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Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka hur identitetsproblematik i anknytning till exil eller diaspora skildras i modern irakisk litteratur, i detta fall Inaam Kachachis roman The American Granddaughter. Berättelsen i romanen utspelas under Irakkriget 2003-2006 där romanens huvudperson, som irakisk-amerikansk kvinna med dubbla identiteter, deltar som tolk i kriget. Den rådande krigssituationen ger upphov till en stark fientlighet nationaliteterna emellan trots att Irak och USA inte är varandras motståndare i kriget. Under den spänning som uppstår och den brutalitet som följer blir huvudpersonen och framför allt hennes identitet såsom irakisk- amerikansk satt i fråga, med resultatet att hon upplever sig alltmer kluven. Huvudpersonen kan sägas fungera som bärare av essensen av identitetskonflikten. Utifrån Jonas Stiers teoretiska utgångspunkter om identitet (Stier, 2019) utforskar jag hur protagonistens dubbla identitet är uppbyggd och hur den förändras under de omständigheter hon hamnar i, och med hjälp av Gérard Genettes narratologiska begrepp undersöker jag hur romanen presenterar identitetsproblematiken, dess orsaker och konsekvenser., The purpose of this essay is to examine how conflicting identities associated with exile or diaspora is depicted in modern Iraqi literature, in this case in the novel The American Granddaughter by Inaam Kachachi. The story of the novel takes place during the Iraq War 2003-2006, and the protagonist is the holder of two identities as an Iraqi-American woman who is participating in the war as an interpreter. The situation of war results in a hostility between these nationalities even though the nations Iraq and the USA are not each other’s adversaries. This hostility brings about a sharp tension that causes brutality to escalate and this affects the protagonist as an Iraqi-American as her identity is being questioned and she experiences that her dual identity is becoming a problem. The protagonist serves as a vessel of the essence of the conflict of identities. Based on Jonas Stier’s theoretical concepts of identity (Stier, 2019) I will explore how the protagonist’s dual identity is constructed and the way this duality changes due to her experiences in the war and the circumstances she is being exposed to. By using Gérard Genette’s narratological concepts I will examine how the identity issue is presented in the novel, what is it caused by and what the consequences are.

Medical advances in addition to improved body armor during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have greatly increased the chance of survival especially among deployment related severe closed and penetrating traumatic brain injury (TBI). However, early medical complications resulting from secondary brain injury play an important role in severe TBI patient outcomes and future survival. Early-onset infectious complications that occurred at a Level IV military treatment facility (MTF) were evaluated among active duty service members that sustained a TBI while deployed during OEF and OIF from calendar years 2008 to 2013. As a group, 14.0% of severe closed and penetrating TBI patients had at least one diagnosis indicating an early-onset infectious complication, most commonly pneumonia followed by systemic infection. However, closed TBI patients developed a greater proportion of early-onset infectious complications compared to penetrating TBI patients. Of infections caused by multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs), MDR Acinetobacter and MRSA were the predominate pathogens. MDRO infections have the potential to further complicate the care of TBI patients.

One of the most important questions in military suicide research at this time is whether deployment in support of Operations Iraqi or Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) is associated with an increased risk of suicide. The equivocal research conducted to date on this topic creates a confusing picture for military senior leaders and the American public. The Report of the Blue Ribbon Workgroup on Suicide Prevention in the Veteran Population (Peake, 2008) reviewed this body of literature and concluded that significant limitations and biases in many of the epidemiological approaches conducted to date contribute to the current confusion. The funded study is specifically designed to address many of the recommendations of that report in order to generate seminal results that will fill what is arguably the most important gap in the epidemiological study of military suicide. This collaborative DoD-VA study will utilize multiple enterprise level databases to determine whether a history of deployment in support of OIF/OEF is a risk factor for suicide. In addition, the proposed study will examine the suicide rates of post-deployed National Guard members and Reservists to determine whether these cohorts are at increased risk of suicide. Furthermore, it will examine rates of deaths of undetermined intent in military and civilian populations to determine whether potential misclassifications of deaths may confound military and civilian comparisons of suicide rates. In examining these suicide rates, the funded study will also specifically account for the potential confounding effect of service members who have not completed a full term of service (e.g., because of misconduct, substance abuse, etc.) and thus may be more likely to have risk factors for suicide., The original document contains color images.

