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This study explores the variation in the non-state armed group (NSAGs)'s behavior concerning target selection. Scholars of transnational terrorism have investigated transnational NSAGs' target selection. However, we are still missing out on the most common form of terrorism, terrorism perpetrated by domestic NSAGs involved in civil conflicts. This paper's novel contribution is to the understanding of domestic NSAGs' strategic logic. I argue that hardening makes soft targets, including civilians, attractive targets when hard targets are no longer attractive. NSAGs tactically adapt to hardening by switching to soft targets or by displacing attacks to adjacent locations within their home country. The empirical results from data on relevant state-group dyads in India between 2004–2016 show that domestic NSAGs (1) switch to soft targets when faced with hardening, (2) less frequently target soft targets when more of their attacks against hard targets have been logistically successful, and (3) commit more attacks in their primary area of operation when more of their attacks in that location have been logistically successful. These findings emphasize a variety of ways through which domestic NSAGs adapt their tactics and underscore potential costs for target hardening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores rebel legitimacy building by investigating rebel network formation during civil wars. Through a longitudinal study of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, it examines various mechanisms through which a non-state armed group (NSAG) embellishes and enhances its legitimacy among domestic and international support networks. The research also theorizes the complex interaction between domestic and international legitimacy, when and why NSAGs prioritizes politically prestigious network over initial resource-based one, and the impact of the shift on rebel behavior. The causal process explores how rebels' legitimacy consideration affects their lobbying and coalition-building efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Precision strikes from a distance are a common practice of state warfare. However, the global proliferation of precision strike technologies, like missiles and armed drones, makes such weapons progressively available to non-state armed groups (NSAGs). We look at Daesh in Syria and Iraq and at the Houthis in Yemen as two case studies to analyse the consequences of this proliferation for non-state warfare. Our focus is the socio-spatial dimension of warfare. We probe to what extent precision strike technology is used to conquer and control territory (solid warfare) or to weaken the enemy network without territorial ambition (liquid warfare). The predominant view in the literature on NSAGs perceives them as would-be state builders who desire to govern and hence, seek to control territory. Our findings support this view, as both Daesh and the Houthis have applied precision strike technologies for solid warfare. However, at the same time, both groups have used these weapons for liquid warfare, too, targeting in particular civilians and civilian infrastructure to weaken the network of their enemies. This poses new questions to scholars of small wars and insurgencies and calls upon policy makers to increase efforts to curb the proliferation of precision strike technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the potential classification of decentralized armed groups in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Unlike centralized armed groups, decentralized groups consist of fluid alliances of small subunits or cells with loose coordination between them. The central question explored by the authors is whether such groups meet the minimum organizational criterion to be considered parties to an armed conflict under international humanitarian law (IHL). The authors argue that, while not possessing the same chain of command as centralized armed groups, decentralized armed groups can, under certain conditions, nevertheless fulfil the criteria for conflict classification. Judicial precedents and IHL interpretation point to this conclusion where the absence of a centralized command structure within the group can be compensated by the existence of other factors attesting to the group's organization, such as the exercise of operational command over armed subunits, with the intensity of violence being an additional element suggesting the overall organization of the group. Ultimately, this interpretation would ensure the applicability of a legal framework that would better reflect the intensity of armed confrontations on the ground, and bind both States and non-State parties to a NIAC alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the critical issue of detainee protection in the complex landscape of contemporary non-international armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations. It examines the interplay between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, highlighting the challenges in their application and interpretation. The article delves into the contemporary challenges faced in protecting detainees, including the involvement of non-state armed groups, extraterritorial detention practices, administrative detention, and the impact of counterterrorism measures. It proposes a multifaceted approach to enhancing detainee protection, encompassing strategies for strengthening compliance with the legal framework, addressing the specific needs of vulnerable groups, and promoting best practices and capacity-building. The article argues that a