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Although they come from different traditions, Hans Kelsen and W. N. Hohfeld have offered two essential contributions to the clarification of fundamental legal concepts. After a brief review of their proposals, certain problematic aspects of their reconstructions will be analyzed in the light of categories developed by Eugenio Bulygin, in particular his criticism of the reductionist conceptions of norms, the non-prescriptive character of power-conferring rules, and the distinction between norms and norm-propositions. On this basis, and starting from the concept of legal obligation, an outline of an alternative reconstruction of the theory of fundamental legal concepts will be presented. | The Spanish original of this article was published in Revus (2018) 36.

Hans Kelsen y W. N. Hohfeld, desde diferentes tradiciones, han ofrecido dos contribuciones imprescindibles para el esclarecimiento de los conceptos jurídicos básicos. Tras un breve repaso de sus propuestas, se analizarán algunos aspectos deficitarios de sus reconstrucciones a la luz de categorías desarrolladas por Eugenio Bulygin en diversos trabajos, en particular sus críticas al reduccionismo normativo, la imposibilidad de identificar las reglas que confieren potestades con prescripciones y la distinción entre normas y proposiciones normativas. Sobre tales bases, y tomando como punto de partida al concepto de deber jurídico, se ofrecerá finalmente un bosquejo de reconstrucción alternativa de la teoría de los conceptos jurídicos básicos. Hans Kelsen and W. N. Hohfeld, from different traditions, have offered two essential contributions for the clarification of the fundamental legal concepts. After a brief review of their proposals, certain problematic aspects of their reconstructions will be analyzed in the light of categories developed by Eugenio Bulygin in several papers, in particular his criticism of normative reductionism, the impossibility of identifying power-conferring rules with prescriptions, and the distinction between norms and norm-propositions. On this basis, and taking as a starting point the concept of legal obligation, an outline of an alternative reconstruction of the theory of fundamental legal concepts will be presented.

Este artículo hace un examen formal del razonamiento jurídico con principios implícitos desde el positivismo lógico y partiendo de los trabajos de Alonso en la materia. A la vista de las tesis de la separación fuerte y débil entre principios y reglas y de las diferencias entre norma y proposición normativa, se presentan problemas para considerar que las consecuencias lógicas que Alonso denomina principios implícitos son principios. Como correlación caso-solución carecen de la nota de generalidad y como relaciones de preferencia son sólo proposiciones normativas que derivan de aplicar un criterio de preferencia al sistema normativo. En su caso, el criterio de preferencia podría considerarse un principio implícito, pero al ser una proposición normativa surgen problemas de juridicidad, justificación y coherencia del principio. This paper reviews legal reasoning with implicit principles from the formal perspective of the logical legal positivism and taking as starting point the works by Alonso on the subject. In view of the strong and weak demarcation thesis between principles and rules and the differences between norms and norm-propositions, it concludes that the logical consequences considered implicit principles by Alonso are not principles. As case-solution correlation they lack the required note of generality and as preference relations they are only norm-propositions derived from the application of a preference criterion to the normative system. If any, the preference criterion could be understood as the implicit principle, however, in so far as the criterion is a norm-proposition, certain concerns arise as to the legal character of the principle, its justification and coherence. Este trabajo se incardina dentro del proyecto DeCyT DCT1403 sobre principios jurídicos implícitos.