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This article presents the results of an analysis of the patent trading flows of small and large firms and the determinants of these firm's patent sale and acquisition decisions. We also examine whether these transactions lead to an excessive concentration of patent rights. We show that small firms disproportionately sell and acquire more patents than large firms, and find no evidence that patent trading brings about a significant concentration of patent rights in the hands of large firms. We find that the match between new patented innovations and the original inventor's patent portfolio plays an important role in how successful firms are at generating value from their patents, and in the decision to sell a patent. And among the traded patents, we show that patent acquisitions respond to complementarities between the acquired patented innovation and the buyer's technological capabilities to adopt it. Our empirical analysis uses a new, comprehensive data set that matches information on patent trades and the identity of patent owners over a patent's lifetime.

Many organizations fund their spending out of a fixed budget that expires at year’s end. Faced with uncertainty over future spending demands, these organizations have an incentive to build a buffer stock of funds over the front end of the budget cycle. When demand does not materialize, they then rush to spend these funds on lower quality projects at the end of the year. We test these predictions using data on procurement spending by the U.S. federal government. Using data on all federal contracts from 2004 through 2009, we document that spending spikes in all major federal agencies during the 52nd week of the year as the agencies rush to exhaust expiring budget authority. Spending in the last week of the year is 4.9 times higher than the rest-of-the-year weekly average. We examine the relative quality of year-end spending using a newly available dataset that tracks the quality of $130 billion in information technology (I.T.) projects made by federal agencies. Consistent with the model, average project quality falls at the end of the year. Quality scores in the last week of the year are 2.2 to 5.6 times more likely to be below the central value. To explore the impact of allowing agencies to roll unused spending over into subsequent fiscal years, we study the I.T. contracts of an agency with special authority to roll over unused funding. We show that there is only a small end-of-year I.T. spending spike in this agency and that the one major I.T. contract this agency issued in the 52nd week of the year has a quality rating that is well above average.

This paper considers the relative efficiency of unit tax and ad valorem tax in a Cournot duopoly market in the presence of licensing opportunities after the announcement of the tax rates by the government. In case of fixed-fee licensing, if the unit cost difference of the firms is low and tax revenue of the government is high, then unit tax is more efficient than the ad valorem tax. If tax revenue of the government is low, then ad valorem tax is more efficient than unit tax. Ad valorem tax is more efficient than unit tax in the case of royalty licensing.

The article brings up the issue of identification of joint activity with other collaboration forms, in particular with cooperation, partnership, joint ventures, reorganization (merge, acquisition) since these forms also mean incorporation of entities. Purpose of the study is to find out specific features of joint activity in the context of investigation of its essence and comparison with other similar collaboration forms. The essence of the joint activity is disclosed by analysis of this notion interpretation in regulations. Main features of joint activity without establishing a legal entity are found out and substantiated. Author makes an effort to deepen the contents of the notion 'joint activity'. Interrelation is studied between joint activity and other collaboration forms of entities by comparison of organizational and methodological grounds of their implementation. Comparative analysis of joint activity is made in relation to cooperatives, investment companies. Conclusion is drawn that joint activity represents a separate business form and therefore needs relevant accounting and legal provision.

This study explores the relative contributions of large incumbent and small innovative firms in explaining the different structures and dynamics of interorganizational networks across multi-levels of analysis, egocentric, sectoral, and industrial. Empirically, we study alliance network evolution in the pharmaceutical industry and one of its major market segments, the antibody sector, from 2000 to 2007. Results show that small biotech and large pharmaceutical firms have opposite behavior and can both occupy central positions, though not at the same network level and for different durations. Key findings are that two distinct types of firms, with markedly dissimilar sizes and economic assets, shape the form and stability of alliance networks albeit each at a given level, industrial or sectoral. Consequently, network structure and stability are different at these different levels of aggregation. JEL Codes: D85, L14, L16, L20, L24, L26

Cumulative innovation is central to economic growth. Do patent rights facilitate or impede follow-on innovation? We study the causal effect of removing patent rights by court invalidation on subsequent research related to the focal patent, as measured by later citations. We exploit random allocation of judges at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to control for endogeneity of patent invalidation. Patent invalidation leads to a 50% increase in citations to the focal patent, on average, but the impact is heterogeneous and depends on characteristics of the bargaining environment. Patent rights block downstream innovation in computers, electronics, and medical instruments, but not in drugs, chemicals, or mechanical technologies. Moreover, the effect is entirely driven by invalidation of patents owned by large patentees that triggers more follow-on innovation by small firms.

Can formal contracts help resolving the holdup problem? We address this important question by studying the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer in which the seller can make relation-specific investments in each period. In contrast to previous findings, we demonstrate that writing a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. In particular, there is a range of parameter values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal fixed-price contract is written and combined with an informal agreement on additional payments or termination of future trade, contingent upon investments. Furthermore, we show that under an additional natural assumption, focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force of our result is a possibility that the threat-point effect is negative, i.e., the relation-specific investment decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very plausible, has been largely ignored in previous theoretical/empirical analyses of the holdup problem.

