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La siguiente monografía referativa muestra a familiares militares que integraron el árbol genealógico de la familia Martí, los cuales sirvieron de ejemplo al Héroe Nacional para que se convirtiera en un soldado de las ideas. Sus participaciones en diferentes filiaciones fueron pautas a seguir por José Julián para lo que sería posteriormente la creación de la Guerra Necesaria. Todos portaron grados militares y sirvieron de forma estoica en los ejércitos que sirvieron, obteniendo condecoraciones y logros relevantes en sus vidas. Este resultado es parte de una tesis doctoral donde se pretende dotar a alumnos de la Universidad Central «Marta Abreu» de Las Villas de una nueva herramienta práctica el pensamiento militar martiano. Los métodos empleados fueron el estudio de documentos, el histórico lógico y la práctica pedagógica. The following refectory monograph shows military relatives who integrated the family tree of the Martí family, which served as an example to the Cuban National Hero to become a soldier of ideas. Their participation in different affiliations guidelines to be followed by José Julián for what would later be the creation of the Guerra Necesaria. All carried military degrees and served stoically in the armies they served, earning decorations and relevant achievements in their lives. This result is part of a doctoral thesis where it is intended to provide students of the Universidad Central «Marta Abreu» de Las Villas with a new practical tool for Martian military thinking. The methods used were the study of documents, the logical history and the pedagogical practice.

Resumen: En el desarrollo de la geopolítica chilena, el nombre del general Ramón Canas Montalva ocupa un lugar destacado por sus ideas acerca de la importância del Pacífico "Sur-Austral y Polar" -como le denominaba- para la constitución de Chile como una "pequena potencia del Pacífico Sur". Su geopolítica, que es tridimensional: terrestre, marítima y aérea, tuvo un especial auge en los tres periodos de gobierno del Partido Radical chileno (centro-izquierda), entre 1939 y 1952. Este artículo describe su relación de consejero de dichos gobiernos y también las circunstancias políticas y profesionales que explican su influencia, en ese tiempo y en el largo plazo, en la política exterior chilena. Abstract: In the development of Chilean geopolitics, the name of General Ramón Canas Montalva occupies a prominent place for his ideas about the importance of the "South-Austral and Polar" Pacific -as he called it- for the consolidation of Chile as a "small power in the South Pacific." Its geopolitics, which is three-dimensional (land, sea and air), experienced a special boom during the three administrations of the Chilean Radical Party (center-left) between 1939-1952. This article describes his position as an advisor to these governments, as well as the political and professional circumstances that account for his influence on Chilean foreign policy at the time and in the long term. Resumo: No desenvolvimento da geopolítica chilena, o nome do general Ramón Canas Montalva ocupa um lugar de destaque por suas ideias sobre a importância do Pacífico "Sul-Austral e Polar" - como ele o chamava - para a constituição do Chile como uma "pequena potência do Pacífico Sul ". Sua geopolítica, que é tridimensional (terrestre, marítima e aérea), teve seu auge, principalmente, nos três períodos de governo do Partido Radical chileno (centro-esquerda), entre 1939 e 1952. Este artigo descreve a relação dele como conselheiro desses governos e também as circunstâncias políticas e profissionais que explicam sua influência, naquele tempo e em longo prazo, na política externa chilena.

This study analyses the Dutch military’s tactical conduct in Indonesia during the decolonization war of 1945-1949. Its principal questions are how the Dutch armed forces understood and shaped their tactical military conduct in Indonesia, and to what extent this can help explain the extremely violent nature of the war.The Dutch armed forces interpreted the conflict within the conceptual framework of past colonial wars, of the restoration of authority by military means, and of regular warfare. While the Dutch military did learn some lessons during the conflict, radical new insights were not developed, for various reasons.From beginning to end, Dutch military conduct in Indonesia was characterised by harsh repressive action, the absolute prioritisation of military solutions, mistrust of the Indonesian civilian population and the disregard of the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage. This modus operandi found backing in both the existing and new tactical regulations and the army’s organizational culture. The army’s forceful and harsh mode of conduct during the war was therefore not simply the result of situational force majeure or the political developments; it was also born from the way in which the Dutch armed forces understood the conflict.

