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This article offers a reconceptualization of class-in-capitalism and its articulation with racialization and gender that builds on critical strands of Marxian thought and integrates insights from Black radical and feminist socialist traditions. Rather than a transhistorical materialist conception of class simpliciter, we develop a historically-specific conception of class embedded within an analysis of capitalist social relations. The result is an account of class based not on the appropriation of a “material surplus,” but on asymmetrical social relations in the division of labor and disposition of its fruits. Developing this conception along three key axes of asymmetries—property, production, and personhood—we show how the dynamics propelled by capitalist social relations are co-constitutive with those of racialization, while both the privatization of reproduction and gender-based super-exploitation are systemic features of these dynamics. We emphasize law’s role in the history of these relations, and end with implications of our analysis for their transformation.

Machines powered by artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly taking over tasks previously performed by humans alone. In accomplishing such tasks, they may intentionally commit 'AI crimes', ie engage in behaviour which would be considered a crime if it were accomplished by humans. For instance, an advanced AI trading agent may—despite its designer's best efforts—autonomously manipulate markets while lacking the properties for being held criminally responsible. In such cases (hard AI crimes) a criminal responsibility gap emerges since no agent (human or artificial) can be legitimately punished for this outcome. We aim to shift the 'hard AI crime' discussion from blame to deterrence and design an 'AI deterrence paradigm', separate from criminal law and inspired by the economic theory of crime. The homo economicus has come to life as a machina economica , which, even if cannot be meaningfully blamed, can nevertheless be effectively deterred since it internalises criminal sanctions as costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an account of the structure of property law based on the principle of subsidiarity. This principle holds that more centralized organizations, including governments, should fulfil a subsidiary role in relation to the individuals and groups of which they are comprised. While subsidiarity has been highly influential in the areas of public law, constitutional law, and international law, its relevance to property law has been underappreciated. Property rights distribute decision-making authority over resources to non-state parties. This promotes a number of interrelated benefits associated with subsidiarity, including the qualitatively distinct contributions made by individuals and groups to the common good, the instrumental benefits of decentralized decision-making, the intrinsic benefits of involvement in actions and decisions affecting oneself, and the development of virtues. However, the principle of subsidiarity also suggests important roles for public authorities, including assuring an appropriate distribution of resources in society and intervening where the private authority of owners fails to uphold the common good. In this respect, subsidiarity offers a distinctive understanding of the divide between private and public law. Private law doctrine appropriately provides owners with a significant sphere of presumptive authority, yet this is subject to broad powers of public authorities to alter the baseline where, in their judgment, the common good requires it. This article argues that the concept of subsidiarity can help to bridge the divide between progressive property theory and theoretical approaches that emphasize the authority of owners. It can also contribute to an understanding of the concept of property, public access rights to private property, property-based community governance, and legal protections for property rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yıldırım Beyazıt Law Review (YBLR) is the property of Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University Law School and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article delves into the relationship between language in law and the automation of legal decision-making processes. The conflict arises between the indeterminate language of the law and the necessary precision of algorithmic language, where the first needs to be translated into the other during the process of automation. The article seeks to provide definitions as well as the necessary excursion into the role of indeterminacy in the legal language to be able to shed a light on this process. In this regard, the article examines several problematic examples of the currently utilised algorithmic systems in legal decision-making. Subsequently, the article sets forth its thesis: that indeterminate language used within legal rules sets out the perimeter for areas suitable for the process of automation, determined by the very nature of such areas of law as a negative demarcation. Lastly, it provides language-based positive demarcations for such areas. Further, by examining the theory of legal indeterminacy, the article shows that the conclusion does not in fact lie in the technical impossibility of creating an indetermined algorithm, but rather in the very purpose of such language – that of mandating a value judgement. The conclusion of this article thus seeks to be technologically neutral by providing a different route of the purpose examination to reach it, rather than technological impossibility, which may change in time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an account of the structure of property law based on the principle of subsidiarity. This principle holds that more centralized organizations, including governments, should fulfil a subsidiary role in relation to the individuals