comprehensive and contextualised approach, grounded in the principles of humanity and human dignity, is essential to effectively safeguard the rights and well-being of detainees in these challenging contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do non-state armed groups form in intra-state armed conflicts? Researchers have started to disaggregate armed groups, but we still know little about how armed groups emerge in different ways. Drawing on the literature on social movements, civil wars, and civil–military relations, we generate a typology of 'movement', 'insurgent', and 'state splinter' origins of armed groups. We argue that fundamentally different dynamics of conflict shape armed group origins in the context of broad-based mobilisation, peripheral challenges to the state, and intra-regime fragmentation. Armed groups that emerge in these contexts in general differ in their initial membership and leadership, the basic organisational dimensions that we focus on. We demonstrate the utility of our typology by mapping different origins of armed groups onto existing cross-national data and charting type narratives in illustrative cases. This discussion advances recent efforts to understand the importance of armed group emergence for outcomes of interest to conflict scholars by moving beyond either separate types of origins or highly disaggregated organisational analyses to broader conflict dynamics through which armed groups form, with implications for how these groups act. Future research should consider different origins which we identify in comparison through an in-depth analysis of armed groups' complex histories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Violent conflict is the primary driver of food crises worldwide. However, our understanding of the specific role non-state armed groups (NSAGs) play in food systems remains incomplete. There is limited evidence on how NSAGs shape food systems, including through forms of (non-)violent regulation; where NSAGs intersect with different stages of the food value chain, beyond production alone; and comparative analysis of NSAGs across diverse contexts, security environments and food systems. This study addresses these gaps through comparative analysis of NSAG food system engagement in Haiti and South-Central Somalia, drawing on primary qualitative data. We find that i) NSAGs are active at every stage of the food system; ii) this activity is often systematic in nature; and iii) NSAG engagement shares several commonalities across Haiti and Somalia, despite very different contexts. In identifying this, we make several contributions, including advancing research on conflict and hunger to highlight precise mechanisms by which violent actors disrupt and shape food systems; and contributing to research on rebel and criminal governance by highlighting a heretofore neglected domain of armed actor governance (food systems). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In various conflict contexts where the state is unable to maintain security and public order, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and the United Nations (UN) conduct their activities alongside one another. While previous research has focused on hostile relations between the UN and NSAGs, less attention has been given to collaborative interactions. This paper aims to address this research gap by formulating a novel conceptual typology of NSAG–UN interactions in the context of a peace operation. The typological framework comprises two-dimensions: firstly, the thematic field of interaction including human rights, humanitarian needs and governance, security, and political processes and, secondly, the nature of interaction ranging from confrontation to cooperation. Based on the typology, interaction activities between the UN and NSAGs in two peacekeeping operations—the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)—are systematically documented and described. While both cases show confrontation in the security field, UNOCI also commonly cooperated with NSAGs on security-related issues; MINUSMA instead cooperated with NSAGs primarily regarding the political process. The analysis further proposes factors that may explain such variation, including institutional arrangements and NSAG characteristics. The conceptual framework presented in this paper is crucial in advancing knowledge about an empirical phenomenon that we know little about and that has important implications for different forms of "local" engagement in peace operations and the effectiveness of UN policies and practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although organised criminal networks and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have historically exploited conflict situations to commit various crimes, the extent of human trafficking by these entities in the Sahel has barely been interrogated in academic literature. In principle, while states have an obligation to criminalise trafficking in persons, problems arise where the state has lost parts of its territory to NSAGs or is facing ongoing conflicts with such groups. Boko Haram, for instance, controlled a large swath of territory in Northeast Nigeria from 2009 to 2015, with evidence of human trafficking. Therefore, this paper examines two specific aspects of human trafficking in the Sahel conflicts: trafficking by organised criminals and trafficking by NSAGs, especially terrorist organisations. It argues that while domestic laws may be useful in combating trafficking linked to organised criminal networks, the traditional state-centric approach to human rights protection makes human trafficking governance more complicated where NSAGs are involved, especially where they exercise territorial control. The paper unpacks these complexities and highlights the deficits in existing international law treaties. It argues that customary international law could provide a solution to the anti-trafficking governance challenge in the Sahel and makes a case for the adoption of an anti-trafficking Deed of Commitment within the Geneva Call mechanism.

