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There are a lot of disputes in the academic circle about the land ownership in the Qin Dynasty. The unearthed Qin slips show that the government not only directly controlled and operated a large number of public or official fields, but also granted more land to private households and recognized the private rights of land acquired by the people through inheritance, trading and other ways. The emperor did not own all the land, and private ownership was the universal natural law in the history of ancient law and ideas. However, the ancient property right and land ownership were fundamentally different from the modern property right concept and real right system originating from the West, which cannot be equated with modern private or public ownership and not a purely economic issue. Different rights of people with different identities were often attached to a piece of land at the same time. Property rights were not clear, absolute, exclusive, nor targeted at individuals, but related to identity and relations. In ancient times, there was no clear concept of "subject" and property rights, but a vague and mixed ownership. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the land property rights and ownership system have inherited this tradition to some extent, and are fundamentally different from the capitalist land property rights system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Hubei Open Vocational College is the property of Journal of Hubei Open Vocational College Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the port supply chain, vertical integration between ports and shipping lines is no longer confined to private integration, but is more likely performed as a hybrid integration between public ports and private shipping lines. In this study, we consider port supply chain integration between a public or private port and its shipping line, which provides differentiated services in the shipping market, and investigate shipping lines' competition contracts under mixed ownership. We show that if shipping lines choose a volume contract, double vertical integration between two ports and their corresponding shipping lines yields the highest welfare; however, if shipping lines choose a price contract, single private integration can yield the highest welfare. We also endogenize the supply chain integration and find that a double integration-and then-price contract is socially beneficial only when the private share of a mixed merger is low while the shipping service substitutability is neither high nor low. Our findings suggest that government ownership of a public port can serve as an efficient tool for port policy in the context of port supply chain integration. • We consider port supply chain integration between a port (public or private) and its shipping line, and investigate shipping lines' competition contracts under mixed ownership. • We find that double integration between two ports and their corresponding shipping lines yields the highest welfare if shipping lines choose a volume contract, while single private integration can yield the highest welfare if shipping lines choose a price contract. • In an endogenous choice of supply chain integration, a double integration-and then-price contract is socially beneficial only when the private share of a mixed merger is low while the shipping service substitutability is neither high nor low. • The government ownership of a public port can serve as an efficient tool for port integration policy, while it should monitor competition contract, depending on the shipping service substitutability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mixed ownership reform aims to improve the performance of firms, which is important for optimizing the overall economic layout and promoting firms to sustainable development. Therefore, an important issue is whether state ownership participation in private firms improves their performance in the context of the mixed ownership reform. This study investigates whether and how state ownership participation affects the performance of private firms using Chinese listed private firms from 2010 to 2020. The results of this study indicate that state ownership participation significantly eliminates the performance of private firms. Further results show that there is a U‐shaped relationship between the mixed ownership model and the performance of private firms. At the same time, firm transparency and financing constraints play a negative moderating role in the relationship between the mixed ownership model and the performance of private firms. The findings of this study enrich the literature on factors influencing the performance of private firms, provide empirical evidence for mixed ownership reforms in China, and further reveal the characteristics of Chinese accounting practices and the logical rules behind the operation of these practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Results reported in this article, on local implementation of mixed-ownership reforms and the corporatization of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE) in the period 2008–2017, confirm that political and economic factors determine the possibility, objective, and pace of SOE corporate restructuring. With a starting point in a comprehensive review of the literature on Chinese SOE reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s, hypotheses on the effects of 1) market supporting institutions, 2) fiscal and financial stability constraints, and 3) social stability constraints on state sector ownership reforms were identified. Industrial economy statistics found in province-level statistical yearbooks were used to test the continuing relevance of these hypotheses