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The sovereign debt default and the linkages from banking and currency crisis have been rarely explored in the crisis literature. This study attempts to dive into this unexplored area by applying panel data binary choice model on a sample with 20 emerging countries having monthly observations for the years between 1985 and 2007. The non-linear linkages from currency and banking crises to sovereign defaults are explored by using the interactions of these crises with international illiquidity, appreciated real exchange rates and real international monetary policy rates. It is discovered that currency, banking and debt crises tend to occur simultaneously. Prior occurrence of a currency crisis increases the sovereign default probability through appreciated real exchange rates, and in countries with high short-term indebtedness the occurrence of banking crisis raises the probability of a debt crisis.

I study economies where banks do not fully internalize the social costs of default, which distorts their lending decisions. In all these economies, a common general equilibrium effect leads to aggregate over-investment. As a result, under laissez-faire, crises are too frequent and too costly from a social point of view. In response, the regulator sets a capital requirement to trade off expected output against financial stability. The capital requirement that ensures investment efficiency depends on the state of the economy. Because of the general equilibrium effect, the more aggregate banking capital the tighter the optimal requirement. A regulation that fails to take this effect into account exacerbates economic fluctuations and allows for excessive build-up of risk in the financial sector during booms. Government guarantees amplify this mechanism and, at the peak of a boom, even a small adverse shock can trigger a banking sector collapse, followed by an excessively severe credit crunch. JEL Classification: E44, G01, G21, G28

Housing market transactions are a matter of public record and thus provide a rare opportunity to analyze the behavior, performance, and strategies of individual investors. Using data for all housing transactions in the Los Angeles area from 1988-2009, this paper provides empirical evidence on investor behavior that is consistent with several rationales for speculative investment in the finance literature, including the roles of middlemen and naïve speculators. Speculative activity by novice investors increased sharply in the recent housing boom. These investors earned little more than the market rate of appreciation and demonstrated no ability to foresee market price movements.

Using comprehensive data on bank lending and establishment-level outcomes from 1997–2010, this paper finds that small business lending is an unimportant determinant of small business and overall economic activity. A shift-share style research design is implemented to predict county-level lending shocks using variation in preexisting bank market shares and bank supply shifts. Counties with negative predicted lending shocks experienced declines in small business loan originations, indicating that it is costly to switch lenders. However, small business loan originations have an economically insignificant and generally statistically insignificant impact on both small firm and overall employment during the Great Recession and normal times. (JEL E32, E44, E52, G21, G32, L25)

This paper studies the impact of the banks’ portfolio holdings of financial derivatives on the banks’ individual contribution to systemic risk over and above the effect of variables related to size, interconnectedness, substitutability, and other balance sheet information. Using a sample of 95 U.S. bank holding companies from 2002 to 2011, we compare five measures of the banks’ contribution to systemic risk and find that the new measure proposed in this study, Net Shapley Value, outperforms the others. Using this measure we find that banks’ aggregate holdings of five classes of derivatives do not exhibit a significant effect on the bank’s contribution to systemic risk. On the contrary, the banks’ holdings of certain specific types of derivatives such as foreign exchange and credit derivatives increase the banks contributions to systemic risk whereas holdings of interest rate derivatives decrease it. Nevertheless, the proportion of non-performing loans over total loans and the leverage ratio have much stronger impact on systemic risk than derivatives holdings. Therefore, the derivatives’ impact plays a second fiddle in comparison with traditional banking activities related to the former two items.

We study the dividend payouts of U.S. banks during the 2008 financial crisis. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we shows that banks with higher share of short-term liabilities to total liabilities, which were thus more exposed to the rollover crisis that took place in 2008, increased their dividend payouts relative to less exposed banks. This relative increase in dividend payouts is concentrated in relatively cash-rich banks. The dividend payout increase was associated with a short-run increase in stock valuations. We argue that this front-loading of dividends of more exposed banks is consistent with a theory of dividend payouts, in which the payout policy has a (short-run) stabilizing role on the bank’s liquidity position by signaling information to short-term lenders about the bank’s available liquidity.

We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.

