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Copyright of Revista de Derecho Privado (0123-4366) is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia, Departmento de Derecho Civil and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Claims that GPT-4 can outperform more than 90% of human test-takers in the US Uniform Bar Examination have sparked heated debates about the impact of Generative AI (GenAI) on legal education, academic integrity, and the future of legal practice. Yet GenAI's capabilities in broader legal examination contexts – including in jurisdictions outside the US – are unclear. This study addresses this gap by evaluating GenAI's performance against students who took the 'Criminal Law' final exam at an Australian law school in Spring 2023. Various AI models and prompt engineering techniques were used to generate 10 distinct answers to the exam question. Five criminal law tutors, unaware of AI involvement, graded a mix of AI-generated and student responses. Then, the tutors were briefed on the AI-generated papers they marked and engaged in reflective semi-structured interviews. The study found that GenAI performed below the student average in questions that required detailed legal and critical analysis. However, all GenAI papers performed better than students in open-ended questions and essay writing tasks. These results provide a benchmark for the capabilities and limitations of GenAI in higher education and provide insights into the potential implications of its application to legal assessments and education, curriculum development, and the future workforce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes the use of conceptual resources from science and technology studies to historicise and investigate co-constitution of the laws of war and military computer technology, with a particular focus on the law's development in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. This approach brings into sharper relief the values of the laws of war and aid our critical analysis of its norms and practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital Constitutionalism makes sense. We can all see the problem it tries to solve. And like many other ‘constitutionalisms’, Digital Constitutionalism is a project fuelled by the institutional hope of striking a power equilibrium between competing actors. In seeking this equilibrium, however, important assumptions are made and serious questions are oversimplified.

The world we live in is constantly evolving. Humans tend to seek out simple solutions. Technology has attempted to make the world a better place for people to live by introducing revolutionary technologies intended to reduce human labor and raise the standard of living. As technology advances rapidly, artificial intelligence's function shifts from novelty to necessity, changing established conventions. Artificial intelligence ("AI") is the development of machine technology to mimic human intelligence, resulting in increased efficiency in the performance of jobs previously undertaken by humans. Over time, research into AI has revealed that it is a fascinating contribution to the world of technology as we know it, as well as other fields of human endeavor such as legal practice, justice administration, financial services, insurance, health, and so on. In the field of law, the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) in developed countries has had an impact on their legal systems. For example, in many jurisdictions' civil and criminal proceedings, electronic evidence is admissible in court because of technology and artificial intelligence. With that said, it is nearly impossible for a legal practitioner to do well without technology due to its efficacy; that is, the introduction of Artificial Intelligence into Law will make the creation of legal databases easier and portable, communication and processing faster and more efficient, and, most importantly, data research easier and more reliable. This article investigates artificial intelligence (AI) and the benefits it could bring to Nigeria's court system if properly implemented. It adopts the doctrinal approach of research and concludes that AI will go a long way in improving the judicial system in Nigeria. It recommends that the Nigerian government and all relevant stakeholders should ensure that AI is introduced to the judicial system in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human nature being what it is, individuals engaging in unlawful activity will often seek to avoid having their misconduct detected by law enforcement. This article provides the first legal analysis of what are termed detection avoidance measures, and evaluates whether, and how, they should be subject to criminalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital Constitutionalism makes sense. We can all see the problem it tries to solve. And like many other 'constitutionalisms', Digital Constitutionalism is a project fuelled by the institutional hope of striking a power equilibrium between competing actors. In seeking this equilibrium, however, important assumptions are made and serious questions are oversimplified. Firstly, Digital Constitutionalism ignores the production logics of digital technologies thereby mistaking 'objects' with 'subjects'. Secondly, Digital Constitutionalism's myopic lenses lead to narrations of 'constitutional moments' caused by digital powers and digital revolutions, separate from the histories of private corporations in the global stage. Finally, Digital Constitutionalism falsely implies the absence of law rather than its presence – or indeed irrelevance – as major causes of this 'constitutional crisis'. On this account, it seeks to respond to the 'digital revolution' with a 'legal revolution'. Against this background, this Article invites legal scholars to look back to think differently, and to engage critically with the long evolution of legal regulation that has enabled the emergence of the corporate form and the consolidation of economic and political power on the global stage. This historicisation may ultimately lead us to turn inward and reflect on the role of legal experts and professionals in the political economy of technology. It may even inspire us to break free from restraining mental maps and thinking patterns and to unlock novel intellectual and methodological pathways in the field of Law and Technology. And if it takes a Digital Constitutionalism to come to this, it will have been worth it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can law graduates contribute