and groups of which they are comprised. While subsidiarity has been highly influential in the areas of public law, constitutional law, and international law, its relevance to property law has been underappreciated. Property rights distribute decision-making authority over resources to non-state parties. This promotes a number of interrelated benefits associated with subsidiarity, including the qualitatively distinct contributions made by individuals and groups to the common good, the instrumental benefits of decentralized decision-making, the intrinsic benefits of involvement in actions and decisions affecting oneself, and the development of virtues. However, the principle of subsidiarity also suggests important roles for public authorities, including assuring an appropriate distribution of resources in society and intervening where the private authority of owners fails to uphold the common good. In this respect, subsidiarity offers a distinctive understanding of the divide between private and public law. Private law doctrine appropriately provides owners with a significant sphere of presumptive authority, yet this is subject to broad powers of public authorities to alter the baseline where, in their judgment, the common good requires it. This article argues that the concept of subsidiarity can help to bridge the divide between progressive property theory and theoretical approaches that emphasize the authority of owners. It can also contribute to an understanding of the concept of property, public access rights to private property, property-based community governance, and legal protections for property rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is dedicated to the study of the theory of transformation of intellectual property legal regimes through blockchain technologies on an international scale. It focuses on three thematic blocks: firstly, defining the essence of blockchain technologies; secondly, analysing international blockchain technology standards; and thirdly, exploring variations in the use of blockchain technologies for the registration of intellectual property objects. The subject of the study is the social relations in the field of intellectual property and the mechanisms for their regulation. Methodology. The article employs scientific methods of cognition and doctrinal resolution of issues related to the use of digital tools in the regulation of social relations. This encompasses formal-logical and dialectical methodologies. A variety of empirical techniques, including synthesis, deduction, and statistical analysis, were employed. Results. The study reveals the absence of a direct indication of the use or intent to use distributed ledger technology, otherwise known as blockchain technology. The study demonstrates the significance of utilising blockchain technology in maintaining the customs register to account for intellectual property objects protected by law. This ensures the impossibility of unauthorised alteration or deletion of information about intellectual property objects, as provided by distributed ledger technology. These legal relations emerge in the course of entering information into the aforementioned registers, making modifications (updates), and providing information to interested parties. The use of blockchain technologies in the formation of the register of issued certificates of state registration of copyright for a work is justified.

This article delves into the relationship between language in law and the automation of legal decision-making processes. The conflict arises between the indeterminate language of the law and the necessary precision of algorithmic language, where the first needs to be translated into the other during the process of automation. The article seeks to provide definitions as well as the necessary excursion into the role of indeterminacy in the legal language to be able to shed a light on this process. In this regard, the article examines several problematic examples of the currently utilised algorithmic systems in legal decision-making. Subsequently, the article sets forth its thesis: that indeterminate language used within legal rules sets out the perimeter for areas suitable for the process of automation, determined by the very nature of such areas of law as a negative demarcation. Lastly, it provides language-based positive demarcations for such areas. Further, by examining the theory of legal indeterminacy, the article shows that the conclusion does not in fact lie in the technical impossibility of creating an indetermined algorithm, but rather in the very purpose of such language – that of mandating a value judgement. The conclusion of this article thus seeks to be technologically neutral by providing a different route of the purpose examination to reach it, rather than technological impossibility, which may change in time.

This work comprehensively analyzes the legal definition of genocide. In so doing, it details the material and mental conditions that can lead to an individual’s punishment for the commission of the crime of genocide. Further, it addresses some of the difficulties that have arisen when interpreting and applying the legal rule. To this end, this work starts by presenting the basic structure of the crime of genocide, and also the goals of its legal prohibition. It then concentrates on the material element (actus reus) of genocide, placing emphasis on two difficulties; namely, the notion of the group, and how to identify the four protected groups. In addition, the conduct prohibited by the Convention is detailed. This work then focuses on the mental element (mens rea) of the crime, examining each term from the Convention’s formulation separately in order to better assess the concept of specific intent. This work then considers the meaning of article 30 from the ICC Statute. Ultimately, this work details the conventional definition of genocide and reveals some of the main interpretative challenges associated with it.