The objective of the proposed study is to initiate a large scale investigation of patient based outcomes following extremity vascular injury in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This study proposes a link acute injury and clinical management information from the Joint Theater Trauma Registry (JTTR) to authentic patient-based outcomes years following injury. In this effort, the study aims to provide novel information on amputation and return to duty rates as well as to characterize the relationship between eventual quality of limb and psychological recovery or well-being., The original document contains color images.

XXI century's Security and Defense structures faces new risks and threats. Overcoming space and time as well as increasing interconnectedness all risks, triggers new global threats and challenges for state security. The new global threats require stronger international cooperation in security. The Cultural Approach is a framework gestated from September 11, 2001, in response to new global threats. Shortly after, US Army defined and implemented a new military capability in Iraq and Afghanistan: the Human Terrain Teams. Ten years later, I consider it can useful a review about current status of this capability and what could be its near future. This article develops this issue., La Seguridad y Defensa del siglo XXI se enfrenta a nuevos riesgos y amenazas. La superación del espacio y el tiempo, así como la creciente interconexión de todos los riesgos, provoca amenazas globales y por tanto nuevos retos para la seguridad del estado. El carácter global de las nuevas amenazas exige mayor cooperación internacional en Seguridad. El Enfoque Cultural, es un entorno de trabajo gestado a partir del 11 septiembre de 2001, como respuesta a las nuevas amenazas globales. Poco después el Ejercito de los Estados Unidos definió e implantó una nueva capacidad militar en Irak y Afganistán: las Células de Estudio Cultural. Casi 10 años después conviene hacer una reflexión sobre la situación actual de esta capacidad y su futuro próximo. Este artículo desarrolla esta cuestión.

IMPORTANCE Advances in the care of the injured patient are perhaps the only benefit of military conflict. One of the unique aspects of the military medical care system that emerged during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom has been the opportunity to apply existing civilian trauma system standards to the provision of combat casualty care across an evolving theater of operations. OBJECTIVES To identify differences in mortality for soldiers undergoing early and rapid evacuation from the combat theater and to evaluate the capabilities of the Critical Care Air Transport Team (CCATT) and Joint Theater Trauma Registry databases to provide adequate data to support future initiatives for improvement of performance. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS Retrospective review of CCATT records and the Joint Theater Trauma Registry from September 11, 2001, to December 31, 2010, for the in-theater military medicine health system, including centers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Germany. Of 2899 CCATT transport records, those for 975 individuals had all the required data elements. EXPOSURE Rapid evacuation by the CCATT. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Survival as a function of time from injury to arrival at the role IV facility at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. RESULTS The patient cohort demonstrated a mean Injury Severity Score of 23.7 and an overall 30-day mortality of 2.1%. Mortality en route was less than 0.02%. Statistically significant differences between survivors and decedents with respect to the Injury Severity Score (mean [SD], 23.4 [12.4] vs 37.7 [16.5]; P .001), cumulative volume of blood transfused among the patients in each group who received a transfusion (P .001), worst base deficit (mean [SD], 3.4 [5.0] vs 7.8 [6.9]; P = .02), and worst international normalized ratio (median [interquartile range], 1.2 [1.0-1.4] vs 1.4 [1.1-2.2]; P = .03) were observed.

