Search

We analyse the behaviour of the Norwegian unsecured overnight interbank market in response to heightened uncertainty and the central bank's liquidity support measures following the Covid-19 pandemic. The liquidity measures enabled banks to fulfil their liquidity needs primarily through participation in extraordinary liquidity auctions. The distribution of central bank reserves across banks did not change due to these measures, but interbank trading fell sharply. Ample liquidity support through the auctions and low interbank trading contributed to low and overly stable overnight rates. Actually, throughout our sample period from 2017 to 2021, the overnight rates remained largely unaffected by fluctuations in uncertainty and overall liquidity conditions.

Despite the distinctive character of the Austrian approach to «microfoundations for macroeconomics», the literature on free banking contains a number of arguments which make use of game-theoretic concepts and models such as the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma model. While there can be no general a priori presumption against the possible usefulness of game-theoretic concepts for Austrian theorizing, in the context of the debate on free banking such concepts and models have been used with varying degrees of perspicacity. One example which is elaborated in the paper is concerned with the interaction configuration between independent banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system, which has sometimes been modeled as a One-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This conceptualization does not provide a sufficient argument for the in-concert overexpansion thesis, nor for the thesis that fractional-reserve free banking will tend to lead to the establishment of a central bank. The author drops the implicit assumption that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the outcome matrix and the utility matrix. When it is acknowledged that banks in a fractional-reserve free banking system need not necessarily adopt a «myopic», self-regarding perspective but may recognize the long-run harmony of interests between the banking sector and society at large, a different conceptualization and a different matrix representation emerge. Key words: Economic Mechanism Design; Business Cycle Theory; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Free Banking. JEL codes: D01, E31, E32, E42, E52, E58, E66, G18, K39. Resumen: A pesar del carácter distintivo del enfoque austríaco de las «microfundaciones para la macroeconomía», la literatura sobre la banca libre contiene algunos argumentos que recurren a los conceptos y modelos de la teoría de juegos tales como el conocido modelo Dilema del Prisionero. A pesar de que no puede existir una presunción a priori sobre la posible utilidad de conceptos de la teoría de juegos para las teorías austríacas, en el contexto del debate sobre la banca libre tales conceptos y modelos han sido manejados con distintos grados de perspicacia. Un ejemplo elaborado en el documento comenta la configuración de interacción entre los bancos independientes en un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria, que a veces ha sido modelado como un juego de Dilema del Prisionero One-Shot. Esta conceptualización no ofrece suficientes argumentos para la tesis de la sobreexpansión in-concert, ni para la tesis de que un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria tendería a la creación de un banco central. El autor abandona la asunción implícita de que existe una correspondencia de uno a uno entre la matriz de resultado y la matriz de utilidad. Al reconocerse que los bancos en un sistema de banca libre con reserva fraccionaria no deben adoptar necesariamente una perspectiva «miope» y egoísta, pero pueden reconocer la armonía de intereses a largo plazo entre el sector bancario y la sociedad en general, surgen una conceptualización y representación de la matriz distintas. Palabras clave: Diseño de mecanismo económico; Teoría del ciclo económico; Dilema del Prisionero; Banca libre. Códigos JEL: D01, E31, E32, E42, E52, E58, E66, G18, K39.

The unconventional monetary policy of forward guidance operates through the management of expectations about future paths of interest rates. This paper examines the link between expectations formation and the effectiveness of forward guidance. A standard New Keynesian model is extended to include forward guidance shocks in the monetary policy rule. Agents form expectations about future macroeconomic variables via either the standard rational expectations hypothesis or a more plausible theory of expectations formation called adaptive learning. The results show the efficacy of forward guidance depends on the manner in which agents form their expectations. In response to forward guidance, the paths of the output gap and inflation under adaptive learning overshoot and undershoot those implied by rational expectations. The adaptive learning impulse responses of the endogenous variables to a forward guidance shock exhibit more persistence before and after the forward guidance shock has been realized upon the economy. During an economic crisis (e.g. a recession), the assumption of rational expectations overstates the effects of forward guidance relative to adaptive learning. Specifically, the output gap is higher under rational expectations than adaptive learning. Thus, if monetary policy is based on a model with rational expectations, which is the standard assumption in the macroeconomic literature, the results of forward guidance could be potentially misleading.

High-frequency changes in interest rates around FOMC announcements are an important tool for identifying the effects of monetary policy on asset prices and the macroeconomy. However, some recent studies have questioned both the exogeneity and the relevance of these monetary policy surprises as instruments, especially for estimating the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks. For example, monetary policy surprises are correlated with macroeconomic and financial data that is publicly available prior to the FOMC announcement. The authors address these concerns in two ways: First, they expand the set of monetary policy announcements to include speeches by the Fed Chair, which essentially doubles the number and importance of announcements in our dataset. Second, they explain the predictability of the monetary policy surprises in terms of the “Fed response to news” channel of Bauer and Swanson (2021) and account for it by orthogonalizing the surprises with respect to macroeconomic and financial data. Their subsequent reassessment of the effects of monetary policy yields two key results: First, estimates of the high-frequency effects on financial markets are largely unchanged. Second, estimates of the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy are substantially larger and more significant than what most previous empirical studies have found.