This article explores the domain of legal analysis and its methodologies, emphasising the significance of generalisation in legal systems. It discusses the process of generalisation in relation to legal concepts and the development of ideal concepts that form the foundation of law. The article examines the role of logical induction and its similarities with semantic generalisation, highlighting their importance in legal decision-making. It also critiques the formal-deductive approach in legal practice and advocates for more adaptable models, incorporating fuzzy logic, non-monotonic defeasible reasoning, and artificial intelligence. The potential application of neural networks, specifically deep learning algorithms, in legal theory is also discussed. The article discusses how neural networks encode legal knowledge in their synaptic connections, while the syllogistic model condenses legal information into axioms. The article also highlights how neural networks assimilate novel experiences and exhibit evolutionary progression, unlike the deductive model of law. Additionally, the article examines the historical and theoretical foundations of jurisprudence that align with the basic principles of neural networks. It delves into the statistical analysis of legal phenomena and theories that view legal development as an evolutionary process. The article then explores Friedrich Hayek’s theory of law as an autonomous self-organising system and its compatibility with neural network models. It concludes by discussing the implications of Hayek’s theory on the role of a lawyer and the precision of neural networks.

Mawani has penned a breathtaking book that challenges the terra-centric understanding of modern (Western) law through an anti-colonial narrative of a ship, its passengers, and the ambitiously defiant journey they took together across the timespace of the erstwhile British Empire. Five years after its publication, this book review seeks to revisit this narrative and distinguish Mawani's work as pathbreaking for the theorisation of law at a planetary scale in ways that also account for the 'non-human' and 'more-than-human' relations. Unlike many newer strands of scholarship seeking to theorise more-than-human dimensions of law- be it in ecological or technological contexts- Mawani's novel 'oceans as method' approach refuses to erase the centrality of racialised violence to the legal empire, including in law's foundational concepts like time, jurisdiction, object and subject. The last section offers some reflections on how engagements with the contexts of caste could have rendered the work richer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judges have long wrestled with the gigantean task of defining religion, with some describing the task as being 'called upon to ponder the imponderable', an impossible task, and even misguided. Despite these sentiments, and comments in almost every legal definition expressing the impossibility of the task, judges have, in fact, been able to come up with numerous legal definitions for religion. These have been applied in myriad circumstances to define the outer limits of the rights and responsibilities of states, religious communities, organisations, and individuals. By contrast, the term secular has rarely been judicially defined. However, it is no-less important in defining the rights and responsibilities of states and their citizens and residents, particularly in light of the number of states that claim, implicitly or explicitly, to be secular. This paper, therefore, (re)examines the definition of the secular as it pertains to the concept of the secular state. It considers the need for a legal definition of the secular with particular reference to constitutional and other legal instruments that include the term. It then examines the difference between the terms secular, secularisation and secularism, noting the often erroneous conflation as well as the inevitable interaction and overlap between these key concepts. Finally, drawing on existing classifications of legal definitions of religion, the paper classifies definitions of the secular into three overarching classifications, namely 'historical', 'substantive' and 'characteristic'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Punto Género is the property of Revista Punto Genero and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

AbstractThis paper uses analytic philosophy to prevent merely verbal disputes about the concept of fiction within discussions on fictiones iuris. It provides a survey of potentially fruitful connections between legal fictions and fictionalism. More specifically, I will argue that by enriching current accounts of legal fictions in legal theory with insights from (1) the philosophy of language on fictional speech and from (2) contemporary metaphysics on philosophical fictionalism, it seems natural to explore the position that talk involving fictiones iuris is structurally an exemplification of elliptical speech. Such fictionalism about legal fictions illuminates why prominent condemnations of fictions in law – e.g. as blatant falsehoods, shady fraudulences, or legal defects – are theoretical myths, since they fail to distinguish between analytically distinct (ontological, epistemic, alethic, semantic, and evaluative) levels. Moreover, a fictionalist account might even sharpen our sense of which legal fictions are more “innocent” than