With enactment of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act on January 1, 2014 (H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-73), Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total $1.6 trillion for military operations, base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and Iraq security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans health care for the war operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks. Of this $1.6 trillion total, CRS estimates that the total is distributed as follows: $686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and other counterterror operations received; $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn (OND); $27 billion (2%) for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and $81 billion (5%) for war-designated funding not considered directly related to the Afghanistan or Iraq wars. About 92% of the funds are for Department of Defense (DOD), 6% for State Department foreign aid programs and diplomatic operations, 1% for Department of Veterans Administration s medical care for veterans. In addition, 5% of the funds (across agencies) are for programs and activities tangentially-related to war operations. The FY2015 war request for DOD, State/USAID, and Veterans Administration Medical totals $73.5 billion including $58.1 billion for Afghanistan, $5.0 billion for Iraq, $ 100 million for enhanced security, and $10.4 billion for other war-designated funding. These totals do not reflect the new FY2015 request submitted in November 2014 to cover expenses for Operations Inherent Resolve (OIR) that began with airstrikes launched in late August 2014, to aid Syrian insurgents and the Iraq government to counter the takeover of territory by the Islamic State (IS)., CRS Report for Congress.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine how national interest, national security interest, and the jus ad bellum principles of the just war tradition factor into the rhetoric of US presidents in their national addresses prior to US intervention and war. The method used in this monograph is a structured focused comparison utilizing seven research questions applied to five case studies from 1983 to 2013 and spanning five different US presidential administrations. The monograph contains analyses of the arguments of five different US presidents in their national addresses prior to US military action in Grenada, The Gulf War, Bosnia, and The Iraq War. The monograph utilizes Syria as a least likely case due to the fact that US military ground forces did not intervene there. The monograph finds that from 1983 to the present, the lexicon of the just war tradition's jus ad bellum principles has increasingly been used by US presidents to justify military intervention and war worldwide. The monograph finds that the least likely case, Syria, actually presents the strongest national interest, national security interest, and jus ad bellum arguments for intervention when no intervention took place. The monograph's thesis, that just war theory provides a convenient means for US presidents to justify armed conflict and intervention in the absence of true national security threats is partly supported, with national interest and national security interest arguments having a larger role in Presidential discourse prior to conflict than the author originally anticipated.

The civilian literature has expanded the indications for selective nonoperative management (SNOM) for abdominal trauma to minimize morbidity from nontherapeutic laparotomies (NTLs); however, this treatment modality remains controversial and rare in austere settings. This study aimed to quantify the percentage of NTL and incidence of failed SNOM performed in theater and to define each of their respective intra-abdominal-related morbidities. A retrospective evaluation of all patients who underwent a laparotomy from 2002 to 2011 during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was performed for patients who survived a minimum of 24 hours. With the use of DRG International Classification of Diseases V9th Rev. procedure codes, a therapeutic laparotomy was defined by the presence of a defined intraperitoneal or retroperitoneal procedure; an NTL was defined by the absence of a defined intraperitoneal or retroperitoneal procedure. Second, patients transferred from North American Treaty Organization Role II to Role III medical treatment facilities to be operated on were deemed failed SNOM. Finally, intra-abdominal complications and mortality were identified for patients undergoing therapeutic laparotomy, NTL, and failed SNOM. Blunt, burn, and penetrating injuries accounted for 38.5% (n = 490), 1.1% (n = 14), and 60.4% (n = 769) of all laparotomies in the OEF and OIF, respectively. Thirty-two percent of all laparotomies performed during the OEF and OIF campaigns were NTL; specifically, the NTL rates in OEF and OIF were 38.2% and 28.6%, respectively. In addition, 31.6% and 32.2% of all penetrating and blunt injury mechanisms resulted in an NTL, respectively. The percentage of all patients identified as failing SNOM was 7.5% (n = 95). The early intra-abdominal complication rate for failed SNOM and for all patients undergoing NTL was 2.1% and 1.7%, respectively., Published in the Journal of Trauma Acute Care Surgery, v77 n3 supp2 pS171-S175, 2014. Presented at the Society of American Gastrointestinal and Endoscopic Surgeons 2014 Annual Meeting held in Salt Lake City, Utah on 2-5 Apr 2014.

The role of intelligence is one of the most challenging and critical components of conflict. In modern conflict the knowledge of an opponent is often the difference between success and failure. This thesis examines the relationship between two significant events: The 1968 Tet Offensive and the Insurgency in Iraq in 2004. This thesis examines the intelligence resources available, the capabilities, and the impact of external influences. By comparing these two events, this thesis will identify common factors associated with the failure to provide adequate warning to senior military and civilian leaders., The original document contains color images.