Using a unique and original database which combines information on the organisation of the domestic production network with data from segments of international production chains, the research work described in the article aims to present some new findings on how the Belgian economy works. One of the first points to emerge is that Belgian firms have a lot of mutual trading links. Compared to other economies, the Belgian economy seems to exhibit a relatively high degree of fragmentation of production. In addition, via trading links with import or export firms, the majority of Belgian firms are integrated – albeit indirectly – into global production chains. The question of the economy’s external competitiveness is therefore not confined to exporters alone, but extends to a very large number of firms active in a wide variety of branches of activity. In general, belonging to a fragmented production chain seems to be beneficial. Belgian firms which specialise in specific segments of the production chain fared better, and especially those active at the end of the production chain. During the economic and financial crisis, however, specialisation was actually a risk factor for firms, especially for those involved in the early stages of production. Overall, since the crisis, the trading links established by firms in the network have not made up for the links lost. It is therefore more crucial than ever to create new businesses in order to regenerate the domestic production network.

We analyze how a set of traditional as well as new determinants affect trade among European countries over the period 1992–2008. The factors encompass variables from the areas of geography, culture, institutions, infrastructure, and trade direction. Trade is analyzed for three types of goods: primary goods, parts and components, and capital goods. For each type of good we also distinguish its definiti on in terms of flows, intensive margin, and extensive margin. Methodologically we first derive country-pair fixed effects over all possible pairs of export-import partners, and in the second stage we relate fixed effects with a set of influential factors. We show (i) the intuitive and varying effects of geographical, cultural, and institutional factors, (ii) the beneficial effects of soft and hard infrastructure, and (iii) the key importance of the trade between old and new EU members.

UMR 1110 MOISA Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs : Montpellier (Cote : S WPM 2011-8)Article présenté lors de la réunion de l’équipe REGAAL-UMR MOISA, le 13 décembre 2011; Our paper aims to analyze the relationship between asymmetric alliance instability forms and motives on the one hand, and secondly to estimate the effects of the alliance configuration (external environment, relationships between parents and performance) on how to change the allocation of capital between partners of an asymmetric relationship. This article is based on the contingency approach of instability (Ghoshal, Bartlett, 1990), with an analysis of the strategy of the multinational firm, as the main outcomes condition of cooperation with small size partners. The empirical study was conducted through a review of 105 cases of unstable strategic alliances formed between MNCs and local food enterprises in the Mediterranean. Our results support the multidimensional and dynamic analysis of asymmetric cooperative relationships issues.; L’objet de cet article est d’analyser les liens entre les formes et les motifs d’instabilité d’une part, et d’estimer d’autre part les effets des facteurs de la configuration de l’alliance (environnement externe, relations entre les parents et performance de la relation) sur les modalités de modification de la répartition du capital entre les partenaires d’une relation asymétrique. Cet article s’inscrit dans une approche de la contingence des facteurs d’instabilité (Ghoshal, Bartlett, 1990), avec une analyse de la stratégie de la firme multinationale comme déterminant principal des issues des coopérations avec des partenaires de petites tailles. L’étude empirique a été menée à travers l’examen de 105 cas d’alliances stratégiques instables, formées entre des firmes multinationales et des entreprises locales agroalimentaires en Méditerranée. Nos résultats soutiennent l’analyse multidimensionnelle et dynamique des issues des relations coopératives asymétriques.

Suppliers play a major role in firms' innovation processes. We analyse ownership and technology choices in vertical R&D collaborations. Under non-contractible R&D outcomes, trade-offs arise between R&D specifically designed towards a manufacturer (increasing investment productivity) and a general technology (hold-up reduction). Stronger downstream competition shifts optimal ownership towards the supplier and favours contracting over ownership rather than specific performance contracts. Downstream ownership is combined with the specific technology if the supplier's expertise is more pronounced or the specific technology is more productive. Contracts incorporating exit clauses increase the gains from collaborations.

Motivated by empirical evidence I uncover on the dynamics of French firms’ exports , I offer a novel theory of trade frictions. Firms export only into markets where they have a contact. They search directly for new trading partners, but also use their existing network of contacts to search remotely for new partners. I characterize the dynamic formation of an international network of exporters in this model. Structurally, I estimate this model on French data and confirm its predictions regarding the distribution of the number of foreign markets accessed by exporters and the geographic distribution of exports. (JEL D85, F11, F14, L24) This paper proposes a new theory of the frictions associated with international trade, and more generally the frictions that affect the ability of firms to trade with each other. Samuelson (1954) and later Krugman (1980) recognized the key impor tance that trade frictions play not only in shaping the patterns of international trade, but also in determining relative factor prices between countries, and ultimately comparative development. Despite the central role they play in trade models, trade frictions remain largely unexplained, and we only have a very crude formalization of those frictions. Samuelson (1954), Krugman (1980) and most of the trade litera ture assume “iceberg”-type trade costs, a simple proportional cost. Melitz (2003); Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008); and Chaney (2008) recognize the impor tance of the extensive margin of trade in determining firm level and aggregate flows, and introduce a fixed cost in addition to the usual iceberg cost. Arkolakis (2010)

