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O presente artigo investiga a conexão entre modalidade e tempo em dois mestres de artes Parisienses ativos na primeira metade do século 14, João Buridan (c. 1290-c. 1361) e João de Jandun (c. 1286-c. 1328). Busca-se elucidar a abordagem de ambos acerca da natureza dessa relação em um conjunto de textos pouco explorados nos debates sobre a interpretação de modalidades medievais, a saber, os comentários ao fim do primeiro livro do De Caelo de Aristóteles. A interpretação da relação entre o ‘necessário’ e o que ‘sempre é’ nesse texto recebera interpretações divergentes sobre a controversa assimilação de necessidade e omnitemporalidade em concepções pré-modernas das modalidades. Por meio da análise do debate em torno das passagens Aristotélicas do De Caelo, posto por ambos os filósofos pertencentes ao milieu da Faculdade de Artes em Paris, o artigo demonstra que tal assimilação não era consensual. Através do contraste entre as análises de Jandun e Buridan, conclui-se que, embora Buridan acomode a necessidade temporal pressuposta no De Caelo enquanto necessidade condicional, ele desenvolve uma crítica da validade geral dos argumentos de Aristóteles no que tange a modalidades absolutas

Pese al auge actual de los desarrollos teóricos respecto de la prueba de los hechos en el derecho, constituye todavía una asignatura pendiente el reconstruir adecuadamente una lógica de la prueba. En el presente trabajo se presentarán algunas ideas preliminares para una reconstrucción semejante. Suponiendo ya cumplida la producción y valoración de ciertos elementos de prueba en un proceso, se explorarán cuáles resultarían candidatos adecuados para tomar como principios básicos de una lógica de la prueba, examinando las similitudes y diferencias del sistema resultante con otros sistemas de lógicas modales con los que guardan analogías, en particular la lógica alética, la lógica deóntica, la lógica epistémica y la lógica de la verdad.

Copyright of Human Review is the property of Eagora Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Estudios Filosóficos is the property of Estudios Filosoficos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Praxis Filosófica is the property of Universidad del Valle and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Esse trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar uma semântica de vizinhança para uma particular lógica modal, a lógica proposicional do plaus´ıvel. A lógica do plaus´ıvel foi introduzida no contexto das lógicas moduladas, para tratar de um quantificador não clássico, o qual tem seus modelos vinculados com uma variação do conceito de espaço topológico. Esta estrutura matemática de espaço pseudo-topológico pode ser destacada do ambiente das lógicas moduladas e se transformar num modelo para uma lógica proposicional, em que os seus operadores interpretam os operadores lógicos usuais e também um operador de caráter modal. Assim, por ser uma lógica modal não normal, a lógica proposicional do plaus´ıvel não admite uma usual semântica de Kripke, mas com algum contorno assente em semântica de vizinhança, uma semântica relacional.

Este artículo reexamina los conceptos interdisciplinario, complejo, el cuidado y enfermería. Lo que busca es argumentar que la noción de enfermería y el cuidado, como propiedad esencial de esta, siempre lleva a ser una interdisciplina. Se parte de la noción de holístico, que suele usarse como concepto contrario de específico en las intervenciones de enfermería, y que se relaciona con el objeto formal propio de esta: el cuidado. A partir de estos dos elementos se propone y defiende que el mejor término para describir su objeto es complejo, considerando la propuesta de Rolando García de sistema complejo, para defender a la enfermería como un todo complejo, incluso al compararla con los elementos teóricos (como los de la enfermería) y las evidencias empíricas de testimonios de la práctica de la enfermería. Por último, se muestra que la ética es un ejemplo de esa realidad compleja de la profesión del cuidar. Se concluye con una reflexión final.

In this work some theses exposed in "Sobre proposiciones a priori y contingentes y a posteriori y necesarias considerando teoremas geométricos elementales". In particular, the notions of necessity, possibility, impossibility, and contingency are introduced according to Ramsey's conceptions in his writings on mathematical logic and philosophy of mathematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ao propor a crítica da razão lógica em Lógica Formal e Transcendental, Edmund Husserl ampliou sua concepção de lógica e constatou uma lacuna dos Prolegômenos à Lógica Pura: a ausência da consideração da noção de modalidade. O artigo reflete sobre a alteração na concepção de lógica pura a partir da perspectiva modal e sua importância para a filosofia husserliana. A afirmação da dimensão modal aparece em fragmentos espalhados pela obra do autor e inspira hipóteses sobre a interpretação do desenvolvimento de seu pensamento, mas também abre perspectivas sobre o alcance da crítica da razão lógica proposta por Husserl.

