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Since information seeking behavior is a problem-solving process and includes different steps, users are influenced by their reasoning and thinking style during searching and making decisions at each stage of information seeking process, and they may repeat, change the search term, or perform a search many times until reaching the goal. Therefore, identifying users’ reasoning types at each stage of information seeking process increases awareness about their mental challenges and the reasoning process that occur in their minds. Therefore, the purpose of writing this paper is to investigate, theoretically explain the role of reasoning in information seeking process in general and compare the position of the three intellectual approaches of mental logic, mental models and reasoning strategies and in information seeking process in particular. In this research, the role of three thinking approaches (mental logic, mental models, and reasoning strategies) in information seeking process was compared and based on that, the relative advantage of reasoning strategies in comparison with other two approaches were explained. The examination of different intellectual approaches shows that it is not possible to solve the problem by relying on one approach in information seeking process, because the approach of mental logic and the use of logical rules can only be used in the stage of formulating different pieces of information or the stage of evaluating the results, while the examination of the mental models approach shows the application of this approach both in the stage of expressing the need, defining and understanding the problem, and in the stage of evaluating the results. In the meantime, the approach of reasoning strategies indicates that considering some reasoning strategies are based on logical rules and some of them are based on mental models. Therefore, this approach is used in each of the stages of information seeking process. The comparison of three thinking approaches (mental logic, mental models and reasoning strategies) showed that in the reasoning strategies approach, a wide range of strategies can be used to perform reasoning tasks and tasks that are not at the same level in terms of the application of logical rules. In other words, the intellectual approach of reasoning methods includes rule-based approaches (mental logic) or mental models in problem solving. In addition, in this approach, the syntactic and semantic structure as well as the content and context of the problem are taken into consideration. Therfore, compared to the other two approaches, the reasoning strategies approach can be considered as a suitable alternative for explaining and advancing information seeking process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both Johnson-Laird and Jean Piaget proposed psychological theories of reasoning. Johnson-Laird formulated a mental-model theory in opposition to rule-based theories of reasoning; however, he put Piaget's theory in the latter pigeonhole. In this paper, I argue that this is a misconception of Piaget's theory of propositional reasoning and that further misconceptions have separated Johnson- Laird's and Piaget's theory of reasoning unnecessarily. To this end, I outline and compare salient aspects of Piaget's operatory theory and Johnson-Laird's mental-model theory of propositional reasoning. I conclude that a misconception lies at the heart of the purported opposition of the mental-model and operatory theories and suggest that both theories correctly understood might even complement each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

No final do século XX, a versão final da teoria lógica da mente foi apresentada. Ela era constituída por uma aproximação formal e sintática que objetivava descrever e explicar a habilidade de inferências humanas. Tendo em vista vários resultados experimentais obtidos nos útimos anos que fogem ao escopo desta teoria, podemos afirmar que ela, hoje, encontra­se desatualizada. Neste artigo, objetivamos atualizar alguns aspectos particulares da teoria lógica da mente em relação com evidências empíricas recentes e argumentos oriundos da literatura especilaizada. Tais aspectos se referem aos símbolos que ela deveria adotar, ao esquema essencial e ao modo no qual ela pode conviver com suas negações.

There is an intriguing disconnect and disengagement between two prominent nativist doctrines of mind. According to one, thinking and other cognitive mental states take place and are couched in an innately endowed language-like symbolic system realized in the brain. The idea is known as the language of thought hypothesis. According to the other doctrine labelled as mental logic hypothesis, there are hardwired reasoning skills and procedures that are cardinally concerned with the information integration processes of a logical sort that all humans share. Yet there remains to be a meaningfully direct and collaborative interaction between these two nativist hypotheses. Thus, the objective of this paper is to see whether a mutually supportive intercourse can be established between them, especially in view of the continuing criticisms that have been levelled against the language of thought hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The mental logic theory does not accept the disjunction introduction rule of standard propositional calculus as a natural schema of the human mind. In this way, the problem that I want to show in this paper is that, however, that theory does admit another much more complex schema in which the mentioned rule must be used as a previous step. So, I try to argue that this is a very important problem that the mental logic theory needs to solve, and claim that another rival theory, the mental models theory, does not have these difficulties.