to the development of fair technology in a world where rapid technological innovation often outpaces societal considerations? This paper explores the gap between the skills required for a career in "responsible tech" and the skills taught in law and technology courses in the UK. It uses a literature review to identify four types of skills that are relevant for job applicants in this field: technological skills, legal knowledge, context awareness and soft skills. It then analyses 200 job advertisements from three "responsible tech" job boards to determine which skills are most in demand by employers. Finally, it discusses these findings in the light of the current state of law and technology education in the UK. The paper argues that there is a need for more alignment between law and technology curricula and the real-world needs of the "responsible tech" sector. It also suggests some ways to improve legal education in this area, such as interdisciplinary collaboration, experiential learning and critical thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article applies the critical lens of sphere transgression to the field of law, with a particular focus on legal dispute resolution. The engagement of technology corporations with dispute resolution is described in terms of either facilitation or disruption, depending on whether the corporations aim at modernizing the existing justice system, or substituting it with their own adjudicative institutions. The article argues that, while facilitation can be understood as a transgression of technology into the sphere of law, disruption ultimately amounts to a counter-transgression of law into the sphere of digital goods. These observations help illustrate the usefulness of sphere transgression as a critical lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Litigation is a creature of disagreement. Our essay explores the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) to help reduce legal disagreements. In any litigation, parties disagree over the facts, the law, or how the law applies to the facts. The source of the parties' disagreements matters. It may determine the extent to which AI can help resolve their disputes. AI is helpful in clarifying the parties' misunderstanding over how well-defined questions of law apply to their facts. But AI may be less helpful when parties disagree on questions of fact where the prevailing facts dictate the legal outcome. The private nature of information underlying these factual disagreements typically fall outside the strengths of AI's computational leverage over publicly available data. A further complication: parties may disagree about which rule should govern the dispute, which can arise irrespective of whether they agree or disagree over questions of facts. Accordingly, while AI can provide clarity over legal precedent, it often may be insufficient to provide clarity over legal disputes. This article is part of the theme issue 'A complexity science approach to law and governance'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Direito GV is the property of Fundacao Getulio Vargas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

It is conventionally argued that because an artificially-intelligent (AI) system acts autonomously, its makers cannot easily be held liable should the system's actions harm. Since the system cannot be liable on its own account either, existing laws expose victims to accountability gaps and need to be reformed. Recent legal instruments have nonetheless established obligations against AI developers and providers. Drawing on attribution theory, this paper examines how these seemingly opposing positions are shaped by the ways in which AI systems are conceptualised. Specifically, folk dispositionism underpins conventional legal discourse on AI liability, personality, publications, and inventions and leads us towards problematic legal outcomes. Examining the technology and terminology driving contemporary AI systems, the paper contends that AI systems are better conceptualised instead as situational characters whose actions remain constrained by their programming. Properly viewing AI systems as such illuminates how existing legal doctrines could be sensibly applied to AI and reinforces emerging calls for placing greater scrutiny on the broader AI ecosystem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January 2023 the International Seabed Authority (ISA), an intergovernmental organization established under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) granted already thirty contracts for exploration of Deep Seabed Mining, but exploitation has not started yet because ISA has not finalized its regulations, expected in 2025. This article intends to address to what extent is the current deep Seabed mining regime factoring risks and uncertainties in a just and sustainable manner in the current legal framework on environmental liability embedded in the green energy transition's processes with the EU as case study and enquiry if there are baseline or best practice to learn from. It unravels which type of precautionary approach fits and is just. Deep Seabed Mining is also a social justice, ethical dilemma demanding equitable and share solutions to the benefit of current and future generations because activities of this kind can destroy ecosystems that can take decades to regenerate, if not causing irreversible damage. Law and technology, but also technology will be crucial as new methods guaranteeing an "environmental benign Deep Seabed Mining" will determine how liability law will be shaped. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The governance of artificial intelligence (AI) is at a historical juncture. Legislative acts, global treaties, export controls, and technical standards are now dominating the discourse over what used to be a predominantly market-driven space. Amidst all this frenzy, this paper explains why none of these projects will achieve 'alignment' of AI with the prospect of a sustainable model of production authentically committed to the rights and freedoms of people and communities. By reflecting on the role of law in consolidating the visions and logics of few multinationals in the global value chains of AI, it warns against the peril of regulating AI without looking at the methods and logistics of its material production. Following a detailed overview of the various (techno-)legal ways through which law enables the flow of materials, capital, and power from Global South to Global North, and from small players to lead firms, the paper concludes