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People are often presented with large amounts of information to remember, and in many cases, the font size of information may be indicative of its importance (such as headlines or warnings). In the present study, we examined how learners perceive the importance of information in different font sizes and how beliefs about font size influence selective memory. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with to-be-remembered words that were either unrelated or related to a goal (e.g., items for a camping trip) in either small or large font. Participants rated words in large font as more important to remember than words in small font when the words in a list were unrelated but not when the words were schematically related to a goal. In Experiments 2 and 3, we were interested in how learners belief that font size is indicative of importance translates to their ability to selectively encode and recall valuable information. Specifically, we presented participants with words in various font sizes, and larger fonts either corresponded to greater point values or smaller point values (values counted towards participants scores if recalled). When larger fonts corresponded with greater point values, participants were better able to selectively remember high-value words relative to low-value words. Thus, when to-be-remembered information varies in value, font size may be less diagnostic of an items importance (the items importance drives memory), and when the value of information is consistent with a learners belief, learners can better engage in selective memory.

There is uncertainty about whether delusion formation in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) can be explained by false memories. “Metamemory,” the ability to self-evaluate memory and identify memory errors, is impaired in people with delusions in schizophrenia. Our objective was to investigate whether false memory and metamemory were associated with delusions in AD. Participants with mild AD, with and without delusions, completed a computerized word recognition task and a metamemory measure. Group differences were compared using independent-samples t-tests or Mann Whitney tests. Significant findings were explored through binary logistic regression modeling. Participants with delusions (n = 10) gave more high confidence responses, significantly so for correct responses; percentage of high confidence correct responses for those with delusions (mean (SD)) was 69.7% (31.0%) and for those without (n = 14) was 43.5% (29.9%); t22 = -2.09, p = .049. This remained significant when sex was included in regression modeling; for each 1.0% increase in high confidence correct responses, participants were 5.4% more likely to have delusions (Exp(β) 1.054, 95% CI 1.007–1.105, p = .025). Findings provide tentative support for a link between metamemory and delusions in AD. This should be explored in a larger sample as it has potential implications for treatment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD), namely at an initial stage like amnestic cognitive impairment (aMCI), typically present with memory complaints. They also have difficulties regarding self‐knowledge about their cognitive deficits. In clinical practice, a formal neuropsychological assessment is often done. The present study aimed to understand whether patients with aMCI retain the ability to monitor the success or failure in their performance during the neuropsychological assessment and adjust the report of memory complaints accordingly, as compared to healthy controls. Methods: Participants were patients with aMCI and healthy controls who were questioned about their own memory abilities using the Subjective Memory Complaints (SMC) scale, applied before and after the neuropsychological assessment protocol. A repeated measures General Linear Model was performed to analyze changes in SMC (within‐subjects effects) after the neuropsychological assessment, in patients with aMCI and healthy controls (between‐subjects effects). Results: Eighty volunteers, 40 patients with aMCI and 40 healthy controls, participated in the study. Patients with aMCI showed lower MMSE scores, more depressive symptoms, and deficits in memory and learning, language and executive domains. Patients with aMCI had higher SMC scores [9.4(3.6)] than healthy controls [4.4(2.3)] before the neuropsychological assessment. A statistically significant interaction was found between the SMC and the diagnostic group, meaning that healthy controls decreased SMC [3.4(1.9)] after the neuropsychological assessment, whereas patients with aMCI kept high levels of SMC [9.6(3.9)]. In patients with aMCI, an inverse correlation between logical memory and the change in SMC was found, so that patients with lower scores in the logical memory test tended to increase their memory complaints after the assessment. Conclusions: Both patients with aMCI and healthy controls can monitor and update the impression about their memory abilities following a formal neuropsychological assessment. Patients with aMCI maintain a high SMC level, which is inversely associated with their memory performance. In practical terms, SMC should be measured consistently at a particular moment in time, preferably preceding the objective neuropsychological assessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research suggests that making Judgments of Learning (JOLs) can significantly influence memory performance, commonly known as JOL reactivity. While recent investigations have highlighted the role of learning material attributes in JOL reactivity, the impact of emotions on this process has received less attention. Additionally, the cognitive mechanisms underlying JOL reactivity remain debated. This study aimed to investigate the influence of emotion on JOL reactivity and its associated cognitive mechanisms. In Experiment 1, participants were assigned to make JOLs or refrain from such judgments while learning adjectives with positive, negative, and neutral valences. Subsequently, they underwent a recognition test. The results revealed that participants displayed JOL reactivity when exposed to positive and neutral words, but not when encountering negative words. Experiment 2, utilizing nouns as learning material and manipulating the emotion of new words in the recognition test, replicated the findings of Experiment 1. Collectively, both experiments demonstrated distinct effects of emotions on JOL reactivity. These findings provide support for the enhanced learning engagement theory of JOL reactivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractMaking judgments of learning (JOLs) can directly influence memory, a phenomenon termed the reactivity effect of JOLs. However, controversy surrounds the mechanism behind JOL reactivity. This study employs related and unrelated word pairs as learning materials to compare memory outcomes across different JOL conditions. We contrasted the traditional JOL reactivity paradigm with a covert retrieval induction paradigm to explore whether JOLs impact memory through covert retrieval. In Experiment 1, data from 40 participants (18 females, 22 males) were analyzed, revealed distinct patterns between the two paradigms. When word pairs are presented entirely, the JOL group outperforms the no-JOL group in memorizing related pairs, aligning with traditional JOL reactivity. Conversely, when target words are omitted, the JOL group’s memory resembles that of the no-JOL group. This comparison suggested that JOLs may prompt covert retrieval. In Experiment 2, which involved manipulating the retrieval strength, data from 52 participants (46 females, 6 males) were analyzed, yielded results consistent with those of Experiment 1. We conclude that covert retrieval significantly contributes to the JOL reactivity effect, enhancing memory through JOL-induced covert retrieval. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A two-factor account has been proposed as an explanatory model for the formation and maintenance of delusions. The first factor refers to a neurocognitive process leading to a significant change in subjective experience; the second factor has been regarded as a failure in hypothesis evaluation characterized by an impairment in metacognitive ability. This study was focused on the assessment of metacognition in patients with schizophrenia. The aims of the study were to measure the overconfidence in metacognitive judgments through the prediction of word list recall and to analyze the correlation between basic neurocognition (memory and executive function) and metacognition through a metamemory test and the severity of psychotic symptoms. Method: Fifty-one participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia were evaluated. The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) was used to assess the severity of psychiatric symptoms, and the subtest of metamemory included in the Executive Functions and Frontal Lobe-2 battery (BANFE-2) was used to evaluate overconfidence and underestimation errors, intrusion and perseverative response, total volume of recall, and Brief Functioning Assessment Scale (FAST) for social functioning. Results: The strongest correlation is observed between overconfidence errors and the positive factor of the PANSS (r = 0.774, p < 0.001). For the enter model in the multiple linear regression (r = 0.78, r2 = 0.61; F = 24.57, p < 0.001), the only significant predictor was overconfidence errors. Conclusion: Our results highlight the relevance of a metacognitive bias of overconfidence, strongly correlated with psychotic symptoms, and support the hypothesis that metacognitive defects contribute to the failure to reject contradictory evidence. From our perspective, these findings align with current mechanistic models of schizophrenia that focus on the role of the prefrontal cortex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown a clear self-reference effect in our memory. However, the question arises as to whether this effect could extend to higher cognitive domains such as metamemory. Thus, this study examined the effects of different encoding types on judgments of learning (JOLs) and explored the role of beliefs in this process. A one-way (encoding type: semantic, self-referential) within-participants design was employed in Experiment 1, which found no self-reference effect in JOLs. In Experiment 2, we manipulated participants' beliefs to explore their effect on JOLs under different encoding strategies. The results showed that learners' metamemory beliefs about encoding types influence JOLs. Learners who believed that self-referential and semantic encoding had the same memory effect tended to give equal JOLs to both words. However, learners who believed that self-referential encoding had a better memory effect than semantic encoding gave higher JOLs to self-referentially encoded words. The conclusions are as follows: There is no self-reference effect in JOLs, but learners' metamemory beliefs about encoding types influence JOLs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prospective memory (PM) is the ability to remember an intention in the future. Individuals with depression are candidates for PM failures, resulting in detrimental consequences, such as forgetting to take a medication or implement therapeutic techniques; inaccurate assessments of one's PM abilities can exacerbate these issues. The current study examined if appraisals about one's prospective memory (meta-PM) performance differs between healthy and depressed adults. Data were gathered from 137 adults and included self-reported depression, PM beliefs, objective PM, and assessment of executive functions (EFs). Participants were separated into depressed/healthy categories based on a self-report measure. There was a non-significant correlation between self-reported PM and objective PM for both depressed (r =.06, p =.61) and healthy (r =.08, p =.52) groups, suggesting both groups had inaccurate meta-PM. There were non-significant differences in meta-PM between these groups (Fisher's Z = −0.09, p =.93), but exploratory gender analyses revealed women's meta-PM was significantly less accurate than men's. Women had higher reports of depression and PM complaints compared to men. This study lends evidence that depression is not necessarily related to worse meta-PM accuracy, despite depression's association with memory complaints, and that women are at greater risk for inaccurate meta-PM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite research showing that perceptually fluent stimuli (i.e., stimuli that are easier to process) are given higher judgment of learning (JOL) ratings than perceptually disfluent stimuli, it remains unknown whether the influence of perceptual fluency on JOLs is driven by the fluent or disfluent items. Moreover, it is unclear whether this difference hinges on relative differences in fluency. The current study addressed these unanswered questions by employing (Fiacconi et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 46:926–944, 2020), Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 46[5], 926–944) letter set priming procedure. In this procedure, participants are first exposed to words containing only a subset of letters. Following this exposure, JOLs to new words composed of the same letters (i.e., fluent), and new words composed of nonexposed letters (i.e., disfluent) are compared with isolate the contribution of perceptual fluency. Because this procedure does not rely on parametric variations in perceptual features, we can directly assess the potential benefit and/or cost of fluent and disfluent items, respectively, by including neutral baseline conditions. Moreover, implementing both a mixed- and pure-list design allowed us to assess the comparative nature of perceptual fluency on JOLs. Counter to previous assumptions, our results are the first to demonstrate that perceptual disfluency decreases JOLs. Moreover, we found that the influence of perceptual disfluency on JOLs hinges on the relative differences in fluency between items even in the absence of a belief about the mnemonic impact of the fluency manipulation. These findings have important implications as they provide evidence that the difficulty, rather than ease, of information form the basis of individuals metacognitive judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In two experiments, we systematically investigated the reasons why people retained certain autobiographical events in their memory, as well as the properties of those events and their predicted memorability. The first experiment used three methods (word-cued, free-recalled, and "memorable, interesting, and/or important") to retrieve event memories, and examined memories from three different time-frames: very recent (within past 7 days), recent (past 2 weeks and 6 months), and older events (at least one year). In addition, data were also collected for an important transitional event recently experienced by all participants ("starting university"). The results revealed that people had access to three types of