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Hume criticizes Malebranche for endorsing an "abstract theory of morals" founded on reason that leaves no role for sentiment. One response in the literature argues that although Malebranche started by endorsing the kind of "abstract" morality Hume rejects, he increasingly replaced this with an incompatible "sensible" morality based on "physical motives" deriving from pleasure. However, I argue that a basis for both moralities is present in Malebranche from the start, and indeed that they are compatible parts of a single morality. In developing this argument, I draw particularly on his contribution to the dispute in early modern France over a Quietist account of "pure love." This contribution reveals that although he did accept the sort of theory of moral truth that Hume criticized, Malebranche at the same time endorsed a theory of moral motivation that is similar in important respects to what we find in Hume. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers an analysis of the implicit conception of translation at work in Malebranche's Entretien d'un philosophe chrétien, et d'un philosophe chinois (1708). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) holds that the senses, imagination, and passions aim at survival and the satisfaction of the body’s needs, rather than truth or the good of the mind. Each of these faculties makes a distinctive and, indeed, an indispensable contribution to the preservation of life. Commentators have largely focused on how the senses keep us alive. By comparison, the imagination and passions have been neglected. In this paper, I reconstruct Malebranche’s account of how the imagination contributes to the preservation of the body by compensating for the limitations of the senses. First, the imagination represents non-actual states of affairs, such as probable or possible future states. Second, the imagination forges new and often helpful associations based on past experiences. Third, the imagination (mis)represents that objects will cause pleasure and pain, thereby imbuing them with emotional significance they would otherwise lack. Together, these features flesh out Malebranche’s view that the imagination is necessary for the preservation of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the author reproduces one of Nicolas Malebranche’s arguments for God’s existence. The text offers (I) a logical formalization of the argument, (II) a formal proof of validity of the argument and, finally, some philosophical reflections concerning not only (III.I) the soundness of the argument, but (III.II) the intellectual benefits that a logical formalization offers to a philosophical historian of philosophy.

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Not much attention has been paid to Malebranche's philosophy of time. Scholars who have written on it have typically written about it only in passing, and by and large discuss it only in relation to his philosophy of religion. This is appropriate insofar as Malebranche doesn't discuss his views of time in isolation from his religious metaphysics. I argue that Malebranche's conception of how created beings have their properties commits him to saying that God is omnitemporal rather than atemporal. For just as bodies get their spatiality by participating in God's omnipresence, so all creatures get their temporality by participating in God's omnitemporality. Moreover, Malebranche is a substantivalist about space and time: infinite space and time are one and the same divinely simple substance, God (partially considered), who contains the world. My exploration of Malebranche's metaphysics sheds light on his views of eminent containment, participation, and causation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Este artículo expone la caracterización que hace Foucault de la época clásica, donde aborda el surgimiento de la modernidad desde un punto de vista arqueológico. Dos corpus serán explorados: el célebre libro Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines, de 1966, y La question anthropologique, manuscrito inédito y recientemente publicado de un curso dictado en 1955 que revela aspectos de la analítica que Foucault está construyendo, dando cuenta, ya en 1950, de una posición que mantendrá como hipótesis analítica en sus textos de 1960, realizando los mismos cortes epocales y ubicando al hombre como figura epistémica moderna. Ahora bien, el análisis de la época clásica en ambos corpus hace énfasis en un problema diferente: si la episteme de la representación ocupa el centro del análisis en Les mots…, en el curso de 1955, la misma época es visitada en relación con el problema de la imaginación, situando en Malebranche un referente principal. En este estudio presentaremos ambas derivas poniendo en valor sus énfasis particulares tanto como la potencia que habilita su cruce.

