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We test whether living through conflict in childhood changes political beliefs and engagement. We combine data on the location and intensity of conflicts since 1945 with nationally representative data on political attitudes and behaviors from 17 sub-Saharan African countries. Exposure from ages 0 to 14 has a very small standardized impact on later attitudes and behaviors. This finding is robust to migration and holds across a variety of definitions, specifications, and sources of data. Our results suggest that at the population level in Africa, conflict does not alter political beliefs, though the most exposed sub-populations may experience large, lasting effects.

We aim at understanding the triggers of electoral violence, which spoiled 80% ofelections in Africa during the last decades. We focus on Burundi, a country wherepolls were organized in 2010, only few months after the end of a long-lasting civilwar. We find that an acute polarization between ex-rebels’ groups is highly conduciveto electoral violence. In particular, we predict a five-fold increase in electoralviolence between the lowest- and highest-polarized municipality. However, neitherethnic nor political cleavages significantly determine such electoral malpractices.These results are robust to numerous specifications. We therefore argue that policiessupporting the transition of ex-rebel groups from warfare to the political arenashould be reinforced., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Following the wave of democratization during the 1990s, elections are now common in low-income societies. However, these elections are frequently flawed. We investigate the Nigerian general election of 2007, which is to date the largest election held in Africa and one seriously marred by violence. We designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on randomized anti-violence grassroots campaigning. We find direct effects on violence outcomes from exploring both subject-surveying and independent data sources. Crucially, we establish that voter intimidation is effective in reducing voter turnout, and that the violence was systematically dissociated from incumbents. We suggest that incumbents have a comparative advantage in alternative strategies, vote buying and ballot fraud. Voter intimidation may be a strategy of the weak analogous to terrorism.

This paper studies empirically the impact of mining on conflicts in Africa. Using novel data, we combine geo-referenced information over the 1997-2010 period on the location and characteristics of violent events and mining extraction of 27 minerals. Working with a grid covering all African countries at a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degree, we find a sizeable impact of mining activity on the probability/intensity of conflict at the local level. This is both true for low-level violence (riots, protests), as well as for organized violence (battles). Our main identification strategy exploits exogenous variations in the minerals' world prices; however the results are robust to various alternative strategies, both in the cross-section and panel dimensions. Our estimates suggest that the historical rise in mineral price observed over the period has contributed to up to 21 percent of the average country-level violence in Africa. The second part of the paper investigates whether minerals, by increasing the financialcapacities of fighting groups, contribute to diffuse violence over time and space, therefore affecting the intensity and duration of wars. We find direct evidence that the appropriation of a mining area by a group increases the probability that this group perpetrates future violence elsewhere. This is consistent with "feasibility" theories of conflict. We also find that seccessionist insurgencies are more likely in mining areas, which is in line with recent theories of secessionist conflict.

Can heroes legitimize strongly-proscribed and repugnant political behaviors? We exploit the purposefully arbitrary rotation of French regiments to measure the legitimizing effects of heroic credentials. 53% of French line regiments happened to rotate under a specific general, Philippe Pétain, during the pivotal WWI battle of Verdun (1916). Using recently declassified intelligence data on 95,314 individuals, we find the home municipalities of regiments serving under Pétain at Verdun raised 7% more Nazi collaborators during the Pétain led Vichy regime (1940-44). The effects are similar across joining Fascist parties, German forces, paramilitaries that hunted Jews and the Resistance, and collaborating economically. These municipalities also increasingly vote for right-wing parties between the wars. The voting effects persist after WWII, becoming particularly salient during social crises. We argue these results reflect the complementary role of the heroes of Verdun in legitimizing and diffusing the authoritarian values of their former leader.

Stochastic uncertainty can cause difficult coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can do so. To test this, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeatedly played Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not entail an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two main reasons for this finding: First, the stochastic uncertainty forces proposers to accept high strategic uncertainty if they intend to cooperate by claiming a low amount (which many proposers do not). Second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperative by transferring too little (which hinders cooperation in future periods)., CEPA Discussion Papers, 20