This study analyses the Dutch military’s tactical conduct in Indonesia during the decolonization war of 1945-1949. Its principal questions are how the Dutch armed forces understood and shaped their tactical military conduct in Indonesia, and to what extent this can help explain the extremely violent nature of the war.The Dutch armed forces interpreted the conflict within the conceptual framework of past colonial wars, of the restoration of authority by military means, and of regular warfare. While the Dutch military did learn some lessons during the conflict, radical new insights were not developed, for various reasons.From beginning to end, Dutch military conduct in Indonesia was characterised by harsh repressive action, the absolute prioritisation of military solutions, mistrust of the Indonesian civilian population and the disregard of the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage. This modus operandi found backing in both the existing and new tactical regulations and the army’s organizational culture. The army’s forceful and harsh mode of conduct during the war was therefore not simply the result of situational force majeure or the political developments; it was also born from the way in which the Dutch armed forces understood the conflict.

The thesis examines the past and present ties between U.S. military thought as expressed in combat doctrine and the imagined and historical reality of war in Europe to examine how the use and abuse of military history within the genesis of U.S. military doctrine and thought has occurred. The thesis surveys the course of U.S. defense strategy as it has related to Europe, and specifically how it has engaged with the record of German military history, thought, and myth as channeled via the writings, interpretations, and misinterpretations of Carl von Clausewitz and the historical record of the Wehrmacht within the mirror of U.S. military doctrine in the 20th century. The thesis concludes that U.S. military thought and the history of war in Europe are connected via an international process of challenge and response wherein U.S. military planners have often looked to the record of European war to extract ready-made tactical and operational practices seemingly suited to solve pressing military challenges. The thesis also concludes that U.S. military thought has adopted various decontextualized concepts from Clausewitz's On War in a manner that obscures a more historic perspective toward the material that, in turn, better prepares the reader to engage with more polemical and flawed critiques of the Prussian and his work. Major, United States Marine Corps Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Submitted by Marilene Donadel (marilene.donadel@unioeste.br) on 2020-01-28T13:47:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Douglas_Zorzo_2019.pdf: 1793607 bytes, checksum: 6248fe3ee261cc52b3963d5150ada3de (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2020-01-28T13:47:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Douglas_Zorzo_2019.pdf: 1793607 bytes, checksum: 6248fe3ee261cc52b3963d5150ada3de (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-09-30 Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES The “war” occupies an essential position in the constitution of Niccolò Machiavelli’s political thinking. Conflicts, in their most varied configurations and expressions, are recurrent and regular topics in the Florentine secretary’s sprawling corpus. In the arte dello stato the war, rather than an empty possibility, is a concrete and irrevocable threat. On the Machiavellian horizon, military activities appear as an omnipresent element. In light of this, the present work has the purpose of investigating the specific place that “war” occupies in its reflection. Our intention is to situate the way in which the Machiavellian writings interpret the military phenomenon, outlining the locus of this word, reconstructing its meaning, exploring its definitions, its forms of manifestation, and especially its implications in the political arena. Here two main guidelines structure our journey. In the first, we will seek to expose the way that the Secretary conceptually conceives the war. For this, in the first chapter of our thesis, we will try to make a definition for this notion, both in its internal developments – in civil wars – as external – in interstate wars. In the second, consequently, we will discuss how this understanding affects the political dynamics of principalities and republics, political regimes that mark the author’s intellectual history. Condensed in the question about why the soldiers sacrifice themselves on the battlefields, we will turn our attention to the peculiarities