For the academic audience, this paper presents the outcome of a well-identified, large change in the monetary policy rule from the lens of a standard New Keynesian model and asks whether the model properly captures the effects. For policymakers, it presents a cautionary tale of the dismal effects of ignoring basic macroeconomics. The Turkish monetary policy experiment of the past decade, stemming from a belief of the government that higher interest rates cause higher inflation, provides an unfortunately clean exogenous variance in the policy rule. The mandate to keep rates low, and the frequent policymaker turnover orchestrated by the government to enforce this, led to the Taylor principle not being satisfied and eventually a negative coeffcient on inflation in the policy rule. In such an environment, was the exchange rate still a random walk? Was inflation anchored? Does the “standard model”” suffice to explain the broad contours of macroeconomic outcomes in an emerging economy with large identifying variance in the policy rule? There are no surprises for students of open-economy macroeconomics; the answers are no, no, and yes.

The authors focus on the stabilizing role of cash from a society-wide perspective. Starting with conceptual remarks on the importance of money for the economy in general, special attention is paid to the unique characteristics of cash. As these become apparent especially during crisis periods, a comparison of the Great Depression (1929 – 1933) and the Great Recession 2008/09 shows the devastating effects of a severe monetary contraction and how a fully elastic provision of cash can help to avoid such a situation. The authors find interesting similarities to both crises in two separate case studies, one on the demonetization in India 2016 and the other on cash supply during various crises in Greece since 2008. The paper concludes that supply-driven cash withdrawals from circulation (either by demonetization or by capital controls) destabilize the economy if electronic payment substitutes are not instantly available. However, as there is no perfect substitute for cash due to its unique properties, from the viewpoint of the society as a whole an efficient payment mix necessarily includes cash: It helps to stabilize the economy not only in times of crises in general, no matter which government is in place. The authors argue that it should be the undisputed task of central banks to ensure that cash remains in circulation in normal times and is provided in a fully elastic way in times of crisis.

We show that discretionary policymaking can lead to multiple rational-expectations equilibria where the central bank responds to inflation sentiments, which are driven by past endogenous variables but are unrelated to current economic fundamentals. Some of these equilibria have favourable consequences for welfare, resulting in outcomes superior even to those achieved under timeless-perspective commitment. Inflation sentiments also provide a novel explanation for the sizeable macroeconomic fluctuations in many countries in the 1970s. Compared to interest-rate rules violating the Taylor principle, our explanation has the advantage of providing a rationale for why central banks that are confronted with inefficiently large macroeconomic fluctuations may not be able to deviate to new policies with superior macroeconomic outcomes. Moreover, we show that our approach provides an alternative explanation for the high degree of inflation persistence found in the data.

This paper revisits the benefits of explicitly announcing an inflation target for the con- duct of monetary policy in the framework of an agent-based model (ABM). This framework offers a flexible tool for modeling heterogeneity among individual agents and their bounded rationality, and to emphasize, on this basis, the role of learning in macroeconomic dynamics. We consider that those three features (heterogeneity, bounded rationality, and learning) are particularly relevant if one desires to question the rationale for the monetary authorities to be transparent about the inflation target, and to achieve credibility. Indeed, the inflation targeting’s potential role in anchoring inflation expectations and stabilizing the inflation and the economy can be analyzed more realistically if we do not assume a representative agent framework based on substantial rationality in behaviors and expectations. Our results show that a dynamic loop between credibility and success can arise, and stabilize inflation, but only in the case of a learning environment that corresponds to a moderate degree in heterogeneity regarding the behavior and decisions of individual agents. In a more general way, we analyze, using this ABM, different assumptions about the nature of the economic volatility, and the degree of disclosure of the target.

The recently observed disconnect between inflation and economic activity can be explained by the interplay between the zero lower bound (ZLB) and the costs of external financing. In normal times, credit spreads and the nominal interest rate balance out; factor costs dominate firms' marginal costs. When nominal rates are constrained, larger spreads can more than offset the effect of lower factor costs and induce only moderate inflation responses. The Phillips curve is hence flat at the ZLB, but features a positive slope in normal times and thus a hockey stick shape. Via this mechanism, forward guidance may induce deflationary effects.