В межах статті проведено аналіз причин виникнення конфліктних ситуацій на підприємстві, що дозволило визначити механізми профілактики соціальної напруги в колективі. Авторами було розглянуто різні погляди щодо впливу виробничих конфліктів на діяльність організації. В статті зазначені можливі негативні і позитивні наслідки виробничих конфліктів, а також їх конструктивний і деструктивний вплив на колектив. З метою обґрунтування способів і методів управління конфліктами, охарактеризовано зазначену дефініцію з позицій когнітивної психології, психоаналітичного представлення про природу індивіда, біхевіористської позиції, рольових підходів та сформовано визначення поняття «конфлікт» як зіткнення несумісних між собою мотивів, які неможливо задовольнити одночасно в повній мірі. Було визначено поняття організаційного конфлікту, який в найбільшій мірі впливає на діяльність соціально-виробничих систем. Розглянуто конфлікти ролей, інтересів і норм поведінки та охарактеризовано причини виникнення конфліктів з вини керівника. Проаналізовано функціональні та дисфункціональні конфлікти і вплив останніх на колектив. Доведено важливість завчасного попередження та управління конфліктами. Запропоновано застосування двох основних стратегій управління конфліктами: запобігання конфлікту та вирішення конфлікту. Визначено основні шляхи запобігання або вирішення конфліктів, серед яких ізоляція конфліктних сторін та зміна власної поведінки. Обґрунтовано мету профілактики і спеціальні умови, які повинні бути основою для цього. В межах статті розглянуто різні методи профілактики конфліктів, запропонованих іншими науковцями. Охарактеризовано метод поділу профілактики конфліктів на первинну і вторинну, обґрунтовано мету даного методу. Розглянуто різні типи запобігання конфліктів, серед них авторитарний і демократичний. Обґрунтовано їх переваги та недоліки. Отримані результати можуть бути використанні для мінімізації деструктивних наслідків конфліктів в організації. The article analyzes the causes of conflict situations at the enterprise, which allowed to determine the mechanisms of prevention of social tension in the team. The authors considered different views on the impact of industrial conflicts on the organization. Possible negative and positive consequences of industrial conflicts, as well as their constructive and destructive impact on the team, are stated in the article. In order to substantiate methods and methods of conflict management, the above definition is defined from the standpoint of cognitive psychology, psychoanalytic conception of the nature of the individual, behaviorist position, role approaches, and the definition of the concept of "conflict" as incompatible with each other is formed. The concept of organizational conflict, which most influences the activity of social production systems, was defined. The conflicts of roles, interests and norms of behavior are considered and the causes of conflicts due to the manager's fault are characterized. Functional and dysfunctional conflicts and influence of the latter on the team are analyzed. The authors prove the importance of early conflict prevention and management. Two major conflict management strategies are proposed: conflict prevention and conflict resolution. The main ways of preventing or resolving conflicts were identified, including isolation of conflicting parties and change of one's behavior. The purpose of prevention and the special conditions that must be the basis for this are justified. Various methods of conflict prevention proposed by other scholars have also been considered. The article describes the method of division of conflict prevention into primary and secondary, and the purpose of this method is substantiated. The authors considered various types of conflict prevention, including authoritarian and democratic ones. Their advantages and disadvantages were justified. The results obtained can be used to minimize the destructive effects of conflicts within the organization.

We study the effect of divisions within the elite on the probability of internalconflict in the Papal States between 1295 and 1846. We assemble a new databaseusing information on cardinals that participated in conclaves during this period,and construct measures of polarization and fractionalization based on the cardinals’places of birth. The deaths of popes and cardinals provide plausible exogenousvariation in the timing of the conclave and the composition of the Collegeof Cardinals, which we exploit to analyze the causal effect of a divided conclaveon conflict. We find that an increase of one standard deviation in our measure ofpolarization raised the likelihood of internal conflict by between 2 and 3 percentin a given year and by up to 18 percent in a given papacy. The effect is largestin the initial years after the conclave, to gradually vanish over time. Our resultsconfirm that cardinals’ influence on the politics of the Papal States decreased afterreforms introduced between 1586 and 1588. Our measure of religious productivity,however, is negatively and significantly linked to polarization in the post-reformperiod. These reforms were successful in shifting the effect of divisions among theelite of one of the largest and oldest organizations from violent conflict to religiousmatters.

У статті проаналізовано роботи провідних науковців, які досліджували організаційні конфлікти. Розглянуто організаційний конфлікт як най розповсюджений вид конфлікту в сфері трудової діяльності через неузгодженість поглядів учасників колективу процесі трудової діяльності. Уточнено зміст поняття «конфлікт», охарактеризовано сутність конфліктів, проаналізовано природу конфліктів для їх вирішення, розглянуто і охарактеризовано основні види організаційних конфліктів (внутрішньо-особистісні, міжособистісні, внутрішньо-групові, між групові); охарактеризовано технології та методи врегулювання конфліктних ситуацій, розглянуто їх види. З’ясовано природу конфлікту та його вплив на організацію праці. Визначено основні причини виникнення конфліктної ситуації. Доведено неоднозначний вплив конфлікту на трудову поведінку колективу та систему соціально-трудових відносин в організації. Охарактеризовано основні причини виникнення конструктивних і деструктивних конфліктів та відповідні зміни у колективі, що виникають внаслідок появи конфліктних ситуацій, визначено основні чинники їх регулювання. Вияснено роль керівника у регулюванні конфліктної ситуації, та визначено необхідність формування у працівників конфліктологічної компетентності та культури. Доведено, що будь-яка організація може піддаватися різним видам конфліктів. Визначено важливість психологічного клімату в колективі, де переважають ті чи інші види конфліктів залежно від розмірів організації, рівня якості корпоративної культури, особистісних характеристик керівника та членів колективу, які впливають на робочий процес та особисте життя в цілому. Узагальнено теоретичні положення вирішення організаційних конфліктів через ефективне управління. Запропоновано застосування методу вирішення проблем та охарактеризовано алгоритм його дій для розв’язання складних конфліктних ситуацій. The article analyzes the work of leading scholars who have investigated organizational conflicts. Organizational conflict was considered as the most widespread type of conflict in the sphere of work due to the inconsistency of the views of the team members. The paper deals with the theoretical and practical aspects of conflict management. The content of the concept of "conflict" is clarified, the nature of conflicts is characterized, the nature of conflicts is analyzed to solve them, the main types of organizational conflicts are considered (intra-personal, interpersonal, intra-group, between groups); technologies and methods of conflict management are described, their types are considered. The nature of the conflict and its impact on the organization of work has been clarified. The main causes of the conflict have been identified. The ambiguous impact of the conflict on the labor behavior of the team and the system of social and labor relations in the organization has been proved. Conflict was considered as a positive as well as a negative phenomenon, and its impact on the effectiveness of activities in the organization. The main causes of constructive and destructive conflicts and corresponding changes in the collective are described, the main factors of their regulation are determined. The role of the manager in the regulation of the conflict situation is clarified, and the necessity of formation of conflict competence and culture in the employees is determined. It is proved that any organization can be exposed to different types of conflicts. The importance of the psychological climate in the team was determined, where certain types of conflicts prevail, depending on the size of the organization, the quality level of the corporate culture, the personal characteristics of the leader and the team members, which influence the work process and personal life in general. It is suggested to use one of the methods, or a combination of several to solve problems. The most effective method has been identified and its algorithm for solving complex conflict situations has been characterized. The theoretical propositions of resolving organizational conflicts are summarized through effective problem-solving method management.