of the political, institutional, and procedural organization of these forms of government that attempt to constitute their own arms, and how each political constitution reflects on the motivations of their armies. Then, in the second chapter, we will endeavor to point out how this understanding of armed conflicts impacts at the Machiavellian princely theory. On the one hand, as an essential attribute for the formation of principalities; on the other, as an indispensable element for the maintenance of political structures, which will constrain the prince to establish a specific form of relationship with the people under his command. Finally, in the third chapter, we will evaluate how this same idea reverberates in Machiavelli’s republican considerations, in a practical and theoretical context. The preservation of the republics, by force of arms, will guide the Secretary to the definition of a specific political model capable of promotion the formation of his own armies to control the chaotic world of fortune: the popular republic. In these terms, the hypothesis that we will pursue is that this particular view of war has such influence on the Machiavellian universe that it acts as a conditioner for its political positions. The demand to face a context of action, in which conflicts between powers emerge as inevitable, installs the political agent, regardless of his princely or republican inclination, ahead of other impositions strictly political, which defines either his behavior in respect to the individuals over which they rule how sets out the observance of certain institutional mechanisms. A “guerra” ocupa uma posição essencial na economia do pensamento político de Nicolau Maquiavel. Os conflitos, em suas mais diversas configurações e expressões, são tópicos reincidentes e regulares no alargado corpus do Secretário florentino. Na arte dello stato a guerra, ao invés de uma possibilidade vazia, é uma ameaça concreta e irrevogável. No horizonte maquiaveliano, as atividades militares aparecem como um elemento onipresente. Diante disso, o presente trabalho possui o propósito de investigar o lugar específico que a “guerra” ocupa em sua reflexão. Nossa intenção é a de situar o modo por meio do qual os escritos maquiavelianos interpretam o fenômeno militar, delineando o locus desse vocábulo, reconstruindo seu significado, explorando suas definições, suas formas de manifestação, e, principalmente, suas implicações na arena da política. Aqui, duas diretrizes principais estruturam nosso percurso. Na primeira, buscaremos expor a forma como Secretário concebe conceitualmente a guerra. Para isso, no primeiro capítulo de nossa tese, tentaremos realizar uma definição para essa noção, tanto em seus desdobramentos internos, nas guerras civis, como externos, nas guerras entre estados. Na segunda, como decorrência, abordaremos como esse entendimento afeta a dinâmica política de principados e repúblicas, regimes políticos que marcam a história intelectual do autor. Condensada na indagação sobre as razões que levam os soldados a se sacrificarem nos campos de batalha, voltaremos nossa atenção para as peculiaridades do organizar-se político, institucional e procedimental dessas formas de governo que buscam constituir suas armas próprias, e como cada constituição política reflete no motivacional de seus exércitos. Nesse caso, no segundo capítulo, nos empenharemos para apontar como essa compreensão dos conflitos armados impactam na teoria principesca maquiaveliana. Por um lado, como atributo essencial à formação dos principados; por outro, como elemento indispensável à manutenção das estruturas políticas, o que constrangerá o príncipe a estabelecer uma forma de relação específica com o povo sob seu comando. Por fim, no terceiro capítulo, avaliaremos como essa mesma ideia reverbera, em um âmbito prático e teórico, nas considerações republicanas de Maquiavel. A conservação das repúblicas, pelas vias armadas, guiará o Secretário para a definição de um modelo político específico, capaz de promover a formação das armas próprias para o caótico controle da fortuna: a república popular. Nisso, a hipótese que buscamos defender é a de que essa visão particular sobre a guerra desempenha tamanha influência no universo maquiaveliano que acaba agindo como um condicionante para seus posicionamentos políticos. A exigência para enfrentar um contexto de ação, em que os conflitos entre potências surgem como inevitáveis, instala o agente político, seja ele de inclinação principesca ou republicana, à frente de outras imposições de natureza estritamente política, que definem tanto seu comportamento em relação aos governados, quanto estabelece a observância de certos mecanismos institucionais.