and to provide the basis for an updated analysis of the ownership structure of local state-owned enterprises in a new phase of SOE reforms. Most of the firm-level findings reported here are consistent with those of previous studies. However, in contrast to earlier stages of SOE reforms, we find that fiscal pressure on local governments no longer functions as a driver of local-state-sector ownership restructuring. The analysis implies that the Chinese government's current SOE reform strategy, which this time focus on mixed ownership, is mainly relevant for high-performing SOEs located in rich provinces with well-developed market-supporting institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a sample of mixed ownership pilot enterprises in China from 2014 to 2018, we find that mixed ownership reform (MOR) can improve earnings quality. Thus, improving earnings quality (reducing market friction) is a specific mechanism through which MOR affects economic growth. We also find that the effect of government intervention on earnings quality varies across regions. In high-marketization regions, government intervention cater to the market and it has little or marginal effect on the effect of MOR on earnings quality. However, in low-marketization regions, government weakens the effect of MOR on earnings quality. MOR and reduced government intervention have complementary effects on earnings quality. MOR is not a one-size-fits-all formula, and it should be tailor-made according to local conditions (such as marketization levels). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in an industry chain. By constructing an oligopoly model considering the proportion of state-owned shares and product differentiation, this study examines the impacts of the balance of state-owned shares and product differentiation in four scenarios, and analyzes the proportion of state-owned shares to maximize the social welfare of the industry chain. The results reveal a synergistic relationship between the balance of state-owned shares and product differentiation. The equilibrium results vary in different industry chain links and competition modes. The implementation of mixed ownership by upstream enterprises will help improve the overall efficiency of the industry chain. Complete nationalization may be optimal and an upstream monopoly can be realized under certain conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how policies of market liberalization and partial privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) involved in the production and provision of key inputs – banking, energy and telecom – affect the vulnerability and resilience of an economy. SOEs' response to such policy changes and their ability to operate under the new market conditions are crucial for maintaining quality and continuity in the supply of intermediate goods and services that underlie the functioning of the economy and society. The paper analyses this issue in the context of Chinese SOEs' reforms. It finds that privatization and liberalization in China have been designed (i) to strengthen the economy's resilience, as access to private capital and foreign markets has contributed to companies' growth and to increase the stock and quality of critical infrastructure for the country; but also (ii) to minimize the vulnerabilities that arise from such policies, by envisaging measures against volatility in capital markets and the destabilizing effect of market competition through ad hoc regulation. The paper may prove relevant for the next steps of Chinese SOEs' reforms and its findings might find applicability in other geographical contexts as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the impact of property rights reform on private firms' environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices. ESG investing has become mainstream and a hot topic globally, but it is a black box of corporate ESG practices and performance. Importantly, it is not clear how to specifically enhance private firms' ESG practices. This study addresses this problem by exploring an ideal setting of China's mixed‐ownership reform in which private firms acquire equity in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We examine whether and how this reform affects private acquirer firms' ESG practices. Using a powerful difference‐in‐differences design, we find that mixed‐ownership reform significantly enhances private firms' ESG practices through heightened public scrutiny and the privileges of formal financing and government subsidies that are available due to the firms' partial government ownership after mixed‐ownership reform. Our findings have policy implications for promoting ESG practices and SOE reform. Specifically, our empirical evidence indicates that mixed‐ownership reform can facilitate sustainable development for both SOEs and private firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study focuses on the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in an industry chain. By constructing an oligopoly model considering the proportion of state-owned shares and product differentiation, this study examines the impacts of the balance of state-owned shares and product differentiation in four scenarios, and analyzes the proportion of state-owned shares to maximize the social welfare of the industry chain. The results reveal a synergistic relationship between the balance of state-owned shares and product differentiation. The equilibrium results vary in different industry chain links and competition modes. The implementation of mixed ownership by upstream enterprises will help improve the overall efficiency of the industry chain. Complete nationalization may be optimal and an upstream monopoly can be realized under certain conditions.