The secular decline in the equilibrium real interest rate observed over the past decades has materially limited the room for policy-rate reductions in recessions, and has led to a marked increase in the incidence of episodes where policy rates are likely to be at, or near, the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates. Using the ECB's New Area-Wide Model, we show that, if unaddressed, the effective lower bound can cause substantial costs in terms of worsened macroeconomic performance, as rejected in negative biases in inflation and economic activity, as well as heightened macroeconomic volatility. These costs can be mitigated by the use of nonstandard instruments, notably the joint use of interest-rate forward guidance and large-scale asset purchases. When considering alternatives to inflation targeting, we find that make-up strategies such as price-level targeting and average-inflation targeting can, if they are well-understood by the private sector, largely undo the negative biases and heightened volatility induced by the effective lower bound.

Using the exact wording of the ECB’s definition of price-stability, we started a representative online survey of German citizens in January 2019 that is designed to measure long-term inflation expectations and the credibility of the inflation target. Our results indicate that credibility has decreased in our sample period, particularly in the course of the deep recession implied by the COVID-19 pandemic. Interestingly, even though inflation rates in Germany have been clearly below 2% for several years, credibility has declined mainly because Germans increasingly expect that inflation will be much higher than 2% over the medium term. We investigate how inflation expectations and the impact of the pandemic depend on personal characteristics including age, gender, education, income, and political attitude.

We explore the impact of low and negative monetary policy rates in core world economies on bank lending in four small open economies – Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic and Norway – using confidential bank-level data. Our results show that the impact on lending in these small open economies depends on the interest rate level in the core. When interest rates are high, monetary policy cuts in core economies can reduce credit supply in small open economies. In contrast, when interest rates in core economies are low, further expansionary monetary policy increases lending in small open economies, consistent with an international bank lending channel. These results have important policy implications, suggesting that central banks in small open economies should watch for the impact of potential regime switches in core economies’ monetary policy when rates shift to and from the very low end of the distribution.

Despite the increasing use of cashless payment instruments, the notion that cash loses importance over time can be unambiguously refuted. In contrast, the authors show that cash demand increased steeply over the past 30 years. This is not only true on a global scale, but also for the most important currencies in advanced countries (USD, EUR, CHF, GBP and JPY). In this paper, they focus especially on the role of different crises (technological crises, financial market crises, natural disasters) and analyse the demand for small and large banknote denominations since the 1990s in an international perspective. It is evident that cash demand always increases in times of crises, independent of the nature of the crisis itself. However, largely unaffected from crises we observe a trend increase in global cash aligned with a shift from transaction balances towards more hoarding, especially in the form of large denomination banknotes.

Central banks sometimes evaluate their own policies. To assess the inherent conflict of interest, the authors compare the research findings of central bank researchers and academic economists regarding the macroeconomic effects of quantitative easing (QE). They find that central bank papers report larger effects of QE on output and inflation. Central bankers are also more likely to report significant effects of QE on output and to use more positive language in the abstract. Central bankers who report larger QE effects on output experience more favorable career outcomes. A survey of central banks reveals substantial involvement of bank management in research production.

Should central banks use leaning against the wind (LAW)-type monetary or macroprudential policy to address risks to financial stability? We first assess LAW as a one-off (nonsystematic) policy using an estimated large-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with empirically plausible persistent financial cycles and a stylised regime-switching (RS) framework of occasional crises. We then evaluate policy-rule based (systematic) LAW using an endogenous RS version of our DSGE model with financial crises, effective lower bound (ELB) on interest rates, and an asymmetric LAW policy. Our findings do not support LAW by monetary policy because the costs of depressing the economy in normal times far outweigh the benefits of a less likely and less severe crisis. LAW increases inflation volatility significantly as it amplifies the effects of supply shocks on inflation. It also leads to higher long-run output costs in the case of nonsystematic policy and to a lower mean inflation rate in the case of systematic policy. The latter also results in more frequent ELB episodes due to the lower mean inflation rate it induces. We find that LAW is only advisable if the policymaker cares more about output stability relative to inflation stability or if financial cycles are less persistent, exclusively under systematic LAW. Higher long-run capital requirements in normal times address risks to financial stability better as they reduce the fluctuations in inflation and output considerably.

We study a noncooperative policy game between monetary and fiscal policy, where only monetary policy can commit to future actions. The equilibrium outcome of the game depends on the strategies available to the monetary policymaker. If strategies are left unrestricted, the central bank can alter the incentives of the fiscal authority in a way that replicates the full commitment solution. If the central bank cannot commit to respond to fiscal policy, the fiscal authority generates fluctuations in government expenditure that undermine the stabilization goals of the central bank. (JEL E12, E23, E31, E52, E58, E62)

Central banks normally accept debt of their own governments as collateral in liquidity operations without reservations. This gives rise to a valuable liquidity premium that reduces the cost of government finance. The ECB is an interesting exception in this respect. It relies on external assessments of the creditworthiness of its member states, such as credit ratings, to determine eligibility and the haircut it imposes on such debt. The authors show how such features in a central bank's collateral framework can give rise to cliff effects and multiple equilibria in bond yields and increase the vulnerability of governments to external shocks. This can potentially induce sovereign debt crises and defaults that would not otherwise arise.