event memories: memories for life transitions, memories for older distinctive events, and memories for recent mundane events. Participants reported remembering events that were distinctive, first-time experiences, emotionally impactful, or simply because they were recent. They also predicted that older events would be more resistant to forgetting than very recent and recent events. The second experiment examined participants' memorable and forgettable events, and found that memorable events tended to be older, while forgettable events were more likely to be recent. These findings suggested that many retrievable memorable autobiographical memories were neither important nor transitional in nature. The studies contribute to our understanding of people's metamnemonic knowledge about their autobiographical memories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: We assessed the psychometric properties, established normative data for the German Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire (MMQ), and analyzed its association with neuropsychiatric factors across the life span to provide a validated metamemory assessment for a German-speaking population. Methods: The three MMQ scales (memory satisfaction, self-rated ability, and strategy application) were translated into German, considering cultural, linguistic, and conceptual aspects. To validate the MMQ and assess associations with neuropsychiatric factors, the Complainer Profile Identification, Geriatric Depression Scale, Beck Anxiety Inventory, Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index, and Short-Form-Health Survey were applied in an online study in 336 healthy participants with follow-up after 8 months. Results: Psychometric evaluation of the German MMQ showed normal distribution of all scales and good to excellent validity, internal consistency, and retest reliability. We provide percentiles and normative data for z-score conversion. Importantly, even subclinically elevated scores in depressiveness and anxiety were associated with decreased memory satisfaction and self-rated ability. Furthermore, although the influence of age on the German MMQ scales was minimal, effects of neuropsychiatric factors such as sleep quality, anxiety, and depressiveness on MMQ Satisfaction and Ability varied across the life span. Conclusions: Our study provides a validated German translation of the MMQ with normative data and reliability measures, including reliable change scores. We show the impact of neuropsychiatric factors on the MMQ scales across the life span and emphasize the relevance of a multifactorial approach to metamemory as a measure of individualized everyday functionality and the importance of including neuropsychiatric factors into both research and clinical assessments of metamemory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Although the effect of aging on episodic memory is relatively well studied, little is known about how aging influences metamemory. In addition, while executive function (EF) is known to mediate the age-related decline in episodic memory, the role of metamemory in aging-related memory differences beyond EF remains unknown. This study aimed to elucidate the effect of aging on metamemory and to clarify the role of metamemory in the age-related decline in memory. Method: One hundred and four adults aged 18–79 years (50 M, 54 F) performed several EF tasks, as well as a face-scene paired-associate learning task that required them to make judgments of learning, feeling-of-knowing judgments, and retrospective confidence judgments. Results: Aging was significantly associated with poor metamemory accuracy and increased confidence across metamemory judgment types, even after controlling for EF and memory performance. A parallel mediation analysis indicated that both confidence of learning and EF performance had significant partial mediation effects on the relationship between aging and memory, albeit in different ways. Specifically, poor EF explained the age-related decline in memory, whereas increased confidence of learning served to compensate for this memory decline. Conclusions: Aging is associated with general changes (i.e., poor inferences from cues) rather than specific changes (i.e., declined activation or utilization of certain cues) in metamemory monitoring. Also, changes in confidence of learning and in EF ability contribute to the preservation and decline of memory during aging, respectively. Therefore, boosting confidence during encoding and enhancing EF skills might be complementary memory intervention strategies for older adults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The experiences associated with remembering, including metamemory feelings about the act of remembering and attempts at remembering, are not often integrated into general accounts of memory. For example, David Rubin (2022) proposes a unified, three-dimensional conceptual space for mapping memory states, a map that does not systematically specify metamemory feelings. Drawing on Rubin's model, we define a distinct role for metamemory in relation to first-order memory content. We propose a fourth dimension for the model and support the proposal with conceptual, neurocognitive, and clinical lines of reasoning. We use the modified model to illustrate several cases, and show how it helps to conceptualize a new category of memory state: autonoetic knowing, exemplified by déjà vu. We also caution not to assume that memory experience is directly correlated with or caused by memory content, an assumption Tulving (1989) labeled the doctrine of concordance.

Mild cognitive impairment (MCI) affects quality of life (QoL) in those living with Parkinson’s Disease (PD) through the loss of independence, sociability and creates feelings of shame. Knowledge pertaining to metamemory and cognitive interventions for PD in exercise rehabilitation is limited. This exploratory study aimed to determine the level of memory contentment, self-appraised memory ability and compensatory memory strategy among non-demented PD patients (n = 20) partaking in exercise rehabilitation. An online cross-sectional survey study design was employed, and the Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire was completed, measuring several aspects of metamemory. Inter-group comparisons were performed using a one-way ANOVA to determine relationships between variables by means of Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Statistical analysis was performed with SPSS (Version 28.0, IBM) at a significance level of p

Our memory for common, easily recognizable logos, like the Apple logo, is surprisingly poor because of attentional saturation, where we stop attending to details of frequently encountered objects. This lack of attention to details may leave us susceptible to misinformation effects. Across four experiments, we tested recognition memory for the Apple logo after incidentally encoding an accurate or altered version of the logo (Experiments 1–3), or after no incidental encounter of the logo prior to the surprise test (Experiment 4). Additionally, participants rated how much they liked the logo as a measure of processing fluency. Results demonstrated that incidentally viewing an altered version of the Apple logo can disrupt subsequent recognition of the correct logo, but this effect may diminish following a short delay. Considering our frequent exposure to everyday stimuli, we show conditions in which memory for a ubiquitous stimulus can be disrupted when incidentally presented with inaccurate information.