Using an original dataset from the Vietnamese catfish sector, we study the impact of vertical coordination options on household welfare and the implications of different stages of vertical coordination for the success of the whole sector. The welfare gain from contract farming and employment on processor-owned estate farms is estimated using a maximum simulated likelihood estimator. Our results show positive welfare effects from participating in contract farming, but not from employment on processor-owned estate farms. The results imply that contract farming presents opportunities for economic growth, but additional effort is required to make the contracts more accessible to smallholders.

Services represent a most important and dynamic frontier of international trade and investment. The steady expansion of trade in services and its relative resilience in the recent crisis, coupled with its key role in global production networks and its increasing potential in attracting investment provides new opportunities for countries to grow their economies and integrate into the global economy. Drawing on insights from current literature and relying on balance of payments and trade in value-added statistics, this paper examines the main developments shaping Romania’s services trade over the post-crisis years. Its aim is to assess whether the country is grabbing the new opportunities arising from services globalization. It finds that following the dramatic crisis-induced decline in the value and performance of Romania’s services trade, the outlook is now radically improving as evidenced by the strongly rebounding services flows and net exports. Nonetheless, the country’s integration into the global economy through services flows continues to remain below its potential.

Several recent technological standards were accompanied by patent pools—arrangements to license relevant intellectual property as a package. A key distinction made by regulators—between patents essential to a standard and patents with substitutes—has not been addressed in the theoretical literature. I show that pools of essential patents are always welfare increasing, while pools which include nonessential patents can be welfare reducing—even pools limited to complementary patents and stable under compulsory individual licensing. If pools gain commitment power and price as Stackelberg leaders, this reduces, and can reverse, the gains from welfareincreasing pools. (JEL D43, D45, K21, L13, L24, O34) hen firms with market power sell complementary goods, their combined price will typically be higher than if both were sold by a single monopolist. This effect, first understood by Cournot (1838) and later termed double marginalization, can be particularly severe in the context of intellectual property. In high-tech fields where innovation is rapid and cumulative, a large number of patents may touch on the same new technology; double marginalization can make the technology expensive to commercialize, harming downstream producers and consumers as well as the innovators the patent system was designed to reward. One tool to address this problem is a patent pool—an agreement by multiple patent holders to share a group of patents among themselves or to license them as a package to third parties. Patent pools in the United States go back to the 1850s, the first one involving sewing machine patents. Lerner and Tirole (

This study considers a Cournot duopoly market in which a clean firm can transfer its less polluting technology to a dirty firm through a fixed-fee licensing contract. We analyze the impacts of emissions taxes on the incentives of firms to transfer technology as well as on the total pollution level, and examine the properties of the optimal emissions tax policy. We first show that higher emissions taxes weaken incentives for technology transfer and that this can lead to a perverse increase in the level of total pollution. We then compare the optimal emissions tax when technology licensing is possible with that when licensing is infeasible and show that the relationship between the optimal tax rate and the degree of the initial technology gap between firms when licensing is possible can be the opposite of that when licensing is infeasible.

This paper empirically examines the dichotomous contribution for innovation, for technological exploration and market exploitation, from alliances. Using a sample from US economy-wide alliances of US Public companies and employing cross-tabulation of various classifications of alliances and parent firms, the related phenomena are investigated. Results show that alliances are predominantly undertaken by technology-intensive companies and their frequency has a direct association with the parental technological intensity. However, technological explorative purposes do not dominate in the complete sample of alliances. Many firms, whether technologically intensive or not, enter into alliances also for market exploitative purposes. This contingent phenomenon shows that alliances offer a very important additional role that is not all technology centered, but that is also deeply market centered.

The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment if and only if both tasks are successful. Yet, if the government has only a limited budget, it may be optimal to separate the tasks, so that there are two contractors each in charge of one task. In this case, high efforts in both tasks can be implemented with smaller bonus payments.

The decisions of foreign investors on technical cooperation versus equity engagements and on the degree of ownership in FDI projects are likely to depend on their relative bargaining position vis-à-vis the host country. India provides an interesting case for analyzing the interplay between country-of origin-characteristics and host-country-characteristics and their respective effects on ownership decisions since opening up its economy to FDI in the early 1990s. We perform negative binominal regressions by making use of a unique dataset on about 24,500 technical cooperation and FDI projects by investors from 45 countries of origin over the 1991- 2004 period. We find that relative market size, relative financial market development, relative risk, relative endowment of human capital and previous international experience significantly affect the type of engagement by foreign investors in post-reform India.

