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In this paper, I consider whether there are limits to virtuous argumentation in certain situations. I consider three types of cases: 1) arguing against denier discourses, 2) arguing with people who make bigoted claims, and 3) cases in which marginalised people are expected to exercise virtues of argument from a position of limited agency. For each type of case, I look at where limits to arguing responsibly might be drawn. I argue that there are situations in which we might withdraw from engagement for practical reasons and others in which withdrawing or refraining from engagement is a responsible way to deal with a particular position. Finally, I argue that in the third type of case, expecting the marginalised to argue as though on even terms with the positions of the dominant risks perpetrating argumentative harm., Dans cet article, j’examine s'il existe des limites à l'argumentation vertueuse dans certaines situations. Je considère trois types de cas: 1. des arguments contre les discours négateurs 2. des arguments avec des gens qui font des revendications fanatiques 3. des arguments des personnes marginalisées qui sont censées exercer des vertus d'argumentation à partir d'une position de pouvoir limité. Pour chaque type de cas, je regarde les limites de l'argumentation responsable. Je soutiens qu'il existe des situations dans lesquelles nous pourrions nous retirer de l'engagement pour des raisons pratiques et d'autres situations dans lesquelles le retrait ou l'abstention d'un engagement est une manière responsable de traiter une position particulière. Enfin, je soutiens que dans le troisième type de cas, s'attendre à ce que les marginalisés avancent leurs arguments comme s'ils étaient égaux à ceux en positions dominantes risque de nuire leurs arguments.

I explore how empathetic visual argument may be the mode best suited for eliciting appropriate force to the reasons given by arguers who face systematic identity prejudices. In the verbal mode, this force is often skewed through epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007), argumentative injustice (Bondy 2010), and discursive injustice (Kukla 2010). Highlighting their reliance on the Aristotelian sense of enthymeme, I show how visual arguments are highly context specific. Using Ian Dove’s Visual Scheming (2016) and the theory of the Retort collective (2004) via case study, I demonstrate how the visual mode can leave the appropriate force in the arguer’s control.

Bilinear Logic of Lambek amounts to Noncommutative MALL of Abrusci. Lambek proves the cut–elimination theorem for a one-sided (in fact, left-sided) sequent system for this logic. Here we prove an analogous result for the nonassociative version of this logic. Like Lambek, we consider a left-sided system, but the result also holds for its right-sided version, by a natural symmetry. The treatment of nonassociative sequent systems involves some subtleties, not appearing in associative logics. We also prove the PTime complexity of the multiplicative fragment of NBL.

In this paper, we consider the class of four-valued literal-paraconsistent-paracomplete logics constructed by combination of isomorphs of classical logic CPC. These logics form a 10-element upper semi-lattice with respect to the functional embeddinig one logic into another. The mechanism of variation of paraconsistency and paracompleteness properties in logics is demonstrated on the example of two four-element lattices included in the upper semi-lattice. Functional properties and sets of tautologies of corresponding literal-paraconsistent-paracomplete matrices are investigated. Among the considered matrices there are the matrix of Puga and da Costa's logic V and the matrix of paranormal logic P1I1, which is the part of a sequence of paranormal matrices proposed by V. Fernández.

This paper introduces the logics of super-strict implications, where a super-strict implication is a strengthening of C.I. Lewis' strict implication that avoids not only the paradoxes of material implication but also those of strict implication. The semantics of super-strict implications is obtained by strengthening the (normal) relational semantics for strict implication. We consider all logics of super-strict implications that are based on relational frames for modal logics in the modal cube. it is shown that all logics of super-strict implications are connexive logics in that they validate Aristotle's Theses and (weak) Boethius's Theses. A proof-theoretic characterisation of logics of super-strict implications is given by means of G3-style labelled calculi, and it is proved that the structural rules of inference are admissible in these calculi. It is also shown that validity in the S5-based logic of super-strict implications is equivalent to validity in G. Priest's negation-as-cancellation-based logic. Hence, we also give a cut-free calculus for Priest's logic.

We comment on certain features that second-level inference rules commonly used in mathematical proof sometimes have, sometimes lack: suppositions, indirectness, goal-simplification, goal-preservation and premise-preservation. The emphasis is on the roles of these features, which we call 'perfumes', in mathematical practice rather than on the space of all formal possibilities, deployment in proof-theory, or conventions for display in systems of natural deduction.