This paper introduces a model of endogenous network formation and systemic risk. In it, agents form networks that efficiently trade-off the possibility of systemic risk with the benefits of trade. Second, fundamentally ‘safer’ economies generate higher interconnectedness, which in turn leads to higher systemic risk. Third, the structure of the network formed depends on whether the shocks to the system are believed to be correlated or independent of each other. In particular, when shocks are perfectly correlated, the network formed is a complete graph, i.e., a link between every pair of agents. This underlines the importance of specifying the shock structure before investigating a given network because a given network and shock structure could be incompatible.

Heightened counterparty risk during the recent financial crisis has raised questions about the role clearinghouses play in global financial stability. Empirical identification of the effect of centralized clearing on counterparty risk is challenging because of the co-incidence of macro-economic turbulence and the introduction of clearinghouses. We overcome these concerns by examining a novel historical experiment, the establishment of a clearinghouse on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1892. During this period the largest NYSE stocks were also listed on the Consolidated Stock Exchange (CSE), which already had a clearinghouse. Using identical securities on the CSE as a control, we find that the introduction of clearing reduced annualized volatility of NYSE returns by 90-173bps and increased asset values. Prior to clearing, shocks to overnight lending rates reduced the value of stocks on the NYSE, relative to identical stocks on the CSE, but this was no longer true after the establishment of clearing. We also show that at least ½ of the average reduction in counterparty risk on the NYSE is driven by a reduction in contagion risk - the risk of a cascade of broker defaults. Our results indicate that clearing can cause a significant improvement in market stability and value through a reduction in network contagion and counterparty risk.

Using the pandemic as a laboratory, we show that asset markets assign a time- varying price to firms' disaster risk exposure. In 2020 the cross-section of realized and expected stock returns reflected firms' different exposure to the pandemic, as measured by their vulnerability to social distancing. Realized and expected return differentials initially widened and then narrowed, but disaster exposure still commanded a risk premium in December 2020. When inferred from market outcomes, resilience correlates not only with social distancing, but also with cash and environmental ratings. However, vulnerability to social distancing is the only characteristic that identifies persistently scarred firms.

We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP - the government's ability to appoint independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury - helped attenuate bailout-related moral hazard. Banks were averse to these appointments - the empirical distribution of missed payments exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury led to improved bank performance, lower CEO pay, and higher stock market valuations. Thursday 16th September, 2021

We show that the COVID-19 pandemic triggered a surge in the elasticity of non-financial corporate to sovereign credit default swaps in core EU countries, characterized by strong fiscal capacity. For peripheral countries with lower budgetary slackness, the pandemic had essentially no impact on such elasticity. This evidence is consistent with the disaster-induced repricing of government support, which we model through a rare-disaster asset pricing framework with bailout guarantees and defaultable public debt. The model implies that risk-adjusted guarantees in the core were 2.6 times those in the periphery, suggesting that fiscal capacity buffers provide relief to firms’ financing costs.

Should central banks use leaning against the wind (LAW)-type monetary or macroprudential policy to address risks to financial stability? We first assess LAW as a one-off (nonsystematic) policy using an estimated large-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with empirically plausible persistent financial cycles and a stylised regime-switching (RS) framework of occasional crises. We then evaluate policy-rule based (systematic) LAW using an endogenous RS version of our DSGE model with financial crises, effective lower bound (ELB) on interest rates, and an asymmetric LAW policy. Our findings do not support LAW by monetary policy because the costs of depressing the economy in normal times far outweigh the benefits of a less likely and less severe crisis. LAW increases inflation volatility significantly as it amplifies the effects of supply shocks on inflation. It also leads to higher long-run output costs in the case of nonsystematic policy and to a lower mean inflation rate in the case of systematic policy. The latter also results in more frequent ELB episodes due to the lower mean inflation rate it induces. We find that LAW is only advisable if the policymaker cares more about output stability relative to inflation stability or if financial cycles are less persistent, exclusively under systematic LAW. Higher long-run capital requirements in normal times address risks to financial stability better as they reduce the fluctuations in inflation and output considerably.