It is demonstrated that models of royalty rate calculations developed for licensing should not be applied to franchising because the benefits received by a licensee and a franchisee are different. It is proposed that the risk reduction generated by the franchisor’s effective technologies and the managerial support given to a franchisee also be included in the model of royalty calculation. It is demonstrated that a franchisee may wish to acquire the franchise even if the franchisor takes the full amount of additional income or if this additional income is negative.

Using a new dataset with detailed geographic information about licensing activities of the German Max Planck Society, we analyze how the probability and magnitude of commercial success are affected by geographic distance between licensors and licensees. Our evidence suggests that proximity does not generally lead to superior commercialization outcomes. A significantly negative association between distance and commercialization success is identified only for foreign licensees within the subsample of inventions licensed to more than one firm. Positive associations between distance and performance indicators are not robust to controlling for invention quality or selection into licensing.

How many \"American jobs\" have U.S.-born workers lost due to immigration and offshoring? Or, alternatively, is it possible that immigration and offshoring, by promoting cost-savings and enhanced efficiency in firms, have spurred the creation of jobs for U.S. natives? We consider a multi-sector version of the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) model with a continuum of tasks in each sector and we augment it to include immigrants with heterogeneous productivity in tasks. We use this model to jointly analyze the impact of a reduction in the costs of offshoring and of the costs of immigrating to the U.S. The model predicts that while cheaper offshoring reduces the share of natives among less skilled workers, cheaper immigration does not, but rather reduces the share of offshored jobs instead. Moreover, since both phenomena have a positive \"cost-savings\" effect they may leave unaffected, or even increase, total native employment of less skilled workers. Our model also predicts that offshoring will push natives toward jobs that are more intensive in communication-interactive skills and away from those that are manual and routine intensive. We test the predictions of the model on data for 58 U.S. manufacturing industries over the period 2000-2007 and find evidence in favor of a positive productivity effect such that immigration has a positive net effect on native employment while offshoring has no effect on it. We also find some evidence that offshoring has pushed natives toward more communication-intensive tasks while it has pushed immigrants away from them.

The patent market consists mainly of privately negotiated, bilateral transactions, either sales or cross-licenses, between large companies. There is no eBay, Amazon, New York Stock Exchange, or Kelley's Blue Book equivalent for patents, and when buyers and sellers do manage to find each other, they usually negotiate under enormous uncertainty: prices of similar patents vary widely from transaction to transaction and the terms of the transactions (including prices) are often secret and confidential. Inefficient and illiquid markets, such as the one for patents, generally create profit opportunities for intermediaries. We begin with an overview of the problems that arise in patent markets, and how traditional institutions like patent brokers, patent pools, and standard-setting organizations have sought to address them. During the last decade, a variety of novel patent intermediaries has emerged. We discuss how several online platforms have started services for buying and selling patents but have failed to gain meaningful traction. And new intermediaries that we call defensive patent aggregators and superaggregators have become quite influential and controversial in the technology industries they touch. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the role and efficiency tradeoffs of these new patent intermediaries. Finally, we offer a provisional assessment of how the new patent intermediary institutions affect economic welfare.

A large portion of world trade happens within firms’ boundaries. This paper proposes a new general equilibrium framework where firms decide whether to outsource to unaffiliated suppliers or to integrate input manufacturing. Multinational corporations and intrafirm trade arise endogenously when firms integrate production in foreign countries. Outsourcing allows to benefit from suppliers’ good technologies, but entails the cost of a mark-up price. Intrafirm sourcing allows to save on mark-ups and to match a firm’s productivity with possibly lower foreign wages. The pricing implications of the theory unveil a positive relationship between the intrafirm share of imports and the degree of differentiation across inputs in a sector, for which I find strong support in the data. Moreover, imperfect competition establishes a link between FDI liberalization and optimal pricing: suppliers find optimal to reduce their prices in response to the possibility of insourced production (the “pro-competition effect” of multinationals). The model is calibrated to match aggregate U.S. trade data, and used to quantify the gains arising from vertical multinational production and intrafirm trade. The computed gains are currently about 1% of consumption per capita, and the model shows that further liberalization can increase them substantially.

Using new data on citations to university patents and scientific publications, we study how geography affects university knowledge spillovers. Citations to patents decline sharply with distance up to about 150 miles and are strongly constrained by state borders. Distance also constrains citations to scientific publications, but the impact is less sharp and persists over greater distances. The state border effect for publications is significant only for lower quality public universities. We show that the state border effect is heterogeneous, and is strongly influenced by university and state characteristics and policies. It is larger for public universities and those with strong local development policies. The border effect is larger in states with strong non-compete laws that facilitate intrastate labor mobility, states with greater reliance on in-state educated scientists and engineers, and states with lower rates of interstate scientific labor mobility. We also confirm the impact of non-compete statutes by studying a policy reform in Michigan.