with some preliminary thoughts on a transformative agenda for the transnational regulation of infocomputational production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Microgrid' is a broad concept that is not determined by a single technical definition. This fact is reflected in the academic literature, which agrees that there is no universal definition of microgrids. While this broad understanding might be beneficial for allowing a broad variety of microgrids, from a legal perspective the absence of a common understanding constitutes a barrier to the development of microgrids. Therefore, this article builds upon an extensive literature review to isolate the most salient characteristics of microgrids and proposes a few key elements that any legal definition of microgrids should include, primarily for the European Union's legal framework, but also applicable to other jurisdictions. It also provides preliminary advice for a legal regime for microgrids that would allow adapting their organisation in terms of ownership and operation to the local context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US drone strike programme has prompted debate between pro- and anti-drone lawyers over interpretations of self-defence and the laws of war. The debate frequently neglects the effects of drone technology on interpreting these laws. This article argues that drone strikes are best understood as techno-legal assemblages that combine technoscience and law to make killing lawful. The argument proceeds in three parts. Part one analyses the formal legal debate concerning drone strikes. The seeds of the debate are in the US’s response to terrorism in the 1980s, when it developed legal strategies to overcome the obstacles of territorial sovereignty and the ban on assassination. The contemporary debate on the law of self-defence divides into supporters and critics of the US’s legal position. However, the debate neglects what critical drone scholars have argued is an essential link between drone technology and legal ambiguity. Part two analyses the technoscientific practices of drone strikes and how they interpret and implement the laws of war. Armed drones are part of a widespread surveillance system that converts people into information, which the US uses to target individuals. The thresholds that distinguish between military and civilian objects, and that delineate the spaces, temporal order, and legal subjects of conflict, are all interpreted through the lens of the surveillance system. These techno-legal practices become a legal justification for drone killing that goes beyond positive law. Part three argues that drone strikes are techno-legal assemblages that are part of a general collective of assemblages of control. The enmeshing of law and technology in drone strikes reflects the expansion of the law to cover more subjects and more areas. Drone strikes, then, are not a radical break from the law, but a techno-legal continuation of patterns of colonial warfare.

The development and interest in decision-making that is or can be automated have opened the doors of debate regarding the form and substance of related means of regulating its application. Part of this discourse involves proposals advocating for the creation of a new human right not to be subject to an automated decision. This article questions whether such a right is necessary in light of existing substantive rules under legal frameworks already applicable to automated decision-making, specifically data protection, non-discrimination and human rights. There are also procedural challenges requiring treatment if automated decision-making is to be adequately addressed by application of the law. Exploring these challenges helps appreciate the significance of ensuring that existing substantive law is better implemented for the purpose of protecting human beings in settings where automated decision-making poses risks to individuals and groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Countries all over the world document their statutory law in official legal databases (OLD), but the extent to which these provide effective access to (statutory) law remains unexamined. Ideally, an OLD should be (i) provided online and free for all without requiring registration or payment, (ii) searchable with regard to statutes' titles, (iii) searchable with regard to the full texts of statutes, (iv) provided in a reusable text-based format and (v) comprehensive in its coverage of at least the laws currently in force. To highlight the nature of OLDs as consumer products, we borrow a term from business operations research and refer to a database fulfilling these basic criteria as a 'minimum viable' OLD. We survey 204 states and jurisdictions to assess how far their country-level OLDs adhere to the minimum viability standard. We find that only 48% of them do; 12% of states do not seem to offer any online OLD at all; and a further 40% of countries offer legal databases that lack at least one of the criteria listed above. The quality of legal access is associated with geographical distribution (with Europe faring the best), economic development and a population's overall Internet usage. The results suggest that comparative legal research faces considerable hurdles when dealing with the Global South; that metadata-enriched digitalisation of legal corpora still remains a desideratum for at least half the world; and that the inaccessibility of law may carry high costs for legal practitioners and the wider public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technological innovations can significantly impact market structures and the behavior of actors, necessitating legal changes. However, in the face of technological changes brought by sharing economy, there is a differential in the responsiveness of rule-making institutions across different jurisdictions. This article analyses the rule-making institutions that allow for the regulatory changes procured by Uber and the institutional impediments that may restrict jurisdiction in accommodating this type of crowd-based technological disrupters. Uber's non-adoption in Hong Kong is compared to its success in the United States to evaluate the limitations of rule-making institutions in responding to the legal change required by sharing economy companies. Changes in the rule-making institutions themselves may be needed to accelerate technological innovations and economic growth. This article suggests that there is a lack of institutional adaptability in Hong Kong, where the rule-making institutions are unable to