• Have China's mixed-ownership reforms helped to boost enterprise innovations? How? • We study the topic from the theoretical perspective of organizational controls. • State shareholding is found to be conducive to enterprise innovations. • This conducive effect depends on the capability of organizational controls. Mixed-ownership reforms have been the mainstay of reforming China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in recent years. In relation to the broader context of the continuous slowdown in economic growth under the New Normal, the reshaping of the innovative capacity of SOEs has been widely considered to be of systemic importance. Yet, in the relevant literature, the effects of mixed-ownership reforms on innovations have remained unclear. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by means of studying such effects for China's listed companies in the period 2007–2018, from the theoretical perspective of organizational controls in innovative firms. Our study finds that SOEs tend to be more innovative than non-SOEs, and increases in state shareholding do raise the innovative capacity of mixed-ownership enterprises. Further analyses reveal that, for mixed-ownership enterprises, the lower the level of state shareholding the more reliance of innovations on the capability of organizational controls in corporate governance. These findings offer useful policy lessons for China. Additionally, we discuss the contribution of our study to the broader literature at a conceptual level, with an emphasis on the novelty of highlighting the importance of organizational controls in the reform of SOEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective:This study aims to explain the role of ownership structure in the board strategic decision-making process in the Iranian institutional context as a developing country. The Agency Theory does not direct this research as the dominant theory in the corporate governance field; instead, this study is guided through the behavioral approach. Methods: The strategy of this research is a multiple case study with an abductive theory-building approach. By examining the ownership structure of Iranian banks, four banks were selected. Thirty-four semi-structured interviews are conducted with the CEOs, board members, CEO deputies, and officers relevant to strategy and corporate governance. Data analysis and theorizing were followed by systematic coding of interviews through eight steps, including within-case analysis, cross-case analysis, initial hypothesis building, and enfolding the literature. As a result, six propositions are suggested and conceptualized. Results: The results reveal that ownership concentration harms the balance of power, and thus the effectiveness of the decision-making process. At the same time, mixed ownership hurts strategic decision-making with a negative effect on the balance of trust and emotional climate and balance of the cognitive conflict. Regulatory bodies can moderate the negative effect of ownership concentration on the balance of power. Conclusion: Contrary to existing literature, results show that both "ownership concentration" and "mixed ownership" have negative impacts on the "effectiveness of strategic decision-making". Three primary processes, the balances of "power", "trust and emotional climate" and "cognitive conflict", appear to explain the findings. Regulatory bodies, as critical institutional forces, moderate these adverse effects. We explain our conflicting findings with the differences between institutional contexts. Due to the importance of banking in the Iranian economy and considering the moderating role of supervisory agencies on the mentioned negative impacts, improving regulatory institutions and strengthening supervisory mechanisms to limit major shareholders' interference is suggested.

This study empirically examines whether mixed-ownership intensity influences the level of financial investment across state-owned enterprise (SOE) samples, using the hand-collected mixed-ownership data of A-share non-financial listed SOEs from 2003 to 2018 in China. Consistent with the results of the robustness tests, we found that the greater the mixed-ownership intensity, the less the level of financial investment of non-financial SOEs. Furthermore, the cross-sectional analysis confirmed that the negative influence of the mixed-ownership intensity on the level of financial investment was more significant in firms located in the eastern region of China and firms controlled by the local government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency, we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The effects of direct and indirect state ownership are considered separately. Using econometric analysis, we conclude that the dominance of the block of shares owned by the state has a negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of the companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) perform worse on average than private companies. The mechanism of how changes in the “real sector” affect profitability is examined particularly closely. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of labor productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs, a similar correlation was not revealed. These companies demonstrated no visible relationship between their profitability and performance characteristics. The study shows that increases in the size of direct government ownership lead to lower labor productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play an important role in the Chinese economy and are also crucial instruments for implementing the Party-state's policies and strategic initiatives. SOE reform is not only crucial to China's transformation from an economy overly dependent on exports and investment to one more driven by domestic consumption, but is also a test of the political will and capability of the Chinese authorities to develop a market-based domestic economy. Despite the Chinese government's commitment since 2013 to forging ahead with the SOE reform process, little real progress has been made so far. Reform of the SOEs is a central component of the government's agenda for sustaining domestic economic growth and tightening the political control of the Chinese Communist Party over all aspects of the nation. The current wave of SOE reform has, however, focused on the state's push for consolidation through mergers and acquisitions, rather than pursuit of improving corporate governance. Far from being in retreat, the state is marching in and the market is retreating. This SOE reform process appears to contradict the state's proclaimed commitment to deregulation and development of a market-based competitive economy in China by allowing "the market to play a decisive role". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