This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of relational incentive contracts. It motivates the discussion by the classic applications of relational contracts to the GM-Fisher Body relationship and the relationships between Japanese automobile manufacturers and their subcontractors. It presents basic models with symmetric information to illustrate the fundamental issues and then goes on to consider specific investments, the role of legally enforceable contracts alongside relational contracts, private information, multiple suppliers, and issues of organization design.

A widely used clause in license contracts – the field-of-use restriction (FOUR) – precludes licensees from operating outside of the technical field specified. When a technology has several distinct applications, FOUR allow the licensor to divide up his rights and attribute them to the lowest-cost producer in each field of use. This can improve production efficiency. With complex technologies, however, the boundaries of fields of use may be difficult to codify, entailing a risk of licensees' rights overlapping. We explore how this affects the optimal license contract in a moral hazard framework where the licensor's effort determines the probability of overlap. We show that depending on the contracting environment, the license agreement may include output restrictions and non‐linear royalty schemes.

Despite the expectation of various advantages, university-industry research collaboration (UIC), a relationship between two different worlds, often faces serious conflicts. The performance of UIC depends on the research partners’ strategies and institutional designs through which they seek to mitigate these conflicts and increase partner incentives. We pay special attention to the role of the university intellectual property (IP) policy, formally introduced to Japan in 2003, as the basis of UIC contracts and empirically examine its impact on the performance of UIC projects, considering the factors in firms’ participation in UIC. We argue that the university IP policy that is equitable in sharing revenue and royalty from innovative outcomes and applied flexibly according to the partner’s needs may contribute to improving project performance by enhancing the commitment of firms, and we test our hypotheses using a sample of Japanese firms obtained from our original survey. The estimation results support the hypotheses, although the mediation via the firm’s commitment only partially explains the relationship between the university IP policy and UIC performance.

There exist two approaches in the literature concerning the multina- tional …rm's mode choice for foreign production between an owned subsidiary and a licensing contract. One approach considers environments where the …rm is transfer- ring primarily knowledge-based assets. An important assumption there is that the relevant knowledge is absorbed by the local manager or licensee over the course of time: knowledge is non-excludable. More recently, a number of in‡uential papers have adopted a property-right view of the …rm, assuming the application abroad of physical capital, the owner of which retains full and exclusive rights to the capital should a relationship break down. In this paper we combine both forms of capital assets in a single model. The model predicts that foreign direct investment (owned subsidiaries) is more likely than licensing when the ratio of knowledge capital to phys- ical capital is high, or when market value is high relative to the book value of capital (high Tobin's-Q).

This paper investigates key success factors in logistics outsourcing. A model is used to illustrate outsourcing relationships and then applied to three examples from the logistics sector. The model is presented as a tool which can help managers to minimize the chance of failure by explicitly addressing key issues prior to the implementation of a partnership. In order to fully capture the complexity of the outsourcing process, the model is refined by the analysis of implementation of outsourcing methodology and the analysis of the presence of outsourcing myths in each case. We find that the implementation of outsourcing methodology is critical to successful outsourcing. Overall, we find that the main common factors leading to logistics outsourcing success, after the right third party service provider has been selected, are improved service levels and commercial viability for both parties, joint vision and objectives of the partnership, clear roles, top management commitment and support, communication and trust. The results of the case analysis shed light on what is the key to a successful outsourcing relationship and indicate how the architecture of logistics outsourcing can be analyzed and improved.

The current working paper focuses on the created context within post-merger companies provides the scope to develop new types of business, to increase the competitiveness of active companies with the economic sphere, offering new opportunities to increase productivity and efficiency of all activities. New perspectives generate significant changes for the human resources involved in the designing new strategies for work improvement. Considering the perpetual development of human capital in this new economic context we can say that using fusion strategies is an evolutionary process, which can improve business processes, the primary condition to be an ongoing review of strategies, techniques and tools companies who choose the path to this new digital economy. Failures or problems do not only belong to the past, certainly in the future will be more mergers and acquisitions will fail. Fusion and absorption difficulties will not disappear in the future, despite the terribly poor performance and errors of the past. Post merger, must bear in mind that endogenous parameters that generate highly qualified human capital migration to other companies of the human factor materializes need to resize their quality of living environment, social, economic, and those connected with company policy a major impact on the decision to leave the parent company.