Basic results of the paper are that any four-valued expansion L4 of Dunn-Belnap's logic DB4 is de_ned by a unique (up to isomorphism) conjunctive matrix ℳ4 with exactly two distinguished values over an expansion 𝔄4 of a De Morgan non-Boolean four-valued diamond, but by no matrix with either less than four values or a single [non-]distinguished value, and has no proper extension satisfying Variable Sharing Property (VSP). We then characterize L4's having a theorem / inconsistent formula, satisfying VSP and being [inferentially] maximal / subclassical / maximally paraconsistent, in particular, algebraically through ℳ4|𝔄4's (not) having certain submatrices|subalebras. Likewise, [providing 𝔄4 is regular / has no three-element subalgebra] L4 has a proper consistent axiomatic extension if[f] ℳ4 has a proper paraconsistent / two-valued submatrix [in which case the logic of this submatrix is the only proper consistent axiomatic extension of L4 and is relatively axiomatized by the Excluded Middle law axiom]. As a generic tool (applicable, in particular, to both classically-negative and implicative expansions of DB4), we also prove that the lattice of axiomatic extensions of the logic of an implicative matrix ℳ with equality determinant is dual to the distributive lattice of lower cones of the set of all submatrices of ℳ with non-distinguished values.

The Covid-19 pandemic presents argumentation theorists with an opportunity to reflect on the ways in which people, agencies and governments respond to the emergence of a new virus. Reponses have revealed a range of judgements and decisions, not all of which are rationally warranted. This article will examine errors in reasoning, several of which have reduced the public’s compliance with important health measures. This article will also analyse rationally warranted reasoning about Covid-19 employed by public health agencies. In examining instances of good and bad reasoning during the Covid-19 pandemic, we can begin to construct a taxonomy of arguments that facilitated and hindered individual and collective responses during this public health emergency., La pandémie de COVID-19 offre aux théoriciens de l'argumentation l'occasion de réfléchir sur la manière dont les gens, les agences et les gouvernements réagissent à l'émergence d'un nouveau virus. Les réponses ont révélé une gamme de jugements et de décisions qui ne sont pas tous rationnellement justifiés. Cet article examinera les erreurs de raisonnement, dont plusieurs ont réduit la conformité du public à des mesures sanitaires importantes. Cet article analysera également le raisonnement rationnellement justifié au sujet du COVID-19 employé par les agences de santé publique. En examinant les exemples de bons et de mauvais raisonnements pendant la pandémie de COVID-19, nous pouvons commencer à construire une taxonomie d'arguments qui ont facilité et entravé les réponses individuelles et collectives lors de cette urgence de santé publique.

We continue the investigation of the first paper where we studied logics with various negations including empirical negation and co-negation. We established how such logics can be treated uniformly with R. Sylvan's CCω as the basis. In this paper we use this result to obtain cut-free labelled sequent calculi for the logics.

We try to translate the intuitionistic propositional logic INT into Brouwer's modal logic KTB. Our translation is motivated by intuitions behind Brouwer's axiom p →☐◊p The main idea is to interpret intuitionistic implication as modal strict implication, whereas variables and other positive sentences remain as they are. The proposed translation preserves fragments of the Rieger-Nishimura lattice which is the Lindenbaum algebra of monadic formulas in INT. Unfortunately, INT is not embedded by this mapping into KTB.

We investigate the relationship between M. De's empirical negation in Kripke and Beth Semantics. It turns out empirical negation, as well as co-negation, corresponds to different logics under different semantics. We then establish the relationship between logics related to these negations under unified syntax and semantics based on R. Sylvan's CCω.

In this paper, by considering the notions of effect algebra and product effect algebra, we define the concept of effect module. Then we investigate some properties of effect modules, and we present some examples on them. Finally, we introduce some topologies on effect modules.

In this paper, we introduce and study a corresponding logic to equality-algebras and obtain some basic properties of this logic. We prove the soundness and completeness of this logic based on equality-algebras and local deduction theorem. We show that this logic is regularly algebraizable with respect to the variety of equality∆-algebras but it is not Fregean. Then we introduce the concept of (prelinear) equality∆-algebras and investigate some related properties. Also, we study ∆-deductive systems of equality∆-algebras. In particular, we prove that every prelinear equality ∆-algebra is a subdirect product of linearly ordered equality∆-algebras. Finally, we construct prelinear equality ∆ logic and prove the soundness and strong completeness of this logic respect to prelinear equality∆-algebras.

A modified subformula property for the modal logic KD with the additional axiom $\Box\Diamond(A\vee B)\supset\Box\Diamond A\vee\Box\Diamond B$ is shown. A new modification of the notion of subformula is proposed for this purpose. This modification forms a natural extension of our former one on which modified subformula property for the modal logics K5, K5D and S4.2 has been shown (Bull Sect Logic 30:115--122, 2001 and 48:19--28, 2019). The finite model property as well as decidability for the logic follows from this.

In “Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy: A Reply to Groarke’s Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism,” David Godden (2005) distinguished two notions of deductivism. On the one hand, as an interpretative thesis, deductivism is the view that all-natural language argumentation must be interpreted as being deductive. On the other hand, as an evaluative thesis, deductivism is the view that for a conclusion to follow, it has to follow of necessity from the premises—or, in other words, that being a good inference implies being deductive. The main goal of this paper is to show that evaluative deductivism is wrong., Dans «Le déductivisme comme stratégie interprétative: une réponse à la défense de Groarke contre le déductivisme reconstructif», David Godden (2005) a distingué deux notions de déductivisme. D'une part, en tant que thèse interprétative, le déductivisme est l'idée que toute argumentation en langage naturel doit être interprétée comme étant déductive. À son tour, en tant que thèse évaluative, le déductivisme est l'idée que pour qu'une conclusion s’ensuive, elle doit nécessairement découler des prémisses - ou, en d'autres termes, qu'être une bonne inférence implique d'être déductive. L'objectif principal de cet article est de montrer que le déductivisme évaluatif est faux.

