1. The Collateral Costs of Clearing
- Author
-
Cyril Monnet and Thomas Nellen
- Subjects
Economics and Econometrics ,clearing, central counterparty, segregation, novation, mutualization ,Collateral ,media_common.quotation_subject ,jel:D82 ,Monetary economics ,jel:G28 ,Novation ,Forward contract ,jel:G2 ,Accounting ,0502 economics and business ,Settlement (finance) ,Clearing ,Economics ,050207 economics ,media_common ,050208 finance ,05 social sciences ,jel:D53 ,Investment (macroeconomics) ,jel:G13 ,jel:G14 ,jel:G18 ,Counterparty ,Welfare ,Finance - Abstract
We study three generic clearing arrangements in the presence of two‐sided limited commitment: simple bilateral clearing, segregated collateral clearing through a third party, and—most sophisticated—central counterparty (CCP) clearing. Clearing secures the settlement of obligations from over‐the‐counter forward contracts that smooth the income of risk‐averse traders. Clearing requires collateral to guarantee settlement; this is costly, as it reduces income from investment. More sophisticated clearing arrangements require more collateral. As a result, the welfare gains of CCP clearing may be mostly due to segregation, while mutualization of losses could contribute little to welfare.
- Published
- 2021