others. I will begin by introducing philosophical fictionalism (II), before the fictiones iuris will be characterized as an operation in legal reasoning by consulting the Leibnizian reconstruction of Roman Law’s epistemology (III). Sections IV and V seek to provide further clarifications on the ‘fictional’ / ‘fictitious’ distinction as well as the heterogeneity of fictionalist research questions. Section VI then contains a little guided tour through the different analyses of the concept of fiction(s) within fictionalism. Subsequently, I will show how insights from those discussions contribute to demystify some of the most prominent allegations raised against legal fictions (VII). Fictionalism about legal fictions, Section VIII tentatively suggests, might not only harmonize with both classic and recent treatments of legal fictions, but help to also highlight their epistemic values. In slogan form: fictiones iuris are instruments to preserve legal truths worth having. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThe introductory essay on legal fictionality engages with the practice of legal fictions from Roman Law to the twenty-first century, and with the attempts of legal scholarship to conceptualize this particular form of legal imagination. It will discuss the major questions established in the past, with a particular emphasis on the classical understanding of legal fictions as “untrue” or “counterfactual” assumptions—a dichotomy that has pervaded legal thinking for centuries. It will argue that the classical approach is outdated and in urgent need of revision, also demonstrating that theories of other disciplines are better equipped to adequately deal with the issue, from the early debates on truth to more recent positions, such as possible world theory and institutional theories of fictionality. The essay will mainly draw on analytic philosophy and literary theory, but will also invoke more recent legal scholarship that engages with inter- or transdisciplinary approaches. Authors include James, Bradley, Kelsen, Vaihinger, Cohen, Lewis, Meinong, Fuller, Neurath, Rescher, Habermas, Rorty, Glasersfeld, Goodman, Routley, Searle, Genette, Beardsley, Wolterstorff, Currie, Walton, Eco, Anderegg, Doležel and Pavel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Latvian discourse of the theory of law and legal practice, there is a set of influential ideas that constitute a theory of general principles of law. This article aims to offer some critical remarks on the aforementioned theory and to explore some resulting methodological implications. In this article, two main research methods are used: the descriptive and the deductive methods. The examination of the theory resulted in the conclusion that it is self-contradictory to assert that the basic norm (a democratic state based on the Rule of Law) can determine the entire content of the legal system. Following are some methodological implications: First, instead of asserting that all legal methods are general principles of law, one should adopt a more general norm that is flexible enough and avoids contradictions between different obligations to use legal methods, i.e. the principle of reasonable application of legal norms. Second, the interpretation of written legal norms and the concretisation of unwritten ones cannot coexist if the basic norm determines the entire content of the legal system because of the postulate which asserts that writing down unwritten legal norms in a normative act does not change its unwritten nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Derecho del Estado is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Conceiving legal obligations towards future generations is challenging--especially from a positivist stance and if obligations and claims are understood as being correlative in nature. Legal obligations towards future generations are often rejected from the outset if (and insofar as) there is no explicit acknowledgement or established doctrine. This neglects the power of sound legal interpretation. I argue that obligations towards future people and generations are grounded in the relational character of human rights and that their positivity is not a problem in a legal order containing norm texts that can reasonably be interpreted as acknowledging human rights; no additional enactment is necessary for these obligations to be part of the positive law. This claim is based on a (novel) concept of fundamental rights which is compatible with legal positivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Finnis's central role in Brexit was only the latest intervention in a long life of practical action that recommends a closer examination of the genesis of his distinctive philosophy. He always insisted that it was intended 'primarily to assist the practical reflections of those concerned to act, whether as judges or as statesmen or as citizens.' In this article, I argue that Finnis crafted his philosophy as a practical guide for conservative actors in the disenchanted Cold War world of the 1960–70s. My first aim is to excavate the theoretical foundations of his Thomist theory of natural law. While his turn to practical rather than speculative reason is well known, few if any appreciate how Finnis radically refounded Thomist natural law on an implicit theory of history. By accepting that the world was historically contingent and changing, he needed to show how we could