Although organised criminal networks and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have historically exploited conflict situations to commit various crimes, the extent of human trafficking by these entities in the Sahel has barely been interrogated in academic literature. In principle, while states have an obligation to criminalise trafficking in persons, problems arise where the state has lost parts of its territory to NSAGs or is facing ongoing conflicts with such groups. Boko Haram, for instance, controlled a large swath of territory in Northeast Nigeria from 2009 to 2015, with evidence of human trafficking. Therefore, this paper examines two specific aspects of human trafficking in the Sahel conflicts: trafficking by organised criminals and trafficking by NSAGs, especially terrorist organisations. It argues that while domestic laws may be useful in combating trafficking linked to organised criminal networks, the traditional state-centric approach to human rights protection makes human trafficking governance more complicated where NSAGs are involved, especially where they exercise territorial control. The paper unpacks these complexities and highlights the deficits in existing international law treaties. It argues that customary international law could provide a solution to the anti-trafficking governance challenge in the Sahel and makes a case for the adoption of an anti-trafficking Deed of Commitment within the Geneva Call mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The majority of contemporary armed conflicts are classified as non-international armed conflicts, often occurring in biodiversity hotspots with the destruction of the environment continuing to fall victim to the violence of these conflicts. A startling lacuna in the law of non-international armed conflicts is its lack of direct protection for the environment under International Humanitarian Law. While some scholars argue that indirect protection of the environment may be afforded when interpreting the law of non-international armed conflicts, this falls short of providing legal certainty and promoting 'buy-in' from non-State armed groups. For these reasons, the contribution made by the International Law Commission in its 27 Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts is ground-breaking. The authors of this contribution argue that deeds of commitment, a form of soft law, is the appropriate vehicle to operationalise the Principles of the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts. Ultimately, the authors of this contribution sample Principles 13, 5 and 8 in a proposed blueprint for a thematic deed of commitment, without prejudice to other potential content, unilaterally binding signatory non-State armed groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores community perceptions about traditional authorities' roles during the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. We have selected the case of Somalia, where both government institutions and traditional authorities have partnered with international actors and institutions, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE). International actors have related to traditional authorities based on the assumption that these actors wield a kind of social power that facilitates the reintegration of former members of the violent extremist organisation al-Shabaab. Based on mixed methodology research we explain social reintegration in Somalia from the community perspective, and find that P/CVE programmes are expressive of co-optation of traditional authorities. We make the case that 'risk coping' helps explain why a majority of civilians prefer the government-led formal reintegration pathway of ex-combatants to the traditional authorities pathway. We conclude by discussing the implications that this has for NGOs/INGOs active in this P/CVE sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this iteration of the Review 's "Beyond the Literature" series, we have invited Ezequiel Heffes to introduce his recent book Detention by Non-State Armed Groups under International Law , before then posing a series of questions to Tilman Rodenhäuser, René Provost, Mariana Chacón Lozano and Katharine Fortin, who have agreed to serve as discussants of the book. Tilman Rodenhäuser is a Legal Adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with particular expertise in non-State armed groups (NSAGs) and detention. René Provost is the James McGill Professor of Law at McGill University and has written extensively on public international law, including his recent monograph Rebel Courts: The Administration of Justice by Armed Insurgents. Mariana Chacón Lozano has served as the Operational Legal Coordinator for the ICRC in Colombia since October 2020 and has worked for the ICRC since 2011. Katharine Fortin is Associate Professor at the Netherlands Institute of Human Rights within the Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance of Utrecht University. The Review team is grateful to all four discussants, and to Ezequiel, for taking part in this engaging conversation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The law of belligerent occupation permits