on extraterritorial obligations. The purpose of the present paper is to a) analyse how facts and principles contribute to the explanation of jurisdiction in international human rights law and b) to show how this analysis could help sharpen the debate in this area by making the grounds of disagreement between different accounts explicit. It first describes international practice regarding jurisdiction and shows that it is committed to jurisdiction being a principle that responds to facts on the ground. Second, the paper describes two academic views on jurisdiction in detail. Next, it introduces the framework on facts and principles developed by Jerry Cohen. The idea is that facts only support principles if their relevance is explained by another principle that does not depend on facts. Finally, section 4 combines the framework with our insights into jurisdiction. If jurisdiction is best understood as a principle that responds to facts, this implies that jurisdiction cannot be explained by facts alone. It must instead reflect principles that are themselves not fact-dependent. Adhering to this framework allows for better explanation of jurisdiction and a clearer understanding of the different views on jurisdiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background Research on causal reasoning often uses group-level data analyses that downplay individual differences and simple reasoning problems that are unrepresentative of everyday reasoning. In three empirical studies, we used an individual differences approach to investigate the cognitive processes people used in fault diagnosis, which is a complex diagnostic reasoning task. After first showing how high-level fault diagnosis strategies can be composed of simpler causal inferences, we discussed how two of these strategies—elimination and inference to the best explanation (IBE)—allow normative performance, which minimizes the number of diagnostic tests, whereas backtracking strategies are less efficient. We then investigated whether the use of normative strategies was infrequent and associated with greater fluid intelligence and positive thinking dispositions and whether normative strategies used slow, analytic processing while non-normative strategies used fast, heuristic processing. Results Across three studies and 279 participants, uses of elimination and IBE were infrequent, and most participants used inefficient backtracking strategies. Fluid intelligence positively predicted elimination and IBE use but not backtracking use. Positive thinking dispositions predicted avoidance of backtracking. After classifying participants into groups that consistently used elimination, IBE, and backtracking, we found that participants who used elimination and IBE made fewer, but slower, diagnostic tests compared to backtracking users. Conclusions Participants’ fault diagnosis performance showed wide individual differences. Use of normative strategies was predicted by greater fluid intelligence and more open-minded and engaged thinking dispositions. Elimination and IBE users made the slow, efficient responses typical of analytic processing. Backtracking users made the fast, inefficient responses suggestive of heuristic processing.

We provide a fine-grained analysis of notions of regret and responsibility (such as agent-regret and individual responsibility) in terms of a language of multimodal logic. This language undergoes a detailed semantic analysis via two sorts of models: (i) relating models, which are equipped with a relation of propositional pertinence, and (ii) synonymy models, which are equipped with a relation of propositional synonymy. We specify a class of strictly relating models and show that each synonymy model can be transformed into an equivalent strictly relating model. Moreover, we define an axiomatic system that captures the notion of validity in the class of all strictly relating models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the meaning and role of social critique in the social sciences. This form of theorizing has always been a significant part of the social sciences. Due to the scientific ideal of value neutrality, however, the manner in which social criticism is conducted is seldom discussed. I claim that the value-neutrality ideal rests on a conception of normative subjectivism that can be challenged by turning to some notion of practical reason. However, there is no need to turn to any strong notion of reason; instead, I use the term 'normative reasoning'. The main question posed in the article then becomes: What is it that we do when we reason in a normative manner in the social sciences? The first part of the article addresses Axel Honneth's 'Grand Social Theory of Modernity' in Freedom's Right. His procedure in the book is treated as a significant case of normative reasoning. I investigate his method of 'reconstruction' by comparing it primarily to the methods of 'construction' and 'genealogy'. The second part of the article is a critical discussion of Honneth's method of normative reasoning. My main criticism is that, despite his intentions, his procedure is overly constructivist in the sense that it prevents a disclosure of ongoing transformations of ethical life. In the conclusion, I argue for a pluralistic methodology; different ways of normative reasoning should be used to solve different kinds of normative problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper examines how normative reasoning was applied to empirical applications of different indicator options in order to revise the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) indicators in 2018, to better align with the SDGs. Given the emphasis in the SDGs on leaving no one behind, the household surveys used to estimate the global MPI were explored to see which could create individual-level MPIs, however this sharply reduced country coverage by half. Consistent criteria is applied to assess whether 33 potential additional indicators could be added to strengthen the global MPI. A certain set of criteria applied rules out new indicators. Finally, the paper both illustrates and describes the iterative interplay of normative and technical considerations underlying adjustments in three original