There are two ways of hearing Philo's unexpected endorsement of a version of the design hypothesis in the final part of Hume's Dialogues. We might register it in accordance with Cleanthes's descriptivist approach to religious speech, taking Philo to be reasoning with Cleanthes in Cleanthes's own way. Or we might hear Philo's words in accordance with his own expressivist account of religious speech, an account that Philo appears to have borrowed from Hobbes. I argue that Hume intended this double layering of meanings, presenting us with two distinct ways we might understand Philo's closing remarks. Each possible reading reveals a distinct Humean lesson about the limitations of natural theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Malebranche claims that God always, or nearly always, acts by general volitions. However, two possible interpretations of this claim have led to competing understandings of Malebranche's occasionalism. The General Content interpretation (GC) holds that God forms as few volitions as possible, and that aside from a limited number of particular volitions, God's normal mode of action consists simply in willing the general laws themselves. The Particular Content interpretation (PC) affirms that God forms a distinct volition for each event or state of affairs, but that those volitions count as general when they are issued "in accordance with" some general law. This essay examines five lines of evidence that purport to reveal Malebranche's commitment to PC and explains why they all fail. As a result, GC emerges unscathed as a consistent and viable interpretation, and, at the same time, much of the case for PC is undermined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Arnauld and Descartes. The Nature of Ideas and the Problem of Method The article examines the relation between Antoine Arnauld and Descartes’s theory of ideas in the context of his quarrel with Malebranche. After examining what the quarrel was about, it shows the difference between the older and the modern interpretation of the problem: while the first took all three to hold an object theory of ideas, the new one understands Arnauld to hold an act theory. A new reading of Arnauld made possible a re-evaluation of Descartes’s ideas as acts of perception. The relation of fidelity to Descartes is demonstrated by Arnauld’s specific use of the sequence of methods of analysis and synthesis against Malebranche. It is shown that the lack of the problem of the nature of ideas in Descartes and its appearance as well as its elaboration in Arnauld’s polemic with Malebranche follow from the same succession and different forms of problem-posing, necessitated by each respective method.

Las transformaciones políticas, sociales y económicas que tuvieron lugar en el periodo considerado por Paul Hazard como el escenario histórico de la «Crisis de la conciencia europea» (1680-1715) fueron acompañadas de una radical renovación cultural que se manifestó a través de la revisión de las ideas filosóficas. Este artículo pretende localizar algunos síntomas de este cambio, a saber, la metamorfosis de los paradigmas éticos, a través del análisis de algunos conceptos morales en la obra del filósofo francés Nicolas Malebranche. Centrándose en cuestiones como la autonomía moral y la legitimidad del amor propio, el artículo muestra que se puede rastrear una transformación de los criterios de moralidad dentro de la producción propia del autor, cuyos escritos se publicaron entre 1674 y 1715.

Abstract Although Mulla Sadra believed in sensory, imaginary, and intellectual perceptions, he sought true knowledge within a framework beyond the senses, intellect, and the material world and considered it to be the result of divine enlightenment and exaltation, as well as the promotion of the soul to the world of meaning, and in other words, the knowledge of God. At the same time, in the West, with the advent of Descartes (1650) and his philosophical tradition, epistemology received more attention, which was the result of the emergence of the age of skepticism, which itself was the outcome of the emergence of modern science and the rejection of Aristotelian tradition. Among the Cartesians, Malebranche (1715) proposed a new theory in the field of epistemology, calling it the ‘vision of God’. This theory was quite different from the epistemological views of others such as Descartes and his followers. According to Malebranche, knowledge depended on God and His will. Also, in the works of Mulla Sadra and Malebranche, the truth of perception is interpreted as a kind of representation. This means that we cannot perceive objects directly, but we perceive them through intermediaries. However, the main question of the present article is how to obtain true knowledge and how to acquire it in the philosophy of Mulla Sadra and Malebranche, which is based on the will of God? On the other hand, what are the similarities and possible contradictions between the theory of vision in God in the philosophy of Malebranche and the theory of acquiring knowledge through the enlightenment of God in Mulla Sadra? The author of the present study interprets the latter as ‘vision by God’. In this article, the author tries to answer the mentioned questions in this field by the analytical and descriptive methods based on library research. By proposing the theory of ‘vision in God’, Malebranche believes that to understand the facts, one must observe them in God. According to him, man first perceives the ideas of things and then through them, and by union with God, he realizes the truths. Mulla Sadra also considers true knowledge to be based on the divine will and human psychic intuition through connection with the spiritual world, which the author interprets as ‘vision by God’. Mulla Sadra, by referring all sciences to knowledge by the presence on the one hand and the possibility of true knowledge through psychic intuition, on the other hand, considers knowledge to be based on divine forgiveness. From the similarity of the two, it can be pointed out that their epistemological theory is based on the results of their ontological view based on occasionalism and the unity of existence, which in the later stages leads to the theory of representation of perception. From the opposition of the two views, it can be noted that Malebranche considers his theory as a philosophical matter and explains it within the framework of his philosophical system. But Mulla Sadra considers his view to be transcendent and in the highest mystical degrees, that man attains by connecting with the spiritual world.