the Occupying Power to administer and use the natural resources in the occupied territory under the rules of usufruct. This provision has no counterpart in the provisions of humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts, which may suggest that any exploitation of natural resources by non-State armed groups is illegal. The International Committee of the Red Cross's updated 2020 Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict did not touch on this issue, and nor did the International Law Commission in its 2022 Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, where it applied the notion of sustainable use of natural resources instead of usufruct. The present paper aims to fill this gap. It first reviews the development of the concept of usufruct and then studies whether the current international law entitles non-State armed groups with de facto control over a territory to exploit natural resources. By delving into the proposals raised by some commentators to justify such exploitation for the purpose of administering the daily life of civilian populations, the paper advocates for a limited version of this formula as the appropriate lex ferenda. In the final section, the paper discusses how situations of disaster, as circumstances which may preclude the wrongfulness of the act, may justify the exploitation of natural resources by non-State armed groups in the current international legal order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on original qualitative data on the mobilization of anti‐Kyiv combatants during the war in eastern Ukraine (started in 2014), this article suggests an approach for understanding the spontaneous mobilization of nonstate armed groups during contemporary military conflicts. This approach is based on the notion of career as a collective path of mobilization unfolding over time. It explains how different mobilization factors usually proposed in the literature on contemporary civil wars acquire their mobilization power. The article identifies five combatant careers leading to joining the anti‐Kyiv armed groups: evolving localists, disrupted outcasts, nationalist warriors, adventurous ideologues, and inspired sympathizers. It demonstrates that (1) mobilization requires the combination of factors such as economic incentives, ideological affinity, social connections, and conflict dynamics in a particularly sequenced way, (2) this combination is different for each career path, and (3) these factors acquire their mobilizing capacity only in the context of particular social trajectories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on original qualitative data on the mobilization of anti‐Kyiv combatants during the war in eastern Ukraine (started in 2014), this article suggests an approach for understanding the spontaneous mobilization of nonstate armed groups during contemporary military conflicts. This approach is based on the notion of career as a collective path of mobilization unfolding over time. It explains how different mobilization factors usually proposed in the literature on contemporary civil wars acquire their mobilization power. The article identifies five combatant careers leading to joining the anti‐Kyiv armed groups: evolving localists, disrupted outcasts, nationalist warriors, adventurous ideologues, and inspired sympathizers. It demonstrates that (1) mobilization requires the combination of factors such as economic incentives, ideological affinity, social connections, and conflict dynamics in a particularly sequenced way, (2) this combination is different for each career path, and (3) these factors acquire their mobilizing capacity only in the context of particular social trajectories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International humanitarian law requires that the bodies of those who die as a result of armed conflict, whether of international or non-international character, must be protected, treated with dignity, and all available information recorded prior to their disposal. In practice, non-international conflicts have become more prevalent over the last years, resulting into a proliferation of non-state armed groups who increasingly hold territory and provide governance-like services, such as the case of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Republic of Iraq. In providing services to populations under control through the establishment of a civilian administration, non-state armed groups have recorded deaths and issued death certificates. In response, States have introduced cumbersome procedures to recognize the fact of death for inheritance purposes, though not necessarily recognizing insurgent death certificates alone as proof for death. Failure to obtain a valid proof of death for the death of a family members' results in denial of myriad rights afforded to surviving relatives. In considering the gravity and scale of this problem, this study considers whether the obligation to record deaths under humanitarian law, the obligation of humane treatment and the right to know the fate of relatives can shed light on how states may regard the validity of insurgent death certificates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Armed conflicts leave populations vulnerable to organ trafficking, a criminal enterprise with little international regulation when viewed separately from human trafficking. The Council of Europe's Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs is the only instrument to contemplate the responsibility of actors involved in organ trafficking, but traffickers may go unpunished due to its limited scope. Yet in armed conflict, international