This paper proposes that all new euro area sovereign borrowing be in the form of jointly guaranteed eurobonds. To avoid classic moral hazard problems and to insure the guarantors against default, each country would pay a risk premium conditional on economic fundamentals to a joint debt management agency. This suggests that these bonds be called ‘euro-insurance bonds’. While the sovereign debt markets have taken increasing account of the economic fundamentals, the signal-to-noise ratio has been weakened by huge market volatility, so undercutting incentives for appropriate reforms and obscuring economic realities for voters. This paper uses an econometric model to show that competitiveness, public and private debt to GDP, and the fall-out from housing market crises are the most relevant economic fundamentals. Formula-based risk spreads based on these fundamentals would provide clear incentives for governments to be more oriented towards economic reforms to promote long-run growth than mere fiscal contraction. Putting more weight on incentives that come from risk spreads, than on fiscal centralization and the associated heavy bureaucratic procedures, would promote the principle of subsidiarity to which member states subscribe. The paper compares euro-insurance bonds incorporating these risk spreads with other policy proposals. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

In this paper, we construct a quality-adjusted rent index for the office market in Oslo. Commonly used rent indices are based on average developments or expert opinions. Such indices often suffer from compositional biases or low data coverage. Using detailed data from more than 16,000 rental contracts, we show that compositional biases can have a large impact on rental price developments. By adding building fixed effects to a standard hedonic regression model, we show that the explanatory power increases considerably. Furthermore, indices controlling for micro-location portray a different picture of rent developments than indices that do not take this into account. We also document a considerable rent premium for proximity to a metro station. Finally, we exploit information on contract signature date and find that a more timely detection of turning-points can be achieved by using the signature date instead of the more typically used start date of the lease. The financial system is heavily exposed towards the commercial real estate market and timely detection of turning-points is of major importance to policymakers.

We examine how measures of financial imbalances affect macroeconomic tail risks over the medium-term in Norway and in other advanced economies. We use a broad set of financial indicators to capture cyclical systemic risk in the financial system and different quantile regression models to characterise their effects on the medium-term growth distribution. We find that an increase in financial indicators is associated with both a more adverse prediction for growth-at-risk (5th percentile of growth distribution) and higher downside risks to growth (difference between the median and the 5th percentile of growth distribution). Among financial indicators, credit growth has the most significant effect on downside risks to growth. We also find that downside risks are higher under a fixed exchange rate regime. Using our estimates, we focus on two policy-relevant applications. First, we summarise how financial indicators and growth-at-risk have evolved over time in Norway and how this framework can be used to quantify and communicate risks to the economic outlook. Second, we show how this framework can be used to calibrate the severity of cyclical stress test scenarios.

We employ a representative sample of 80,972 Italian firms to forecast the drop in profits and the equity shortfall triggered by the COVID-19 lockdown. A 3-month lockdown generates an aggregate yearly drop in profits of about 10% of GDP, and 17% of sample firms, which employ 8.8% of the sample’s employees, become financially distressed. Distress is more frequent for small and medium-sized enterprises, for firms with high pre-COVID-19 leverage, and for firms belonging to the Manufacturing and Wholesale Trading sectors. Listed companies are less likely to enter distress, whereas the correlation between distress rates and family firm ownership is unclear. (JEL G01, G32, G33)

We study a controlled experiment in which a bank's loan officers were incentivized based on originated loan volume to encourage prospecting for new business. While treated loan officers did attract new applications, both extensive and intensive margins of loan origination expanded (+ 31% new loans; loan size + 15%). We find that loan officers gave greater weight to hard information in approval decisions. Despite no change in the observable characteristics of approved loans, their default rate increased (+ 24%). Finally, the bank's imputed credit default model lost its predictive power. Overall, loan prospecting incentives led to unfavorable soft information being overlooked in the origination process.

We investigate the characteristics and the default behavior of households who take out complex mortgages. Unlike traditional fixed rate or adjustable rate mortgages, complex mortgages are not fully amortizing and enable households to postpone loan repayment. We find that complex mortgages are used by sophisticated households with high income levels and prime credit scores, in contrast to the low income population targeted by subprime mortgages. Complex mortgage borrowers have significantly higher delinquency rates than traditional mortgage borrowers even after controlling for leverage, payment resets, and other household and loan characteristics. The difference in the delinquency rates between complex and traditional borrowers increases with measures of financial sophistication and leverage, suggesting that complex borrowers are more strategic in their default decisions than traditional borrowers.