This paper reexamines the concepts of interdisciplinary, complexity, care and nursing. The main target is to argue that the notion of nursing and care, as an essential property of this, always leads to the interdisciplinary approach. It is based on the holistic idea of care which is used as an opposite concept of specific nursing interventions, and which is related to the formal object of this: care. From these two elements, it is proposed and defended that the best term to describe its purpose is complex, considering Rolando Garcia's proposal of a complex system. To support nursing a complex whole, even when it's compared with theoretical elements (such as nursing elements) and the empirical evidence of the nursing practice. Finally, it is shown that ethics is an example of that complex reality of the caring profession. It concludes with a final reflection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Metafísica y Persona. Revista Sobre Filosofía, Conocimiento y Vida is the property of Universidad Popular Autonoma del Estado de Puebla A.C. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Studia Poliana is the property of Studia Poliana and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A-priori reasonings for God's existence by Leibniz are compared to a non-modal argument by G. Mavrodes and to recent modal reformulations of St. Anselm's ontological approach, Leibniz's principle that “if the necessary can be, then it is” and St, Bonaventure's “necessity of contingency” are examined with Kant's pre-critical “foundation of possibility” proof Traditional exemplarism (as in St. Augustine), it is suggested, grounds current and scholastic modal theory, and reflects an integrated world-view at once Christian and philosophical.

Tarski presented his definition of consequence operator to explain the most important notions which any logical consequence concept must contemplate. A Tarski space is a pair constituted by a nonempty set and a consequence operator. This structure characterizes an almost topological space. This paper presents an algebraic view of the Tarski spaces and introduces a modal propositional logic which has as a model exactly the closed sets of a Tarski space.

In this paper we are going to deal with a paradox related to metaphysical possibilities - possibilities ruled out by modal metaphysical principles. For our purposes here, the relevant modal principle that we are concerned about is linked to essentiality of the material composition of an artefact. It will be presented here some of the many different formulations for the modal paradox available in literature. There are so many different version of the paradox. Actually, each philosopher who has written about the subject matter usually offer his own version of the paradox. As soon as the paradox's version have been presented, it will be advanced some solutions to the modal paradox available in the literature. Beginning with some more general solutions which go against either essentialist theses or modal discourse itself. And then, presenting some of the more important solutions properly to the modal paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The so-called "problem of theoretical terms" first formulated by Sneed (1971) arises from the interpretation of theoretical terms according to the Inherited Conception. This reading is not consistent with the indirect interpretation of theoretical terms made by Carnap (1937, 1939) using postulates. These texts propose a holistic interpretation of scientific theories, that can only be properly treated in possible-world semantics. Andreas (2008, 2010) provides a modal treatment of theoretical terms; we present these results in terms of Kripkean models; then extend them so as to distinguish between axioms and theoretical sentences, generating a model capable of treating them in a differentiated matter and offering new logical and philosophical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

En este artículo argumentamos que, al contrario de lo sostenido por los defensores del ficcionalismo, el logicismo en la versión si-entoncista profesada por Russell antes de la publicación de Principia Mathematica, es una concepción bastante próxima al ficcionalismo, al menos en la versión profesada por H. Field. Apoyamos esta tesis de similaridad examinando, por una parte, cada una de las concepciones defendidas por Russell en el mencionado período y, por otra, confrontando ambas visiones en relación a la cuestión de la aplicabilidad de la matemática. Finalmente, mostramos que dichas visiones pueden ser caracterizadas mediante una condición no-constructiva sobre los modelos, la condición de serialidad, lo que aún sigue favoreciendo filosóficamente al si-entoncismo por sobre el ficcionalismo, pese a las implicaciones realistas de tal condición.

Este ensayo emplea las nociones de juego de lenguaje y de equivalencia entre juegos para examinar la decisión de John Nash de no jugar el juego coalicional que propuso John von Neumann. El argumento central es que Nash concibió una clase de mundos posibles incompatible con la de von Neumann, y que en el origen de esa divergencia estarían sus distintas nociones de racionalidad.

Logic, as a knowledge instrument, was developed since and during the preaching of the Gospel in our American lands. The New Spain authors make use of the square of opposition —which they spread to unsuspected points— in order to introduce their logic doctrine. In this work I will show some of the square uses in the temporal and modal logic, and Tomás de Mercado’s quantified modality. The square’s logical doctrine and its uses can be compared to nowadays logic’s extensions.