humanitarian law offers additional protection. The rules protecting the living and the dead against ill-treatment provide the basic level of protection necessary to consider the international responsibility of organ trafficking networks and the individual criminal responsibility of their members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Violent conflicts involving non-State armed groups challenge conventional perceptions of war and armed conflict. Criminal enterprises (transnational organized criminal groups including gangs and cartels) are involved in violent competition for both profit and territorial control in many parts of the world. This paper examines the situation in Mexico and Brazil as case studies to assess the legal challenges to criminal armed violence when criminal groups battle among themselves and the State. The paper focuses on the operational challenges and considerations facing police, military, and security forces and justice institutions to illuminate the legal challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humanitarian and development agencies intervening in Latin American cities increasingly face the challenge posed by criminal armed groups (CAGs). Yet, there is a need for evidence‐based comparative studies on how international agencies deal with them. Drawing on data collected in Colombia, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and Mexico, this paper presents a novel typology of humanitarian organisations' access strategies that distinguishes between different levels of interaction with CAGs. The paper shows how humanitarian agencies assess a variety of risks and balance the potential consequences of their engagement with CAGs with the need to maintain constructive and trustful relationships with the state and the community with which they work. It finds that indirect dialogue or negotiation with CAGs via community leaders who act as intermediaries might provide a low‐risk alternative to direct negotiation with CAG leaders, provided that 'do no harm' and humanitarian protection considerations vis‐à‐vis communities and intermediaries play a central role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how virtual groups can trigger an armed conflict, and thus, the application of international humanitarian law (IHL). The emergence of non-State actors as central players in cyberspace, together with the increasing use of cyber operations in conflicts, makes the regulation of non-State actors in armed conflicts a topical issue. The triggering provisions in IHL require a level of organization of non-State groups, which do not necessarily resonate with the realities among virtual groups. To determine if the triggering provisions allow for a reinterpretation to fit better the potentially differently structured virtual groups, the article scrutinizes the legal bases for the organization requirements in the respective provisions and identities the underlying rationales. The article concludes that the legal bases for the organization requirement in the three provisions are distinct, but that none of them currently allows for reinterpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Academic discussion on the adequacy of international law, in particular international humanitarian law (IHL), to protect women from and to respond to gender-based violence against women (GBVAW) has so far omitted a detailed discussion on the law applicable in non-international armed conflict (NIAC). This article reviews the scope of international law, in particular IHL applicable to NIAC and international human rights law (IHRL), on the protection of women from GBVAW, firstly aiming to fill this lacuna in the literature on GBVAW and secondly in an examination as to whether the law on GBVAW in NIAC adequately protects women from GBVAW in NIAC. This analysis is performed distinctly for sexual violence, non-sexual violence, and women in detention. In applying the substance of the law regarding GBVAW under IHL and IHRL to the legal framework on the mutual application of IHL and IHRL in armed conflict, this article finds that IHL applicable to NIAC and IHRL generally may be interpreted harmoniously in substance regarding sexual violence and partially on non-sexual violence and detention. The consolidation of these regimes thus in theory results in a stronger and wider scope of protection from GBVAW. However, this protection may be limited in practice due to challenges in meeting due diligence in conflict and limited human rights responsibility for non-State parties to the conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main objective of this research is to interpret the meanings that the inhabitants of the municipalities of Rosario de Perijá, Machiques de Perijá and Jesús María Semprum in Zulia state, Venezuela, assign to the presence of the Non-State Armed Groups in their living spaces. The premises of qualitative research are considered and for this reason subjectivity is valued as a source of scientific knowledge, in consequence the perspectives of key informants who live such a complex situation are considered. The results showed that these municipalities share a reality that can be translated into a loss of sovereignty of the Venezuelan State, which brings with it profound disorders. Three conclusions stand out from this research: 1) These three municipalities and their towns are controlled by Colombian guerrilla organizations (ELN and FARC dissidents). 