know the timeless truth of practical reasonableness and the basic goods. In the final chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis introduced an 'abysmal' philosophy of history that explained how a spoudaios (wise man) could reason his way out of the historical contingency of the human world to access the timeless moral truths that transcended it. My second aim is to show how Finnis used his Thomist theory of natural law as a practical guide for action in our contingent world. He followed Eric Voegelin in describing humanity as two 'hostile camps' – the 'transcendental' Christians and their secular allies versus the 'immanentist' liberals, communists, and fascists all committed to 'consequentialist' ideologies. In this eternal battle of good versus evil, Finnis saw his philosophy as a practical guide for this 'creative minority' of transcendentalists for collective action against the heretical faith of immanentist movements aiming to perfect mankind and build heavens on earth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Filosofija, Sociologija is the property of Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Accounting & Auditing (2314-4793) is the property of Beni Suef University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper investigates the role of the dark knight archetype in the theory of sovereignty. The dark knight archetype has repeatedly emerged in popular culture, but has never been fully explored in jurisprudence and political theory. The aim is to develop a new visual method to bridge the distance between the theory and the tropes that have historically been used to create and justify the notion of sovereignty. Sovereignty is understood here not only as a founding concept of modern legal theory, but also as a trope: a special kind of narrative, illustrated, capable of being modernized, and yet maintaining its initial trends; one that is foundational and colonial, and capable of institutionalizing subjects and sovereigns. Strategically following the works of Agamben, Benjamin, Jung and Warburg, this paper analyses – in a psychoanalytical sense – the unconscious dimensions of sovereignty from evidence collected in popular culture and political history. From fallen medieval knights to Zorro; from fascist Blackshirts to Darth Vader, this paper examines the pervasive repetition of dark knight figures in Western tropes of sovereignty and its consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Finnis's central role in Brexit was only the latest intervention in a long life of practical action that recommends a closer examination of the genesis of his distinctive philosophy. He always insisted that it was intended 'primarily to assist the practical reflections of those concerned to act, whether as judges or as statesmen or as citizens.' In this article, I argue that Finnis crafted his philosophy as a practical guide for conservative actors in the disenchanted Cold War world of the 1960–70s. My first aim is to excavate the theoretical foundations of his Thomist theory of natural law. While his turn to practical rather than speculative reason is well known, few if any appreciate how Finnis radically refounded Thomist natural law on an implicit theory of history. By accepting that the world was historically contingent and changing, he needed to show how we could know the timeless truth of practical reasonableness and the basic goods. In the final chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis introduced an 'abysmal' philosophy of history that explained how a spoudaios (wise man) could reason his way out of the historical contingency of the human world to access the timeless moral truths that transcended it. My second aim is to show how Finnis used his Thomist theory of natural law as a practical guide for action in our contingent world. He followed Eric Voegelin in describing humanity as two 'hostile camps' – the 'transcendental' Christians and their secular allies versus the 'immanentist' liberals, communists, and fascists all committed to 'consequentialist' ideologies. In this eternal battle of good versus evil, Finnis saw his philosophy as a practical guide for this 'creative minority' of transcendentalists for collective action against the heretical faith of immanentist movements aiming to perfect mankind and build heavens on earth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reflects on the Association for the Promotion of Political Economy and Law (APPEAL), formed in 2012 as the first contemporary scholarly group named for the emerging field of Law and Political Economy (LPE). APPEAL organizes academics and allies to address urgent social problems by exploring possibilities for reorienting the economy toward justice, equality, and democracy. To mobilize ideas for change, APPEAL emphasizes collaborative intellectual communities. I situate APPEAL in the context of a neoliberal political movement to capture law’s power by investing in the Law and Economics message that economic power inevitably limits democracy and social justice. Though vastly outmatched in funding, APPEAL brings together experts in economics, law, and other disciplines to clarify and change influential neoliberal ideas about both law and economics. I highlight APPEAL participants’ scholarship showing the interconnected social, political, and legal nature of economic power as the basis for transforming economic politics and policy.