The aim of this paper is to identify the enduring principles at the basis of Russian military thought, offering an alternative to the contemporary analytical mainstream – which deems Moscow’s military behavior to be revolutionary and unprecedented. This is based on comparative analysis of Russian official military discourse and practice between 2008 and 2016. Critical inspection of the two Military Doctrines approved during this timeframe and of various military drills will reveal a series of rhetorical and operational recurrences. Notwithstanding numerous changes at the international and domestic levels that could have had an impact on Russian military behavior, no substantive shift is distinguishable. These empirical findings will constitute the basis for a reconstruction of Russian military thought. Through a deductive method, we will be able to reconstruct the ultimate assumptions granting them logical coherence and legitimization. Far from being incomprehensible, Russian military thought will be presented as the adaptation of classical strategic principles to contemporary contingencies.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Douglas Antonio Fedel Zorzo.pdf: 869265 bytes, checksum: 9473a988e551499f4b514201bc4f2ef5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-04-06 Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior The political theory of Niccolò Machiavelli is permeated by a constant and inflexible preoccupation: the military question. The problems about the government relations are followed alongside by considerations about the political necessity of formation and organization of national armies. The Machiavellian military theory, diluted in the set of his works, is revealed as an essential aspect for the maintenance of state ordinations and the conservation of the vivere civile. The success of political institutions is dependent on the capacity for coordination and full absorption of the structures directed for the exercise of war: the military art and the political art create, at the heart of Machiavelli's thought, bonds of an inseparable articulation. The proper relation with the martial apparatus is a condition for the survival of States. In this sense, the primary objective of the study here presented is to delineate and to expose how the Machiavelli's warfare conceptions are thoughtful and grounded in the core of political arguments. On the one hand, we will seek to illustrate the function exercised by the art of war in the interior of the dynamic of state, evaluating the necessary requirements for the fusion of war and politics, beyond to devote one particular attention to the implications of this role in republicans and princely governments. On the other hand, we will intend to expose the way in which the interpretations of the technical nature of the military arrangements advocated by the Florentine secretary were strongly guided by government issues. A teoria política de Nicolau Maquiavel é atravessada por uma preocupação constante e inflexível: a questão militar. Os problemas sobre as relações de governo são acompanhados lado a lado pelas considerações sobre a necessidade política da formação e da organização de exércitos nacionais. A teoria militar maquiaveliana, diluída no conjunto de suas obras, se revela como um aspecto imprescindível para a manutenção das ordenações estatais e para a conservação do vivere civile. O êxito das instituições políticas é dependente da capacidade de coordenação e plena absorção das estruturas direcionadas para o exercício da guerra: a arte militar e a arte política, no âmago do pensamento de Maquiavel, criam laços de uma articulação incindível. O relacionamento adequado com o aparato marcial é uma condição para a sobrevivência dos Estados. Nesse sentido, o objetivo primário do trabalho aqui apresentado é o de delinear e o de expor em que medida as concepções bélicas de Maquiavel são pensadas e alicerçadas no núcleo de argumentos políticos. Por um lado, buscaremos ilustrar a função exercida pela arte da guerra no interior da dinâmica estatal, avaliando os requisitos necessários para a fusão de guerra e política, além de dedicarmos uma atenção particular às implicações desse papel nos governos republicanos e principescos. Por outro, pretenderemos expor o modo por meio do qual as interpretações de cunho técnico sobre as disposições militares defendidas pelo Secretário florentino foram fortemente guiadas por questões governamentais.

This is a sociological study of the views of officers in the Swedish Army and its Amphibious Forces on tactics in Irregular Warfare (IW), in particular, Counterinsurgency (COIN). IW comprises struggles, where the military weaker part uses an indirect approach with smaller units and integrates the civilian and military dimensions in a violence spectrum including subversion, terrorism, Guerrilla Warfare and infantry actions. IW is the main armed warfare style in insurgencies. COIN is the combined political, military, economic, social and legal actions in counter insurgencies. Data has been collected by means of interviews with almost all (n =43) officers, who were either commanding battalions or rifle and manoeuvre companies while undergoing training for general warfare and international operations. The main theoretical and methodological inspiration is the traditional one for research on social fields, inaugurated by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. The statistical technique used is Multiple Correspondence Analysis. As a background and context base, an inquiry inspired by the Begriffsgechichte (Conceptual History) tradition explores the genesis and development of understandings of the term Irregular Warfare. The research question is outlined as; “how can contemporary Swedish military thought on tactics in Irregular Warfare be characterized using descriptive patterns, mapped in relation to background factors and normative standards? The most significant findings are that there are two main opposing notions separating the officers’ views on tactics in Irregular Warfare: (1) a focus on larger, combat oriented and collectively operating military units versus smaller and larger, more intelligence oriented and dispersed operating units, and (2) a focus on military tasks and kinetic effects versus military and civilian tasks as well as “soft” effects. The distribution of these views can be presented as a two-dimensional space structured by the two axes. This space represents four categories of tactics, partly diverging from normative military standards for Counterinsurgency. This social space of standpoints shows different structural tendencies for background factors of social and cultural character, particularly dominant concerning military backgrounds, international mission experiences and civilian education. Compared to military standards for Counterinsurgency, the two tactical types characterized by a Regular Warfare mind-set stands out as counter-normative. Signs of creative thought on military practice and theory, as well as a still persistent Regular Warfare doxa are apparent. Power struggles might thus develop, effecting the transformation to a broadened warfare culture with an enhanced focus also on Irregular Warfare. The result does not support research results arguing for a convergence of military thought in the European transformation of Armed Forces. The main argument goes beyond tactics and suggests sociological analysis on reciprocal effects regarding strategy, operational art, tactics as well as leadership, concerning the mind-set and preferences for Regular, Irregular and Hybrid Warfare.

Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais Clausewitz is considered the main philosopher of war. Since the 19th century, his work was frequently read and cited, especially in the military environment. However, until now, no research has proposed investigating the reception of his work in Brazil. The central objective of this study is, more specifically, to analyze the reading of this author among members of the Brazilian Army. The specific objectives are: a) to investigate which Clausewitzian concepts are more cited in these readings; b) to consider the possible influence of the most important readings published abroad over these readings; c) to identify variations of comprehension about Clausewitz s conceptions during two periods: the Cold War and the post-Cold War; d) to examine the reception of Clausewitz in the Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército (Brazilian Army Command and General Staff School) ECEME. The corpus chosen was the geopolitics production that prevailed in the strategic thought of Cold War, as well as papers published in A Defesa Nacional, Revista do Exército Brasileiro e Revista das Ciências Militares Coleção Carlos de Meira Mattos, in the period post 1989. Curricula of the courses offered by ECEME were also examined. Through a bibliographical review and a documental analysis, it was verified that the Brazilian readings of Clausewitz are largely selective and marked by the historical context in which they were elaborated. Concerning the analysis of the ECEME s curricula, it was noticed that Clausewitz is a literature present in the Escola and read in the main course disciplines, Strategy and Military History. Clausewitz é considerado o principal filósofo da guerra. Desde o século XIX suas obras foram frequentemente lidas e citadas, sobretudo no meio militar. No entanto, até o momento nenhuma pesquisa propôs investigar a recepção de sua obra no Brasil. Mais especificamente, o objetivo central desse trabalho é analisar a leitura desse autor entre os militares do Exército brasileiro. Têm-se como objetivos: a) investigar quais os conceitos clausewitzianos mais citados nessas leituras; b) considerar a possível influência nelas das leituras mais importantes publicadas no exterior; c) identificar variações de compreensão das concepções de Clausewitz durante dois períodos: a Guerra Fria e o pós-Guerra Fria; d) examinar a recepção de Clausewitz na Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército (ECEME). O corpus escolhido foi a produção geopolítica, dominante no pensamento estratégico da Guerra Fria, bem como artigos publicados em A Defesa Nacional, Revista do Exército Brasileiro e Revista das Ciências Militares Coleção Carlos de Meira Mattos, para o período do pós 1989. Foram examinados também os currículos dos cursos oferecidos pela ECEME. Por meio da revisão bibliográfica e análise documental constatamos que, em grande parte, as leituras brasileiras de Clausewitz são seletivas e marcadas pela conjuntura histórica em que foram elaboradas. Com relação à analise dos currículos da ECEME, percebemos que Clausewitz é literatura presente na Escola, lido nas principais disciplinas dos cursos, Estratégia e História Militar.

It examines how the military Brazilian evaluated the Chaco War (1932-1935) between Paraguay and Bolivia, from official reports and analysis on the state limit peak of the conflict. Goal is to propose that this view is informed by the character of geopolitical doctrines that have been consolidated in the country throughout the 1920s, finding definite contribution to the work of Mario Travassos, at the beginning of the next de-cade. The traditional rivalry with Argentina over the strategic supremacy in South America was updated so the Brazilian military view of War. Examina-se a forma como o meio militar brasileiro avaliou a Guerra do Chaco (1932-1935), entre o Paraguai e a Bolívia, a partir de relatórios e análises oficiais acerca da situação-limite culminante do conflito. Busca-se propor que essa visão é informada pelas doutrinas de caráter geopolítico que se consolidaram no país ao longo dos anos 1920, encontrando contribuição decisiva na obra de Mario Travassos, no princípio da década seguinte. A rivalidade tradicional com a Argentina em torno da supremacia estratégica na América do Sul foi assim atualizada na visão militar brasileira da Guerra.