We introduce a simple adverse selection problem arising in credit markets into a standard textbook real business cycle model. There is a continuum of households and a continuum of anonymous producers who produce the final goods from intermediate goods. These producers do not have the resources to make up-front payments to purchase inputs and must do so by borrowing from competitive financial intermediates. However, lending to these producers is risky: honest borrowers will always pay off their debt, but dishonest borrowers will always default. This gives rise to an adverse selection problem for financial intermediaries. In a continuous-time real business cycle setting we show that such adverse selection generates multiple steady states and both local and global indeterminacy, and can give rise to equilibria with probabilistic jumps in credit, consumption, investment and employment driven by Markov sunspots under calibrated parameterizations and fully rational expectations. Introducing reputational effects eliminates defaults and results in a unique but still indeterminate steady state. Finally we generalize the model to firms with heterogeneous and stochastic productivity, and show that indeterminacies and sunspots persist.

The paper analyzes the welfare implications of a policy of mandatory disclosure of information on the value of directly held investments by banks. It is based on a model of payments in a network where the value of a bank’s equity depends on the value of directly held investment of its trading partners, i.e. there is “contagion”. Additionally banks have a profitable investment project for which they need funding from outsiders, but due to agency problems they can only obtain financing if their equity is large enough. Furthermore, banks can, at a cost, disclose the information of their directly held investments. We find that there are equilibrium with no disclosure and no funding for new investments projects. Yet when the disclosure costs are not too large, mandatory disclosure increases ex-ante welfare of banks and outside investors if and only if contagion is severe. The difference for the social and private benefits is that an individual bank’s disclosure of the value of its directly held investment can be uninformative due to counterparty default risk. Instead, mandatory disclosure of information by all banks allows outside investors to assess the financial architecture of the system and direct their funding to the solvent banks.

Why does the market discipline that financial intermediaries face seem too weak during booms and too strong during crises? This paper shows in a general equilibrium setting that rollover risk as a disciplining device is effective only if all intermediaries face purely idiosyncratic risk. However, if assets are correlated, a two-sided inefficiency arises: Good aggregate states have intermediaries taking excessive risks, while bad aggregate states suffer from costly fire sales. The driving force behind this inefficiency is an amplifying feedback loop between asset values and market discipline. In equilibrium, financial intermediaries inefficiently amplify both positive and negative aggregate shocks.

We apply utility indifference pricing to solve a contingent claim problem, valuing a connected pair of gas fields where the underlying process is not standard Geometric Brownian Motion and the assumption of complete markets is not fulfilled. First, empirical data are often characterized by time-varying volatility and fat tails; therefore, we use Gaussian generalized autoregressive score (GAS) and GARCH models, extending them to Student’s t-GARCH and t-GAS. Second, an important risk (reservoir size) is not hedgeable. As a result, markets are incomplete which makes preference free pricing impossible and thus standard option pricing methodology inapplicable. Therefore, we parametrize the investor’s risk preference and use utility indifference pricing techniques. We use Least Squares Monte Carlo simulations as a dimension reduction technique in solving the resulting stochastic dynamic programming problems. Moreover, an investor often only has an approximate idea of the true probabilistic model underlying variables, making model ambiguity a relevant problem. We show empirically how model ambiguity affects project values, and importantly, how option values change as model ambiguity gets resolved in later phases of the projects. We show that traditional valuation approaches will consistently underestimate the value of project flexibility and in general lead to overly conservative investment decisions in the presence of time-dependent stochastic structures.

We propose a new approach to studying the pass-through of credit expansion policies that focuses on frictions, such as asymmetric information, that arise in the interaction between banks and borrowers. We decompose the effect of changes in banks’ cost of funds on aggregate borrowing into the product of banks’ marginal propensity to lend (MPL) to borrowers and those borrowers’ marginal propensity to borrow (MPB), aggregated over all borrowers in the economy. We apply our framework by estimating heterogeneous MPBs and MPLs in the U.S. credit card market. Using panel data on 8.5 million credit cards and 743 credit limit regression discontinuities, we find that the MPB is declining in credit score, falling from 59% for consumers with FICO scores below 660 to essentially zero for consumers with FICO scores above 740. We use a simple model of optimal credit limits to show that a bank’s MPL depends on a small number of "sufficient statistics" that capture forces such as asymmetric information, and that can be estimated using our credit limit discontinuities. For the lowest FICO score consumers, higher credit limits sharply reduce profits from lending, limiting banks’ optimal MPL to these consumers. The negative correlation between MPB and MPL reduces the impact of changes in banks’ cost of funds on aggregate household borrowing, and highlights the importance of frictions in bank-borrower interactions for understanding the pass-through of credit expansions.