Hilbert algebras are important tools for certain investigations in intuitionistic logic and other non-classical logic and as a generalization of Hilbert algebra a new algebraic structure, called a GE-algebra (generalized exchange algebra), is introduced and studied its properties. We consider filters, upper sets and congruence kernels in a GE-algebra. We also characterize congruence kernels of transitive GE-algebras.

In this paper, we consider the way that web documents seeking to persuade readers of certain science claims provide information about the sources of the arguments. Our quantitative analysis reveals that web documents in our sample include hundreds of examples in which the reader is provided information regarding the trustworthiness (or lack thereof) of sources. The web documents also contain a large number of examples in which the reader is provided with information about how many individuals hold a particular belief. We discuss ad hominem, ad verecundiam, and ad populum arguments, and the way that the examples found in our sample of documents are related to these argumentation schemes.

Particular reasoning is arguably the most common type of legal reasoning. Neil MacCormick proposed that, in a legal context, justifiable particular reasoning has to be universalizable. This paper aims to: (1) investigate MacCormick’s thesis; (2) explain how a particular can ever be universal by drawing inspiration from Scott Brewer’s formula on reasoning by analogy; (3) further comprehend MacCormick’s thesis by considering some of the arguments advanced by its opponents; (4) use the ‘pilot-judgement procedure’ developed by the European Court of Human Rights as an example to illustrate the relevance of the universalizable particular thesis in today’s legal practices.

The CAT is entirely dedicated to assessing the critical-thinking skills involved in scientific reasoning and practical problem solving. While the test is found to have reasonable content validity, various issues with its prompts are discussed, along with significant issues with its scoring. The CAT’s recommended use as a “model” for curricular changes, called CAT Apps, is criticized as “teaching to the test.”, Le CAT porte sur l'évaluation des compétences en pensée critique impliquées dans le raisonnement scientifique et dans la résolution de problèmes pratiques. Bien que le test ait une « content validity » raisonnable, divers problèmes liés à ces brefs passages de texte sont discutés, ainsi que des problèmes importants liés à sa notation. L'utilisation recommandée par le CAT comme «modèle» pour les changements curriculaires, appelée applications CAT, est critiquée comme un enseignement axé exclusivement sur l’examen.

My topic is the theme of the E-OSSA 12 conference, namely Evidence, Persuasion and Diversity. I will present relevant material from a selection of Canadian legal cases, along with background information as needed and commentary. My primary focus will be on two landmark Supreme Court of Canada cases—an Aboriginal law case and a case that was both a constitutional law case and a criminal law case., Mon sujet est le thème de la conférence E-OSSA 12, à savoir La preuve, la persuasion et la diversité. Je présenterai des documents pertinents tirés d'une sélection de procès juridiques canadiens, ainsi que des renseignements généraux au besoin et des commentaires. Je me concentrerai principalement sur deux affaires historiques de la Cour suprême du Canada - une affaire de droit autochtone et une affaire qui était à la fois une affaire de droit constitutionnel et une affaire de droit pénal.

Argumentation is important for sharing knowledge and information. Given that the receiver of an argument purportedly engages first and foremost with its content, one might expect trust to play a negligible epistemic role, as opposed to its crucial role in testimony. I argue on the contrary that trust plays a fundamental role in argumentative engagement. I present a realistic social epistemological account of argumentation inspired by social exchange theory. Here, argumentation is a form of epistemic exchange. I illustrate my argument with two real-life examples: vaccination hesitancy, and the undermining of the credibility of traditional sources of information by authoritarian politicians., L'argumentation est importante pour le partage des connaissances et des informations. Étant donné que le destinataire d'un argument s'engage prétendument d'abord et avant tout dans son contenu, on peut s'attendre à ce que la confiance joue un rôle épistémique négligeable, par opposition à son rôle crucial dans un témoignage. Je soutiens au contraire que la confiance joue un rôle fondamental dans l'engagement argumentatif. Je présente une description épistémologique sociale réaliste de l'argumentation inspirée de la théorie des échanges sociaux. Ici, l'argumentation est une forme d'échange épistémique. J'illustre mon argumentation par deux exemples concrets: l'hésitation à la vaccination et l'atteinte à la crédibilité des sources d'information traditionnelles par les politiciens autoritaires.