We analyse the implications of asymmetric monetary policy rules by estimating Markovswitching DSGE models for the euro area (EA) and the US. The estimations show that until mid-2014 the ECB's response to inflation was more forceful when inflation was above 2% than below 2%. Since then, the ECB's policy can be characterised as symmetric, and we quantify the macroeconomic implications of this policy change. We uncover asymmetries also in the Fed's policy, which has responded more strongly in times of crisis. We compute an optimal simple rule for the EA and the US in an environment with the effective lower bound and a low neutral real rate, and find that it prescribes a stronger response to inflation and the output gap when inflation is below target compared to when it is above target. We document its stabilisation properties had this optimal rule been implemented over the last two decades.

High-frequency changes in interest rates around FOMC announcements are a standard method of measuring monetary policy shocks. However, some recent studies have documented puzzling effects of these shocks on private-sector forecasts of GDP, unemployment, or inflation that are opposite in sign to what standard macroeconomic models would predict. This evidence has been viewed as supportive of a "Fed information effect" channel of monetary policy, whereby an FOMC tightening (easing) communicates that the economy is stronger (weaker) than the public had expected. We show that these empirical results are also consistent with a "Fed response to news" channel, in which incoming, publicly available economic news causes both the Fed to change monetary policy and the private sector to revise its forecasts. We provide substantial new evidence that distinguishes between these two channels and strongly favors the latter; for example, (i) high-frequency stock market responses to Fed announcements, (ii) a new survey that we conduct of individual Blue Chip forecasters, and (iii) regressions that include the previously omitted public macroeconomic data releases all indicate that the Fed and Blue Chip forecasters are simply responding to the same public news, and that there is little if any role for a "Fed information effect".

Bilateral payment flows between banks may provide private information about a borrowing bank's liquidity position. This paper analyses whether private information on the bilateral payment flow of central bank reserves foster peer monitoring or whether the information is used to reduce search costs in the unsecured interbank market. In the former, banks with outflows of liquidity are penalized by their counterparties, while in the latter, these banks benefit through reduced search costs to find a liquidity provider. I use data from Norges Bank's real time gross settlement system over the period 2012 to 2015 to identify unsecured overnight interbank loans and payment flows. The results suggest that banks are using private information from payment flows to reduce search costs and not for peer monitoring. This has important implications for regulators' assessment of the pros and cons of a centralized versus a decentralized interbank market.

There is widespread disagreement about the role of housing wealth in explaining consumption. This paper exploits liquid and illiquid wealth time series from household balance sheet data for South Africa, previously constructed by the authors, to explain fluctuations in the ratios of consumption and household debt to income in South Africa, from 1971 to 2005. The paper emphasizes the role of substantial credit liberalization and of wealth, treating credit conditions as a latent variable with key interactions with drivers of consumption and debt. Credit conditions are proxied by a spline function entering jointly estimated consumption, debt and income expectations equations in a 'latent interactive variable equation system' (LIVES). The empirical results corroborate the theory in the paper, confirming that consumption relative to income is driven by credit liberalization, fluctuations in a range of asset values and asset accumulation, uncertainty and income expectations, inter alia. The paper confirms a collateral interpretation of housing wealth on consumption as opposed to a life-cycle interpretation. The paper also throws important light on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in South Africa.

We defend the forecasting performance of the FOMC from the recent criticism of Christina and David Romer. Our argument is that the FOMC forecasts a worst-case scenario that it uses to design decisions that will work well enough (are robust) despite possible misspecification of its model. Because these FOMC forecasts are not predictions of what the FOMC expects to occur under its model, it is inappropriate to compare their performance in a horse race against other forecasts. Our interpretation of the FOMC as a robust policymaker can explain all the findings of the Romers and rationalises differences between FOMC forecasts and forecasts published in the Greenbook by the staff of the Federal Reserve System.

We analyze the microfoundations of the Phillips curve and the close links between that relationship and results concerning optimal monetary policy, stabilisation bias and monetary policy delegation. Most recent literature has used a New Keynesian Phillips Curve based on Calvo pricing, often with an additional lagged inflation term motivated by rule-of-thumb behaviour. We develop a framework which encompasses this workhorse model while allowing for a richer time dependent pricing rule. This permits a more general analysis while showing that the standard model and policy conclusions derived from it are not robust to relatively minor changes in its microfoundations.

