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New technological developments have heightened interest in understanding and evaluating new tools of participatory and representative engagement in the political sphere. Recent academic research in this area is mainly theoretical, and focuses on voters rather than legislators. This study addresses this gap in the literature by empirically exploring the unique case of proxy voting by members of the U.S. House of Representatives that was introduced as an emergency measure to allow the Congress to function during COVID-19. The core result from this study, given its finding that vote skipping during 2019 is positively correlated with the use of proxy voting during 2021, indicates that proxy voting in this case is connected to legislative shirking. Thus, it appears that the proxy voting mechanism introduced in 2020 via a U.S. House resolution represents a new configuration of traditional legislative shirking or vote skipping.

This paper aims to test two types of legislative shirking in a new democracy, South Korea. Using the lame-duck sessions of the Korean National Assembly, we test whether a legislator shirks in voting participation and in voting decisions. We weave two competing motivations of legislative shirking in voting participation – that to secure more leisure time and that to utilize the last, valuable voting opportunity – into a synthetic hypothesis and test it with two-part hurdle models. To test a shirking in voting participation hypothesis, we analyze legislators' choices on bills that are supposedly related to the interests of constituents or political parties. Empirical results strongly support our shirking in voting participation claims, while only partial evidence is found on shirking in voting decisions. The findings suggest that, besides the trade-off between labor and leisure, some legislators deem the lame-duck sessions an opportunity to express their own preferences unconstrained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]