The concept of adversariality, like that of argument, admits of significant variation. As a consequence, I argue, the question of adversarial argument has not been well understood. After defining adversariality, I argue that if we take argument to be about beliefs, rather than commitments, then two considerations show that adversariality is an essential part of it. First, beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control. Second, beliefs are costly both for the psychological states they provoke and for the fact that they are causally related to our actions. As a result, argument involving agreement can also be understood to be adversarial., Le concept d'opposition, comme celui d'argument, admet des variations importantes. Par conséquent, j'estime que la question de l'argument opposé n'a pas été bien comprise. Après avoir défini « argument opposé », je soutiens que si nous supposons que l'argument concerne les croyances plutôt que les engagements, deux considérations montrent que l’opposition en est un élément essentiel. Premièrement, les croyances ne sont pas sous notre contrôle volontaire. Deuxièmement, les croyances sont coûteuses à la fois pour les états psychologiques qu'elles provoquent et pour le fait qu'elles sont liées de manière causale à nos actions. Par conséquent, un argument qui mène à un accord peut également être compris comme étant oppositionnel.

In this paper, I will propose a classification of analogies based on their internal structure. Selecting the criteria used in that classification first requires discussing the minimal constitutive parts of any analogy. Accordingly, I will discuss the differences between analogy and similarity and between analogy and “synalogy,” and I will stress the importance of the analogy of operations and procedures. Finally, I will set forth a classification of the different types of analogies, which lends itself to a further understanding of the differences between certain modulations of the general idea of analogy, such as archetypes, prototypes, models, simulations, parables, paradigms, canons, maps, thought experiments, myths, utopias, dystopias and fables., Dans cet article, je pro-poserai une classification des analo-gies en fonction de leur structure interne. La sélection des critères utilisés dans cette classification nécessite d'abord de discuter des parties constantes essentielles de toute analogie. En conséquence, je vais discuter des différences entre l'analo-gie et la similitude et entre l'analogie et la synalogie, et je vais souligner l'importance de l'analogie des opé-rations et des procédures. Enfin, je vais présenter une classification des différents types d'analogies, qui permet une meilleure compréhension des différences entre certaines modu-lations de l'idée générale d'analogie, telles que les archétypes, les proto-types, les modèles, les simulations, les paraboles, les paradigmes, canons, cartes, expériences de pensée, mythes, utopies, dystopies et fables.

Robert Fogelin has argued that in deep disagreements, resolution cannot be achieved by rational argumentation. In response, Richard Feldman has claimed that deep disagreements can be resolved in a similar way to more everyday disagreements. I argue that Feldman’s claim is based on a relatively superficial notion of “resolution” of a disagreement whereas the notion at stake in Fogelin’s argument is more substantive. Furthermore, I argue that Feldman’s reply is based on a particular reading of Fogelin’s argument. There is an alternative reading, which takes the central concern to be the role of common ground in argumentation. Engaging with this version of Fogelin’s argument is also a worthwhile endeavour., Robert Fogelin a soutenu que dans les désaccords profonds, on ne peut pas obtenir une resolution par une argumentation rationnelle. En réponse, Richard Feldman a affirmé qu’on peut résoudre des désaccords profonds de la même manière que les désaccords quotidiens. Je soutiens que l’affirmation de Feldman est basée sur une notion relativement superficielle de «résolution» d’un désaccord alors que la notion en jeu dans l’argument de Fogelin est plus substantielle. En outre, j’affirme que la réponse de Feldman se fonde sur un type particulier d’interprétation de l’argument de Fogelin. Il existe une interprétation alternative, dont la préoccupation centrale est le rôle du terrain d'entente dans l'argumentation. S'engager avec cette version de l'argument de Fogelin est également un effort valable.

The extended pragma-dialectical argumentation theory assumes that people engaged in argumentative discourse manoeuvre strategically. In argumentative reality, the strategic manoeuvring is often carried out according to an argumentative strategy. Language users make an effort to present their strategic manoeuvres in a specific way and the analysis of the stylistic choices in actual argumentative discourse is the most important basis for identification and analysis of argumentative strategies. In this article, it is shown what requirements must be satisfied by a systematic stylistic analysis of argumentative discourse, and the results of such an analysis are illustrated by means of a case study., La théorie de l'argumentation pragma-dialectique détaillée suppose que les gens s'engagent dans des manœuvres de discours argumentatif de manière stratégique. Dans la réalité argumentative, la manœuvre stratégique se réalise souvent selon une stratégie argumentative. Les utilisateurs de langue s'efforcent de présenter leurs manœuvres stratégiques d'une manière spécifique et l'analyse des choix stylistiques dans le discours argumentatif réel constitue la base la plus importante pour l'identification et l'analyse des stratégies argumentatives. Dans cet article, on identifie les exigences qui doivent être remplies par une analyse stylistique systématique du discours argumentatif et on illustre les résultats d’une telle analyse au moyen d’une étude de cas.

My paper aims to find potential elements of comparison between ancient oratoria popularis and modern populist oratory. I will consider case studies drawn from Gracchan speech style and from the oratory of Donald Trump.