According to standard logic, only one of the five indemonstrables proposed by Chrysippus of Soli is actually indemonstrable. The other four schemata are demonstrable in that logic. The question hence is, if four of them are not really indemonstrable, why Chrysippus considered them to be so. López-Astorga showed that, if we ignore standard propositional calculus and assume that a current cognitive theory, the mental logic theory, truly describes human reasoning, it can be explained why Chrysippus thought that all of his indemonstrables were so basic. However, in this paper, I try to argue that the mental logic theory is not the only framework that can account for that. In particular, I hold that another important reasoning theory at present, the mental models theory, can offer an explanation in that regard as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Johnson-Laird and Byrne distinguished ten kinds of conditionals. Their framework was the mental models theory and they attributed different combinations of semantic possibilities to those ten types of conditionals. Based on such combinations, the mental models theory has clear predictions for reasoning tasks, including those kinds of conditionals and involving reasoning schemata such as Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, the affirming the consequent fallacy, and the denying the antecedent fallacy. My aim in this paper is to show that the predictions of the mental logic theory for those reasoning tasks are exactly the same as those of the mental models theory, and that, therefore, such tasks are not useful to decide which of the two theories is correct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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There are disjunctive inferences that can be considered to be illusory, since, when faced to them, people tend to draw logically incorrect conclusions. The mental models theory can explain this problem by distinguishing between mental models and fully explicit models. According to it, individuals often derive only conclusions compatible with the mental models, and not with the fully explicit models. However, I try to show in this paper that a syntactic approach can also account for the problem of the mentioned inferences. It is enough to assume that disjunctions are basically inclusive and that exclusive disjunctions require resorting to more complex formulae.

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Copyright of Praxis Filosófica is the property of Universidad del Valle and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Universum is the property of Instituto de Estudios Humanisticos Juan Ignacio Molina, Universidad de Talca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

By separating the activities of mind from the targets at which they are directed, some attitudes have been obtained. The attitudes are called "mental modalities" which are described by mental modal words such as "believe", "like", and "persist". According to the types of targets, mental modalities can be divided into three kinds: epistemic modality directed at the state of affairs, emotional modality directed at objects (including people), and volitional modality directed at actions. The three modalities can be regarded as "de dicto", "de re" and "de acta" respectively. A mental modal proposition is formed when a mental modal word operates on its corresponding target. Mental logic researches the relationship between mental modal propositions formed by the same or different kinds of mental modal words. Unlike Piaget' psycho-logic, mental logic is concerned with the structure of mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

心理学研究感性认识形式，逻辑学研究理性认识形式。二者密切相关但却长期 分离。认知科学的建立和发展，为心理学和逻辑学的交叉融合提供了科学依据和 学科框架。在认知科学的框架下，逻辑学发生了本质的变化，产生了认知逻辑新的 研究框架。在这个框架下，心理学与逻辑学交叉融合，产生了心理逻辑这一新兴学 科。它认为逻辑推理受心理因素影响，是由人参与的、涉身的经验科学。认知逻辑 开启了当代逻辑学发展的新时代，走上了作为多学科共同工具的广阔发展道路。认 知科学的发展将带来一个学科综合交叉、问题引领科学研究、科学研究引领学科建 设、人才全面发展的新时代。关健词: 认知科学 心理学 逻辑学 逻辑心理学 心理逻辑 Psychology that is experiential forms of cognition (lower-order cognition), and logic that is rational forms of cognition (higher-order cognition) have long been separated although they are closely related in the original. The establishment and development of cognitive science provides a scientific basis and an academic framework for their integration. Against the background of cognitive science, logic has undergone fundamental changes, resulting in the new research framework of so-called “cognitive logic.” Within this framework, the integration of psychology and logic has given birth to the new discipline of mental logic, which holds that logical reasoning is affected by psychological factors and is an embodied and participatory empirical science. Cognitive logic has ushered in a new era for the development of modern logic and enabled it to embark on the broad path of development as a common tool for multiple disciplines. The evolution of cognitive science will bring about a new era which will see the synthesis of different disciplines, problem-driven scientific research that will in turn facilitate discipline construction, and the development of comprehensive human talent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A