A new, more fundamental approach is proposed to the classical bargaining problem. The give-and-take feature in the negotiation process is explicitly modelled under the new framework. A compromise set consists of all allocations a bargainer is willing to accept as agreement. We focus on the relationship between the rationality principles (arguments) adopted by bargainers in making mutual concessions and the formation of compromise sets. The bargaining correspondence is then defined as the intersection of bargainers’ compromise sets. We study the non-emptyness, symmetry, efficiency and single-valuedness of the bargaining correspondence, and establish its connection to the Nash solution. Our framework provides the first rational foundation to Nash’s axiomatic approach, and hence bridges the “Edgeworth-Nash gap”.

This paper presents a theoretical model of conflict between two players, with intervention by a peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers are treated as a military contingent, capable of taking sides, acting as a third (independent) side in the war, or remaining inactive, depending on circumstances. This departs from previous models, in which peacekeeping was no more than a parameter affecting players' fighting costs. The main result is an optimal deployment strategy by peacekeepers, detailing the nature and level of intervention required under different circumstances; a strategy which results in the lowest possible level of warfare between the two antagonists. The credible threat of force (rather than mere intervention) is the strategy's key component.

The stability of many post-conflict societies rests on the successful reintegration of former soldiers. We use an experimental approach to study reintegration in Northern Uganda and examine behavior of former soldiers together with the behavior of receiving communities towards this group. We focus on trust-based interactions and find that individual trustworthiness increases with the length of time a person was with the Lord's Resistance Army, a rebel group which forcibly recruited a large fraction of young people in the area. The effect is strongest among former soldiers who were abducted during childhood and is mute among those who soldiered during adulthood. These results are consistent with predictions of recent theories that highlight the importance of cooperation during war. Furthermore, members of receiving communities with an abductee son, who thus have better knowledge of former soldiers are aware of the behavioral difference. They believe former soldiers are more trustworthy than their peers and trust them more. Last, we find no evidence of preference-based discrimination, suggesting that anger is attenuated when communities do not attribute responsibility for committed violence to returning soldiers.

This paper develops a new model of trade policy under dictatorship and democratization. The paper makes two contributions. One is to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between political institutions and economic performance by studying the endogenous interaction between the form of government and trade policy. If a ruling elite own a factor that is scarce then democratization goes hand in hand with trade liberalization and an increase in economic efficiency, as argued by classical scholars. But if the elite own an abundant factor then democratization is accompanied by an increase in protectionism and a reduction in e¢ ciency. The paper also characterizes the circumstances under which a dictatorship can use trade policy to forestall democratization. The paper?s second contribution is to show how trade policy can be manipulated to maintain the status quo in the face of world price shocks, thus opening the door to a re-examination of trade policy responses to technology shocks. The model is used to explain an interesting episode of trade policymaking between 1815 and 1846, during which time Britain substantially liberalized trade while Prussia, on the other side of the grain market, signi?cantly increased protectionism. It is also used to shed light on the wide-spread imposition of export restrictions in response to the 2007-08 food crisis.

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players' unequal fighting strengths, strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most efficient when power is balanced. In turn, the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power.

This paper shows how, under threat of revolution, a nation's elite are able to maintain political stability and hence ownership of their wealth by creating or expanding a 'pampered bureaucracy.' The elite thus divert part of an otherwise entrepreneurial middle class from more productive manufacturing activities, reducing economic efficiency. If the country has a comparative advantage in primary products, trade integration is potentially destabilizing since it raises the payoff to the lower classes of mounting a revolution and challenging the elite for their wealth. In that case trade integration mandates expansion of the pampered bureaucracy. Therefore, trade integration may actually reduce economic efficiency. The econometric results provide supportive evidence for our model.

We study from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective how a network of military alliances and enmities affects the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We postulate a Tullock contest success function augmented by an externality: each group’s strength is increased by the fighting effort of its allies, and weakened by the fighting effort of its rivals. We obtain a closed form characterization of the Nash equilibrium of the fighting game, and of how the network structure affects individual and total fighting efforts. We then perform an empirical analysis using data on the Second Congo War, a conflict that involves many groups in a complex network of informal alliances and rivalries. We estimate the fighting externalities, and use these to infer the extent to which the conflict intensity can be reduced through (i) removing individual groups involved in the conflict; (ii) pacification policies aimed at alleviating animosity among groups.

We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allow- ing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative and strin- gent approach to type classification, we find that the overwhelming majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome- based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer's demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer, thereby suggesting a strong concern for integrity.