ObjectiveMethodResultsConclusionsPast research has shown that self-reported everyday strategy use and task-specific strategy use are related to associative memory performance in aging. Understudied is the relationship between these types of strategy use, whether they predict associative memory performance, and how this may differ across genders.A sample of older adults (N = 566, 53% female, ages 60–80) completed this online study. Study measures included 1. Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire (MMQ) Strategy Use subscale, a self-report measure of everyday strategy use, 2. Face-Name Task (FNT), a measure of associative memory, and 3. self-initiated number and types of strategies used on the FNT. Analyses examined the interrelationships among all study measures and their relative contributions to FNT performance while accounting for intraindividual factors.Participants who reported using more strategies on the FNT performed better than those who used fewer or no strategies; those who reported using at least three strategies and relating FNT to past experience performed best. Women outperformed men on the FNT but did not differ in task-specific strategy use. Participants who reported using no strategies on the FNT had lower MMQ Strategy Use scores. A multiple regression analysis indicated that female gender and using at least two task strategies were significant predictors of greater FNT performance.The results indicate that task-specific strategy use relates more to associative memory performance than to everyday strategy use, but neither accounts for the female advantage in FNT performance. Findings encourage querying task-specific strategy use to contextualize age-related associative memory decline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relation between an individual's memory accuracy and reported confidence in their memories can indicate self-awareness of memory strengths and weaknesses. We provide a lifespan perspective on this confidence-accuracy relation, based on two previously published experiments with 320 participants, including children aged 6-13, young adults aged 18-27, and older adults aged 65-77, across tests of working memory (WM) and long-term memory (LTM). Participants studied visual items in arrays of varying set sizes and completed item recognition tests featuring 6-point confidence ratings either immediately after studying each array (WM tests) or following a long period of study events (LTM tests). Confidence-accuracy characteristic analyses showed that accuracy improved with increasing confidence for all age groups and in both WM and LTM tests. These findings reflect a universal ability across the lifespan to use awareness of the strengths and limitations of one's memories to adjust reported confidence. Despite this age invariance in the confidence-accuracy relation, however, young children were more prone to high-confidence memory errors than other groups in tests of WM, whereas older adults were more susceptible to high-confidence false alarms in tests of LTM. Thus, although participants of all ages can assess when their memories are weaker or stronger, individuals with generally weaker memories are less adept at this confidence-accuracy calibration. Findings also speak to potential different sources of high-confidence memory errors for young children and older adults, relative to young adults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Subjective memory evaluation is important for assessing memory abilities and complaints alongside objective measures. In research and clinical settings, questionnaires are used to examine perceived memory ability, memory complaints, and memory beliefs/knowledge. Although they provide a structured measure of self-reported memory, there is some debate as to whether subjective evaluation accurately reflects memory abilities. Specifically, the disconnect between subjective and objective memory measures remains a long-standing issue within the field. Thus, it is essential to evaluate the benefits and limitations of questionnaires that are currently in use. This review encompasses three categories of metamemory questionnaires: self-efficacy, complaints, and multidimensional questionnaires. Factors influencing self-evaluation of memory including knowledge and beliefs about memory, ability to evaluate memory, recent metamemory experiences, and affect are examined. The relationship between subjective and objective memory measures is explored, and considerations for future development and use of metamemory questionnaires are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on understanding the relationship between Feeling-of-Knowing (FOK) and the Anomalous State of Knowledge (ASK) in information search processes, exploring neurophysiological drivers associated with FOK. Topics include the distinct neurophysiological signatures in response to different states of knowledge, the role of metamemory and metacognition in information retrieval, and the implications of FOK as a distinctive state in IN realization.

Human adults distinguish their mental event simulations along various dimensions—most prominently according to their "mnemicity": we track whether these simulations are outcomes of past personal experiences or not (i.e., whether we are "remembering" or "imagining"). This distinction between memory and imagination is commonly thought to reflect a deep architectural distinction in the mind. Against this idea, I argue that mnemicity is not based on a fundamentalstructural difference between memories and imaginations but is instead the result of metacognitive attribution and social construction. On this attributional view, mnemicity is likely a uniquely human capacity that both serves collective functions and has been shaped by collective norms. First, on the individual level, mnemicity attribution is an outcome of metacognitive learning: it relies on acquired interpretations of the phenomenal features of mental event simulations. Such interpretations are in part acquired through interactive reminiscing with other community members. Further, how the distinction between memory and imagination is drawn is likely sensitive to cultural norms about what remembering is, when it is appropriate to claim to remember, what can be remembered, and what remembering entails. As a result, how individuals determine whether they remember or imagine is bound to be deeply enculturated. Second, mnemicity attribution solves an important collective challenge: who to grant epistemic authority about the past. Solving this challenge is important because—for humans—the past represents not just an opportunity to learn about the future but to coordinate present social realities. How a community determines such social realities both draws on individuals' remembering and in turn shapes when, what, and how individuals remember. Traditionally, the difference between memory and imagination has been viewed as an architectural distinction of the human mind. Here, I argue that this distinction (a mental state's "mnemicity") is instead the result of a culturally learned, metacognitive attribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of us have experienced moments when we could not recall some piece of information but felt that it was just out of reach. Research in metamemory has established that such judgments are often accurate; but what adaptive purpose do they serve? Here, we present an optimal model of how metacognitive monitoring (feeling of knowing) could dynamically inform metacognitive control of memory (the direction of retrieval efforts). In two experiments, we find that, consistent with the optimal model, people report having a stronger memory for targets they are likely to recall and direct their search efforts accordingly, cutting off the search when it is unlikely to succeed and prioritizing the search for stronger memories. Our results suggest that metamemory is indeed adaptive and motivate the development of process-level theories that account for the dynamic interplay between monitoring and control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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• We compared the metamemory performances of OCD patients under episodic memory with controls. • OCD patients showed lower recognition and metamemory performance than controls. • OCD patients' reaction times were slower than controls for all cognitive tasks. • Episodic memory and metamemory deficits in OCD are domain general. It is clear evidence that individuals diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) lack confidence in their memory and have low metamemory performance (judgment and accuracy). However, it is still unclear whether low metamemory performance is specific to first, domain general or domain specific, and second, to stimulus domain. To address these issues, we compared individuals diagnosed with OCD and healthy controls (HCs) on recognition, retrospective (judgments of learning [JOL]) and prospective (feeling of knowing [FOK]) metamemory judgments and under three different episodic memory tasks, which consisted of symptom-free, familiar and unfamiliar stimuli (word, scene, and face photo). OCD patients showed lower recognition performance, JOL and FOK judgments, and accuracy in all tasks than HCs. Also, OCD patients were slower than HCs during all cognitive performances. In both groups, metamemory performances were lower in familiar items than unfamiliar items. However, recognition performances were not affected by stimulus type. Our results support the idea of general episodic memory and a metamemory deficit in OCD. Moreover, metamemory deficits in OCD are domain general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several studies revealed that predicting one's memory during learning has reactive effects on memory performance: making judgments of learning (JOLs) improved cued-recall performance for related word pairs and recognition memory for single words but impaired or did not impact cued recall for unrelated word pairs. Very little is known, however, about the generalizability of JOL reactivity to educationally relevant study materials and test conditions. The three experiments reported here examined whether making JOLs affects performance in multiple-choice and short-answer tests on general knowledge facts of varying difficulty. Neither experiment revealed reliable effects of making JOLs on performance, and the same was found in a continuously cumulating meta-analysis that included data from all experiments. These results indicate that soliciting metamemory predictions does not affect test performance for general knowledge facts. Further research will be needed to examine whether this holds for educationally relevant materials and tests in general. General Audience Summary: Self-assessments of one's learning are essential for effectively regulating one's learning behavior. For instance, realizing that one might fail to remember study materials at an exam is essential for making informed decisions about how long one has to study and, ultimately, achieving one's desired grades. In addition to these indirect effects on test performance, lab experiments show that predicting one's test performance (judgments of learning [JOLs]) when learning related word pairs and single words can improve memory performance directly. Based on these findings, researchers have repeatedly suggested that making JOLs could be an effective way to boost learning in educational settings. It is unclear, however, whether direct effects of making JOLs occur with educationally relevant materials and test types. In three experiments, we investigated whether making JOLs enhances performance in open-ended and multiple-choice tests on general knowledge facts. Half of the participants studied general knowledge facts and made JOLs, whereas the others studied general knowledge facts without making JOLs. Afterward, participants took open-ended tests or multiple-choice tests. Making JOLs did not reliably improve performance on any test in any experiment. This finding was replicated in a continuously cumulating meta-analysis. Thus, self-assessments during learning had no direct effects on performance in open-ended and multiple-choice tests for general knowledge facts. More research will be needed to test whether this holds for other educationally relevant materials and tests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ObjectiveMemory deficits in individuals with schizophrenia are well-established, but less is known about how schizophrenia affects metacognitive processes such as metamemory. We investigated metamemory ability using the value-directed remembering task, which assesses the degree to which participants use value cues to guide their learning of a list of items (i.e., their memory selectivity).MethodParticipants were patients undergoing treatment following a recent first episode of schizophrenia (n = 20) and demographically comparable healthy controls (n = 18). Participants viewed six lists of 24 words where each word was paired with either a low value (1-3 points) or a high value (10-12 points), and they were instructed to maximize their score on free recall tests given after each list. After the final free recall test, participants completed a recognition test where they gave remember/know judgments.ResultsOn tests of free recall, patients showed reduced memory selectivity relative to healthy controls. On the recognition test, patients failed to show an effect of value on recognition of nonrecalled words, in contrast to healthy controls, who showed a significant value effect that was characterized by greater "remember" judgments. Patients initially overestimated their memory capacity but were able to adjust their estimates to be more accurate based on task experience. Patients' self-reports of memory selectivity were unrelated to their actual memory selectivity.ConclusionsPatients with first-episode schizophrenia had substantial impairments on the value-directed remembering task, but areas of preserved metamemory ability were also observed. These findings have potential implications for cognitive training interventions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Prospective memory (PM) plays a crucial role in daily autonomy. Metamemory and emotional valence have both been shown to influence PM performance in younger and older adults. However, when considered together, the relationship between emotional valence, metamemory, and PM has not been examined yet, especially whether metamemory PM representations develop with task experience (i.e., before versus after performing a task). We collected data from 25 younger and 19 older adults using an event-based PM task with emotional cues (positive, negative, or neutral). Results revealed that younger adults’ predictions underestimated performance for neutral and negative cues. After performing the task, they showed more accurate representations for neutral cues, indicating that they monitored their representations. Older adults’ predictions overestimated performance for negative PM cues, and they did not modify representations after performing the task. Thus, we do not find evidence that older adults are able to coherently monitor their PM representations. These findings highlight the importance of understanding PM representations, especially in older adults, as they may lead to less strategy use and more impaired PM performance in negative everyday situations.

When allocating study time for the English sections of the National College Entrance Examination or the Postgraduate Entrance Examination, learners often encounter value-test likelihood trade-offs, where questions of similar difficulty may have different points and different likelihoods of being tested. This research explored how individuals allocated study time and whether this process exhibited bounded rationality by examining the risky choice framing effects in study time allocation. The research set up two types of items: 1-point items with a 90% likelihood and 9-point items with a 10% likelihood. Each type of item had the same test likelihood but was expressed in different framings. For the 90% likelihood items, the test framing emphasized that they had a 90% likelihood of being tested. Meanwhile, the non-test framing emphasized that they had a 10% likelihood of not being tested. A total of 41 college students participated in the study, and they were allowed to self-regulate their study time for each type of item. The results showed that learners’ study time allocation differed under the two equivalent framings. This indicates that the process of study time allocation is not completely rational, but is rather boundedly rational, which is inconsistent with the expected utility theory.