This article will analyze the logic behind the adoption of Business Process Reengineering and outsourcing. The first part analyzes Business Process Reengineering as a technique for analysis and for defining the business processes implemented by organizations in order to make the achievement of corporate objectives more efficient and effective. Nevertheless, this approach has some limits when the reengineering project aims solely at cost reduction. In any event, for several activities management must constantly evaluate the alternative to turning to outsourcing. In the second part we thus observe what should be the evaluations of management in order to pursue the objectives of maximum efficiency, economic efficiency, and productivity. Starting from the methodological assumptions that aid our understanding of the outsourcing of processes and that represent the operational and conceptual framework for the existence of this approach, several models will be analyzed held to be significant for determining those processes that can be outsourced, from a “strategic” point of view, and that are useful for deciding on the shift from BPR to outsourcing.

This research is focused on achieving green growth through an environmental technology approach. Developing environmental technology we examined four elements considering the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs), research and development (R&D) expenditures, the size of the market capture by GDP and most importantly the environmental taxations. This study includes the 11 developed countries which are Austria, Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Finland, Germany, Sweden, U.K and U.S. Technology change can be better handled by panel data than by pure cross-section or pure time series. It can minimise the bias if we used the aggregate individuals or firms. Estimation techniques depend on short panel or long panel. This study used the Pooled Least Square estimation techniques like Fixed Effect Model (FEM) and random effect model (REM) for both balance period of 2000-2005 and unbalanced period from 1995-2005. The study concluded the policy formulation in making developed‘s climate resilient economies. JEL classification: O34, F19, L24 Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, Foreign Direct Investment, Technology Licensing

In UK public service broadcasting, recent regulatory change has increased the role of the private sector in television production, culminating in the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) introduction of 'creative competition' between in-house and independent television producers. Using the concept of 'cognitive variety', we focus on the increasing role of the independent sector as a source of creativity in the delivery of programming for the BBC. The paper shows that the intended benefit of introducing new competencies has been thwarted by, at the micro-level, a high level of cognitive proximity between in-house and external producers and, at the meso-level, a conflict in values between the BBC and the independent sector, with many of the larger producers responding to a commercial imperative that encourages creativity in profitable genres, but leaves gaps in other areas of provision. Tracing these meso-level institutional effects has implications for micro-level analyses of innovation, notably communities of practice theory. © The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press and the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics. All rights reserved.

We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally copied. Imitators may `enter' the market by copying the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting dramatically affects the need for patent protection. Indeed, our results reveal that: (i) Imitators wait to enter the market and the inventor becomes a temporary monopolist; (ii) The inventor offers contracts which allow resale of the knowledge by the imitators; (iii) The proffits of the inventor typically increase with the number of potential imitators.

In the globalized economy multinational firms have given rise to local firms able to produce at a low cost and at acceptable quality levels. A growing number of firms have outsourced production and manufacturing activities of all types to these firms, not only to reduce production costs but also to make their organizational structures more streamlined and flexible. Outsourcing decisions, which originally were limited to production which had a modest technological content and was of marginal importance for the business in question, is increasingly adopted for activities which, requiring core competencies or belonging to the core business, were considered inseparable from the organization and thus not outsourceable. Gradually an outsourcing strategy has developed which has found it convenient to outsource even core competencies and functions, such as specialized manufacturing, which require a particular technology, marketing, product design, and the search for know-how (Prahalad and Hamel 1990: 79-91).\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\nSuch an outsourcing strategy has a number of advantages, among which quality improvement, a greater focus on managing other core competencies, a greater flexibility and leverage regarding resources, along with the possibility of entering new markets, even ones with a high rate of development.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\nThis article analyzes the fundamental stages for an outsourcing strategy. It will demonstrate how, in order to achieve an outsourcing strategy, it is necessary to include outsourcing in the general strategy, gather suitable information for choosing the outsourcer, negotiate the contract with the supplier, choose the type of relationship to have with the supplier, and, finally, plan the transfer of activities and functions from the outsourcee to one or more outsourcers or providers.\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\r\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\n

This paper examines India’s pattern of development, on the basis of the hypothesis that India today reflects the legacy of a combination of policies simultaneously favouring and disfavouring domestic entrepreneurship. India differs from all other economic systems at the same development level in at least two respects, namely the skill intensity of exports and the variety of products. The paper discusses the challenges and opportunities which derive from India’s position in the globalization process with particular reference to outsourcing/offshoring, to the ‘second unbundling’ and to the rise of an international market of tasks. - Il lavoro esamina le caratteristiche dello sviluppo indiano, ipotizzando che l’India di oggi rifletta le conseguenze congiunte di politiche che per alcuni aspetti hanno incoraggiato l’impresa nazionale, ma per altri l’hanno ostacolata. L’India è diversa dagli altri sistemi economici caratterizzati da un grado di sviluppo comparabile da almeno due punti di vista: l’“intensità di conoscenza” delle sue esportazioni e l’ampia gamma dei suoi prodotti. Il lavoro si sofferma sulle sfide e le opportunità che derivano all’India dalla sua collocazione nel sistema globale, con particolare riferimento al processo di outsourcing/offshoring, al fenomeno noto come “secondo spacchettamento” e allo sviluppo di un mercato internazionale delle mansioni lavorative.