Differential games of common resources that are governed by linear accumulation constraints have several applications. Examples include political rent-seeking groups expropriating public infrastructure, oligopolies expropriating common resources, industries using specific common infrastructure or equipment, capital-flight problems, pollution, etc. Most of the theoretical literature employs specific parametric examples of utility functions. For symmetric differential games with linear constraints and a general time-separable utility function depending only on the player's control variable, we provide an exact formula for interior symmetric Markovian-strategies. This exact solution, (a) serves as a guide for obtaining some new closed-form solutions and for characterizing multiple equilibria, and (b) implies that, if the utility function is an analytic function, then the Markovian strategies are analytic functions, too. This analyticity property facilitates the numerical computation of interior solutions of such games using polynomial projection methods and gives potential to computing modified game versions with corner solutions by employing a homotopy approach.

Why do religious politics thrive in some societies but not others? This paper explores the institutional foundations of this process in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim democracy. We show that a major Islamic institution, the waqf, fostered the entrenchment of political Islam at a critical historical juncture. In the early 1960s, rural elites transferred large amounts of land into waqf—a type of inalienable charitable trust—to avoid expropriation by the government as part of a major land reform effort. Although the land reform was later undone, the waqf properties remained. We show that greater intensity of the planned reform led to more prevalent waqf land and Islamic institutions endowed as such, including religious schools, which are strongholds of the Islamist movement. We identify lasting effects of the reform on electoral support for Islamist parties, preferences for religious candidates, and the adoption of Islamic legal regulations (sharia). Overall, the land reform contributed to the resilience and eventual rise of political Islam by helping to spread religious institutions, thereby solidifying the alliance between local elites and Islamist groups. These findings shed new light on how religious institutions may shape politics in modern democracies.

History offers many examples of dictators who worsened their behavior significantly over time (like Zimbabwe's Mugabe) as well as dictators who displayed remarkable improvements (like Rawlings of Ghana). The authors show that such mutations can result from rational behavior when the dictator's flow use of repression is complementary to his stock of wrongdoings: past wrongdoings then perpetuate further wrongdoings and the dictator can unintentionally get trapped in a repressive steady state where he himself suffers from ex-post regret. This then begs the question why such a dictator would ever choose to do wrong in the first place. The authors show that this can be explained from the dictator's uncertainty over his degree of impunity in relation to wrongdoing, which induces him to experiment along this dimension. This produces a setting where any individual rising to power can end up as either a moderate leader, or as a dreaded tyrant. Since derailment is accidental and accompanied by ex-post regret, increasing accountability can be in the interest of both the public and the dictator.

This paper provides evidence for how an authoritarian state can mobilize civilians to participate in mass violence through a top-down policy. We analyze a Rwandan mandatory community program that required citizens to participate in community work and political meetings every Saturday in the years before the 1994 genocide. We exploit cross-sectional variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations, and find that a one standard-deviation increase in the number of rainy Saturdays resulted in a 16 percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. The natural placebo test -- rainfall on all other weekdays -- yields no statistically significant results. Moreover, the result is entirely driven by areas under the control of pro-Hutu parties, and we find evidence that the political elites used the program beyond simple propaganda, bringing civilians together and practicing mobilization. We also present suggestive evidence that in areas with opposition parties in power, the effects turn positive, implying that the meetings there were used to overcome hatred. Our robust findings shed light on the potentially detrimental role of government-ordered community meetings. Its importance derives, at the very least, from the resurgence of similar practices in sub-Saharan Africa.

A contest is a game where several players compete for winning prizes by expending costly efforts. We assume that the outcome of a contest is an ordered partition of the set of players (a ranking) and a contest success function assigns a probability to each possible outcome as a function of players’ efforts. We define a contest success function for contests whose outcome is a ranking of any type, i.e., with any number of players at each rank. This approach is new in contest theory since the axiomatic work has exclusively been on contests with single-winner, whose outcome is a ranking with one player in the first rank and all other players in the second rank. The contest success function is characterized by pair-swap consistency, which is an axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives and generalizes the main axiom in Skaperdas (1996).

We analyze the choice often faced by countries of whether to directly intervene to counter an external terrorist threat or to subsidize a foreign government to do it. We present a model which analyzes this policy choice where two countries, home and foreign, face a terrorist threat based in the foreign country. The home country chooses how much to invest in defending itself and in reducing terrorist resources either indirectly by subsidising the foreign country or by directly by intervening itself and risking destabilizing the foreign country. We use backward induction to solve a multiple stage game where the home country first commits to its policy decisions, then the foreign country chooses the effort it expends on reducing terrorist capability and finally, the terrorists decide their effort in attacking in the home or foreign country. Using a calibrated model, we are able to show that, for the chosen parameter values, direct intervention is only an equilibrium if foreign and home efforts are not good substitutes in the technology used to reduce the resources of the terrorist group. A higher relative military efficiency by the home country makes intervention more likely.

In anarchic settings, potential rivals can be dragged into arms races degenerating in open wars out of mutual suspicion. We propose a novel commitment device for contestants to avoid both arming and fighting. We assume that the military decides the armament levels of a country, while the civilian decides whether to attack a rival country. When these decision-making bodies perfectly communicate, the decision makers are unable to credibly communicate to their foe their willingness not to arm and not to attack, thus implying that war ensues. With imperfect information, however, peace may ensue as countries credibly signal to their rival a more peaceful stance since contestants are more reluctant to enter in an armed confrontation with a potentially understaffed army. Using data on the 1975 to 2001 period, we provide supportive evidence that in countries where the head of the state or the defense minister are military officers, and are therefore better informed of their armies’ fighting preparedness, the likelihood of observing an international conflict is higher.