Previous research on incidental memory in everyday settings has shown that frequent exposure to stimuli does not guarantee accurate representation in memory. In two studies, we explored the memory and metamemory of car brand logos using recall (drawing) and recognition tasks (Study 1) or a naming task (Study 2). The results showed that memory accuracy for logos was modest in the recall and recognition tasks; nevertheless, the participants' accuracy in naming the visually displayed car logos was almost perfect. The participants showed overconfidence in their ability to recall and recognize car logos prior to their performance, which was adjusted after completing the recall task. Overconfidence was absent in the naming tasks. These results replicate the modest visual memory and metacognitive adjustments in recall and recognition tasks found in previous studies and contrast with participants' better memory performance and metacognitive adjustments in the naming task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two sources of evidence seem to be shared by judgments of past recognition and judgments of future performance: item memory or familiarity (i.e., memory for the item independent of the context in which it was experienced) and context memory or recollection (i.e., memory for the context specific to a particular prior encounter). However, there are few studies investigating the link between these two putative memory processes and judgments of learning (JOLs). We tested memory and metamemory using a continuous exclusion procedure – a modified recognition memory task where study events for two classes of items are interleaved with test trials in which the subject must endorse items from one class and reject items from the other. This procedure allowed us to estimate the influences of memory for context and memory for item on JOLs and licenses conclusions about the relative role of item and context information in supporting JOLs. An analysis of forgetting revealed that JOLs reflect both the initial degree of learning and the rate of forgetting, but only of memory for context and not of memory for items. These findings suggest that JOLs are predictive of memory for context-bound episodes, rather than for the semantic content of those episodes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prospective memory (PM) plays a crucial role in daily autonomy. Metamemory and emotional valence have both been shown to influence PM performance in younger and older adults. However, when considered together, the relationship between emotional valence, metamemory, and PM has not been examined yet, especially whether metamemory PM representations develop with task experience (i.e., before versus after performing a task). We collected data from 25 younger and 19 older adults using an event-based PM task with emotional cues (positive, negative, or neutral). Results revealed that younger adults' predictions underestimated performance for neutral and negative cues. After performing the task, they showed more accurate representations for neutral cues, indicating that they monitored their representations. Older adults' predictions overestimated performance for negative PM cues, and they did not modify representations after performing the task. Thus, we do not find evidence that older adults are able to coherently monitor their PM representations. These findings highlight the importance of understanding PM representations, especially in older adults, as they may lead to less strategy use and more impaired PM performance in negative everyday situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two experiments determined whether metamemory judgments invoking covert retrieval practice for a list of unrelated paired associate words led to the facilitation of learning a subsequent list. Three types of relation between successive lists were compared: negative transfer (A-B, A-D); a control for item-specific proactive interference (A-B, C-D); and repetition (A-B, A-B). Experiment 1 showed that the benefit of retrieval practice relative to restudying was equivalent for overt and covert retrieval in the negative transfer paradigm (A-B, A-D). Both types of retrieval minimized intrusions of first list responses in the cued recall of the second list. Experiment 2 showed that memory enhancement following covert retrieval was equivalent for new (C-D) and repeated (A-B) lists. The results are consistent with theories of the forward testing effect (FTE) that assume retrieval practice insulates subsequent learning from proactive interference and provides self-assessment feedback that may lead to more efficient encoding in future learning. Challenges in accounting for the impact of a substantial number of moderators of the FTE are reviewed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown a clear self-reference effect in our memory. However, the question arises as to whether this effect could extend to higher cognitive domains such as metamemory. Thus, this study examined the effects of different encoding types on judgments of learning (JOLs) and explored the role of beliefs in this process. A one-way (encoding type: semantic, self-referential) within-participants design was employed in Experiment 1, which found no self-reference effect in JOLs. In Experiment 2, we manipulated participants’ beliefs to explore their effect on JOLs under different encoding strategies. The results showed that learners’ metamemory beliefs about encoding types influence JOLs. Learners who believed that self-referential and semantic encoding had the same memory effect tended to give equal JOLs to both words. However, learners who believed that self-referential encoding had a better memory effect than semantic encoding gave higher JOLs to self-referentially encoded words. The conclusions are as follows: There is no self-reference effect in JOLs, but learners’ metamemory beliefs about encoding types influence JOLs.

A two-factor account has been proposed as an explanatory model for the formation and maintenance of delusions. The first factor refers to a neurocognitive process leading to a significant change in subjective experience; the second factor has been regarded as a failure in hypothesis evaluation characterized by an impairment in metacognitive ability. This study was focused on the assessment of metacognition in patients with schizophrenia. The aims of the study were to measure the overconfidence in metacognitive judgments through the prediction of word list recall and to analyze the correlation between basic neurocognition (memory and executive function) and metacognition through a metamemory test and the severity of psychotic symptoms. Method: Fifty-one participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia were evaluated. The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) was used to assess the severity of psychiatric symptoms, and the subtest of metamemory included in the Executive Functions and Frontal Lobe-2 battery (BANFE-2) was used to evaluate overconfidence and underestimation errors, intrusion and perseverative response, total volume of recall, and Brief Functioning Assessment Scale (FAST) for social functioning. Results: The strongest correlation is observed between overconfidence errors and the positive factor of the PANSS (r = 0.774, p < 0.001). For the enter model in the multiple linear regression (r = 0.78, r2 = 0.61; F = 24.57, p < 0.001), the only significant predictor was overconfidence errors. Conclusion: Our results highlight the relevance of a metacognitive bias of overconfidence, strongly correlated with psychotic symptoms, and support the hypothesis that metacognitive defects contribute to the failure to reject contradictory evidence. From our perspective, these findings align with current mechanistic models of schizophrenia that focus on the role of the prefrontal cortex.

Memory enables access to past experiences to guide future behavior. Humans can determine which memories to trust (high confidence) and which to doubt (low confidence). How memory retrieval, memory confidence, and memory-guided decisions are related, however, is not understood. In particular, how confidence in memories is used in decision making is unknown. We developed a spatial memory task in which rats were incentivized to gamble their time: betting more following a correct choice yielded greater reward. Rat behavior reflected memory confidence, with higher temporal bets following correct choices. We applied machine learning to identify a memory decision variable and built a generative model of memories evolving over time that accurately predicted both choices and confidence reports. Our results reveal in rats an ability thought to exist exclusively in primates and introduce a unified model of memory dynamics, retrieval, choice, and confidence.