This article addresses the power of law to make historical change. We begin by charting a rich debate on law’s autonomy held over the course of the twentieth century, overviewing contributions by Classical Legal Thought, Law and Society, Marxism, the New Left, Critical Legal History, and what we term the “Millennial Consensus.” We then sketch an alternative view that we feel is implicit in much legal history, where the law is seen as an “architecture”—a set of tools with which we build our society. On this view, law’s autonomy lies in the way that it facilitates specific forms of societal ordering at the expense of others. We emphasize that it also has an existential dimension in that we can never foresee all the future uses particular legal institutions may be put to.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has been criticised increasingly for its approach to international law. While much literature focuses on reluctance to apply international law (ie refusing direct effect), this criticism also includes interpretation, arguably a more contentious area. The Court interprets international treaties through either the Vienna Convention or its own teleological method, with the latter increasingly applied. The legitimacy of applying localised methods of interpretation to international treaty law is debated in scholarship. Whether the Court’s case law applying international law is Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit (friendliness to international law) is the focus of most contributions in this area. This Article seeks to move beyond that debate by demonstrating the Court should in all instances seek to achieve the legal imperatives of certainty and justice. It is explained that justice divides into ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ forms. Whilst ‘thin’ justice is widely accepted and amounts to treating like cases alike, substantive (‘thick’ justice) outcomes are inherently debatable. The Article proves the Court is failing to clearly distinguish cases (‘thin’ justice) and that case law is uncertain. There are also significant questions concerning ‘thick’ justice. The Court has been subject to criticism for substantive outcomes in this area, with the Commission and Council even seeking to limit its role. With case law that is uncertain and appears unjust it is argued that there is failure in this ‘integral part of EU law.’ The Court is now under increased pressure, and it is uncertain how it will respond. There are certainly cautionary lessons to be learned concerning the importance of paying proper attention to justice and certainty for EU law as a whole, and beyond.

The purpose of this article is to demystify jus cogens rules by trying to map their legal contours. After defining jus cogens and providing a theoretical scaffolding drawn from elementary works on legal theory, the household jus cogens prohibition of genocide is analysed in light of such notions. As a result, jus cogens norms are characterised both as primary rules of behaviour and as secondary rules of change for legal production, constituting an international public order that serves as a tool for international law to safeguard human security.

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2023 8(3), 1247-1254 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. The autonomy of EU law and legal theory: bridging the disconnect. – II. Overview of this Special Section. | (Abstract) The autonomy of EU law is a source of ample connections between EU law and legal theory. This Special Section contributes to the mutual enrichment between EU constitutional law and legal theory – which traditionally have been mostly disconnected disciplines – by bringing together new, theory-informed perspectives on the autonomy of EU law and European integration from both EU lawyers and legal theorists. The ten Articles in this Special Section are grouped together in three categories, focusing re-spectively on philosophy of law, legal theory and legal history, and legal doctrine and the role of the European Court of Justice. Together, they provide a plethora of contrasting and complementary legal-theoretical views on the autonomy of EU law and the EU legal order, within the broader context of European integration. With this Special Section, we aim to contribute to the legal-theoretical analysis of EU constitutional law, hoping that many others will follow in our footsteps.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has been criticised increasingly for its approach to international law. While much literature focuses on reluctance to apply international law (ie refusing direct effect), this criticism also includes interpretation, arguably a more contentious area. The Court interprets international treaties through either the Vienna Convention or its own teleological method, with the latter increasingly applied. The legitimacy of applying localised methods of interpretation to international treaty law is debated in scholarship. Whether the Court's case law applying international law is Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit (friendliness to international law) is the focus of most contributions in this area. This Article seeks to move beyond that debate by demonstrating the Court should in all instances seek to achieve the legal imperatives of certainty and justice. It is explained that justice divides into 'thin' and 'thick' forms. Whilst 'thin' justice is widely accepted and amounts to treating like