From recent operational experiences in Bosnia and Iraq, the U.S. Army has learned many important and hard-earned lessons. By incorporating some of these lessons learned into its capstone doctrine, FM 3-0, the Army has captured some key points and revamped its approach in conducting military operations in a complex environment. Meanwhile, a new thinking has emerged at the end of Cold War that focuses on the non-traditional way of examining warfare and armed conflict. Scholars such as Mary Kaldor, Herfried Munkler, and Rupert Smith have constructed an alternative approach concentrating on identity struggles amongst different racial, religious, ethnic, and sectarian groups as a central theme. These scholars have formulated a coherent argument that rivals the existing focus on the traditional military thinkers such as Carl von Clausewitz or Antonio Jomini. This research concentrates on whether U.S. Army's capstone doctrine, based on its operational experiences in Bosnia and Iraq, has recognized identity conflict as a vital feature in the post-Cold War environment. By analyzing and exploring different aspects of U.S. Army's operations in Bosnia and Iraq, this thesis will attempt to contribute to the discussion and debate on Army's conceptual thinking in framing the current operational environment based on recent experiences., The original document contains color images.

This thesis examines the generalship, leadership, and operational art of General James N. Mattis, US Marine Corps by using Task Force 58 in Afghanistan as a formative base and then comparing elements of operational art to the conduct of the 1st Marine Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003. Mattis draws upon many historical influences that shape his operational design in both campaigns. He puts great effort and focus on ensuring that his commander's intent is understood by all his subordinates and uses a preference for a small staff in the planning and execution of his intent. He makes heavy use of personally selected liaison officers to form and sustain habitual relationships with higher and adjacent units. Through the use of historical examples and a refusal to be constrained by doctrine and popular thought he uses innovative approaches in his design. These innovative approaches often constitute paradigm shifts with contemporary thought and doctrine. A 'Mattis Way of War' is postulated in the conclusion which draws from his use of history, commander's intent, and leadership to build up a capacity, or potential energy, for action in his unit. Once built up, he unleashes this energy utilizing explicit trust in his staff and subordinates.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks against symbolic icons of the United States' economic and military power, then President George W. Bush launched a series of military, political and diplomatic efforts that became widely known as the Global War on Terror. Rebranded as the Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terror by President Barack Obama in 2009, these efforts have had a profound impact both domestically and globally. The resultant political, economic and societal effects give rise to the possibility that these operations collectively constitute a Military Revolution. The absence of a universally-agreed upon definition for a Military Revolution provides an exciting opportunity to consider various authors' theories and provide a fresh look at this intriguing concept. Subsequent analysis seeks to compare the U.S. post-9/11 response to terrorism with historical examples and consider the evidence to determine how these events have affected the United States politically, economically and socially.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, American troops painted artistic murals on large transportable concrete barriers that protected them from enemy combatants. The murals provide an avenue to understand how troops and their units perceived themselves and missions during the war. This thesis researches the barriers painted at the staging and embarkation Camp Buehring, Kuwait, to discover troop identity, values, and warfighting attributes as they deployed into combat. The research is conducted through study of 200 barrier photographs personally taken by the author from February 15th-20th, 2009. The barrier murals are significant because they capture a moment in time and record valuable history about American Service members and the military community. The murals reveal truths proclaimed not by others, but by the very troops who deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Consequently, the values and motivations that sustain an American Service member in combat are disclosed. Further, the barriers are not only a memorial of military personnel deployed to war, but a record of national history. As such, it is critical that our national and military leaders act swiftly in documentation and preservation of these barriers to fully benefit from their value.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, which ended on August 31, 2010, some 3,482 hostile deaths occurred among U.S. military personnel and 31,947 people were wounded in action (WIA). More than 1,800 hostile deaths occurred during Operation Enduring Freedom (in Afghanistan and surrounding countries) through November 2014; about 20,000 more people were wounded in action. In the Iraq conflict, a larger proportion of wounded personnel survived their wounds than was the case during the Vietnam War, but the increased survival rates are not as high as some studies have asserted. Prior to the surge in troop levels that began in early 2007, the survival rate was 90.4 percent in Iraq compared with 86.5 percent in Vietnam. Amputation rates are difficult to measure consistently, but I estimate that 2.6 percent of all WIA and 9.0 percent of medically-evacuated WIA from the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters combined resulted in the major loss of a limb. An elevated non-hostile death rate (including deaths from accidents, illnesses, or suicides) in Iraq before the surge resulted in about 220 more deaths during the first four years of that conflict (March 2003 March 2007) than would have been expected in peacetime among a population the size of the one that deployed to Iraq. Relative to such a peacetime benchmark, I find essentially no additional non-hostile deaths in Iraq after March 2007. For the conflict in Afghanistan, I estimate about 200 additional non-hostile deaths relative to a comparable benchmark through December 2013.