Making immediate judgments of learning (JOLs) during study can influence later memory performance, with a common outcome being that JOLs improve cued-recall performance for related word pairs (i.e., positive reactivity) and do not impact memory for unrelated pairs (i.e., no reactivity). The cue-strengthening hypothesis proposes that JOL reactivity will be observed when a criterion test is sensitive to the cues used to inform JOLs (Soderstrom et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41 (2), 553-558, 2015). Across four experiments, we evaluated this hypothesis with category pairs (e.g., A type of gem – Jade) and letter pairs (e.g., Ja – Jade). Participants studied a list comprised of both pair types, made (or did not make) JOLs, and completed a cued-recall test (Experiments 1a/b). The cue-strengthening hypothesis predicts greater positive reactivity for category pairs than for letter pairs, because making a JOL strengthens the relationship between the cue and target, which is more beneficial for material with an a priori semantic relationship. Outcomes were consistent with this hypothesis. We also evaluated and ruled out alternative explanations for this pattern of effects: (a) that they arose due to overall differences in recall performance for the two pair types (Experiment 2); (b) that they would also occur even when the criterion test is not sensitive to the cues used to inform JOLs (Experiment 3); and (c) that JOLs only increased memory strength for the targets (Experiment 4). Thus, the current experiments rule out plausible accounts of reactivity effects and provide further, converging evidence for the cue-strengthening hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our memory for common, easily recognizable logos, like the Apple logo, is surprisingly poor because of attentional saturation, where we stop attending to details of frequently encountered objects. This lack of attention to details may leave us susceptible to misinformation effects. Across four experiments, we tested recognition memory for the Apple logo after incidentally encoding an accurate or altered version of the logo (Experiments 1–3), or after no incidental encounter of the logo prior to the surprise test (Experiment 4). Additionally, participants rated how much they liked the logo as a measure of processing fluency. Results demonstrated that incidentally viewing an altered version of the Apple logo can disrupt subsequent recognition of the correct logo, but this effect may diminish following a short delay. Considering our frequent exposure to everyday stimuli, we show conditions in which memory for a ubiquitous stimulus can be disrupted when incidentally presented with inaccurate information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After a crime is committed, investigators may query witnesses about whether they believe they will be to identify the perpetrator. However, we know little about how such metacognitive judgments are related to performance on a subsequent lineup identification task. The extant research has found the strength of this relationship to be small or nonexistent, which conflicts with the large body of literature indicating a moderate relationship between predictions and performance on memory tasks. In Studies 1–3, we induce variation in encoding quality by having participants watch a mock crime video with either low, medium, or high exposure quality, and then assess their future lineup performance. Calibration analysis revealed that assessments of future lineup performance were predictive of identification accuracy. This relationship was driven primarily by poor performance following low assessments. Studies 4 and 5 showed that these predictions are not based on a witness's evaluation of their encoding experience, nor on a contemporaneous assessment of memory strength. These results reinforce the argument that variation in memory quality is needed to obtain reliable relationships between predictions and performance. An unexpected finding is that witnesses who made a prediction shortly after encoding evinced superior memory compared to those who made a prediction later. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many people distrust their memories, because they believe themselves prone to omission errors such as forgetfulness, and/or commission errors such as misremembering. However, the most popular psychometric measure of memory distrust—the Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ)—only probes people's beliefs about omission errors, not commission errors. The present research describes a new memory distrust measure that assesses the latter kind of metamemorial belief. Two studies (combined N = 797) showed that our 20-item Memory Distrust Scale (MDS) has good psychometric properties, and is correlated with—but distinct from—the SSMQ. Participants in Study 2 described eight childhood events and rated their recollection of and belief in the occurrence of each. MDS scores were associated with the spontaneous reporting of nonbelieved memories and predicted belief in occurrence better than did SSMQ scores. Our data suggest that the MDS and SSMQ in combination could better predict individual susceptibility to certain memory errors. General Audience Summary: Not everyone always trusts their memories. You might believe you are forgetful, for example, or that you are bad at remembering people's names. Researchers have often measured memory distrust using the Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ), which asks about these types of memory failures. But people might also distrust their memories for other reasons: Perhaps, because they know they sometimes remember things incorrectly, or remember things that never happened. The SSMQ does not focus on these types of memory failures, so we developed a new self-report scale for this purpose. In two studies (combined N = 797), we showed that our 20-item Memory Distrust Scale (MDS) has the characteristics of an effective individual difference measure. For example, people who scored highly on the MDS at one time tended to also score highly at a later time, and their MDS scores were related to their scores on other measures—including the SSMQ—in sensible ways. In Study 2, we asked participants to describe eight events from their childhoods and to rate (a) how vividly they recalled each event and (b) how sure they were that each event really happened. The SSMQ and MDS were similarly good at predicting how vividly people recalled each event, but the MDS was better at predicting their belief in the events' occurrence. This is important because we know people's beliefs about their memories can have significant real-world consequences. For example, people who distrust their memories may be vulnerable to believing misinformation, and case studies show us that memory distrust has sometimes led innocent people to confess to crimes. We suggest that the MDS could help us to better predict which people tend to make particular kinds of errors in what they believe and remember, which might help toward identifying and mitigating the consequences of those errors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adaptive memory refers to the memory advantage for information processed in a survival and/or reproduction context while metacognition involves the awareness of what we can later remember. The notion of "responsible remembering" captures how memory functions to prioritise important information that will need to be remembered and how metacognitive processes may be more precise in situations involving consequences for forgetting. In 5 experiments, we examined whether judgments of learning and judgments of importance affect recall selectivity for information with negative consequences if forgotten. We presented participants with lists of children, each with 2 foods they like, 2 foods they dislike, and 2 foods they are allergic to. When making no metacognitive judgments or making JOLs for each food preference, participants best recalled foods the children liked, likely resulting from serial remembering (recalling information according to where it was presented). However, when judging the importance of remembering items, participants were strategic in their memory for the food preferences such that they best recalled information they rated as important to remember (allergies). These results suggest that when forced to consider the importance of remembering, participants engage in responsible remembering by deeming information with consequences for forgetting as most important and subsequently best remembering this information.

Accurate memories are often associated with vivid experiences of recollection. However, the neural mechanisms underlying subjective recollection and their unique role in decision making beyond accuracy have received limited attention. We dissociated subjective recollection from accuracy during a forced-choice task. Distractors corresponded either to non-studied exemplars of the targets (A-A' condition) or to non-studied exemplars of different studied items (A-B' condition). The A-A' condition resulted in higher accuracy and greater activation in the superior parietal lobe, whereas the A-B' condition resulted in higher subjective recollection and greater activation in the precuneus and retrosplenial regions, indicating a dissociation between objective and subjective memory. Activation in insular, cingulate, and lateral prefrontal regions was also associated with subjective recollection; however, during a subsequent decision phase, activation in these same regions was greater for discarded than for selected responses in anticipation of a social reward, underscoring their role in evaluating memory evidence flexibly based on current goals.

IntroductionIs retrieval practice always superior to restudy? In a classic study by Roediger and Karpicke, long-term retention of information contained in prose passages was found to be best when opportunities to restudy were replaced with opportunities to self-test. We were interested whether this striking benefit for repeated testing at the expense of any restudy replicates when study opportunities are brief, akin to a single mention of a fact in an academic lecture. We were also interested in whether restudying after a test would provide any additional benefits compared to restudying before test.MethodIn the current study, participants encountered academically relevant facts a total of three times; each time either studied (S) or self-tested (T). During study, participants predicted how likely they were to remember each fact in the future. During self-test, participants performed covert cued recall and self-reported their recall success. Final test followed immediately or after a delay (Experiment 1: 2 days, Experiment 2: 7 days).ResultsContrary to prior work, long-term memory was superior for facts the were restudied in addition to self-tested (SST > STT = SSS). We further investigated whether restudy after a test (STS) provides additional benefits compared to restudy before test (SST). Restudying after a retrieval attempt provided an additional benefit compared to restudying before a retrieval attempt on an immediate test, but this benefit did not carry over a delay. Finally, exploratory analyses indicated that restudy after test improved the accuracy of participants' subjective predictions of encoding success.DiscussionTogether, our results qualify prior work on the benefits of repeated testing, indicating that balancing testing with repetition may allow for more information to be learned and retained. These findings offer new insights into the conditions that promote encoding and long-term retention, provide new constraints for existing cognitive theories of testing effects, and have practical implications for education.