An increase in the household debt to GDP ratio in the medium run predicts lower subsequent GDP growth, higher unemployment, and negative growth forecasting errors in a panel of 30 countries from 1960 to 2012. Consistent with the “credit supply hypothesis,” we show that low mortgage spreads predict an increase in the household debt to GDP ratio and a decline in subsequent GDP growth when used as an instrument. The negative relation between the change in household debt to GDP and subsequent output growth is stronger for countries that face stricter monetary policy constraints as measured by a less flexible exchange rate regime, proximity to the zero lower bound, or more external borrowing. A rise in the household debt to GDP ratio is contemporaneously associated with a consumption boom followed by a reversal in the trade deficit as imports collapse. We also uncover a global household debt cycle that partly predicts the severity of the global growth slowdown after 2007. Countries with a household debt cycle more correlated with the global household debt cycle experience a sharper decline in growth after an increase in domestic household debt.

This paper documents the cyclical properties of financial intermediation costs and uses their dynamics to explain excess consumption volatility differences across countries in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework. I find that financial development levels have no role in explaining excess consumption volatilities. Instead, the volatility of the financial sector plays the determinative role. The model matches the data, finding excess consumption volatility to be four times higher in an average emerging country compared to the US. This paper also shows that if the US had the same intermediation cost structure as the average emerging country, deteriorations in the production, consumption, labor market, business investment, and real estate market following a financial shock would increase sixfold, on average.

We examine the delinquency rate for mortgages originated before and after the 2008 financial crisis, using a novel and large representative panel obtained by merging data from tax records and credit registers. First, we estimate the selection into the mortgage market using an exogenous index of local credit supply as exclusion restriction. Second, controlling for selection we estimate the impact of income shocks on the probability of recording a delinquency. We find that since 2008 the selection process operated by banks has led to the halving of the delinquency rate. Conditional on mortgage origination, a job loss nearly doubles the delinquency risk. Estimates uncorrected for selection are subject to severe downward biased.

Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via subscription. Using an international panel of 104 countries over the period 1995–2012, we analyze the relationship between country-level securitization and economic activity. Our findings suggest that securitization is negatively related to various proxies of economic activity – even prior to the crisis of 2007–2009. We explain this finding as the results of securitization spurring consumption at the expense of investment and capital formation. Consistent with this, we find that securitization of household loans is negatively associated with economic activity, whereas business securitization displays a weak positive association with it, and that household securitization increases an economy's consumption-investment ratio. Our results inform recent initiatives aimed at reviving securitization markets, as they indicate that the impact of securitization crucially depends on the underlying collateral.

US data display aggregate external financing and savings waves. Firms can allocate costly external finance to productive capital, or to liquid assets with low physical returns. If firms raise costly external finance and accumulate liquidity, either the cost of external finance is relatively low or the total return to liquidity accumulation, including its shadow value as future internal funds, is particularly high. We formalize this intuition by estimating a dynamic model of firms׳ financing and savings decisions, and use our model along with firm level data to construct an empirical estimate of the average cost of external finance from 1980 to 2014.

Financialisation in Iceland should be seen as an evolving process driven by a mixture of global and domestic forces. Responding to fundamental issues underlying macroeconomic imbalances, the authorities introduced policies that proved particularly supportive of financial expansion at a time when cross-border capital movements were rapidly on the rise. Consequently, the rise in financial activity has had profound effects on income distribution and corporate and household behaviour. Following the 2008 financial meltdown, which was triggered by excessive growth of the financial sector, financialisation in Iceland has reversed to a degree, allowing for a shift away from financial-led towards increasingly export-led growth.