The main objective of the study is to test a motivational enhancement (ME) intervention to address barriers to engaging in mental health treatment for recently returned veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The long term goal of the study is to increase veteran s participation in mental health treatment by using a Stages of Change model to reduce perceived stigma and barriers to treatment. The central hypothesis put forth is that veterans who receive motivational enhancement will demonstrate greater readiness to change and higher treatment program attendance than veterans who receive treatment as usual. During this year the pilot study for the project was completed. The purpose of the pilot study group was to inform us of any changes and/or enhance user ability of the project manuals. However, due to the lapse in coverage the data collected from the pilot group members could not be used. The veterans in the pilot study were notified of the lapse and were re-consented. During the year the team has continued to brainstorm resources and methods to recruit OIF/OEF veterans for the study. It is a logistical matter that continues to be challenging. More efforts are being made to reach agencies that may encounter OIF/OEF veterans that qualify for the study. Hiring of the veterans to help with recruitment was somewhat helpful in that we received additional inquires about the project, however, only a small number met the criteria for eligibility., The original document contains color images.

This investigation looks at the evolution of problem framing in U.S. Army decision-making doctrine, and its applicability to the planner at the operational level of war. It contends that operational environments have shaped U.S. Army's decision-making doctrine. Specifically, this investigation looks at the development, and eventual codification, of problem framing in U.S. Army decision-making doctrine from the 1930s to the present. The U.S. Army decision-making doctrine has adapted and evolved over time to help planners address complexities in operational environments. Further, doctrine's adaptations and evolutions have influenced how operational planners have framed problems in their respective environments. For the purpose of this inquiry, four doctrinal periods comprise this evolution: the Interwar Period (1930s-40s), the Containment Period (1950s-60s), the AirLand Battle Period (1970s-1980s), and the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Period (2008-present day). In addition to challenges posed by the environment, planners may face cognitive challenges that hinder effective problem framing: planning in complexity, the trappings of categorical thought, and overcoming constructed biases. Hence, this investigation illuminates how contemporary U.S. Army decision-making doctrine may assist planners navigating through complex problems. Concerning the continued development of planners as problem framers, three recommendations arose from this investigation. The Army should consider: merging of the army design methodology and military decision-making process into a single process, re-titling of Step 1 (Receipt of Mission) of the military decision-making process, and increasing the feedback mechanics of exercises conducted at the Command and General Staff College. These recommendations foster the cultivation of critical and creative thinking -- qualities necessary for proficient problem framing.

This monograph identifies the process of organizational change demonstrated by the Department of State (DOS) when supporting U.S. efforts in an irregular warfare environment where there is a large Department of Defense (DOD) general purpose force present. To successfully conduct operations abroad, United States Government (USG) interagency cooperation is necessary to achieve unity of effort towards a common aim. Although this seems obvious in theory, case studies analyzing Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that this is tremendously difficult to achieve in practice. This research shows that to adapt to this environment the DOS (1) creates ad hoc organizations, (2) establishes a unified command structure with the DOD and (3) uses local solutions to solve local problems. This monograph is intended to improve the U.S. Army professional understanding of the DOS so interagency cooperation in future political-military operations can be improved.