There is a tremendous amount of variation in conflict intensity both across and within civil conflicts. Some conflicts result in huge numbers of battle deaths, while others do not. Conflict intensity is also dynamic. Conflict intensity escalates, de-escalates, and persists. What explains this variation? We take one of the most prominent explanations for the onset and occurrence of civil conflict—variation in economic conditions—and apply it to the intensity and dynamics of civil conflict. Using an instrumental variables strategy and a rich set of empirical models, we find that the intensity of conflict is negatively related to per capita income. We also find that economic conditions affect conflict dynamics, as poorer countries are likely to experience longer and more intense spells of fighting after the onset of conflict.

The consumption of imported goods is thought to influence consumers’ views and attitudes toward export countries. It is important to consider this issue, especially when there is political tension and conflict between countries. Because of their historical background, political conflict exists between Korea and Japan. This paper examines the effect of viewing Japanese anime (animation) on the attitudes of Koreans toward Japanese living in Korea. The major findings of the study show that the more frequently adult Koreans view Japanese anime, the more likely they are to accept Japanese as workplace colleagues and neighbors after controlling for endogeneity bias using instrumental variables. The findings of this paper imply that via the consumption of imported cultural goods, people are exposed to positive traits of the trading partner, and thus consumers have a stronger affinity with the export country. From this, we derive the policy implication that promoting the trade of modern cultural goods is effective in increasing mutual understanding between trading partners, thereby reducing political tension between them.

The economics literature typically uses counts of casualties as a measure of conflict intensity despite the fact that the units of observation vary considerably in population size. When analysing the impact of conflict on economic growth, the use of counts relies on the assumption that a given number of casualties affects large and small populations in the same way. Using within‐ and between‐country evidence, this paper demonstrates that this standard assumption can be rejected. A per capita model of conflict intensity that captures local effects of violence provides a more consistent empirical framework for both between‐country and within‐country studies., Ramon y Cajal programme. Grant Number: 2014 SGR 1064 Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness

The relationship between income inequality and crime has attracted the interest of many researchers, but little convincing evidence exists on the causal effect of inequality on crime in developing countries. This paper estimates this effect in a unique context: Mexico's Drug War. The analysis takes advantage of a unique data set containing inequality and crime statistics for more than 2,000 Mexican municipalities covering a period of 20 years. Using an instrumental variable for inequality that tackles problems of reverse causality and omitted variable bias, this paper finds that an increment of one point in the Gini coefficient translates into an increase of more than 10 drug-related homicides per 100,000 inhabitants between 2006 and 2010. There are no significant effects before 2005. The fact that the effect was found during Mexico's Drug War and not before is likely because the cost of crime decreased with the proliferation of gangs (facilitating access to knowledge and logistics, lowering the marginal cost of criminal behavior), which, combined with rising inequality, increased the expected net benefit from criminal acts after 2005.

This paper studies the influence of regional inequality within countries on internal conflicts. Regional inequalities are measured by the population-weighted coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita. As the main innovation, I use a panel dataset of country-level regional inequalities, which covers 56 countries (835 subnational regions) between 1980 and 2009. I also consider a broader cross section dataset for the year 2005, which covers 110 countries (1569 subnational regions). Conflict is measured by the incidence of civil war (UCDP/PRIO data) and a risk measure of internal conflict (war, terrorism and riots) provided by the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide. Logit estimations are employed as well as OLS fixed effects panel regressions. I find that regional inequalities increase the risk of internal conflict.

This paper investigates the effect of trade integration on military conflict. Our empirical analysis,based on a large panel data set of 290,040 country-pair observations from 1950 to 2000, confirms that an increase in bilateral trade interdependence and global trade openness significantly promotes peace. It also suggests that the effect of trade openness varies depending on the geographical proximity of countries. The peace-promotion effect of bilateral trade integration is significantly higher for contiguous countries that are likely to experience more conflicts. The analysis shows, however, that an increase in global trade openness reduces the probability of conflict more for countries far apart from each other than it does for countries sharing borders. The results also show that military conflict between countries significantly reduces not only bilateral trade interdependence but also multilateral trade integration. The main finding of the peace-promotion effect of bilateral and global trade integration holds robust when controlling for the natural and geopolitical characteristics of dyads of states that may influence the probability of military conflict and for the simultaneous determination of trade and peace.

We examine the game theoretic properties of a model of crime first introduced by Short et al. (2010 Phys. Rev. E82, 066114) as the SBD Adversarial Game. We identify the rationalizable strategies and one-shot equilibria under multiple equilibrium refinements. We further show that SBD's main result about the effectiveness of defecting-punishers (“Informants”) in driving the system to evolve to the cooperative equilibrium under an imitation dynamic generalizes to a best response dynamic, though only under certain parameter regimes. The nature of this strategy's role, however, differs significantly between the two dynamics: in the SBD imitation dynamic, Informants are sufficient but not necessary to achieve the cooperative equilibrium, while under the best response dynamic, Informants are necessary but not sufficient for convergence to cooperation. Since a policy of simply converting citizens to Informants will not guarantee success under best response dynamics, we identify alternative strategies that may help the system reach cooperation in this case, e.g., the use of moderate but not too severe punishments on criminals.