Hume’s discussion of pride and sympathy in the 'Treatise' shows direct engagement with Malebranche’s discussion of ‘imitation’ in the 'Search'. For Malebranche, imitation—both of passions and belief—and our tendency to judge ourselves by comparison, generate the passion of pride or grandeur, which plays a useful social role. However, as both cause and effect of the admiration of others, grandeur is ungrounded and thus imaginary. Hume disagrees. He invokes the principle of sympathy to explain how the evaluations of others can support pride by indicating, without constituting, grounds for pride. Hume’s argument depends on his underappreciated claim that sympathy can communicate the evaluative opinions as well as the passions of others. Working with the Malebranchean inventory of principles—sympathy and comparison—Hume refines their characterization, thereby redeeming the human tendency to feel pride and humility by characterizing it as corrigible and subject to social regulation.

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Copyright of Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica (1575-6866) is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Malebranche holds that visual experience represents the size of objects relative to the perceiver's body and does not represent objects as having intrinsic or nonrelational spatial magnitudes. I argue that Malebranche's case for this body-relative thesis is more sophisticated than other commentators—most notably, Atherton (1990) and Simmons (2003)—have presented it. Malebranche's central argument relies on the possibility of perceptual variation with respect to size. He uses two thought experiments to show that perceivers of different sizes—namely, miniature people, giants, and typical human beings—can experience the very same objects as having radically different sizes. Malebranche argues that there is no principled reason to privilege one of these ways of experiencing size over the others and, more specifically, that all three kinds of perceivers experience size veridically. From the possibility of this kind of veridical perceptual variation, Malebranche infers that visual experience represents only body-relative size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper treats a heretofore-unnoticed concept in the history of the philosophical discussion of human freedom, a kind of freedom that is not defined solely in terms of the causal power of the agent. Instead, the exercise of freedom essentially involves the 'non-occurrence' of something. That being free involves the 'non-occurrence', that is, the 'absence', of an act may seem counterintuitive. With the exception of those specifically treated in this paper, philosophers tend to think of freedom as intimately involved with volition, the judging or deciding activity of the will that votes in favor of or against a proposed action. However, there are two thinkers who endorse a view where not willing constitutes human freedom. Our analysis focuses on the views of Malebranche and Locke. Both invoke a notion dubbed here as ‘absential suspension.’ On this view, freedom is associated not with the power of volition, but rather with this kind of suspension.

The article deals with the critical reception of the Cartesian theory of the eternal truths. It aims to analyze the central role played by Descartes’ doctrine in Early Modern Philosophy, with particular regard to the reflections of Leibniz, Malebranche and Spinoza. Indeed, part of their philosophy can be considered as an attempt to criticize the premises of the Cartesian theory in order to avoid their consequences. There are then strong reasons for believing that the importance of the theodicean issues in Early Modern Philosophy is directly related to Descartes’ doctrine of the free creation of the eternal truths.

The purpose of this article is to highlight Challe's criticism of the Malebranchist conception of God. Directly aiming the subordination of the divine omnipotence (Puissance) to the divine wisdom (Sagesse), which Malebranche supports in order to build his theodicy, Challe's reply surprises with its metaphysical acuity and the use of some innovative strategies, namely the metaphysical foundation of divine justice as the third (and independent) divine attribute and the use of some Cartesian formulas which were rejected by almost all Cartesiens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article proposes to analyze the measure of the contribution which causality in Malebrance, according his work De la recherche de la vérité, makes to the critique of causality presented in Hume's Treatise of Human Nature and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. For this, the analysis of Malebranche will be expounded, establishing the measure of its relationship with the doctrine of occasionalism. Hume's critiques of this doctrine will be revisited in order to then point out the similarities between the authors' analyses, establishing, whenever possible, the influences of the French philosopher in the Scottish philosopher. Beyond this, those aspects in Hume's analysis, which are not present in the philosophy of Malebranche, will be highlighted. Finally, the foundations of this difference will be situated, examining the humean epistemology in this context of the critique of causality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

La filosofía de Nicolas de Malebranche es el testimonio de una época en la que la fascinación por el racionalismo cartesiano converge con la permanente atracción agustiniana. Este contexto sirve como punto de partida para una reflexión sobre la obra de Malebranche, en la cual se despliega la originalidad de un «sistema», que tiene en las nociones de representación y de visión en Dios sus puntos fundamentales. La metafísica del discípulo de Descartes aparece inscrita bajo el signo de la epistemología, allí donde el conocimiento manifiesta la profunda armonía de la verdad.