The Australian Army faces a future where potential adversaries are not clear, new technology makes military equipment more expensive, and funding for the military is likely to decrease. This dictates that the Australian Army will be made to innovate with less resources and greater ambiguity about the nature of the enemy that they will face and the type of warfare that they will be required to conduct. An operational evaluation should seek to identify lessons that may inform military innovation. The Australian Army has contributed forces to coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq for over a decade, making this Australia's longest war. Therefore, the establishment of a logical and holistic methodology for the operational evaluation of the Australian Army's contribution to these conflicts is important in order to inform military innovation once operations in Afghanistan are completed. The conduct of operational evaluation by the United States Army in the 20th century provided a number of examples that allowed analysis of the process to identify lessons learned and the implementation of fixes. The establishment of the Superior Board for the review of American Expeditionary Force operations post the First World War and the General Boards for the review of United States Army operations in the European Theatre during the Second World War provided a holistic systems thinking approach to operational evaluation. The methodology for the operational evaluation of the Australian Army operations in Afghanistan and Iraq should concentrate on establishing the correct composition of the review organization, identifying processes and procedures to ensure the effective conduct of the review, and formulating an effective implementation process to coordinate the required change to fix the lessons identified.

The occupation of Germany after World War II and the liberation of Iraq resulting from Operation Iraqi Freedom were two entirely different approaches to ending each conflict. The Army during World War II benefitted from several years of extensive whole of government planning and preparation for the transition from combat operations to military occupation in the European Theater. In approaching Iraq, political and military leaders neither prepared the policies nor provided the resources necessary to achieve the strategic objective. Additionally, the U.S. government and U.S. Central Command incorrectly framed the operation as a liberation. The liberation approach constrained the Army's ability to control the environment, ultimately ceding the initiative gained through the invasion. The dissonance between the strategic objective and the strategic and operational planning and resourcing contributed to the early failures of the Army's transition to stability operations. The utility of comparing lessons from both conflicts is in the development of relevant recommendations for future military, and specifically Army planning and preparation for transitions from offensive operations to stability operations. Operation Iraqi Freedom revealed both the associated complexity and critical importance of planning for the transition from offensive to stabilization operations. U.S. Central Command primarily focused on planning and preparations for combat, and was ill prepared to transition to stability operations. Why were World War II civil affairs and military government operations in Germany successful and initial stability operations in Iraq not? Analysis of this question includes evaluations of U.S. national and strategic policy, military planning and resourcing, and Army doctrine from the time of each campaign., Monograph rept.

Attack aviation should adopt a balanced approach to employment against hybrid threats. While the exact nature of future threats is uncertain, evidence points to the increasingly hybrid nature of potential threats in the current and future operational environment. Traditionally attack aviation has focused on either aerial support to ground forces in the close fight or deep attacks at operational depths of the battlefield. This singular focus in employment technique came at the expense of additional roles attack aviation plays on the battlefield. Given that hybrid threats are characterized by their ability to engage US forces across a spectrum of conflict from the material to cognitive in nature, attack aviation must posture its doctrine, training, and focus to seamlessly counter both conventional and unconventional threats., The original document contains color images.

The war in Afghanistan signifies the longest period of war in United States history. The purpose of this research is to investigate the perception of the decrease in valor awards in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. This research addresses the perception question with regard to the U.S. Marine Corps. This thesis conducted a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the Medal of Honor, Navy Cross, and Silver Star awards presented to U.S. Marines. It reviewed professional articles written by Marines concerning awards in every war from World War I through Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. It also reviewed and conducted analysis of news media articles and a Congressional Committee meeting regarding valor awards. Reviewing all awards data and documents, there is evidence that the perception of the U.S. Marines is valid that during the Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom time frame the U.S. Marine Corps awarding level does not reach that of the wars since World War I through the Vietnam War.

I wrote this book to address the lacuna in the burden sharing literature regarding new member countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While working at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) during the first wave of post-Cold War enlargement, I personally witnessed the pride and eagerness with which new NATO members entered the Alliance. The puzzle was whether this enthusiasm translated into concrete contributions to the Alliance. My research differs from existing literature in that it addresses the varied aspects of burden sharing in NATO and expands the scope of research from a dichotomous United States and Europe analysis to an examination of burden sharing within Europe (specifically focused on new members). It takes a more comprehensive view of burden sharing to include defense expenditures and more importantly, contributions to NATO missions. On the heels of several rounds of expansion and the winding down of NATO operations in Afghanistan, this book contributes to the literature on burden sharing and provides essential information on the effects of enlargement. These findings should inform decisionmakers about the behavior of new NATO members and help them to make appropriate decisions in regards to further expansion. The main contribution of this work is that it specifically examines the burden sharing behavior of new NATO members and the impact of enlargement on NATO burden sharing. This inquiry is intrinsically important because burden sharing concerns have been salient and recurring issues for the NATO Alliance since its inception. The United States, as the leader of the Alliance, has frequently complained about the low level defense expenditures of its allies. In addition, some NATO members have repeatedly come under criticism for not providing adequate forces and for imposing restrictions on forces committed to the recent NATO mission in Afghanistan.