indicators – child mortality, nutrition, and housing – which involves considering the joint distribution of alternative indicators across twenty trial measures for all countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to address the problem of the 'resource consumption bottleneck' of creating legal semantic technologies manually. It describes a semantic role labeling based information extraction system to extract definitions and norms from legislation and represent them as structured norms in legal ontologies. The output is intended to help make laws more accessible, understandable, and searchable in a legal document management system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prominent theories in moral psychology maintain that a core aspect of moral competence is the ability to distinguish moral norms, which derive from universal principles of justice and fairness, from conventional norms, which are contingent on a specific group consensus. The present study investigated the psychological bases of the moral-conventional distinction by manipulating the framing of the test question, the authority's license, and the historical context. Participants evaluated moral and conventional transgressions by answering an 'okay for you' test question (i.e., judging according to their opinion) or an 'okay in context' test question (i.e., judging by imagining being a contemporary of the story protagonist). In evaluating moral transgressions that happened in a distant context or with the authority's license, most of the participants condemned the violations when responding to the 'okay for you' test question, but did not do so when responding to the 'okay in context' test question. A similar effect of the question framing was found also on scenarios presenting conventional violations suggesting that subtle changes in the framing of the test question can influence people's evaluations of both moral and conventional prototypical transgressions. We propose that these effects indicate the presence of moral and conventional construals of social actions that are highly flexible and context-sensitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The LogiKEy workbench and dataset for ethical and legal reasoning is presented. This workbench simultaneously supports development, experimentation, assessment and deployment of formal logics and ethical and legal theories at different conceptual layers. More concretely, it comprises, in form of a dataset (Isabelle/HOL theory files), formal encodings of multiple deontic logics, logic combinations, deontic paradoxes and normative theories in the higher-order proof assistant system Isabelle/HOL. The data were acquired through application of the LogiKEy methodology, which supports experimentation with different normative theories, in different application scenarios, and which is not tied to specific logics or logic combinations. Our workbench consolidates related research contributions of the authors and it may serve as a starting point for further studies and experiments in flexible and expressive ethical and legal reasoning. It may also support hands-on teaching of non-trivial logic formalisms in lecture courses and tutorials.The LogiKEy methodology and framework is discussed in more detail in the companion research article titled “Designing Normative Theories for Ethical and Legal Reasoning: LogiKEy Framework, Methodology, and Tool Support” [5].

Abductive Logic Programming (ALP) has been proven very effective for formalizing societies of agents, commitments and norms, in particular by mapping the most common deontic operators (obligation, prohibition, permission) to abductive expectations. In our previous works, we have shown that ALP is a suitable framework for representing norms. Normative reasoning and query answering were accommodated by the same abductive proof procedure, named CIFF. In this work, we introduce a defeasible flavour in this framework, in order to possibly discharge obligations in some scenarios. Abductive expectations can also be qualified as dischargeable, in the new, extended syntax. Both declarative and operational semantics are improved accordingly, and proof of soundness is given under syntax allowedness conditions Moreover, the dischargement itself might be proved invalid, or incoherent with the rules, due to new knowledge provided later on. In such a case, a discharged expectation might be reinstated and hold again after some evidence is given. We extend the notion of dischargement to take into consideration also the reinstatement of expectations. The expressiveness and power of the extended framework, named CIFF, is shown by modeling and reasoning upon a fragment of the Japanese Civil Code. In particular, we consider a case study concerning manifestations of intention and their rescission (Section II of the Japanese Civil Code). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper is motivated by the need of accounting for the practical syllogism as a piece of defeasible reasoning. To meet the need, the paper first refers to ranking theory as an account of defeasible descriptive reasoning. It then argues that two kinds of ought need to be distinguished, purely normative and fact-regarding obligations (in analogy to intrinsic and extrinsic utilities). It continues arguing that both kinds of ought can be iteratively revised and should hence be represented by ranking functions, too, just as iteratively revisable beliefs. Its central proposal will then be that the fact-regarding normative ranking function must be conceived as the sum of a purely normative ranking function and an epistemic ranking function (as suggested in qualitative decision theory). The distinctions defends this proposal with a comparative discussion of some critical examples and some other distinctions made in the literature. It gives a more rigorous justification of this proposal. Finally, it starts developing the logic of purely normative and of fact-regarding normative defeasible reasoning, points to the difficulties of completing the logic of the fact-regarding side, but reaches the initial aim of accounting for the defeasible nature of the practical syllogism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]