This paper studies a model of the interest-rate channel of monetary policy in which a low policy rate lowers the cost of capital for firms thereby spurring investment, but also induces destabilizing “carry trades” against their assets. If the public sector does not have sufficient fiscal capacity to cope with the large resulting private borrowing, then carry trades and productive investment compete for scarce funds, and so the former crowd out the latter. Below an endogenous lower bound, monetary easing generates only limited investment at the cost of large and socially wasteful financial risk taking.

Should monetary policy lean against financial stability risks? This has been a subject of fierce debate over the last decades. We contribute to the debate about “leaning against the wind” (LAW) along three lines. First, we evaluate the cost and benefits of LAW using the Svensson (2017) framework for the euro area and find that the costs outweigh the benefits. Second, we extend the framework to address a critique that Svensson does not consider the lower frequency financial cycle. Third, we use this extended framework to assess the costs and benefits of monetary and macroprudential policy. We find that macroprudential policy has net marginal benefits in addressing risks to financial stability in the euro area, whereas monetary policy has net marginal costs. This would suggest that an active use of macroprudential policies targeting financial stability risks would alleviate the burden on monetary policy to “lean against the wind”.

We investigate the transmission of central bank liquidity to bank deposits and loan spreads in Europe over the period from January 2006 to June 2010. We find evidence consistent with an impaired transmission channel due to bank risk. Central bank liquidity does not translate into lower loan spreads for high-risk banks for maturities beyond one year, even as it lowers deposit spreads for both high-risk and low-risk banks. This adversely affects the balance sheets of highrisk bank borrowers, leading to lower payouts, capital expenditures and employment. Overall, our results suggest that banks' capital constraints at the time of an easing of monetary policy pose a challenge to the effectiveness of the bank-lending channel and the central bank's lender-of- last-resort function.

Using account-level credit card data from six major commercial banks from January 2009 to December 2013, we apply machine-learning techniques to combined consumer tradeline, credit bureau, and macroeconomic variables to predict delinquency. In addition to providing accurate measures of loss probabilities and credit risk, our models can also be used to analyze and compare risk management practices and the drivers of delinquency across banks. We find substantial heterogeneity in risk factors, sensitivities, and predictability of delinquency across banks, implying that no single model applies to all six institutions. We measure the efficacy of a bank's risk management process by the percentage of delinquent accounts that a bank manages effectively, and find that efficacy also varies widely across institutions. These results suggest the need for a more customized approached to the supervision and regulation of financial institutions, in which capital ratios, loss reserves, and other parameters are specified individually for each institution according to its credit risk model exposures and forecasts.

The CLASS model is a top-down capital stress testing framework that uses public data, simple econometric models and auxiliary assumptions to project the effect of macroeconomic scenarios on U.S. banking firms. Through the lens of the model, we find that the total banking system capital shortfall under stressful macroeconomic conditions began to rise 4 years before the financial crisis, peaking in the fourth quarter of 2008. The capital gap has since fallen sharply, and is now significantly below pre-crisis levels. In the cross-section, banking firms estimated to be most sensitive to macroeconomic conditions also have higher capital ratios, consistent with a “precautionary” view of bank capital, though this behavior is evident only since the crisis. We interpret our results as evidence that the resiliency of the U.S. banking system has improved since the financial crisis, and also as an illustration of the value of stress testing as a macroprudential policy tool.

The announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a prior connection. This return was about 6% after the first full day of trading and about 12% after ten trading days. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news broke that Geithner’s confirmation might be derailed by tax issues. Personal connections to top executive branch officials can matter greatly even in a country with strong overall institutions, at least during a time of acute financial crisis and heightened policy discretion.

How important are financial friction shocks in business cycles fluctuations? To answer this question, I use micro data to quantify key features of US financial markets. I then construct a dynamic equilibrium model that is consistent with these features and fit the model to business cycle data using Bayesian methods. In my micro data analysis, I establish facts that may be of independent interest. For example, I find that a substantial 33% of firm investment is funded using financial markets. The dynamic model introduces price and wage rigidities and a financial intermediation shock into Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). According to the estimated model, the financial intermediation shock explains around 40% of GDP and 55% of investment volatility. The estimation assigns such a large role to the financial shock for two reasons: (i) the shock is closely related to the interest rate spread, and this spread is strongly countercyclical and (ii) according to the model, the response in consumption, investment, employment and asset prices to a financial shock resembles the behavior of these variables over the business cycle.