2) The permissiveness of the Venezuelan State in consenting to a kind of small but significant parallel States, which includes territorial possession and actions of the type commonly available to governments to govern are pointed out. 3) For these municipalities the guerrilla constitutes "a necessary evil", given the absence of Venezuelan State in the border of Zulia state with Colombia, which implies the existence of criminal governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to characterize the type of governance exercised in their territories by the collectives of Caracas, Venezuela, based on the cooperative relationships they established with the State at the beginning of the 21st century. Interviews were conducted with neighbors, people working in the area and police officers during 2018, 2019 and 2021. Secondary sources were consulted from the organizations themselves, as well as from the media and social networks. The results showed that the collectives have a territorial control that limited the drug retail market, substitute for police forces and impose on neighbors norms of social and political behavior and punishments not contemplated in the law; they have a financial base based on contributions from the national government and that they used to build legitimacy based on the distribution of benefits they have obtained from the state and links with national political power. The collectives exercise a shared or collaborative governance that can be catalogued as a duality in power or as a hybrid political order, in which they share the territorial domain with the State, acting in parallel or superimposed, where the group acts to favor the interests of the government and the government acts in favor of the group, so they ceased to be a subversive political movement to become an expression of the constituted power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Tren de Aragua is the non-state armed group that directs criminal activities in the state, whose primary function is to maintain absolute control of the communities that make up the peace zones. In order to understand the dynamics and realities of the non-state armed groups in Aragua State, interviews were conducted with key informants, members of the non-state armed groups and community members close to or related to the non-state armed groups (NSAGs), aged between 24 and 63 years old, community members, gang members and public officials. The results showed that the group functions as a centralized and deconcentrated structure, where orders are issued from the Tocorón prison by the maximum leader of the organization and are executed under the responsibility of the local "pranes". In the context of the pandemic, the economic crisis and the great emigration of the country, The Tren de Aragua has expanded its criminal action to other countries such as Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and Chile, where it has had a catalyzing effect of violence and social instability, as well as a negative and xenophobic effect towards the Venezuelan diaspora, generating rejection and discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How are patterns of armed control and dispute by armed actors related to land concentration, land property rights, and distribution? We argue that armed actors affect land tenure by using different land transfer mechanisms to distribute the land, which reflects the dynamics of control and dispute during civil conflict. We test this argument by studying the case of Urabá, a region in northwestern Colombia, using a mixed-method strategy. First, using extensive qualitative fieldwork, we find that armed actors systematically applied different land transfer mechanisms in areas where they held control. Armed actors strategically changed from employing one land transfer mechanism to another in relation to the level of dispute, political and economic objectives, and alignment with the state, among others. In our fieldwork, we identify how these land transfer mechanisms led to patterns of territorial control and land tenure structure. We then analyze an original dataset of rural plot ownership in Urabá, based on official cadastral information, to empirically verify our qualitative findings. We estimate a village-level fixed effects model that shows that disputed territories and those under paramilitary control had larger plots, higher land inequality, and fewer land transfers. In contrast, territories with established control by left-wing insurgents exhibit a small landholder scheme. These results offer important insights into the relationship between civil armed conflict and land and the logic of rebel governance. ¿Cómo se relacionan los patrones de control armado y de disputa por parte de los agentes armados con la concentración de tierras, los derechos de propiedad de las tierras y su distribución? Argumentamos que los agentes armados ejercen un efecto en la tenencia de tierras utilizando diversos mecanismos de transferencia de tierras para distribuir las tierras, lo que refleja la dinámica de control y de disputa durante un conflicto civil. Ponemos a prueba esta hipótesis, utilizando una estrategia de método mixto, a través del estudio del caso de Urabá, una región en el noroeste de Colombia. En primer lugar, hallamos, utilizando un extenso trabajo de campo cualitativo, que los agentes armados aplicaron sistemáticamente diferentes mecanismos de transferencia de tierras en las áreas donde tenían el control. Los agentes armados fueron cambiando, de manera estratégica, el uso entre uno u otro mecanismo de transferencia de tierras en función del nivel de disputa, de los objetivos políticos y económicos, y de la alineación con el Estado, entre otros factores. En nuestro trabajo de campo, identificamos cómo estos mecanismos de transferencia