本文以2007-201 6年我国非金融类国有A 股上市公司为样本，研究了混合所有制对国有 企业研发投入的影响. 研究发现：混合所有制促进了国有企业研发投入，即股东股份比例多样化能 够显著地提升国有企业研发投入.进一步研究发现，与集体股东和外资股东相比，私有股东更能提 高国有企业研发投入；与地方国企相比，混合所有制对中央国企研发投入的促进作用更为显著；此 外，混合所有制能够提升国有企业管理层薪酬与业绩敏感性，改善国有企业公司治理.本文的研究 发现为评价混合所有制、推动和深化国有企业改革提供了政策依据，也为推动国有企业研发投入提 供了对策建议. Based on the data of Chinese non-financial A-share state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2016, this paper conducts theoretical analysis and empirical test of the impact of mixed ownership on R&D investment of state-owned enterprises. The empirical results show that mixed ownership promotes the stateowned enterprises R&D investment. Moreover, private enterprises can promote the R&D investment of state-owned enterprises, but enterprises under collective ownership and foreign-funded enterprises cannot promote the R&D investment of state-owned enterprises. This paper also examines the differences in the influence of mixed ownership in central state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises on enterprise R&D investment, the results show that mixed ownership has a more significant effect on the R&D investment of central state-owned enterprises. In addition, this paper finds that mixed ownership can enhance the executive pay-for-performance sensitivity of state-owned enterprises, and improve the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises. The research findings of this paper provide policy basis for evaluating the mixed ownership, promoting and deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, and also provide countermeasures and suggestions for promoting the R&D investment of state-owned enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the impacts of nongovernmental stake, ownership balance, and nonexecutive directors on bank performance and risk taking in city commercial banks (CCBs) in China. We find that ownership balance can improve CCBs' financial performance and reduce their bankruptcy risk as well as nonperforming loan level. Nonexecutive directors can help reduce bankruptcy risk, but have no significant effect on performance or nonperforming loans. The impacts of ownership balance and nonexecutive directors become more prominent when the nongovernmental stake is relatively high, suggesting that mixed ownership reform can promote bank performance and risk control via these two avenues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Nanning Zhiye Jishu Xueyuan Xuebao is the property of Nanning College for Vocational Technology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As the most innovative and important institutes for the development of science and technology in China, due to various reasons, universities have not effectively achieved the commercialization of employee inventions. As a result, some universities have decided to conduct pilot projects with Mixed Ownership concerning patent rights for employee inventions under the framework of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Promoting the Transformation of Scientific and Technological Achievements (PTSTA) and Patent Law, namely transferring a portion of the rights to the employed inventors before the inventions are commercialized. The pilot reform has been backed by some local governments in China. This article systematically introduces and analyses this experimental system's theoretical and practical background, legal theory and policy logic. Southwest Jiaotong University (SWJTU) was selected as the subject of a case study to analyse its related progress and issues. This article also puts forward countermeasures and suggestions, such as establishing the comprehensive scientific research work orientation of the researchers in universities, preventing the legal risks of the transformation of employee inventions in universities, improving the capabilities of China's technology transfer institutions, and carrying out legislative practices, thereby providing references for the effective management of universities' intellectual property and the reengineering of the employee invention system in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Social Sciences in China is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A growing body of literature provides evidence that mixed-ownership reform in China greatly affects firm behavior. This study focuses on a novel mixed ownership reform of China's private firms, which we define as "reverse mixed-ownership reform". We find that firms' green innovation level improves after the reform. Environmental awareness and substantive resources are identified as two underlying mechanisms. These effects are stronger when a firm is in an area with a lower level of market openness and when managerial shareholding is lower. We also find evidence that firms make a trade-off between green innovation and financial performance after the reform. • Explore China's unique economic phenomenon: reverse mixed-ownership reform. • State-ownership plays an important role in private enterprises. • Reverse mixed-ownership reform increases private enterprises' green innovation levels. • Environmental awareness and substantive resources are two channels. • Both internal and external environment of enterprises impact the main results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This paper studies the organisational structure of contracting out transportation operations to a vertical partnership between local authorities and a vertically integrated monopoly. Pricing decisions are delegated to the partnership operating in the downstream market as a socially concerned firm that maximises a weighted sum of social welfare and profits. The price for essential input required to produce each unit of the transportation service is determined by the monopoly in the upstream market for rolling stock and crew leasing. A forward ownership interest in the vertical partnership held by the monopoly yields a partial rebate of the downstream margin. In turn, the local authorities can extract the upstream monopoly rent via a franchise fee which can be determined ex post. Our theoretical model predicts that local authorities with a relatively high share in the partnership should decrease the net transfer from the budget by increasing the franchise fees if the upstream profit margins are high. The empirical evidence for the impact of the ownership structure on contractual regime is found in the panel data for 25 suburban passenger companies in Russia in 2011–2015, where partial cost recovery and inappropriate compensation plays the role of pseudo-franchising contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State intervention into concentration and mixed ownership of cultural ventures and news media derives mainly from two a priori assumptions: one views communication and democracy as intimately linked, and the other sees the private sector as primarily motivated by profit. In the past, these a priori assumptions guided the policies of occidental democracies, including Canada's. In an ever-changing world made up largely of market discourse, these assumptions seem out dated. Today, the government of Canada favours the creation of gigantic enterprises as if no regulation exists, and as such, ignores it's interventionist traditions and consequently, the "reasonable doubts" of those who worry about the negative impact of concentration and mixed ownership in cultural ventures and news media upon the quality and plurality of news content.