This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the impact of macroprudential regulation on bank’s financial decisions and the implications for the real sector. I explicitly incorporate costs and benefits of capital requirements. I model an occasionally binding capital constraint and approximate it using an asymmetric non linear penalty function. This friction means that the banks refrain from valuable lending. At the same time, countercyclical buffers provide structural stability to the financial system. I show that higher capital requirements can dampen the business cycle fluctuations. I also show that stronger regulation can induce banks to hold buffers and hence mitigate an economic downturn as well. Increasing the capital requirements do not seem to have an adverse effect on the welfare. Lastly, I also show that switching to a countercyclical capital requirement regime can help reduce fluctuations and raise welfare.

Is liquidity creation in shadow banking vulnerable to self-fulfilling runs? Investors typically decide to withdraw simultaneously, making it challenging to identify self-fulfilling runs. In this paper, we exploit the contractual structure of funding agreement-backed securities offered by U.S. life insurers to institutional investors. The contracts allow us to obtain variation in investors’ expectations about other investors’ actions that is plausibly orthogonal to changes in fundamentals. We find that a run on U.S. life insurers during the summer of 2007 was partly due to self-fulfilling expectations. Our findings suggest that other contemporaneous runs in shadow banking by institutional investors may have had a self-fulfilling component.

An individual bank can put the whole banking system at risk if its losses in response to shocks push losses for the system as a whole above a critical threshold. We determine the contribution of banks to this systemic risk using a generalisation of the Shapley value; a concept originating in co-operative game theory. An important feature of this approach is that the order in which banks fail in response to a shock depends on the composition of the banks’ asset portfolios and capital buffers. We show how these factors affect banks’ contributions to systemic risk, and the extent to which these contributions depend on the level of the critical threshold.

Summary This paper introduces classification tree ensembles (CTEs) to the banking crisis forecasting literature. I show that CTEs substantially improve out-of-sample forecasting performance over best-practice early-warning systems. CTEs enable policymakers to correctly forecast 80% of crises with a 20% probability of incorrectly forecasting a crisis. These findings are based on a long-run sample (1870–2011), and two broad post-1970 samples which together cover almost all known systemic banking crises. I show that the marked improvement in forecasting performance results from the combination of many classification trees into an ensemble, and the use of many predictors. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

This paper studies how financial information frictions can generate sentiment-driven fluctuations in asset prices and self-fulfilling business cycles. In our model economy, exuberant financial market sentiments of high output and high demand for capital increase the price of capital, which signals strong fundamentals of the economy to the real side and consequently leads to an actual boom in real output and employment. The model further derives implications for asymmetric nonlinear asset prices and for economic contagion and co-movement across countries. In the extension to the dynamic overlapping generations (OLG) setting, our model demonstrates that sentiment shocks can generate persistent output, employment, and business cycle fluctuations, and it offers some new implications for asset prices over business cycles.

© 2016 Elsevier B.V.. This paper examines the extent to which individual investors provide liquidity to the stock market and whether they are compensated for doing so. We show that the ability of aggregate retail order imbalances, contrarian in nature, to predict short-term future returns is significantly enhanced during times of market stress, when market liquidity provisions decline. While a weekly rebalanced portfolio long in stocks purchased and short in stocks sold by retail investors delivers 19% annualized excess returns over a four-factor model from 2002 to 2010, it delivers up to 40% annualized returns in periods of high uncertainty. Despite this high aggregate performance, individual investors do not reap the rewards from liquidity provision because they experience a negative return on the day of their trade and they reverse their trades long after the excess returns from liquidity provision are dissipated. During the financial crisis, French active retail stock traders stepped up to the plate, increased stock holdings, and provided liquidity. In contrast, mutual fund investors fled from delegation by selling their mutual funds.