de tierras provocaron patrones de control territorial y de estructura de tenencia de la tierra. A continuación, analizamos un conjunto de datos originales, basado en información catastral oficial, de propiedades parcelarias rurales en Urabá con el fin de verificar empíricamente nuestros hallazgos cualitativos. Estimamos un modelo de efectos fijos en las aldeas que demuestra que los territorios en disputa y aquellos bajo control paramilitar tenían parcelas más grandes, mayor desigualdad de tierras y menor transferencia de tierras. En contraposición, aquellos territorios cuyo control está establecido por insurgentes de izquierdas exhiben un pequeño esquema de terratenientes. Estos resultados ofrecen información importante acerca de la relación entre el conflicto armado civil y la tierra, y acerca de la lógica de la gobernanza rebelde. Quels sont les liens qui unissent les schémas de contrôle armé et de conflits des acteurs armés à la concentration et la distribution des terres, ainsi que les droits à la propriété foncière? Selon nous, les acteurs armés ont une incidence sur le régime foncier en utilisant différents mécanismes de transfert des terres, qui reflètent la dynamique de contrôle et les oppositions lors d'un conflit civil. Afin de vérifier cette hypothèse, nous appliquons une stratégie aux méthodes mixtes pour analyser le cas d'Urabá, une région au nord-ouest de la Colombie. D'abord, à l'aide d'un travail de terrain qualitatif approfondi, nous observons que les acteurs armés ont systématiquement appliqué différents mécanismes de transfert de terres dans les régions qu'ils contrôlaient. Ils passaient stratégiquement d'un mécanisme de transfert des terres à l'autre, notamment selon l'intensité du conflit, les objectifs politiques et économiques ou leur accord avec l'État. Dans notre travail de terrain, nous identifions comment ces mécanismes de transfert de terres ont engendré des schémas de contrôle territorial et une structure de régime foncier. Ensuite, afin de vérifier empiriquement nos observations qualitatives, nous analysons un ensemble de données original de la propriété des parcelles rurales à Urabá, en nous appuyant sur les informations officielles du cadastre. Nous élaborons un modèle des effets fixe au niveau d'un village qui montre que les territoires disputés, et ceux contrôlés par des forces paramilitaires, se caractérisent par de plus grandes parcelles, une inégalité foncière plus marquée et des transferts de terres plus rares. À l'inverse, l'organisation des territoires non disputés et contrôlés par des rebelles de gauche favorise les petits propriétaires terriens. Ces résultats fournissent des renseignements importants sur la relation entre un conflit armé civil, les terres et la logique de gouvernance rebelle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the different relationship patterns established by the Salvadoran guerrillas with social movements throughout the 1970s. Using testimonies from ex-guerrilla commanders, social organizers and internal documents of the Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) and the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), this research suggests that the interaction between guerrillas and social movements shaped the organizational structure of both and that the specific patterns of this interaction – secondary milieus or co-constitution – produced specific and differentiated effects. The linkage of guerrillas with pre-existing and initially autonomous social movements resulted in a greater territorial control but also in internal conflicts and less organizational cohesion. Instead, resorting exclusively to the creation of secondary milieus seems to be associated in this case with greater organizational stability and internal cohesion, but with less mobilization capacity. Also, the case of El Salvador shows that the type of relationship established by an armed group with its support environment is conditioned by several key factors, which include the presence, or absence, of a pre-existing social movement infrastructure, or the strategic choices made by the leaders of the armed group itself.

This article examines the sweeping assault on democratic rights in the United States today, the far-reaching impact of Donald Trump’s presidency and development of «permanent Trumpism» on American political culture, and the activist mobilization against these forces. The authors discuss the growing alarm among scholars of democracy about the increasing «autocratization» of US politics and the «Orbanization» of the Republican Party. They examine how these dynamics are playing out at the local level, with a focus on the «swing» state of Michigan. They look at the growth of armed White Power groups and the turn to political violence in the US. They analyze the proliferation of conspiratorial claims (such as the assertion that the 2020 election was stolen) and the mainstreaming of far-right ideas (such as the «Great Replacement») via a right-wing media ecosystem that increasingly sustains a parallel epistemic universe. The authors map out the apparatus of election theft that is setting the stage for another coup attempt, and various measures designed to make it more difficult to vote. They review the scholarly debate about the nature of Trumpism. Finally, they discuss the growing resistance to Trumpism and various forms of organizing to defend democracy and defeat authoritarianism. Received: 11 July 2022 Accepted: 23 November 2022