A number of recent studies show that males may increase their performance by more than females in response to competitive incentives. The literature suggests that such a male competitive advantage may contribute to observed gender gaps in labor force pay and achievement. Understanding which factors may be driving these gender differences is essential for designing policies that promote quality. Using a game theoretic model of contests, we consider a variety of explanations for the male competitive advantage that have been proposed in the empirical and experimental literature. Comparing the testable predictions of the model with the empirical evidence from past papers, we reject explanations involving male over-confidence, misperceptions about relative ability, and some types of preference differences. Explanations involving female under-confidence and differences in risk aversion are consistent with the significant evidence. Two explanations provide perfect matches to observed performance patterns: (i) males are better than females at handling competitive pressure, and (ii) males enjoy competition more or have greater desire to win than females.

This paper uses the experimental setup of Tanaka et al. (2010) to measure refugees’ risk preferences. A sample of 206 asylum seekers was interviewed in 2017-18 in Luxembourg. Contrary to studies which focus on risk aversion in general, we analyze its components using a cumulative prospect theory (CPT) frame-work. We show that refugees exhibit particularly low levels of risk aversion compared to other populations and that CPT provides a better fit for modelling risk attitudes. Moreover, we include randomised temporary treatments provoking emotions and find a small significant impact on probability distortion. Robustness of the Tanaka et al. (2010) experimental framework is confirmed by including treatments regarding the embedding effect. Finally, we propose a theoretical model of refugee migration that integrates the insights from our experimental outcomes regarding the functional form of refugees’ decision under risk and the estimated parameter values. The model is then simulated using the data from our study

Досліджено підходи до оцінки ефективності співпраці у межах стратегічних альянсів. Розглянуто сутність поняття стратегічний альянс, окреслено основні риси стратегічних альянсів та мотиви, за якими підприємства їх утворюють. Визначено основні принципи успішної співпраці підприємств у межах стратегічних альянсів. Підкреслено аспекти, на які варто зменшити акцент, та аспекти, на яких доцільно акцентувати при розробленні основ спільної роботи. Наведено передумови проведення оцінки ефективності співпраці компаній у стратегічному альянсі. Розглянуто різні підходи до оцінки ефективності співпраці у межах стратегічних альянсів. Виділено дві основні групи підходів до оцінки ефективності стратегічного альянсу: на основі «прямого» зіставлення результатів співпраці та ресурсів, залучених для їх досягнення, що передбачає фінансову оцінку вигід і витрат партнерської взаємодії; на основі «непрямої» оцінки досягнутих ефектів партнерських відносин його учасниками, у т. ч. у соціально-психологічному аспекті трактування ними набутих результатів спільної взаємодії. Наведено порівняльну характеристику вартісних підходів до оцінки синергетичного ефекту стратегічного партнерства. Окреслено переваги та недоліки кожного з наведених підходів. Проаналізовано доходний підхід до оцінки ефекту синергії, який, дозволяє найбільш точно та комплексно оцінити ефективність співпраці у межах стратегічного альянсу. Визначено, що найбільш об’єктивним є комплексний метод оцінки синергетичного ефекту партнерської взаємодії, що включає як кількісні, так і якісні оцінки та основні складові оцінки ефекту співпраці: операційну, інвестиційну, ринкову, фінансову та управлінську. Підкреслено, що найбільш актуальний метод для конкретного підприємства – індивідуальний на основі самостійно встановлених критеріїв успішного досягнення цілей. Як наукову новизну праці визначено удосконалення науково-методичних аспектів оцінювання участі в альянсі, що дає можливість підприємству сформувати власне бачення та систему оцінювання співпраці у межах стратегічного альянсу. The approaches to assessing the effectiveness of cooperation in the strategic alliances are explored. The essence of the concept of a strategic alliance is considered, the main features of strategic alliances and motives are outlined, according to which the enterprises form them. The main principles of successful cooperation of enterprises within the framework of strategic alliances are defined. The emphasis is on aspects that should be underlined and aspects that should not be underlined when developing the basics of working together. The prerequisites for assessing the effectiveness of companies' cooperation in a strategic alliance are given. Different approaches to assessing the effectiveness of cooperation within the framework of strategic alliances are considered. Two main groups of approaches to the strategic alliance effectiveness are identified: based on a "direct" comparison of the cooperation results and resources involved in their achievement, that involves a financial evaluation of the benefits and costs of collaboration; based on "indirect" assessment of the achieved effects of partnerships, including in the sociopsychological aspect of the results interpretation. The comparative characteristic of cost approaches to an estimation of a synergetic effect is resulted. The advantages and disadvantages of each approach are determined. The income approach to the evaluation of the synergy effect is analysed, which allows the most accurate and comprehensive assessment of the cooperation effectiveness within the strategic alliance. It is determined that the most objective method is to assess the synergetic effect, which includes both quantitative and qualitative assessments and the main components of cooperation: operational, investment, market, financial and managerial. It is emphasized that the most actual method for a particular enterprise is individual and based on independently established criteria. As a scientific novelty of work, the improvement of methodical aspects of the evaluation of participation in the alliance was determined, which enables the company to form its own vision and a system for evaluating cooperation.