facilitate potential regulatory reform. While the feasibility of changing a particular jurisdiction's electoral system and political systems may be low, jurisdictions can improve the accountability of their executive regulators by modifying the incentive structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the past decade, a small but rapidly growing number of Law&Tech scholars have been applying algorithmic methods in their legal research. This Article does it too, for the sake of saving disclosure regulation failure: a normative strategy that has long been considered dead by legal scholars, but conspicuously abused by rule-makers. Existing proposals to revive disclosure duties, however, either focus on the industry policies (e.g. seeking to reduce consumers' costs of reading) or on rulemaking (e.g. by simplifying linguistic intricacies). But failure may well depend on both. Therefore, this Article develops a 'comprehensive approach', suggesting to use computational tools to cope with linguistic and behavioral failures at both the enactment and implementation phases of disclosure duties, thus filling a void in the Law & Tech scholarship. Specifically, it outlines how algorithmic tools can be used in a holistic manner to address the many failures of disclosures from the rulemaking in parliament to consumer screens. It suggests a multi-layered design where lawmakers deploy three tools in order to produce optimal disclosure rules: machine learning, natural language processing, and behavioral experimentation through regulatory sandboxes. To clarify how and why these tasks should be performed, disclosures in the contexts of online contract terms and privacy online are taken as examples. Because algorithmic rulemaking is frequently met with well-justified skepticism, problems of its compatibility with legitimacy, efficacy and proportionality are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt‐out 'class actions' using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re‐enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aims to analyze the paradigm article published by researchers from OpenAI, OpenResearch, and the University of Pennsylvania on March 23, 2023, reporting on the possible impacts of generative transformative AI (GPT) on the American labor market. From the analysis of the article and definition of an assessment of points of interest for the Brazilian Legal field, an enumeration of hypotheses will be structured to meet the objective of this paper. To guide the analytical, evaluative, and descriptive approach, the paper will also rely on other scientific articles published in databases as well as institutionally available statistical elements. Using the deductive method, this paper presents formulations, highlighting the higher probability of GPTs' impact on legal work, including that which requires more time to develop skills, except for applications of sophisticated scientific knowledge or that require critical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do we talk about changing the law? This article considers the rhetoric of law reform and what it can tell us about the current relationships between key institutions involved in the relevant processes. A key claim is that the rhetoric deployed in formulating proposals can complicate the fate of law reform projects as they develop. Several examples from private and criminal law are used to support the argument, with assessment of the interaction of time and legal development. The language of 'modernisation'—a noticeable theme in contemporary proposals from the Law Commission of England and Wales—is scrutinised. The Commission's statutory functions expressly include 'the repeal of obsolete and unnecessary enactments... and generally the simplification and modernisation of the law', but what 'modernisation' means in this area has, so far, been under-examined. The author then goes on to identify attitudinal and structural tensions in the current relationship between the Law Commission and Government. Constructive suggestions are offered for reforming our law reform practices. The way in which we talk about law reform can be understood as both a cause and symptom of some of the problems in developing the law today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does proportionality reasoning mean for decision support in international humanitarian law (IHL)? We first consider contemporary IHL commentaries on proportionality as an analogue form of decision support through a paradigmatic example. Over time, proportionality in IHL has changed from being a rule-specific space for discretionary decision making to a much broader compromise-seeking within boundaries marked by law. Today, proportionality is a master norm in IHL, remaking rules by stealth and enabling the accommodation of novel master technologies as lawful. Artificial Intelligence (AI) support for military decision making is one such master technology that resonates particularly well with the inner structure of proportionality thinking: both build on cost-benefit analysis and engender the quantification of the world through data collection. We analyse how cost-benefit analysis and digitalization and algorithmic processing intersect in the U.S. legal context, to then proliferate into U.S. warfare and decision support systems, and onwards into IHL. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The US drone strike programme has prompted debate between pro- and anti-drone lawyers over interpretations of self-defence and the laws of war. The debate frequently neglects the effects of drone technology on interpreting these laws. This article argues that drone strikes are best understood as techno-legal assemblages that combine technoscience and law to make killing lawful. The argument proceeds in three parts. Part one analyses the formal legal debate concerning drone strikes. The seeds of the debate are in the US's response to terrorism in the 1980s, when it developed legal strategies to overcome the obstacles of territorial sovereignty and the ban on assassination. The contemporary debate on the law of self-defence divides into supporters and critics of the US's legal position. However, the debate neglects what critical drone scholars have argued is an essential link between drone technology and legal ambiguity. Part two analyses the technoscientific practices of drone strikes and how they interpret and implement the laws of war. Armed drones are part of a widespread surveillance system that converts people into information, which the US uses to target individuals. The