This paper investigates how best to determine time-invariant policy rules in macroeconomic models with forward-looking constraints, where fully optimal policy is known to be time-inconsistent. It proposes a new 'coefficient optimisation' approach that improves upon the timeless perspective method of Woodford (2003) in deterministic problems, and on average in stochastic problems, without resorting to asymptotic ('unconditional') loss comparisons.

In a monetary policy model incorporating partial persistence in inflation it is shown that inflation bias is reduced and the response to shocks improved if the policy maker has a discount rate lower than its true social value. Thus a patient central banker is shown to be a third mechanism for offsetting time inconsistency problems in addition to Rogoff's conservative central banker and the principal-agent approach of Walsh. The paper also analyses outcomes under the latter regimes and the optimal rule, finding important differences from the results of earlier literature that excludes inflation persistence.

When optimal policymaking is subject to dynamic inconsistencies (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), but shocks hit the economy after private agents form expectations, there is a trade off between the need to commit to a policy, and the need to retain discretion so as to respond to shocks. Rogoff (1985) shows that a way to strike the right balance between commitment and flexibility in monetary policy is to appoint a conservative central banker. I show that a rationale for using a committee to make decisions through voting is that a commitment device can be created out of it, without totally renouncing flexibility to respond to unexpected contingenices. Appropriate voting procedures and a well chosen supermajority rule can make a randomly sampled committee behave like Rogoff`s optimally conservative central banker. The model is developed for the case of monetary policy but these insights are more general (extending to capital taxation and patent protection). Supermajority rules can mitigate time inconsistency by introducing a status quo bias. When voting institutions (ie. the committee`s constitution) are endogenously chosen by simple majority voting, the emerging majority rule is the supermajority yielding the mix of commitment and flexibility preferred by the median voter. A corollary to this provides a theory of why constitutional reform typically requires the approval of a supermajority.

Conventional wisdom has that peripheral economies had to `play by the rules of the game` under the Classical Gold Standard (1870s-1914), while core countries could get away with frequent violations. Drawing on the experience of three core economies (England, France, Germany) and seven peripheral economies (Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Norway, Serbia, Sweden), my paper argues for a more nuanced perspective on the European periphery. While the conventional view might be true for some countries - most notably the Balkan countries - our findings, based on a VAR model and impulse response functions, suggest that the average gold drain that a specific peripheral economy was exposed to differed substantially from country to country. We also show that some of the peripheral economies, most notably Austria-Hungary, always enjoyed enough pulling power via discount rate policy to reverse quickly any such gold outflow. In sum, while the experience of some peripheral economies under gold was poor and hence normally short-lived, the experience of other peripheral countries resembled more those of the core economies.

We analyse the derivation of optimal monetary policy under discretion and commitment when lagged expectations appear in the Phillips curve, making use of the comparatively simple MSV approach which does not require transformation of the model into state-space form.

Did the Federal Reserves’ Quantitative Easing (QE) in the aftermath of the financial crisis have macroeconomic effects? To answer this question, the authors estimate a large-scale DSGE model over the sample from 1998 to 2020, including data of the Fed’s balance sheet. The authors allow for QE to affect the economy via multiple channels that arise from several financial frictions. Their nonlinear Bayesian likelihood approach fully accounts for the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. They find that between 2009 to 2015, QE increased output by about 1.2 percent. This reflects a net increase in investment of nearly 9 percent, that was accompanied by a 0.7 percent drop in aggregate consumption. Both, government bond and capital asset purchases were effective in improving financing conditions. Especially capital asset purchases significantly facilitated new investment and increased the production capacity. Against the backdrop of a fall in consumption, supply side effects dominated which led to a mild disinflationary effect of about 0.25 percent annually.

We build a general equilibrium model with financial frictions that impede monetary policy transmission. Agents with heterogeneous productivity can increase investment by levering up, which increases liquidity risk due to maturity transformation. In equilibrium, more productive agents choose higher leverage than less productive agents, which exposes the more productive agents to greater liquidity risk and makes their investment less responsive to interest rate changes. When monetary policy reduces interest rates, aggregate investment quality deteriorates, which blunts the monetary stimulus and decreases asset liquidation values. This, in turn, reduces loan demand, decreasing the interest rate further and generating a negative spiral. Overall, the allocation of credit is distorted and monetary stimulus can become ineffective even with significant interest rate drops., NA

We study how the Eurosystem Collateral Framework for corporate bonds helps the European Central Bank (ECB) fulfill its policy mandate. Using the ECBs eligibility list, we identify the first inclusion date of both bonds and issuers. We find that due to the increased supply and demand for pledgeable collateral following eligibility, (i) securities lending market trading activity increases, (ii) eligible bonds have lower yields, and (iii) the liquidity of newly-issued bonds declines, whereas the liquidity of older bonds is una↵ected/improves. Corporate bond lending relaxes the constraint of limited collateral supply, thereby making the market more cohesive and complete. Following eligibility, bond-issuing firms reduce bank debt and expand corporate bond issuance, thus increasing overall debt size and extending maturity.