In this study, we consider the ways different degrees of dissent are established in interaction, especially in interactions among children. One important aspect in the development of the ability to argue is the framing of interactions as rather cooperative or agonistic. Different framings seem to allow for different forms of argumentative activity. The focus in this paper is on the mediation of degrees of dissensus in argumentation in child-child communication. It is established, we argue, through verbal as well as non-verbal means, and the agonistic and cooperativity can be indicators for the space argumentation has in child-child interaction.

When can exerting pressure in a public controversy promote reasonable outcomes, and when is it rather a hindrance? We show how negotiation and persuasion dialogue can be intertwined. Then, we examine in what ways one can in a public controversy exert pressure on others through sanctions or rewards. Finally, we discuss from the viewpoints of persuasion and negotiation whether and, if so, how pressure hinders the achievement of a reasonable outcome.

Donald Trump’s speeches and messages are characterized by terms that are commonly referred to as “thick” or “emotive,” meaning that they are characterized by a tendency to be used to generate emotive reactions. This paper investigates how emotive meaning is related to emotions, and how it is generated or manipulated. Emotive meaning is analyzed as an evaluative conclusion that results from inferences triggered by the use of a term, which can be represented and assessed using argumentation schemes. The evaluative inferences are regarded as part of the connotation of emotive words, which can be modified and stabilized by means of recontextualizations. The manipulative risks underlying the misuse and the redefinition of emotive words are accounted for in terms of presuppositions and implicit modifications of the interlocutors’ commitments., Les discours et les messages de Trump sont caractérisés par des termes couramment appelés «affectif» et par une tendance à être utilisés pour générer des réactions affectives. Cet article étudie comment la signification affective est liée aux émotions et comment elle est produite ou manipulée. La signification affective est analysée comme une conclusion évaluative résultant d'inférences déclenchées par l'utilisation d'un terme, qui peut être représenté et évalué à l'aide de schémas d'argumentation. Les inférences évaluatives sont considérées comme faisant partie de la connotation des mots affectifs, qui peuvent être modifiés et stabilisés au moyen de recontextualisations. Les risques manipulatoires sous-jacents à l’utilisation incorrecte et à la redéfinition des mots affectifs sont comptabilisés en termes de présuppositions et de modifications implicites des engagements des interlocuteurs.

In this paper, the role played in learning to argue by an essential and yet under-researched epistemic and argumentative norm is discussed, namely, the consistency requirement. An argumentative intervention is presented, that is designed to enhance the understanding of this norm among high school students, to enable them to recognize contradictions in the process of argumentation and to familiarize them with the argumentative strategies related to the reductio ad absurdum. There follows a description of how the designed intervention was implemented in two Italian high schools, which served as an exploratory case study, and the results obtained are discussed., Dans cet article, on discute du rôle joué par l’exigence de cohérence, une norme épistémique et argumentative essentielle et encore peu étudiée, dans l'apprentissage d’argumentation.On présente une intervention argumentative, conçue pour améliorer la compréhension de cette norme parmi les étudiants du secondaire pour leur permettre de reconnaître les contradictions dans le processus d’argumentation et de se familiariser avec les stratégies argumentatives liées à la réduction à l’absurde. Suit une description de la manière dont l’intervention conçue a été mise en œuvre dans deux lycées italiens, qui a servi d’étude de cas exploratoire, et les résultats obtenus sont discutés.

In our article, we will analyze the differences and similarities that wecan find in the use of diagrams between two mathematical practices of antiquity.We will show that there is no single possible use of these, but that they have to beconsidered as reasoning tools created and manipulated according to the purposes ofeach tradition. We will argue that the differences in the procedures and organizationsof knowledge that both traditions present do not imply any kind of assessment oftheir greater or lesser “mathematicity”, since both traditions reached sufficientlygeneral and precise mathematical results, a fact that is characteristic of mathematicalresearch at a theoretical level.

espanolPresento y defiendo una teoria sobre las intuiciones y la justificacion que proporcionan. La teoria invoca una nocion familiar: tener justificacion directa prima facie derivada de la mera comprension de los conceptos. Pero, en el supuesto de que no todas las proposiciones intuitivamente verdaderas estan tan directamente justificadas, propongo y desarrollo una tesis original sobre el resto de casos en que alguien tiene una intuicion: cuando un sujeto intuye que P, hace una estimacion (tipicamente implicita) sobre la simplicidad comparativa de posibles extensiones de ciertas partes de su sistema de creencias. EnglishI present and defend a theory about intuitions and the justification they provide. The theory relies on a familiar notion: having direct prima facie justification merely on the basis of understanding concepts. But, under the assumption that not all intuitively true propositions are so directly justified, I advance and develop an original thesis about the rest of cases in which someone has an intuition: when a subject has the intuition that P, she/he makes a (tipycally implicit) estimate about the comparative simplicity of possible extensions of certain parts of her/his system of beliefs.