Climate change has caused more effects in fragile states as they were already suffering from non-international armed conflicts. It created an environment in which non-state armed groups flourished and enabled them to increase their influence and strengthen their ranks relying on the spread of poverty and unemployment, the low availability of basic services, and the scarcity of natural resources, as they have forcibly recruited young men of these states into their ranks, especially the children. Also, they have committed human trafficking to increase their resources. In addition, they have militarized natural resources to use them as a weapon of war. These things resulted in serious implications and repercussions on the enforcement of international humanitarian law and in order to confront the crimes of these groups that are causing a real threat to the safety and stability of the international community and a danger that most countries of the world live in as it targets its joints. Therefore, this damage requires activating the enforcement of criminal responsibility against their leaders and members even if their countries are not a party to the Rome Statue of the international criminal court and that is to ensure respect for the international law in armed conflicts in light of the increased activities of these groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the crisis in Mali erupted in 2012, numerous conflicts have broken out in countries of the Sahel and resulted in many violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. While these bodies of law were designed primarily to protect individuals or categories of individuals, they also require that reparations be made for harm suffered by the victims of such violations. Despite the ever-growing number of victims in conflicts in the Sahel in general and in Niger in particular, it is evident that States of the Sahel have not made a priority of meeting the reparation obligation, which falls mainly on them. However, the specific nature of the harm suffered (as a result, in part, of civilians being targeted) in terrorist-related conflicts calls for a prompt reaction by States, as they are the true targets of acts perpetrated by terrorist-designated non-State armed groups, while individuals and communities are only proxy victims. A legal, institutional and operational framework for victim reparations needs to be set up by the States, but that has yet to happen, even though it is one of the conditions of durable conflict resolution. The scattered initiatives that have been launched in Niger would gain from being brought together under a holistic framework with a global strategic vision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bakary Sambe is Regional Director of the Timbuktu African Institute for Peace Studies (Dakar, Niamey, Bamako). Founder of the Observatory of Religious Radicalism and Conflicts in Africa, Sambe is a teacher–researcher at Gaston Berger University in St Louis (Senegal). Sambe's current work focuses on endogenous strategies, cross-border dynamics and experimenting with agile approaches in crisis zones. An expert working with the United Nations, European Union, African Union, etc., he has notably designed and led advocacy for the establishment of the regional group for the prevention and fight against radicalization of the G5 Sahel (CELLARD), assisted in the process of developing national strategies in Niger, Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic, and produced the first manual of good resilience practices. In addition to numerous articles, Sambe has published several books: Islam et diplomatie : la politique africaine du Maroc (2010–2011), Boko Haram : du problème nigérian à la menace régionale (2015) and Contestations islamisées : Le Sénégal entre diplomatie d'influence et islam politique (2018). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Marmara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Hukuk Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Marmara University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Rapid urbanisation in countries undergoing or recovering from armed conflict has imposed severe strain on public services and governance. It has also been accompanied by increasing policy and academic concern about the vulnerability of cities to armed conflict. But even when major armed clashes between conflict parties concentrate in rural areas or towns, large cities play a critical but often less visible role: that of hubs for illicit economies supporting the political agendas of armed groups such as militias and insurgents. Urbanisation has reinforced the economic functions of cities for non-state armed groups willing to exploit the rising demand for services, amid weak state governance. This article argues that cities located near armed conflicts contain economic opportunities and incentives, linked to scarce public services amid rising populations, that are attractive to armed groups for their material and political value. These resources also provide incentives for the use of violence. The article develops the concept of urban resources, defined as sources of income for armed groups linked to the agglomeration of people and the scarcity of essential goods and services (housing, water, security provision etc.) resulting from inefficient urban governance. It uses the case studies of Mogadishu, in Somalia, and Karachi, in Pakistan. The article identifies two main categories of urban resources for armed groups: rents linked to the concentration of people within areas of weak state presence (extortion, charges for security services) and fixed assets linked to the growing demand for land and housing. It then examines the political benefits that have accompanied the exploitation of these resources.