Multiple prizes are usually awarded in contests (e.g., internal promotions, school admissions, sports, etc.) and players exert effort to increase their chances for winning a higher prize. A multi-prize contest model must provide each player's probabilities of winning each prize as functions of all players’ efforts. We find that the key notion of “hypothetical subcontests” in the contest axiomatization literature initiated by Skaperdas (1996) can be appropriately interpreted and precisely defined from a ranking perspective, as well as the relevant axioms of “ Subcontest Consistency ” and “ Independence of Irrelevant Contestants ” (IIC). When there are less than four contestants (exclusive), a set of axioms properly adapted from those in Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998a) are sufficient and necessary for axiomatizing the widely adopted multi-prize nested lottery contest of Clark and Riis (1996a) . When there are more than four contestants (inclusive), including a new axiom of “ Independence of Irrelevant Ranks ” (IIR) is necessary and sufficient.

We consider a multi-battle team contest in which players from two rival teams form pairwise matches to fight in distinct component battles, which are carried out sequentially or (partially) simultaneously. A team wins if and only if its players win a majority of battles. Each player benefits from his team's win, while he can also receive a private reward for winning his own battle. We find that the outcomes of past battles do not distort the outcomes of future battles. Neither the total expected effort nor the overall outcome of the contest depends on the contest's temporal structure or its feedback policy. (JEL C72, D72, D74, D82)

Conflict parties are frequently involved into more than one conflict at a given time. In this paper the interrelated structure of conflictive relations is modeled as a conflict network where opponents are embedded in a local structure of bilateral conflicts. Conflict parties invest in specific conflict technology to attack their respective rivals and defend their own resources. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this conflict game and examine the relation between aggregated equilibrium investment (interpreted as conflict intensity) and underlying network characteristics. The derived results have implications for peaceful resolutions of conflicts because neglecting the fact that opponents are embedded into an interrelated conflict structure might have adverse consequences for conflict intensity.

Throughout history, victory in conflict has created fearsome reputations. With it, the victor ensures greater allegiance of the wider population, increasing their rents at the expense of their enemy. Such reputational concerns generate two motives for conflict. When only victory or defeat is informative, the less scary party may attack to show that they are tougher than expected. If the occurrence of conflict also conveys information, the scarier party is more likely to attack. By failing to do so, the population would perceive them as weak and switch loyalties anyway. In this case, conflict arises to save face.

This paper investigates the role that International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) surveillance—the Mobile INTERPOL Network Database (MIND) and the Fixed INTERPOL Network Database (FIND)—played in the War on Terror since its inception in 2005. MIND/FIND surveillance allows countries to screen people and documents systematically at border crossings against INTERPOL databases on terrorists, fugitives, and stolen and lost travel documents. Such documents have been used in the past by terrorists to transit borders. By applying methods developed in the treatment‐effects literature, this paper establishes that countries adopting MIND/FIND experienced fewer transnational terrorist attacks than they would have had they not adopted MIND/FIND. Our estimates indicate that, on average, from 2008 to 2011, adopting and using MIND/FIND results in 0.5 fewer transnational terrorist incidents each year per 100 million people. Thus, a country like France with a population just above 64 million people in 2008 would have 0.32 fewer transnational terrorist incidents per year owing to its use of INTERPOL surveillance. This amounts to a sizeable average proportional reduction of about 30 percent.

For a panel of 109 coastal countries, we show that negative economic shocks in the fisheries sector are associated with an increase in maritime piracy. Our identification strategy uses the variation in the phytoplankton abundance off the individual countries' coasts, measured by satellite data, as a source of such shocks. We find that plankton abundance is positively related to fish catches, but negatively associated with the incidence of piracy, the onset of piracy and the absolute number of pirate attacks. Our instrumental variable estimates indicate that a plankton shock that induces fish capture production to decrease by 10% increases the risk of piracy occurring by 10 percentage points. Similarly, a shock of the same magnitude increases the number of piracy attacks by 8.6%.

This study seeks to analyze a) if the frequency with which group choose to use a certain strategy is associated with the type of conflict represented in a given situation and b) if, for different types of conflict, different conflict handling patterns (the frequency of their use) could be considered significant predictors of group effectiveness, measured through group performance and satisfaction. We developed a correlational empirical study with a sample composed of 73 work groups, taken from 14 organizations in the industrial and service sectors. The results showed that groups in task conflict situations choose integrative strategies more often than when in relational conflict situations. Moreover, avoiding strategies were more likely to be used in relational conflict situations than in task conflict situations. On the other hand, our results showed that the frequency with which a group uses an integrative strategy can be considered a significant (positive) predictor of group satisfaction for both types of conflict situations (task and relationship). Our results are discussed and compared with our previous literature review, as well as the implications and limitations of the study, along with some thoughts on further investigation.

We present a model of collective decision making in which aggregation and deliberation are treated simultaneously. In our model, individuals debate in a public forum and potentially revise their judgements in light of deliberation. Once this process is exhausted, a rule is applied to aggregate post-deliberation judgements in order to make a social choice. Restricting attention to three alternatives, we identify conditions under which a democracy is “truth-revealing”. This condition says that the deliberation path and the aggregation rule always lead to the correct social choice being made, irrespective of the original profile of judgements and irrespective of the size of the electorate (provided the latter is finite).

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use Schaffer’s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability. We find that players ‘evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.