We evaluate the impact of mortgage regulation on credit volumes, household balance sheets and the reaction to adverse economic shocks. Using a comprehensive dataset of all housing transactions in Norway matched with buyers' balance sheet information from official tax records, we identify causal effects of mortgage loan-to-value (LTV) limits. Our results show that LTV-requirements have substantial effects on credit volumes, especially on the extensive margin. As a result, such requirements contribute to dampening aggregate credit growth. We find that affected households lower their debt uptake and face lower interest expenses, thereby reducing their vulnerability to adverse shocks. However, affected households also deplete liquid assets when purchasing a home, in order to meet the new requirement. This negative effect on liquid savings persists in the years following the house purchase, suggesting that the impact on financial vulnerability at the household level is in fact ambiguous. We illustrate this further by documenting that households affected by the regulation are more likely to sell their home when becoming unemployed compared to non-affected households.

Does policymakers’ choice of words matter? We explore empirically whether central bank tone conveyed in FOMC statements contains useful information for financial market participants. We quantify central bank tone using computational linguistics and identify exogenous shocks to central bank tone orthogonal to the state of the economy. Using an ARCH model and a high-frequency approach, we find that positive central bank tone increases interest rates at the 1-year maturity. We therefore investigate which potential pieces of information could be revealed by central bank tone. Our tests suggest that it relates to the dispersion of views among FOMC members. This information may be useful to financial markets to understand current and future policy decisions. Finally, we show that central bank tone helps predicting future policy decisions.

The ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court and its call for conducting and communicating proportionality assessments regarding monetary policy have been the subject of some controversy. However, it can also be understood as a way to strengthen the de-facto independence of the European Central Bank. The authors shows how a regular proportionality check could be integrated in the ECB’s strategy that is currently undergoing a systematic review. In particular, they propose to include quantitative benchmarks for policy rates and the central bank balance sheet. Deviations from such benchmarks can have benefits in terms of the intended path for inflation while involving costs in terms of risks and side effects that need to be balanced. Practical applications to the euro area are provided

To shed light on the interaction between macroprudential and monetary policies, we study the inward transmission of foreign monetary policy in conjunction with domestic macroprudential and monetary policies in Norway and Sweden. Using detailed bank-level data we show how Norwegian and Swedish banks' lending reacts to monetary policy surprises arising abroad, controlling for the domestic macroprudential stance and the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies. In both countries, the domestic macroprudential policy helps mitigate the effects arising after foreign monetary surprises.

Central banks unexpectedly tightening policy rates often observe the exchange value of their currency depreciate, rather than appreciate as predicted by standard models. We document this for Fed and ECB policy days using event studies and ask whether an information effect, where the public attributes the policy surprise to an unobserved state of the economy that the central bank is signaling by its policy may explain the abnormality. It turns out that many informational assumptions make a standard two- country New Keynesian model match this behavior. To identify the particular mechanism, we condition on multiple asset prices in the event study and model implications for these. We find that there is heterogeneity in this dimension in the event study and no model with a single regime can match the evidence. Further, even after conditioning on possible information effects driving longer term interest rates, there appear to be other drivers of exchange rates. Our results show that existing models have a long way to go in reconciling event study analysis with model-based mechanisms of asset pricing.

We show that FED policy announcements lead to a significant increase in international comovements in the cross-section of equity and in particular sovereign CDS markets. The relaxation of unconventionary monetary policies is felt strongly by emerging markets, and by countries that are open to the trading of goods and flows, even in the presence of floating exchange rates. It also impacts closed economies whose currencies are pegged to the dollar. This evidence is consistent with recent theories of a global financial cycle and the pricing of a FED’s put. In contrast, ECB announcements hardly affect comovements, even in the Eurozone.

This paper investigates how the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy depends on the distribution of household debt. Using an original loan-level dataset covering the universe of UK mortgages, we assess the effect of monetary shocks on aggregate consumption by exploiting time variation in a measure of the proportion of households close to their borrowing constraint. We find that monetary policy is most potent when there is a large share of constrained households. In contrast, we find noevidence that the average level of borrowing relative-to-income of the household sector affects the transmission of monetary policy.