We construct an index of financial development for twenty-three Asian economies based on sub-indices of access, depth, and efficiency of financial institutions and markets and find evidence that economies with weaker financial systems are catching up to the Asian benchmark economies, namely Hong Kong, China; Japan; the Republic of Korea; and Singapore. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, aggregate GDP, and mobile subscriptions all increase the growth rate of financial development in Asian economies while institutional factors have insignificant or ambiguous effects. We also evaluate the relative importance of the sub-indices in delivering high economic growth, low volatility, and greater financial access.

A number of papers have shown that rapid growth in private sector credit is a strong predictor of a banking crisis. This paper will ask if credit growth is itself the cause of a crisis, or is it the combination of credit growth and external deficits? This paper estimates a probabilistic model to find the marginal effect of private sector credit growth on the probability of a banking crisis. The model contains an interaction term between credit growth and the level of the current account, so the marginal effect of private sector credit growth may itself be a function of the level of the current account. We find that the marginal effect of rising private sector debt levels depends on an economy's external position. When the current account is in balance, the marginal effect of an increase in debt is rather small. However, when the economy is running a sizable current account deficit, implying that any increase in the debt ratio is financed through foreign borrowing, this marginal effect is large.

We examine the role of bank leverage to explain why the 2007–2008 financial crisis unfolded at a time when the economy appears to be less fragile to crisis risks. To this end, we extend the model introduced by Diamond and Rajan (2012) to a variant where the probability of financial crises varies endogenously. In our model, aggregate liquidity shock plays a key role in precipitating a crisis because high liquidity demand in a highly leveraged banking system is likely to expose the economy to greater crisis risks. We consider an example of a “safe” environment where liquidity demand tends to be low on average. Using numerical analysis, we show that the “safer” environment could incentivize banks to raise their leverage, resulting in a banking system that is more vulnerable to liquidity shocks.

This paper unveils a new resource for macroeconomic research: a long-run dataset covering disaggregated bank credit for 17 advanced economies since 1870. The new data show that the share of mortgages on banks’ balance sheets doubled in the course of the twentieth century, driven by a sharp rise of mortgage lending to households. Household debt to asset ratios have risen substantially in many countries. Financial stability risks have been increasingly linked to real estate lending booms, which are typically followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. Housing finance has come to play a central role in the modern macroeconomy.

The hedge-fund industry has grown rapidly over the past two decades, offering investors unique investment opportunities that often reflect more complex risk exposures than those of traditional investments. In this article, we present a selective review of the recent academic literature on hedge funds as well as updated empirical results for this industry. Our review is written from several distinct perspectives: the investor's, the portfolio manager's, the regulator's, and the academic's. Each of these perspectives offers a different set of insights into the financial system, and the combination provides surprisingly rich implications for the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, investment management, systemic risk, financial regulation, and other aspects of financial theory and practice.

While the Dodd Frank Act (DFA) broadens the regulatory reach to reduce systemic risks to the U.S. financial system, it does not address some important risks that could migrate to or emanate from entities outside the federal safety net. At the same time, it limits the types of interventions by financial authorities to address systemic events when they occur. As a result, a broad and forward-looking monitoring program, which seeks to identify financial vulnerabilities and guide the development of pre-emptive policies to help mitigate them, is essential. Systemic vulnerabilities arise from market failures that can lead to excessive leverage, maturity transformation, interconnectedness, and complexity. These vulnerabilities, when hit by adverse shocks, can lead to fire sale dynamics, negative feedback loops, and inefficient contractions in the supply of credit. We present a framework that centers on the vulnerabilities that propagate adverse shocks, rather than shocks themselves, which are difficult to predict. Vulnerabilities can emerge in four areas: (1) systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), (2) shadow banking, (3) asset markets, and (4) the nonfinancial sector. This framework also highlights how policies that reduce the likelihood of systemic crises may do so only by raising the cost of financial intermediation in non-crisis periods.

We describe the background, design choices, and particular details of stress tests used as part of an overall supervisory regime, that is, their formal integration into the ongoing prudential supervision of banks and other large financial institutions. We then describe how the US Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and Dodd-Frank Act stress testing (DFAST) regime is designed and what that means for the macroprudential versus microprudential nature of US supervisory exercises. We argue that routine stress tests have the potential to substantially change the nature of the supervisory process. We also argue that a great deal depends on the philosophy underpinning modeling decisions, which has not received as much attention as scenario design, disclosure, or other stress test design choices.