Open innovation has attracted extensive interest (and has raised numerous debates) in the recent literature on economics and management of innovation. If rich and stimulating, open innovation remains however a loose concept, which calls for further exploration of its shapes and stakes. This article precisely intends to 1) question the originality of the open innovation paradigm, by confronting it with other related concepts developed in the literature previously; 2) investigate more in depth the new modalities that open innovation may take in reality; and 3) discuss the rationales and challenges of the different declinations of the open innovation model by analyzing their benefits and their costs. In other words, we both summarize the state of the art on open innovation and identify research tracks worth being investigating in the future. JEL Codes: L22, L24, O32, M2

While a large body of researches discusses the effects of international subcontracting on firm dynamics, the present work deals with the similar issues of a domestic firm who subcontracts to the informal sector in a typical developing world. Theoretically, we develop a model that if the formal sector wage is higher than that of informal sector, the choice of informal sector subcontracting and in-house R&D investment appears to be alternative options to the firm to bypass expensive labour in the formal sector. We argue that the R&D and labour productivity in formal sector are highly influenced by the informal wage but not the formal sector one. Since the subcontracting can raise both supply and demand for informal workers due to a rise of formal sector wage, the movement of informal sector wage is uncertain and thereby, the formal sector R&D and labour-productivity are also ambiguous. Thus, countries with a vast segment of lowly-paid informal workers exhibit lowly-productive formal workers.

IT outsourcing is among the prevalent practices in the global business today. It is found that business organizations decide to transfer such kind of services to other firms (identified as “vendors”) mainly because of cost-related advantages. It is still not clear whether the vendors are able to provide comparative advantages from the point of view of economizing costs of the production of these ser- vices. The objective of this paper is to identify the main determinants affecting the success of IT outsourcing partnership in Bulgaria on the basis of empirical study. The paper presents selected re- sults from a survey of the outsourcing relations between Bulgarian vendor organizations and their clients (outsourcers) considering the issues of the development of successful strategic partnerships in outsourcing practices. In 2008 an empirical survey of outsourcing partnerships in 28 organizations providing high technology services has been conducted based on cases of Bulgarian vendor organiza- tions. The subject of the study was the analysis of the key determinants influencing the formation and development of strategic outsourcing partnerships between Bulgarian vendor organizations and their clients (foreign companies)."

Organizational performance is those step and state of the whole organization in which, as a result of congruent decisions and actions, are reached those targets and elements of strategic vision which satisfy all interested parts. To consumer good manufactures, satisfying the needs of new world thinking , mandatory today in industry, implies collaborative relationships which allow the companies to grow with small costs and to supply products having improved technology. Using key performance indicators (KPI) its possible to measure the global performance of alliance relationships in terms of inventories,satisfaction and delivery terms.The building process of collaborative control panel of ECR alliance between two organizations always begins with establishing of a clear strategy. This strategy has to be an inter-organizational project and, as every effective implementation project of control panel, has to offer the opportunity of cooperation between processes and organizations in order to establish common objectives. Measuring is the only way to verify the process performance and the need for eventual further actions. After the performance evaluation for the organizations using the Balanced Scorecard, the information and data will be transferred to inter-organizational project team which will incorporate it into the chain control panel. The turnover a strategic map, a control panel for measuring, targets and initiatives commonly accepted - offers to the management of alliance project the way to follow and an excellent foundation for governing the joint-venture project.

The present article contains an analysis of differences between licensing and franchising. It is demonstrated that models of royalty rate calculation developed for licensing should not be applied to franchising as benefits received by licensee and franchisee are different. It is proposed to include in the model of royalty calculation the risk reduction generated by franchisor¡¯s effective technologies and managerial support that are given to franchisee. It is demonstrated that franchisee may wish to acquire the franchise even if franchisor takes the full amount of additional income or if this additional income is negative.

To comply with laws, regulations and social demands, polluting firms increasingly purchase the needed means from specialized suppliers. This paper an- alyzes this relatively recent phenomenon. We show how environmental regulation, the size of the output market, the elasticity of demand for abatement goods and services, and the fact that in-house and outsourced abatement expenses are substitutes or complements can influence a polluter's make-or-buy decision. Specific features of abatement outsourcing are highlighted, qualifications and refinements of the theory of vertical integration are then proposed, and some consequences for environmental policy are briefly discussed.