thresholds that distinguish between military and civilian objects, and that delineate the spaces, temporal order, and legal subjects of conflict, are all interpreted through the lens of the surveillance system. These techno-legal practices become a legal justification for drone killing that goes beyond positive law. Part three argues that drone strikes are techno-legal assemblages that are part of a general collective of assemblages of control. The enmeshing of law and technology in drone strikes reflects the expansion of the law to cover more subjects and more areas. Drone strikes, then, are not a radical break from the law, but a techno-legal continuation of patterns of colonial warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Law schools are increasingly pressured to rethink the character of next generation research, policy impact and curricular training in the wake of computer-oriented technologies. For all its heralded importance and the proliferation of markets and talk around the topic of law and technology within the law school industry, there are still no systematic scholarly attempts to understand how these dynamics currently play out in practice for law schools, what such an investigation might tell us about the present and future composition of legal academia, or how one might begin in the first place to even identify, gather and make sense of data toward these ends. The purpose of this paper is two-fold: on the one hand, to analyse the methodological and theoretical challenges involved in this sort of blended empirical/qualitative study that might be applied to similar studies in any global context, and on the other hand, to draw out a clearer picture of the dynamics of organizational change in US law schools in relation to the phenomena of digital technologies – and all too often underexplored, to unpack some of the dynamics of culture, profession and wealth at play. In more vernacular terms, our aim here is to get a better sense of how and what we talk about when we talk about law and technology as legal academics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) technologies, individuals use electronic 'wallets' to collect information ('credentials') from various parties about themselves and present this information to (possibly other) parties. The context in which the information is presented, or used, is often different from the context in which a credential with this information is created and issued. In this paper, we illustrate this with financial guardianship, which is created by a judge in an official court procedure and which gives the guardian rights and duties that can or need to be invoked vis-avis a party not being the court. In this illustration, we explore (i) the application of SSI in the context of financial guardianship, (ii) what is characteristic about the gap between the practical (legal) and technical perspective, and (iii) what needs to be done to overcome the challenges. We observe gaps between the legal and technical reality. We offer insights into how to advance the application of SSI in the context of financial guardianship, and possibly beyond, which may be taken up in future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to analyze the impact of the Brazilian National Council of Justice (CNJ) policies on the digital transformation of the Judiciary, providing reflections on the need for this in light of the rapid changes in social and economic dynamics that have taken place in recent decades, including technological disruptions. For that, a brief contextualization of the Brazilian Judiciary will be carried out, followed by the presentation of the CNJ Program Justice 4.0 and its initiatives over the years 2020-2022 in the construction of the so-called Judiciary 4.0, adapting the millenary institution to contemporary society and new times and establishing the concepts of online courts and digital justice as the best way to expand access to justice and to increase judiciary efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central banks and governments all over the world are increasingly exploring digital versions of fiat money, known as retail Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs). Most initiatives rely on Distributed Ledger Technologies and are presented as alternatives to physical cash. Consequently, anonymity-related regulatory questions have naturally started to arise in terms of Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing compliance. Against this backdrop, this paper provides a techno-legal taxonomy of approaches to balance privacy and transparency in CBDCs without thwarting accountability, but it also underlines cross-sectoral impacts. The contribution heeds regulation-by-design as its core methodological foundation, with Privacy-Enhancing Technologies as the relevant use case. Thus, it highlights that not only technology aids legal purposes, but also that some regulatory requirements ought to be designed into technology for one to reach agreed-upon results and/or standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Catalana de Dret Públic is the property of Revista Catalana de Dret Public and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article examines the history of technological policing in Germany from the 1970s to today. Combining perspectives from intellectual history and legal theory, it explores the ideas and practices of Horst Herold, former President of the German Federal Criminal Police Agency. Herold's thought was both deeply influenced by cybernetics, a form of techno-utopian thought developed during World War II as well as the basis on which technological policing was first put to the test in Germany. The article illustrates Herold's hopes for a cybernetic transformation of police, law, and society. It locates Herold's cybernetic legal theory within a broader context of shifting legal paradigms of German public law towards the so-called preventive state in the 1970s and 80s. Crucially, an anti-legal affect is revealed to lie at the center of Herold's ideas. His concept of cybernetics ultimately serves to supplant the rule of law. In the concluding part, the article assesses Herold's legacy and attempts to both critique it and point towards a productive way forward by invoking modern, second-order order cybernetics. The article argues—perhaps counterintuitively—that Herold's ultimate failure was not adapting cybernetics but rather not staying with it all the way, supplanting its weaknesses, and drawing on its strengths. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]