The nature of monetary arrangements is often discussed without any reference to its detailed construction. We present a graph representation that allows for a clear understanding of modern monetary systems. First, we show that systems based on commodity money are incompatible with credit. We then study the current chartalist systems based on pure fiat money, and we discuss the consolidation of the central bank with the Treasury. We obtain a visual explanation about how commercial banks are responsible for endogenous money creation whereas the Treasury and the central bank are in charge of the total amount of net money. Finally we draw an analogy between systems based on gold convertibility and currency pegs to show that fixed exchange rates can never be maintained., Comment: 25 pages, 10 figures

To “ensure depth and liquidity,” the European Central Bank intervened in sovereign debt markets through its Securities Markets Programme (SMP), providing a unique opportunity to estimate the effects of large-scale asset purchases on sovereign bond liquidity premia. From reduced-form estimates, we find robust, economically significant impact and lasting reductions in sovereign bonds’ liquidity premia in response to official purchases. We develop a search-based asset-pricing model to understand our empirical results. The theory implies that bond liquidity premia fall in response to both official purchases and rising sovereign default probabilities, as seen in the data.

I show how the evolution of bank capital depends on the share of non-state-contingent assets in banks’ balance sheets and present the implications for macroeconomic dynamics. State-contingent securities impact on banks’ balance sheets through changes in their returns (and their prices), both of which depend on the current state of the economy. Non-state-contingent assets are signed before shocks are realized and their repayment is guaranteed. For this reason, they insulate banks’ balance sheets from recent economic activity in the absence of defaults. Non-state-contingent assets in banks’ balance sheets attenuate the amplification of shocks resulting from financial frictions. The same effect can be achieved if more weight is placed on the state-contingent assets in the equity related constraint against the costs of long-run output losses.

Established by a three person committee in 1914, the structure of the Federal Reserve System has remained essentially unchanged ever since, despite criticism at the time and over ensuing decades. With Congress now considering reforms to the System, this paper examines the original selection of cities for Reserve Banks and branches, and of district boundaries. We show that each aspect of the Fed’s structure reflected the preferences of national banks, including adjustments to district boundaries after 1914. Further, using newly-collected data on interbank connections, we find that banker preferences mirrored established correspondent relationships. The Federal Reserve was thus formed on top of the structure that it was meant to replace.

In this paper, we derive a modification of a forward-looking Taylor rule by integrating two variables that measure the uncertainty of inflation and GDP growth forecasts into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model. We show that certainty-equivalence in New Keynesian models is a consequence of log-linearization and that a second-order Taylor approximation leads to a reaction function that includes the uncertainty of macroeconomic expectations. To test the model empirically, we use the standard deviation of individual forecasts around the median Consensus Forecast as a proxy for forecast uncertainty. Our sample covers the euro area, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the period 1990Q1–2016Q4. We find that the Bank of England and the European Central Bank have a significantly negative reaction to inflation forecast uncertainty. Our findings also reveal that the Federal Reserve (Bank of England) lowers (raises) its interest rate in response to higher GDP growth forecast uncertainty. We conclude by offering some implications for optimal monetary policy rules and central bank watchers.

In the years preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis, forward-looking indicators of bank risk concentrated and suggested unusually low expectations of bank default. We assess whether the ex-ante (i.e. prior to the crisis) cross-sectional variability in bank characteristics is related to the ex-post (i.e. during the crisis) materialization of bank risk. Our tailor-made dataset crucially accounts for the different dimensions of realized bank risk including access to central bank liquidity during the crisis. We consistently find that less reliance on deposit funding, more aggressive credit growth, larger size and leverage were associated with larger levels of realized risk. The impact of these characteristics is particularly relevant for capturing the systemic dimensions of bank risk and tends to become stronger for the tail of the riskier banks. The majority of these characteristics also predicted bank risk as materialized before the financial crisis.

We develop a macroeconomic model in which in which commercial banks can o oad risky loans to a highly levered ‘shadow’ banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. We highlight the liquidity creation role played by securitization. We show how an endogenous tightening of credit constraints can exacerbate the e ect of shocks by limiting the ability of shadow banks to supply collateral, and of banks to securitize. The model is able to reproduce the cyclical behavior of bank and non-bank credit and leverage. Macroeconomic shocks that directly impact the worth of financial sector are particularly harmful to economic activity, but purely redistributive intra-financial shocks can also generate recessions. We discuss how government policy can stabilize the securitization market when the shadow banking system becomes impaired.

We estimate the Smets and Wouters (2007) model augmented with the Gertler and Karadi (2011) financial intermediation sector on US data by using real and financial observables. Given the framework of the estimated model, we address the question whether and how standard monetary policy should interact with macroprudential policy in order to safeguard real and financial stability. For this purpose, monetary policy is described by a flexible inflation targeting regime using the interest rate as instrument, while the macroprudential regulator adopts a tax/subsidy on bank capital in a countercyclical manner in order to stabilize nominal credit growth and the output gap. We look at the gains from coordination between the central bank and the macroprudential regulator under alternative assumptions regarding the degree of importance assigned to output gap fluctuations in the macroprudential mandate. The results suggest that there can be considerable gains from coordination if the macroprudential regulator has been assigned a sufficiently high weight on output gap stabilization, i.e. the common objective with monetary policy. If, on the other hand, the main focus of the macroprudential mandate is on credit growth, the macroprudential policy maker can reach better outcomes, while the central bank does worse, in the absence of coordination. Therefore, whether and to which extent monetary policy gains from coordination with the macroprudential regulator depends on the relative weight assigned to output fluctuations in the macroprudential mandate. Our counterfactual analysis further confirms the effectiveness of the countercyclical macroprudential tax/subsidy in containing the amplification effects triggered by a financial shock, and suggests that having a macroprudential regulatory tool at work could have successfully avoided the massive drop in credit such as the one observed at the onset of the Great Recession.