In den letzten Jahren ist die Lizenzierung neuer Software- und Elektronikprodukte in Europa und den USA anhand einiger prominenter Fälle intensiv diskutiert worden. So gab die Europäische Kommission Anfang 2011 erst grünes Licht für die Übernahme des Sicherheitssoftware- Herstellers McAfee durch Intel, nachdem Intel sich verpflichtet hatte, wichtige Informationen über Schnittstellen seiner Produkte offen zu legen und somit die Kompatibilität mit Produkten anderer Hersteller zu gewährleisten. Zuvor spielte Technologie-Lizenzierung in den Qualcomm- und Microsoft-Fällen eine wichtige Rolle. Gleichzeitig wurde der für die Lizenzierung von Technologien relevante europäische Rechtsrahmen angepasst. Neben der Darstellung der einschlägigen ökonomischen Theorien und ausgewählter Entscheidungen der EU-Kommission in Lizenzierungsfällen gibt dieser Artikel einen Überblick über die aktuellen Änderungen im EU-Rechtsrahmen.

In this paper, we show that the substitution of imported for domestically produced goods and services—often known as offshoring—can lead to overestimates of U.S. productivity growth and value added. We explore how the measurement of productivity and value added in manufacturing has been affected by the dramatic rise in imports of manufactured goods, which more than doubled from 1997 to 2007. We argue that, analogous to the widely discussed problem of outlet substitution bias in the literature on the Consumer Price Index, the price declines associated with the shift to low-cost foreign suppliers are generally not captured in existing price indexes. Just as the CPI fails to capture fully the lower prices for consumers due to the entry and expansion of big-box retailers like Wal-Mart, import price indexes and the intermediate input price indexes based on them do not capture the price drops associated with a shift to new low-cost suppliers in China and other developing countries. As a result, the real growth of imported inputs has been understated. And if input growth is understated, it follows that the growth in multifactor productivity and real value added in the manufacturing sector have been overstated. We estimate that average annual multifactor productivity growth in manufacturing was overstated by 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points and real value added growth by 0.2 to 0.5 percentage points from 1997 to 2007. Moreover, this bias may have accounted for a fifth to a half of the growth in real value added in manufacturing output excluding the computer and electronics industry.

This paper analyzes the characteristics of Italian firms involved in global value chains (�intermediate� firms) by using the Bank of Italy survey on industrial companies. Intermediate firms show, on average, worse features than �final� firms: smaller size, lower share of white collars, lower productivity and export propensity. However we observe a strong heterogeneity, depending on the ability (and modalities) to upgrade along the value chains. There are wide differences between upgrading and non-upgrading (marginal) intermediate firms in terms of size, efficiency, human capital endowment and international competitiveness. During the 2008-09 crisis, marginal intermediate firms performed definitely worse; moreover, facing a collapse in world trade, firms that were upgrading by expanding their international linkages were more severely hit than those that were differentiating their internal functions.

Even if most successful joint ventures are created when economy is in glorious times, the reality of the last years has shown true possibilities of obtaining advantages by considering joint venture strategies during economic crisis. Some Romanian companies, as presented in the paper, have noticed that could transform the crisis into an opportunity, by offering foreign investors the perfect place to implement a joint venture strategy. Consequently, under the name of a joint venture agreement, companies can develop their businesses on local and international markets, benefiting from better qualified work force, new technologies, larger resources and experience.

A model of R&D cost sharing between a manufacturer and its component supplier is examined. The manufacturer can pay for a fraction of the supplier's cost-reducing R&D in return for a lower component price, and both firms can improve profits.

The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee and the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) Business Cycle Dating Committee date business cycle turning points using a small number of aggregate measures of real economic activity. For example, in its memorandum explaining the December 2007 peak (NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee 2008), the NBER committee mentioned that it considers five series, quarterly real GDP and the “big four” monthly series, real personal income less transfers, real manufacturing and wholesaleretail trade sales, industrial production, and nonfarm employment. (These series do not in general receive equal weight.) In contrast, when the NBER research program on dating business cycles commenced, researchers examined turning points in hundreds of series and dated business cycles by detecting clusters of specific-cycle turning points; see Arthur Burns and Wesley Mitchell (1946, 13 and 77–80). The dating of turning points evidently has shifted from aggregating the turning points of many disaggregated series to using the turning points of a few highly aggregated series. This shift raises a methodological question: should reference cycle turning points be determined by aggregating then dating, or by dating then aggregating? This paper provides some preliminary evidence on the question of whether it is better to date then aggregate or aggregate then date using 270 monthly disaggregated real economic indicators. The questions considered in this paper parallel those in the large literature on forecasting Indicators for Dating Business Cycles: Cross-History Selection and Comparisons

In our model, production of a final good requires access to an excludable resource owned by an integrated firm. The quality of the resource depends on an investment by the owner and impacts the downstream demand curve. Under open access, the owner must share the resource with downstream competitors at a regulated tar iff We show that quality exceeds the monopoly level, and increases with the number of competitors, if the access tariff is set according to a principle we call revenue neutrality. Our results contradict the notion that dynamic efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in static (allocative) efficiency. (JEL D21, D43, D45, L24, 034) ertically integrated firms which control essential upstream resources often have an incentive to deny competitors access to these inputs. They can thus extend their upstream monopoly power into potentially competitive downstream markets