This article reports on the potential macroeconomic benefits of peace stemming from a reduction in farmer-pastoralist violence in four Middle Belt states of Nigeria (Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau). Farmers and pastoralists routinely clash over access to farmland, grazing areas, stock routes, and water points for both animals and households. Farmer-pastoralist violence in these states is a relatively low-intensity form of conflict, but it is regionally widespread and chronic, and its incidence is arguably increasing. Using estimates of potential income benefits of peace at the household-level derived from a related study, we herein derive macroeconomic benefits via an input-output model of the Nigerian economy. We estimate these benefits to amount to around 2.8 percent of the nominal Nigerian GDP (or around 0.8 percent of the total Nigerian GDP, inclusive of the informal sector), representing a major macroeconomic opportunity. We break out these benefits by sector, showing that the sectors that stand to gain most from peace are the crop production, food and beverage, livestock, and chemical and petroleum industries. [JEL codes: C65, D74, E01]

Using a newer and expanded dataset as well as a survey of practitioner perceptions, this article adds to a recent body of literature on reconstruction and violence in Afghanistan. Data are taken from military-led development projects by way of the United States military’s Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and, to measure violence, from U.S. military Significant Activity reports. The results suggest that, at great cost, large-budget CERP efforts (those in excess of USD50,000 per project) are associated with an increase in violence and thus counter-productive to military stability goals. In contrast, small projects (below USD50,000), which comprise a smaller proportion of total CERP allocations, are associated in statistically significant ways with reductions in violence. To explore why CERP projects may have these effects, the article also examines administrative modalities for CERP spending. The results suggest that timely, flexible expenditure of CERP funds are most effective at reducing violence. [JEL codes: D74, O53]

We characterize a ruler's decision of whether to censor media reports that convey information to citizens who decide whether to revolt. We find: (i) a ruler gains (his ex ante expected payoff increases) by committing to censoring slightly less than he does in equilibrium: his equilibrium calculations ignore that censoring less causes citizens to update more positively following no news; (ii) a ruler gains from higher censorship costs if and only if censorship costs exceed a critical threshold; (iii) a bad ruler prefers a very strong media to a very weak one, but a good ruler prefers the opposite. (JEL D72, D74, D83)

El presente estudio, con base en las nociones de costos de transacción y gestión de la cadena de suministro, analiza cómo la adopción de prácticas administrativas en la cadena de suministro reduce los costos de transacción entre productores y empacadores en la industria del aguacate en México. Se usan dos fuentes de información: entrevistas a distintos actores de la industria y revisión de documentos. Las conclusiones muestran que la adopción de tres prácticas (estandarización del producto, proveedor asociado e intercambio de información) han sido una solución ante desafíos como la mejora en la calidad, la certidumbre en la oferta del producto y una mejor coordinación entre oferta y demanda.

В декабре российские власти столкнулись с острым валютным кризисом, для преодоления которо- го была повышена учетная ставка до 17%, ряд государственных компаний, в том числе «Газпром» и «Роснефть», были обязаны вернуть валютные резервы на уровень октября, то есть продать часть валюты. Однако непростая ситуация сохраняется в связи с низкими ценами на нефть, предстоящими крупными выплатами российскими компаниями внешнего долга и общей мировой напряженностью. В. Путин в своем послании обещал налоговую амнистию физическим лицам (впрочем, пока не решен значительно более важный вопрос по юридическим лицам) и отказ от проверок на 3 года в отношении малого бизнеса, не имевшего серьезных нареканий предыдущие 3 года, а также выразил уверенность в невиновности В. Евтушенкова, после чего тот был освобожден. Эти неплохие для бизнеса новости, однако, оказались смазаны непонятным административным запретом на экспорт зерна, при том что Россия собрала крупный урожай и его дефицита не наблюдается.

Recent studies present contrasting findings on how reconstruction and development aid affects security in wartime contexts. Some research has found that aid projects decrease violent incidences, while other work has found both no effect and suggestions of a positive relationship. In an effort to resolve the mixed empirical picture, this article examines the complex intra-communal dynamics spurred by the distribution of aid in rural Afghanistan. Drawing on original interviews conducted in a community of Majarh district, Helmand province, the analysis indicates that development aid helps to elevate previously relatively less powerful individuals into positions of community leadership. This newly generated class of local leadership subsequently development relationships to the community that differ from their predecessors since their social position is rooted in new sources of power. As a result, intra-community tension increases. These findings help to specify the conditions under which the delivery of aid does not help to win hearts and minds and potentially promotes conflict. In addition, the analysis underscores how consideration of antecedent social conditions and temporal processes can help further refine our understanding of the wartime relationship between aid and security. [JEL codes: D74, O53]

Since the early 1990s, the human security movement has sought to expand the concept of security beyond the traditional military defense of national borders to focus on the intra-state security needs of populations at the individual level. Specific initiatives frequently address problems of population health, ethnic conflict, religious extremism, human rights, environmental or natural disasters, and other critical issues. For expatriate human security workers in the field, the environment may present meaningful challenges to their wellbeing and productivity. This can be especially so for those who have relatively more experience in academic, business, or administrative settings, and less in the field. The authors' goal is to illuminate practices that have demonstrated their efficacy in enhancing wellness, sustainment, and productivity for human security and other humanitarian and development workers deployed to austere environments. The content represents a synoptic consensus of best general practices and guidance from a range of resources comprising United Nations agencies and activities, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGO's), private volunteer organ­izations (PVO's), national military services, and international business concerns.