In 1989, the United States Marine Corps published the document Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting. Its appearance signaled the official adoption of maneuver warfare as the Corps's organizational philosophy and the basis of its doctrine for preparing and conducting operations. The decade of debate and experimentation that preceded the publication of Warfighting has not received detailed examination, but merits such for the insights it can provide to understanding intellectual change and military reform. Beginning in 1979, Marine Corps officers engaged in an intraservice debate over the issue of maneuver warfare, a new concept that began to circulate among military reformers in the latter half of the 1970s. A group of Marine officers known as "maneuverists" began meeting in unofficial seminars to study, refine, and promote the idea. Maneuverists believed that maneuver warfare was a more fluid and dynamic way of fighting because it stressed flexibility, creativity, and a focus on enemy behavior. They also thought the new idea offered a more effective alternative for fighting war than contemporary practices, which they thought focused too much on rigid application of standardized procedures and methods of existing manuals. The intellectual transformation of the Marine Corps involved three main mechanisms. The first was a theoretical mechanism centered on public debate in the pages of Marine Corps Gazette to introduce and defend maneuver warfare to Marine audience. The second was a functional/practical mechanism that involved educational and training initiatives at the Amphibious Warfare School and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The third mechanism was the use of institutional authority made possible with the appointment of General Alfred M. Gray, a senior and vocal maneuver warfare champion, to the position Commandant of the Marine Corps. Using the authority of his office, Gray directed the writing of a doctrinal manual encapsulating the ideas of maneuver warfare to provide the Corps organizational focus and direction. The resulting manual FMFM 1, Warfighting, officially adopted maneuver warfare as service doctrine and organizational warfighting philosophy.

O artigo aborda o impacto da guerra das Malvinas/Falklands no pensamento militar brasileiro. Analisa as percepções de militares brasileiros sobre diferentes aspectos do conflito publicada sem livros e periódicos profissionais, bem como recomendações feitas e seus desdobramentos em mudanças organizacionais. Argumenta-se que a guerra reforçou a estratégia de busca por autonomia e de instrumentos que dissuadissem a presença das grandes potências na região. Assim, apesar das restrições orçamentárias, os programas de produção doméstica armamentos foram mantidos e cada uma das forças promoveu reformas com vistas a incorporar algumas das lições extraídas da guerra. Paralelamente, foram adotadas iniciativas diplomáticas de concertação regional que criassem constrangimentos políticos a atuação de potências extrarregionais, como a Zona de Paz e Cooperação do Atlântico Sul. The article addresses the impact of the Malvinas/Falklands war on Brazilian military thought. It analyzesthe perceptions of Brazilian military personnel about different aspects of the conflict published inbooks andprofessional journals, it also inquiries about the recommendations made and their consequences in organizational changes. It is argued that thewar reinforced the strategy of seeking autonomy and instruments to deter the presence of the great powers in the region. Thus, despite budgetary constraints, domestic armaments production programs were maintained and each of the forces carried out reformsaimed at incorporating some of the lessons learned from the war. At the same time, diplomatic initiatives of regional agreement were adopted to create political constraints on the actions of extra-regional powers, such as the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone. El artículo aborda el impacto de la guerra Malvinas/Falklands en el pensamiento militar brasileño. Analiza las percepciones del personal militar brasileño sobre diferentes aspectos del conflicto publicadosenlibros yrevistas profesionales, así como las recomendaciones formuladas y sus consecuencias en los cambios organizativos. Se argumenta que la guerra reforzó la estrategia de búsqueda de autonomía e instrumentos para disuadir la presencia de las grandes potencias en la región. Así, a pesar de las limitaciones presupuestarias, se mantuvieron los programas nacionales de producción de armamento y cada una de las fuerzas llevó a cabo reformas destinadas a incorporar algunas de las lecciones aprendidas de laguerra. Al mismo tiempo, se adoptaron iniciativas diplomáticas de acuerdo regional para crear restricciones políticas a las acciones de poderes extrarregionales, como la Zona de Paz y Cooperación del Atlántico Sur.