The justification for alternative calculi based on particular cases that seem to conflict with the truth-table of the standard conditional is here analyzed. We advocate a more thorough examination of oft-repeated examples and a search for different kinds of new ones. Leibniz's interpretation of legal statements as probable hypotheticals is mentioned as a model for the type of work proposed in this paper. Although several kinds of conditionals are usually distinguished in logic textbooks, counterfactuals are almost always placed together as a single category. We propose here that several kinds of counterfactuals can be distinguished from a logical perspective; some of them are mentioned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia is the property of Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Se presenta como extensión del cálculo proposicional clásico, el sistema deductivo LT: lógica de las tautologías. En el sistema LT, se formalizan las nociones meta-lógicas de tautología, contradicción, satisfacible, refutable y contingencia. El sistema LT, es caracterizado con una semántica al estilo Kripke, y puede ser visto como una extensión del sistema de lógica modal S5. MSC: 03B45

Se presentan como extensiones del cálculo proposicional clásico las jerarquías de sistemas deductivos LER–n y LDR–n, con n ≥ 1. LER–n es la Lógica epistémica con restricciones de profundidad–n, LDR–n es la Lógica doxástica con restricciones de profundidad–n. Los sistemas LER–1 y LDR–1 son el cálculo proposicional clásico. El sistema LER–(n + 1) puede ser visto como el resultado de aplicar la regla: de X se infiere +X, una vez a los teoremas del sistema LER–n, además, se restringe la validez de los axiomas +(X → Y ) → (+X → +Y ) y +X → X en términos de la profundidad (complejidad respecto al operador +) de X y de Y , y también se incluyen versiones generalizadas y con restricciones de los axiomas de introspección positiva y negativa. El sistema LER resulta de la reunión de los sistemas de la jerarquía, y puede ser visto como el sistema de Lógica modal S5 con diversos tipos de restricciones. Cambiando +X → X por +X → ~+~ X se construye la jerarquía LDR–n y el sistema LDR; este último puede ser visto como el sistema de Lógica modal KD45 con diversos tipos de restricciones. Los sistemas son caracterizados con semánticas de mundos posibles encajados, con las cuales se le imponen, al problema de la omnisciencia Lógica, ciertos límites. MSC: 03B42, 03B45

Se presentan las jerarquías de sistemas SCR–nT4, SCR–nT5 y SCR–nD45 con n > 3, en las cuales se formaliza la noción de creencia en el sentido de creencia justificada, de conocimiento y de convicción respectivamente, dando como resultado sistemas de lógicas doxásticas y epistémicas en los cuales el problema de la omnisciencia lógica puede ser parcialmente controlado. Los sistemas son caracterizados con sem´anticas al estilo Kripke, en las cuales, la longitud de las cadenas de mundos posibles se encuentra restringida en función del tipo de razonador. Así, la profundidad de un modelo corresponde a la longitud máxima de las cadenas de mundos posibles que figuren en el modelo, resultando que los modelos de profundidad n se encuentran asociados a los sistemas deductivos SCR–nT4, SCR–nT5 y SCR–nD45. PACS: 07.05.Mh MSC: 03B45, 03B42

Necessitism about individuals claims that necessarily every individual necessarily exists. An analogous necessitist thesis attributes necessary existence to properties and relations. Both theses have been defended by Williamson. Furthermore, Williamson specifically argues against the hybrid conjunction of first-order contingentism (the negation of necessitism about individuals) and higher-order necessitism; a combination that would bring about additional drawbacks. I work out a defence of the hybrid combination, including some replies to Williamson's additional objections. Considerations of ontological parsimony and pretheoretical intuitions favour the hybrid view over necessitism at all orders (which Williamson mainly defends by invoking considerations of simplicity). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A reply is attempted here to those who say that the rejection of the ontological proof for the existence of God is due to a failure to understand it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El texto presenta una reflexión con respecto al rescate y la exclusión del sujeto. El sujeto es entendido como una entidad que despierta con la perspectiva en la pintura, y luego se consolida con la ciencia. Se evidencia que el sujeto se disuelve en el todo de su cultura, en tanto queda excluido cuando la perspectiva establece una manera universal de pintar cualquier cosa. El texto cierra con una posición sobre lo que sería una condición específica de lo humano, vista desde los valores de la lógica modal, a fin de indicar que el mismo sujeto es el que hace la historia.