cases alike, substantive ('thick' justice) outcomes are inherently debatable. The Article proves the Court is failing to clearly distinguish cases ('thin' justice) and that case law is uncertain. There are also significant questions concerning 'thick' justice. The Court has been subject to criticism for substantive outcomes in this area, with the Commission and Council even seeking to limit its role. With case law that is uncertain and appears unjust it is argued that there is failure in this 'integral part of EU law.' The Court is now under increased pressure, and it is uncertain how it will respond. There are certainly cautionary lessons to be learned concerning the importance of paying proper attention to justice and certainty for EU law as a whole, and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the role the law has played in the construction of the US–Mexico border wall. It explores two episodes of wall-building in American history: the first surrounding the adoption of the Act of August 19, 1935, and the second the adoption of the Secure Fence Act of 2006, both authorizing the erection of a fence at the U.S.-Mexico border. The article observes that for each episode, the law provided the sites for the deployment of narratives that constructed Mexicans as "others," instituting legal precedents that informed increasingly explicit and ambitious legal provisions for the construction of a border wall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract, To dare is to risk, and to err is to blunder. I suggest that the neologism “to derr” can helpfully refer to the audacious inscription of deliberately erroneous and therefore fictitious information, which is the literary strategy that I discreetly pursued in my Negative Comparative Law: A Strong Programme for Weak Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022). In this way, I sought to enhance the literarity and the correlative depositivization of the comparative enterprise in law. This essay probes this initiative and explains how it must withstand disqualification as mere whimsy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work comprehensively analyzes the legal definition of genocide. In so doing, it details the material and mental conditions that can lead to an individual's punishment for the commission of the crime of genocide. Further, it addresses some of the difficulties that have arisen when interpreting and applying the legal rule. To this end, this work starts by presenting the basic structure of the crime of genocide, and also the goals of its legal prohibition. It then concentrates on the material element (actus reus) of genocide, placing emphasis on two difficulties; namely, the notion of the group, and how to identify the four protected groups. In addition, the conduct prohibited by the Convention is detailed. This work then focuses on the mental element (mens rea) of the crime, examining each term from the Convention's formulation separately in order to better assess the concept of specific intent. This work then considers the meaning of article 30 from the ICC Statute. Ultimately, this work details the conventional definition of genocide and reveals some of the main interpretative challenges associated with it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his commentary on the Qurʾān, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī makes use of various traditional and rational sciences, among them legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh). This science plays a primary role within his exegetical device, since he draws from it many notions and arguments that allow him to propose new interpretations or to refute the opinions issued by his predecessors. The present paper aims to study the contribution of legal theory to al-Rāzī's exegesis. Our purpose is to show how this author uses the hermeneutical rules borrowed from the science of uṣūl al-fiqh and the benefits he derives from them, especially in the debates opposing him to other commentators of the Qurʾān. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Law / Teise is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista Centroamericana de Administración Pública del ICAP is the property of Revista Centroamericana de Administracion Publica del ICAP and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper discusses the recently emerging platform law from a jurisprudential point of view. After defining the platform as a general coordination mechanism, it deals with topics such as the rationale for regulation, its main goals, and its general characteristics. According to the study, the main argument for regulation is that the platform, as a coordination mechanism, tends to become unstable without intervention, or to become harmful from the point of view of society. Above all, it tends to abuse the asymmetric power situation that exists between the platform and its users. These conditions must be prevented from occurring and platform users must be protected in certain situations. The study lists four features that characterise platform law: its ex ante regulatory nature, the predominance of technology regulation and self-regulation, and the extensive use of user protection tools, such as complaint mechanisms, protection of user accounts and explainability obligations. This toolbox partly resembles the long-established methods of consumer protection, but it also differs from it in certain ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]