In 1971, Wellman coined the terms “conduction” and “conductive”to name a distinctive kind of reasoning, different both from deductive and in-ductive reasoning. Most authors think that the weighing of pros and cons is thedistinctive feature of conduction. However I contend that weighing is characteristicof some kinds of argumentation structures while “conductive” applies to the rela-tionship between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. Hence I offer a definition of conductive argument according to which conductive arguments are arguments from verbal classifications involving cluster concepts or compounds of such arguments.

In the present work I inspect several answers to the question raised by Descartes: What Am I? I suggest that, although the proposal that I am identical tomy human organism or to some part of it (the thesis embraced by materialists) isthought to be the most plausible in nowadays scientific viewpoint, it faces a problemthat seems intractable, namely: the problem of accounting the identity-dependencebetween mental states and their subjects. Finally, I contend that the genuine bearers of mental states are, in the broad sense of the term, unitary subjects of experience, rather than persons.

I argue that conductions are a special type of inference indeed, but that this does not mean that we need to develop novel standards of inference goodness or specific argument schemes for properly assessing them. Following LNMA’s theoretical framework, I provide a semantic account of conductions and explain the interesting pragmatic properties of a certain type of conductions (i.e., balance of considerations or pro-and-con argumenta-tion) in terms of the rhetorical dimension of the speech-act of arguing., Je soutiens que les arguments conducteurs sont un type spécial d’inférence, mais que cela ne signifie pas que nous devons élaborer des nouvelles normes de bonne inférence ou de catégorie d’arguments pour les évaluer correctement. Suivant le cadre théorique de la représentation normative linguis-tique de l’argumentation, je fournis un compte rendu sémantique des arguments conducteurs et explique les pro-priétés pragmatiques intéressantes d’un certain type de ces arguments (c’est-à-dire l’équilibre des considérations ou les arguments pour et contre) en termes de dimension rhétorique de l’acte de parole d’argument., The work presented in this paper has been financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (Research project FFI2016-79317-P)

In the literature, Weak Kleene logics are usually taken as three-valued logics. However, Suszko has challenged the main idea of many-valued logic claiming thatevery logic can be presented in a two-valued fashion. In this paper, we providetwo-valued semantics for the Weak Kleene logics and for a number of four-valuedsubsystems of them. We do the same for the so-called Logics of Nonsense, which are extensions of theWeak Kleene logics with unary operators that allow looking at them as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and Logics of Formal Underterminedness (LFUs). Our aim with this work, rather than arguing for Suszko´s thesis, is to show that two-valued presentations of these peculiar logics enlighten the non-standard behavior of their logical connectives. More specically, the two-valued presentations of paraconsistent logics illustrate and clarify the disjunctive flavor of the conjunction, and dually, the two-valued presentations of paracomplete subsystems ofWeak Kleene logics reveal the conjunctive flavor of the disjunction. Fil: Da Re, Bruno. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina Fil: Szmuc, Damián Enrique. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina

We review Linnebo's Philosophy of Mathematics, briefly describing the content of the book.

In this review I briefly analyse the main elements of each chapter of the book centred in the general areas of logic, epistemology, philosophy and history of science. Most of them are developed around a fine-grained investigation on the principle of non-contradiction and the concept of consistency, inquired mainly into the broad area of paraconsistent logics. The book itself is the result of a work that was initiated on the Studia Logica conference "Trends in Logic XVI: Consistency, Contradiction, Paraconsistency and Reasoning - 40 years of CLE", held at the State University of Campinas (Unicamp), Brazil, between September 12-15, 2016.

espanolLa tesis de la subdeterminacion empirica representa uno de los mayores desafios contemporaneos en contra del realismo cientifico, sin embargo, frecuentemente se le ha considerado como un reto coherente y se ha buscado una forma de atenuar su impacto ya sea mitigando alguna posicion realista, o bien, atacando alguno de sus presupuestos mas problematicos. En este ensayo defiendo un argumento en su contra, a saber, que es una tesis que nos conduce a una reductio y que semejante resultado echa por tierra su supuesta plausibilidad como una tesis antirrealista. EnglishThe thesis of empirical underdetermination figures as one of the major contemporary challenges against scientific realism. Nevertheless, it has been fre- quently considered as a coherent challenge and a way to mitigate its impact has been sought by either weakening some realist position or attacking some of its most problematic premises. In the present essay, I defend an argument against it, namely, that it is a thesis that leads us to a reductio and that such a result defeats its alleged plausibility as an anti-realist thesis

espanolCentrando la atencion en los predicados de gusto, este articulo propone una nueva version de relativismo, cuya motivacion es un fenomeno que se ha discutido recientemente: la pluralidad de perspectivas. Tras mostrar que este fenomeno es problematico para algunas versiones de relativismo y discutir posibles respuestas que el relativista podria ofrecer, presento mi propia version. La principal caracteristica de la propuesta es la introduccion en el indice, no de un unico parametro para perspectivas, sino de una secuencia (posiblemente infinita) de tales parametros. En la ultima seccion del articulo defiendo esta propuesta de tres objeciones. EnglishFocusing on predicates of taste, this paper puts forward a novel version of relativism, motivated by a recently discussed phenomenon: perspectival plurality. After showing that the phenomenon is problematic for at least some versions of relativism and discussing several possible answers on behalf of the relativist, I put forward my own version. The main feature of the proposal is the introduction in the index not of a single parameter for perspectives, but of a (possibly infinite) sequence of such parameters. In the last part of the paper, I defend the view against three objections.