Background: Prior work has shown positive effects of High Definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) on semantic memory performance and metamemory monitoring accuracy. However, HD-tDCS requires setup by a trained researcher, which is not always feasible. Few studies have used remotely supervised (rs) tDCS in healthy populations, and remote supervision has strong practical benefits. Objective/hypothesis: The goal of the current study was to test if previously shown effects of HD-tDCS over the left DLPFC on semantic memory performance and metamemory monitoring accuracy extended to conventional rs-tDCS, which is less focal than HD-tDCS, and to episodic memory and metamemory tasks. Materials and methods: A total of 36 healthy participants completed 6 weeks of rs-tDCS sessions, with either active left or right anodal DLPFC stimulation, or sham. Participants completed semantic and episodic memory and metamemory tasks, which each lasted for three consecutive sessions, and session order was counterbalanced across participants. Results: Overall, there were no main effects of rs-tDCS on metamemory monitoring accuracy or memory performance for either the semantic or the episodic tasks. However, there were effects of rs-tDCS that depended on the order of completing the episodic and semantic task sessions. When participants completed the semantic task sessions after the episodic task sessions, semantic recognition was greater in the left anodal DLPFC condition. In a parallel effect, when participants completed the episodic task sessions after the semantic task sessions, episodic recognition was greater in the right anodal DLPFC condition. Conclusion: Prior experience with tDCS is a factor for effects of rs-tDCS on cognition. Additionally, the current experiment provides evidence for the feasibility of fully remotely supervised tDCS in healthy participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Extant research suggests a complex relationship between prospective memory (PM) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptom severity. In a general population, this relationship exists for self-report assessment but not objective, in-lab PM performance (e.g., pressing a certain key at a particular time, or when particular words appear). However, both these measurement methods have limitations. Objective, in-lab PM tasks might not represent typical everyday performance, while self-report measurement might be biased by metacognitive beliefs. Thus, we used a naturalistic diary paradigm to answer the overarching question: are PTSD symptoms associated with PM failures in everyday life? We found a small positive correlation between diary-recorded PM errors and PTSD symptom severity (r =.21). Time-based tasks (i.e., intentions completed at a particular time, or after a specified time has elapsed; r =.29), but not event-based tasks (i.e., intentions completed in response to an environmental cue; r =.08), correlated with PTSD symptoms. Moreover, although diary-recorded and self-report PM correlated, we did not replicate the finding that metacognitive beliefs underpin the PM-PTSD relationship. These results suggest that metacognitive beliefs might be particularly important for self-report PM only. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Making judgments of learning (JOLs) while studying related word pairs can enhance performance on tests that rely on cue-target associations (e.g., cued recall) compared to studying alone. One possible explanation for this positive JOL reactivity effect is that the prompt to make JOLs, which typically occurs halfway through the presentation of each pair, may encourage learners to devote more attention to the pair during the second half of the encoding episode, which may contribute to enhanced recall performance. To investigate this idea, an online sample of participants (Experiment 1) and undergraduate students (Experiment 2) studied a set of moderately related word pairs (e.g., dairy–cow) in preparation for a cued recall test. Some participants made JOLs for each pair halfway through the presentation, whereas other participants did not. Also, some participants were presented with a fixation point halfway through the presentation, whereas other participants were not. The goal of this fixation point was to simulate the possible "reorienting" effect of a JOL prompt halfway through each encoding episode. In both an unsupervised online context and a supervised laboratory context, cued recall performance was higher for participants who made JOLs compared to those who did not make JOLs. However, presenting a fixation point halfway through the presentation of each pair did not lead to reactive effects on memory. Thus, JOLs are more effective than a manipulation that reoriented participants to the word pairs in another way (i.e., via a fixation point), which provides some initial evidence that positive reactivity for related pairs is not solely driven by attentional reorienting during encoding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We report three experiments designed to reveal the mechanisms that underlie subjective experiences of recognition by examining effects of how those experiences are measured. Prior research has explored the potential influences of collecting metacognitive measures on memory performance. Building on this work, here we systematically evaluated whether cross-measure contamination occurs when remember-know (RK) and/or confidence (C) judgments are made after old/new recognition decisions. In Experiment 1, making either RK or C judgments did not significantly influence recognition relative to a standard no-judgment condition. In Experiment 2, making RK judgments in addition to C judgments did not significantly affect recognition or confidence. In Experiment 3, making C judgments in addition to RK judgments did not significantly affect recognition or patterns of RK responses. Cross-contamination was not apparent regardless of whether items were studied using a shallow or deep levels-of-processing task – a manipulation that yielded robust effects on recognition, RK judgments, and C. Our results indicate that under some conditions, participants can independently evaluate their recognition, subjective recognition experience, and confidence. Though contamination across measures of metamemory and memory is always possible, it may not be inevitable. This has implications for the mechanisms that underlie subjective experiences that accompany recognition judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mechanisms underlying a tendency among individuals with depression to report personal episodic memories with low specificity remain to be understood. We assessed a sample of undergraduate students with dysphoria to determine whether depression relates to a broader dysregulation of balancing accuracy and informativeness during memory reports. Specifically, we investigated metamnemonic processes using a quantity-accuracy profile approach. Recall involved three phases with increasing allowance for more general, or coarse-grained, responses: (a) forced-precise responding, requiring high precision; (b) free-choice report with high and low penalty incentives on accuracy; (c) a lexical description phase. Individuals with and without dysphoria were largely indistinguishable across indices of retrieval, monitoring, and control aspects of metamemory. The results indicate intact metacognitive processing in young individuals with dysphoria and provide no support for the view that impaired metacognitive control underlies either memory deficits or bias in memory reports that accompany dysphoria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]