This paper structurally investigates the changes in the Federal Reserve's communication strategy during the 1990s by analyzing anticipated and unanticipated disturbances to a Taylor rule. The anticipated monetary policy disturbances are identified by estimating a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with the term structure of interest rates, using the U.S. data that includes bond yields. The estimation results show that the Fed made its future policy actions unanticipated for market participants until the mid-1990s, but thereafter, the Fed tended to coordinate market expectations about future policy actions. This finding suggests that the changes in the Fed's communication strategy are consistent with the rise of the academic views on central banking as management of expectations. The inclusion of bond yields in the data for estimation is indispensable to the finding because the yields contain crucial information on the expected future path of the federal funds rate. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the presence of bond yields data generates a substantial contribution of monetary policy disturbances to business cycles.

This paper examines the financial and real effects of excess reserves in a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with monopoly banking, credit market imperfections and a cost channel. The model explicitly accounts for the fact that banks hold excess reserves and they incur costs in holding these assets. Simulations of a shock to required reserves show that although raising reserve require- ments is successful in sterilizing excess reserves, it creates a procyclical e¤ect for real economic activity. This result implies that financial stability may come at a cost of macroeconomic stability. The findings also indicate that using an augmented Taylor rule in which the policy interest rate is adjusted in response to changes in excess re- serves reduces volatility in output and inflation but increases fluctuations in financial variables. To the contrary, using a countercyclical reserve requirement rule helps to mitigate fluctuations in excess reserves, but increases volatility in real variables.

A debate on the scope of bank information disclosures seems to be essential, especially after the Global Financial Crisis. The adequate quantity of data provided to the public domain is a condition of transparency of the banking sector which should assure the optimization of market participants’ decisions. There is also a tendency to unify global accountancy standards, and they are expected to ensure the same scope of disclosed information for the global financial market. The aim of the study is to investigate if there are any differences with the number of risk disclosures among the banks using GAAP and IFRS accounting standards, and if more stable banking sectors tend to report a wider scope of data. Finding out the nature of the determinants of disclosures is an important aspect in terms of working out the procedures which will increase the transparency and stability of the financial markets. Doświadczenia globalnego kryzysu finansowego sprawiły, że debata nad zakresem informacji ujawnianych przez banki nabrała szczególnego znaczenia. Odpowiednia ilość danych trafiających do domeny publicznej warunkuje bowiem przejrzystość sektora bankowego optymalizującą decyzje uczestników rynku. Jednocześnie na globalnym rynku finansowym obserwuje się tendencję do ujednolicania standardów rachunkowości, aby zakres ujawnianych informacji był taki sam. Celem przedstawionych w artykule badań jest zweryfikowanie istnienia różnic, jeśli chodzi o ilość ujawnianych informacji wymaganych standardami GAAP i IFRS, oraz zbadanie, czy bardziej stabilne sektory bankowe mają tendencję do ujawniania większego zakresu danych. Wskazanie czynników determinujących poziom ujawnień wydaje się istotne dla wypracowania procedur poprawiających przejrzystość i stabilność rynków finansowych.

We assess the impact on the credit supply to non-financial corporations of the two very long term refinancing operations (VLTROs) conducted by the Eurosystem in December 2011 and February 2012 for the case of Spain. To do so we use bank–firm level information from a sample of more than one million lending relationships during two years. Our methodology tackles three main identification challenges: (i) how to disentangle credit supply from demand; (ii) the non-random assignment of firms to banks; (iii) the endogeneity of the VLTRO bids, as banks with more deteriorated funding conditions were more likely both to ask for a large amount of funds and to restrain credit supply. Our findings suggest that the VLTROs had a positive moderate-sized effect on the supply of bank credit to firms. We also find that the effect was greater for illiquid banks and that it was driven by credit to SMEs, as there was no impact on loans to large firms. By contrast, strong firm–bank relationships were less sensitive to the positive liquidity shock caused by the VLTROs, which is consistent with the studies that find that relationship lending is a more stable source of credit than transaction lending. Finally, the VLTROs had no impact on either the degree of loan collateralisation or the probability of making loans to new borrowers, while they decreased the probability of renewing old ones, which suggests that those funds were not used for loan “evergreening”.