espanolEl articulo tiene como proposito analizar la nocion de contexto en algunas de las teorias mas importantes en la psicologia cognitiva. Argumentaremos que la nocion de contexto puede hacer referencia a al menos cinco ideas: la familiaridad del contenido, el formato del problema, la perspectiva del sujeto, la estructura logica distinta y el ambiente. Indagaremos las relaciones posibles entre dichas nociones de contexto y esbozaremos respuestas a dos preguntas que pueden plantearse al analisis presentado, esto es, cual es la razon por la que se tienen diferentes nociones de contexto en la psicologia cognitiva, y cual podria ser la consecuencia en los debates sobre razonamiento y racionalidad si se distinguen distintas nociones de contexto. EnglishThe purpose of this article is to analyze the notion of context in some of the most important theories of cognitive psychology. We shall argue that the notion of context can make reference to at least five different ideas: familiarity of the content, problem format, subject’s perspective, different logical structure, and environment. We shall investigate what relationships between the notions of context might be, and we shall draw to an answer two questions that can be raised to our analysis, i.e., why there are different notions of context in cognitive psychology, and what the consequences would be to reasoning and rationality debates if we distinguish different notions of context

The paper tries to show that when the deepest or foundational aspects of truth are at issue, both consequentially logical argument and rhetoric that aims to establish truth or justified conviction must engage with the being, or the irreplaceable particularity, of its audience’s members and also that of the arguer, what we refer to in ordinary language as who the person is. Beyond the existing discussion of existential rhetoric, the paper argues that this engagement with being is necessary to establish not only truth that directly concerns or turns on the arguer’s and audience’s being, but also truth or justification about fundamental aspects of things and issues in general. Further, the address of being requires us to suspend both our own and our addressees’ familiar conceptual frameworks in order to allow being to emerge in its own terms. As a result, in contrast with our usual understanding of argumentation, the rhetorician’s initial aim and procedure will be to achieve a genuine suspension of conviction and even of the appropriate concepts under which to proceed, and so to produce a fundamental confusion. The paper then outlines some consequences for rhetoric and reasoning and also the structure of the process of working with this fundamental confusion., Cet article montre que, lorsque les aspects les plus profonds ou les plus fondamentaux de la vérité sont en cause, les arguments logiques et la rhétorique visant à établir la vérité ou une conviction justifiée doivent être en relation avec l’être du raisonneur et de son auditoire ou avec la particularité irremplaçable du raisonneur et de son auditoire, ce que nous appelons dans la langue ordinaire, être avec qui la personne est. Au-delà de la discussion courante sur la rhétorique existentielle, cet article soutient que cet engagement avec l’être est nécessaire pour établir non seulement la vérité qui concerne directement l’être du raisonneur et de son auditoire, mais aussi la vérité ou la justification des aspects fondamentaux des choses et des problèmes en général. De plus, cette attention à l'être exige de nous de suspendre nos cadres conceptuels bien connus, ainsi que ceux de nos destinataires, afin de permettre à l'être d'émerger dans ses propres termes. En conséquence, contrairement à notre conception habituelle de l’argumentation, le but et la procédure du rhétoricien est de réaliser une suspension réelle de la conviction et même des concepts appropriés pour procéder, et créer ainsi une confusion fondamentale. Cet article décrit ensuite certaines conséquences pour la rhétorique et le raisonnement, ainsi que la structure du processus de travail avec cette confusion fondamentale.

When Carl Wellman (1971) introduced the reasoning-type conduction, he endorsed a dialectical view on natural language argumentation. Contemporary scholarship, by contrast, treats conductive argument predominantly on a product view. Not only did Wellman’s reasons for a dialectical view thus fall into disregard; a product-treatment of conduction also flouts the standard semantics of ‘argument’. Attempting to resolve these difficulties, our paper traces Wellman’s preference for a dialectical view to the role of defeasible warrants. These act as stand-ins for (parts of) value hierarchies that arguers of normal suasory inclination find acceptable. We also improve on extant ways of diagramming conduction and distinguish two of its structural variants., Carl Wellman (1971) a introduit la notion d’argument conducteur tout en souscrivant à une vision dialectique de l'argumentation dans le langage naturel. Les études contemporaines, en revanche, traitent un argument conducteur principalement comme un produit. Elles ont non seulement pas tenu compte des raisons avancées par Wellman pour appuyer une vision dialectique, leur interprétation qu’un argument conducteur est un produit fait également fi de la sémantique standard de «l’argumentation». Cet article explique pourquoi Wellman avait une vision dialectique du rôle des lois de passage révocables. Celles-ci agissent comme des substituts pour les (parties de) hiérarchies de valeurs que les raisonneurs, doués d’une inclination à persuader normale, trouvent acceptables. Nous améliorons également la manière de schématiser un argument conducteur et de distinguer deux de ses variantes structurelles