Is presented as extension of classical propositional calculus, the deductive system LT: logic of the tautologies. In the LT system, the meta-logical notions of tautology, contradiction, refutable and contingency are formalized. The LT system, is characterized as a Kripke-style semantic, and can be seen as an extension of the modal logic system S5. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Análisis Filosófico is the property of Sociedad Argentina de Analisis Filosofico and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Are presented as extensions of classical propositional calculus hierarchies of deductive systems LDR-n and LER-n with n > 1. LER-n is the epistemic logic with restrictions, LDR-n is the doxastic logic with restrictions. The systems LER-1 and LDR-1 are the classical propositional calculus. System LER-(n + 1) can be seen as the result of applying the rule: if X is theorem of LER-n then +X is theorem of LER-(n + 1). Systems also restricts the validity of the axioms +( X> Y) -v (+X -> +Y) and +X-> X, in terms of depth (complexity with respect to the operator +) of X and Y, and also includes restricted versions of the axioms of positive and negative introspec-tion. LER system results from the union of LER-n systems, and can be seen as the S5 modal logic system with different types of restrictions. Changing +X -> X by +X -^+^X are built LDR-n and the LDR systems. LDR can be seen as the KD45 modal logic system with different types of restrictions. The systems are characterized with a embedded worlds semantics, with which the 'omniscience logical problem' is limited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can we find propositions that cannot rationally be denied in any possible world without assuming the existence of that same proposition, and so involving ourselves in a contradiction? In other words, can we find transworld propositions needing no further foundation or justification? Basically, three differing positions can be imagined: firstly, a relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are impossible; secondly, a meta-relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are possible but unnecessary; and thirdly, an absolute position, according to which such propositions are necessary. In this short essay I show that under the premise of modal logic S5 with constant domain there are ultimately founded propositions and that their existence is even necessary, and I will give some reasons for the superiority of S5 over other logics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Barcan Formula and the postulation of possibilia contradict the pretheoretical intuitive judgments of most people, which favour actualism about possible worlds. In this paper I discuss and reject two arguments against such judgments, both of which conceive wrongly the relation between possible worlds semantics (PWS) and modal natural languages. The more important argument (advanced by Williamson) assumes that the domain of the actual world is identical to the domain of @ (the index that —in PWS— represents the actual world). I develop an interpretation of PWS which elucidates why that thesis is unwarranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Este ensayo emplea las nociones de juego de lenguaje y de equivalencia entre juegos para examinar la decisión de John Nash de no jugar el juego coalicional que propuso John von Neumann. El argumento central es que Nash concibió una clase de mundos posibles incompatible con la de von Neumann, y que en el origen de esa divergencia estarían sus distintas nociones de racionalidad.

Logic, as a knowledge instrument, was developed since and during the preaching of the Gospel in our American lands. The New Spain authors make use of the square of opposition --which they spread to unsuspected points-- in order to introduce their logic doctrine. In this work I will show some of the square uses in the temporal and modal logic, and Tomás de Mercado's quantified modality. The square's logical doctrine and its uses can be compared to nowadays logic's extensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The hierarchies of systems SCR-nT4, SCR-nT5 and SCR-nD45 with n ⩾ 3 are presented. In these systems the belief notion is formalized in the sense of justified belief, of knowledge and of conviction respectively, giving systems of doxastic and epistemic logics as a result where the problem of the logical omniscience can be partially controlled. The systems are characterized with Kripke-style semantics. In these semantics, the length of the possible world chains is restricted in function of reasoner's type. Moreover, the depth of a model corresponds to the maxim length of the possible world chains that they figure in the model, being that the models of depth n are associated to the deductive systems SCR-nT4, SCR-nT5 and SCR-nD45. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the usual attribution of propositional logic to Chrysippus as its founder, it is our contention in this paper that a brief text in Analytics shows that Aristotle already knew the modus ponens, modus tollens and the affirmation of the consequent in a conditional statement. Although he does not name the corresponding rules, his terminology is similar to the one used by the Stoics. Our interpretation of the text fits in with today's propositional logic, without any need to introduce an additional rule with validity problems [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Possible worlds can be understood in different ways, and the philosophical implications of each vision differ likewise. The notion is neither primitive nor sufficient for a satisfactory explanation of modal logic. The statistical interpretation of modalities is here rejected. Possibilities are considered part of reality but not independent realities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]