This paper intends to shed light on Kant’s conception of judgement as presented in his Nova Dilucidatio. As he will never revise his particular theory of judgment throughout his life, which will become of utmost importance regarding his three Critiques, we maintain that this constant of Kant’s thought predetermines to a large degree his development towards his Transcendental Philosophy. The identification of this core constant of his philosophy allows us to expose the limitations and problems inherent in this specific conception of judgment and thereby to expose the weak point underlying Kant’s thought, showing that a critique of the Critique has to be essentially a critique of Kant’s conception of judgement.

İnsanın beşeri tecrübe alanlarından ikisini oluşturan din ve felsefe, aynı zamanda sosyal hayatında iki yönünü oluşturmaktadır. Din ve felsefe, bu özelliğinden dolayı da her zaman aralarında bir ilişki bulunmak kaydıyla tarihte yer almıştır. Din ve felsefenin metot açısından farklı yöntemler kullanmasına rağmen, amaçları bakımından aynı doğrultuda oldukları söylenebilir. Tarih boyunca felsefe ve din arasında bir ilişkinin olmadığını, hatta olmaması gerektiğini savunan düşünürler olmakla birlikte, diğer bir kısmı da bunların arasında olumlu bir ilişki ve uzlaşının olduğunu savunmuştur. Biz de aynı zamanda bir din adamı ve filozof olan Malebranche’ın din ve felsefe arasında var olan uzlaşmayı ortaya koyma çabasını makalemize araştırma konusu edineceğiz

The Genevan printer and bookseller Jean-Louis Dufour (1656-89) had a brief career, interrupted abruptly by a bankruptcy. He succeeded nevertheless during the first three years of his activity in finding his place in the world of the Geneva book trade. By adopting an original policy in the management of his activity, Dufour published various Latin translations, which at the time was the lingua franca of scholars and intellectuals in Europe. Among these translations we find the famous masterpiece of Nicolas Malebranche, De la Recherche de la vérité. The present study explores the history of this printer, his business strategies and his intellectual preferences through two main documents: a book sale catalogue of 1683 and the inventory of vacant goods established after his bankruptcy. In addition, this study devotes special attention to Dufour’s translation of De la Recherche de la vérité to show how this initiative contributed to the spread of Malebranche’s philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents new evidence regarding Hume's stay in La Flèche and attempts to reconstruct the intellectual world in which he wrote A Treatise of Human Nature. The evidence comes from a 1777 manuscript containing the catalogue of the library of the College of La Flèche, where Hume worked, and from a study of the books still extant in that library. Based on this new evidence, I claim a) that La Flèche provided Hume with a rich intellectual environment where he could learn not only about philosophy and classical literature but also get acquainted with the main debates that agitated scholars on the Continent; b) that Hume had access to the works of Sextus and to other important sources on skepticism; and c) that we should pay closer attention to the influence of some less-noticed French sources on Hume's philosophical views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some Remarks regarding Judgement, Truth and Being in Kant's Nova Dilucidatio This paper intends to shed light on Kant's conception of judgement as presented in his Nova Dilucidatio. As he will never revise his particular theory of judgment throughout his life, which will become of utmost importance regarding his three Critiques, we maintain that this constant of Kant's thought predetermines to a large degree his development towards his Transcendental Philosophy. The identification of this core constant of his philosophy allows us to expose the limitations and problems inherent in this specific conception of judgment and thereby to expose the weak point underlying Kant's thought, showing that a critique of the Critique has to be essentially a critique of Kant's conception of judgement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this text, I intend to examine the way Malebranche understands intentionality, a characteristic of human cognition, and its relation to the development of the theory of ideas presented in Recherche de la Verité. In opposition with several of Malebranche's critics, I offer an interpretation in which sensations can be considered intentional for the author and, therefore, his analysis cannot be regarded as a starting point for the argument that modifications of the soul are not representational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting from an excerpt of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (section 7, part I), this article compares the conceptions that Hume, Locke and Malebranche uphold regarding the experience we have of the power of our will. It stresses how Hume reproduces some arguments directly taken from Malebranche’s occasionalism in order to criticize the Lockean thesis according to which our idea of power derives from our reflection on the causality of the will. It then argues that this textual evidence reveals the existence of a major divergence, within the confines of empiricism, regarding the extent of the experience we have of our will.

Nicolas Malebranche holds that God can act in two ways: by general volitions or by particular volitions. Malebranche is clear that general volidons are acts of God in accordance with the laws of nature or laws of grace, and always have a secondary cause that occasions the event. He is much less direct about how, exactly, to understand particular volitions and when, if ever, they occur. In this paper, we examine the nature and possibility of divine particular actions in Malebranche's system by way of an analysis of his discussions of creation, original sin, and the Incarnation of Christ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]