espanolResumen Varios problemas en la filosofia de la fisica han llevado al ‘realismo estructural ontico’, esto es, la suposicion de que en el nivel fisico fundamental no hay ‘objetos’, sino ‘estructuras’. Hay varios requerimientos que una ‘estructura’ debe satisfacer para el ‘realismo estructural ontico’. Las estructuras deben ser entidades concretas, debe haber algo que cumpla las funciones de ‘nodo’, y las relaciones no deben depender de los objetos que estan siendo relacionados. La mayoria de las ontologias tradicionales, tanto de sustratos y propiedades, como de cumulos de propiedades, parecen ser inadecuadas para satisfacer tales requerimientos. Se argumenta aqui que hay varias formas en que tales requerimientos podrian ser solventados: por relaciones nodales, por ‘hechos nodales’ primitivos y por dependencias simetricas entre objetos y relaciones. EnglishAbstract Several problems in philosophy of physics have led to ‘ontic structural realism’, i. e., the supposition that, at the fundamental physical level, there are no ‘objects’, but ‘structures’. There are various requirements that a ‘structure’ should satisfy for ‘ontic structural realism’. Structures must be concrete entities, there must be something that fulfills the role of ‘node’, and the relations of the structure must not be dependent on the objects that are being related. Most of the traditional ontologies, both of substrata and properties, and of bundles of properties, seem to be inadequate to satisfy those requirements. It is argued here that there are several ways in which those requirements can be met: by nodal relations, by primitive ‘nodal facts’, and by symmetric dependencies between objects and relations.

Causal approaches to explanation often assume that a model explains by describing features that make a difference regarding the phenomenon. Chirimuuta claims that this idea can be also used to understand non-causal explanation in computational neuroscience. She argues that mathematical principles that figure in efficient coding explanations are non-causal difference-makers. Although these principles cannot be causally altered, efficient coding models can be used to show how would the phenomenon change if the principles were modified in counterpossible situations. The problem is that efficient coding models also involve difference-makers that, prima facie, cannot be characterized as non-causal in this sense. Mathematical principles always involve variables which have counterfactual (instead of counterpossible) relations between them. However, we cannot simply assume that these difference-makers are causal. They can also be found in paradigmatic non-causal explanations and therefore they must be characterized as non-causal in some sense. I argue that, despite appearances, Chirimuuta's view can be applied to these cases. The mentioned counterfactual relations presuppose the counterpossible conditionals that describe the modification of a relevant mathematical principle. If these conditionals are the hallmark of non-causal relations, then Chirimuuta’s criterion has the desired implication that variables in mathematical principles are non-causal difference-makers.

This paper presents preliminary findings of the project [name omitted for anonymity]. This interdisciplinary project builds on Argumentation theory and developmental sociocultural psychology for the study of children’s argumentation. We reconstruct children’s inferences in adult-child and child-child dialogical interaction in conversation in different settings. We focus in particular on implicit premises using the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT) for the reconstruction of the inferential configuration of arguments. Our findings reveal that sources of misunderstandings are more often than not due to misalignments of implicit premises between adults and children; these misalignments concern material premises rather than the inferential-procedural level., Cette contribution présente les résultats préliminaires du projet «Analyse de l’argumentation implicite des enfants: reconstruction des prémisses procédurales et matérielles». Ce projet interdisciplinaire s’appuie sur la théorie de l’argumentation et sur la psychologie socioculturelle du développement pour étudier l’argumentation des enfants. Nous reconstruisons les inférences des enfants dans des interactions dialogiques au cours de conversations adulte-enfant et enfant-enfant dans différents contextes. En particulier, nous nous concentrons sur les prémisses implicites en utilisant le Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT) pour la reconstruction de la configuration inférentielle des arguments. Nos résultats révèlent que les sources de malentendus résident le plus souvent dans le non-alignement des prémisses des adultes et des enfants; et que ces non-alignements concernent plus souvent les prémisses matérielles que les procédures inférentielles.

The perennial appeal of Kantian ethics surely lies in its conception of autonomy. Kantianism tells us that the good life is fundamentally about acting in accordance with an internal rather than an external authority: a good will is simply a will in agreement with its own rational, self-constituting law. In this paper, I argue against Kantian autonomy, on the grounds that it excessively narrows our concept of the good, it confuses the difference between practical and theoretical modes of knowing the good, and it cannot respect the essential efficacy of the principles of practical reason.

J. Mayoral, Thomas S. Kuhn: la búsqueda de la estructura, Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, 2017, 523 pp.