Previous research on hybrid organizations has drawn attention to the accountability gap that is believed to emerge when the provision of public services is transferred to a hybrid organization. In this article we take our point of departure in that research and use a case study method to explore whether this gap can be bridged by existing corporate governance systems or if governance systems specially tailored to hybrid forms need to be developed. The result of the study shows that the process is equally important as the system in place. That is, it is not only the actual system but also how the system is implemented and used that affects the ability to bridge the accountability gap. Points for practitioners This article provides insight into how the hybrid form alters the relationship between citizens, elected politicians and organizations performing public services and, consequently, how the ability to secure accountability in public services changes. The results presented in the article provide politicians and managers in the public sector with knowledge regarding how, by focusing on organizational processes, relationships between stakeholders and performance evaluation can work with improving accountability in hybrid organizations. Further, the article stresses the need for performance evaluation to encompass not only financial aspects, but also the societal values of the public services performed by the hybrid organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does ownership transformation affect firm performance? On the basis of an analysis of over 1100 Chinese companies during the period of ownership reform (1997–2003), this paper identifies that, for China that has the world’s largest state sector under transition, the mix of state and private ownership – partial privatisation – emerges as the best performing type of ownership model for Chinese firms. The finding supports the argument that firms can gain the best synergy of both state support and private business strength, which provides a good explanation to the current campaign of mixed ownership for further reform of state enterprises after 2013. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Southern Yangtze University: Humanities & Social Sciences Edition is the property of Jiangnan Daxue and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Indian banking system is characterized by a large number of banks with mixed ownership. The trend towards consolidation has been driven by the need to attain meaningful balance sheet size and market share in the face of intensified competition, whereas the trend towards convergence is driven across the industry to provide most of the financial services such as banking, insurance, investment, cash management, etc., to the customers under one roof. The financial performance of the banks suggests that the banks are becoming more focused on their activities and primary factors for their consolidation is to scale up their operations and technological progress, excess retention capacity, need for large investment. The present paper attempts to find out the reasons to get consolidated in Indian Banking sector. This paper also analyzes some critical issues and challenges in consolidation in indian banking sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee passed a program of comprehensive reforms to stem the slowdown of the country's economic growth to make China the world's leading power and to give a bigger role to the market in allocation of resources. Above all, the goal of the new stage in China's development is to turn it into the biggest economy on Earth. Worldwide spread of its investments will lead to China's interests reaching across the globe and, in its turn, stimulate evolution of its military doctrine toward "defense on the outlying borders." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Public & Cooperative Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Many airlines are neither completely public nor private enterprises but have hybrid or mixed public-private ownership. Theory and evidence regarding the performance of private, public and mixed ownership are addressed in the context of the international airline industry. The study empirically examines the influence of an airline''s ownership structure on multiple dimensions of its performance. In general, the results indicate that public sector airlines under-perform relative private sector airlines. In addition, we find that airlines with mixed ownership tend to perform better than public sector airlines, but worse than private sector carriers. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We examine the impact of mixed ownership on the performance of venture capital (VC) firms in China. We use successful/unsuccessful exits from VC-financed entrepreneurial companies and number of patent applications by VC-financed companies as proxies for VC firms' performance. Consistent with existing research on the inferior performance of SOEs relative to non-SOEs, we find that on average government-controlled VC firms (GVCs) underperform domestic private investors-controlled VC firms (PVCs). More importantly, we find that introducing minority private investors (i.e., mixed ownership) helps improve the performance of GVCs. However, we find no evidence that introducing minority government investors (i.e., mixed ownership) helps improve the performance of PVCs. Our results provide relevant information to the ongoing debate on the role of the government investors and private investors in developing the VC industry in emerging markets. • Government-controlled VC firms (GVCs) underperform non-GVCs. • Adding minority private investors helps improve the performance of GVCs. • Adding minority government investors does not improve the performance of non-GVCs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]