The study was designed to identify clinically accessible molecular biomarkers of traumatic brain injury (TBI) prior to definitive clinical diagnosis. Specifically, these studies were meant to identify, characterize, and validate small noncoding (snc) RNA biomarker species whose content in peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMC) could help to identify TBI cases from the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) veteran population. In initial Biomarker Discovery studies using high-throughput array platforms, we identified 13 candidate sncRNA biomarkers that are differentially regulated in PBMC of mTBI compared to non-TBI control cases. In follow-up Biomarker Validation studies using an independent cohort of 58 veteran cases, we confirmed that 4 small nucleolar RNAs (snoRNAs), ACA48, U35, U55, and U83A, are significantly down-regulated in PBMC from veterans with mTBI and PTSD compared to non-TBI, control subjects with PTSD only. The snoRNA biomarkers are able to dissect subjects with comorbid mTBI and PTSD from PTSD subjects without mTBI with 100% sensitivity, 81% accuracy, and 72% specificity. No significant differential expression of snoRNA biomarkers was found in mTBI subjects without comorbid PTSD. With the exception of U55, we also found no significant differential expression of snoRNA biomarkers in subjects with PTSD. Additional application of the 4 snoRNA biomarker to current diagnostic criteria may provide an objective biomarker pattern to help identify veterans with comorbid mTBI and PTSD. Outcomes from our studies suggest that biological interactions between TBI and PTSD may contribute to the clinical features of mTBI with comorbid PTSD. Thus, ongoing and future investigations on mTBI mechanisms or TBI biomarkers should carefully consider their interactions with PTSD., The original document contains color images.

Purpose: The purpose of this longitudinal study is to test relevant theory providing results that will support future military behavioral research and provide guidance for interventions to promote mental health and retention. An additional wave of data explored how various personal and organizational factors (e.g., job stress, involvement, commitment, supervisor support) contribute to deployment readiness, mental health and functioning, and ultimately retention. Qualitative data were gathered with supplemental funding to identify the main events, experiences and agents that bring about conflict and disruption in the re-integration of OEF and OIF veterans. Design: Survey methodology was used to gather measures based on the selected theoretical frameworks (reported earlier). Methods: Mixed methods including surveys and qualitative in-depth telephone interviews. Sample: Randomized, stratified sample (component, deployment & parental status) of 829 US Army men and women deployed to OEF and OIF. A subset of 24 respondents volunteered for an additional telephone interview to assess family stressors. Analysis: A multivariate data analysis strategy was utilized to address the specific aims and qualitative analyses were used to describe the family stressors and social network characteristics of the military family participants. Findings: Testing multivariate models revealed that post-deployment mental health is influenced by multiple interactive factors in an individual s military environment, family and social network. The study revealed several models that will be useful for future research into this complex network of factors that enhance or impede psychological recovery from stressful and sometimes traumatic experiences. Implications for Military Nursing: This research is instrumental in understanding the relationships among the psychological, motivational and organizational factors that influence soldier and family well being.

The U.S. war with Iraq that resulted in the removal of Saddam Hussein will be remembered as one of the most momentous events of the early 21st century and one of the most contentious. Much has been written about the decision to invade and the difficulties the United States and its allies encountered during and after the 2003 invasion and the resulting occupation. As time passes, however, the focus of analysis will naturally shift toward the war s longer-term impact on U.S. foreign policy. The lasting effect that the Iraq war has had on U.S. security structures and institutions is one important dimension. This paper presents an admittedly early overview of the major ways in which the war has and has not shaped U.S. security and foreign policy structures and the implications for the future. It is intended for readers who have a general understanding of the war and of the basic apparatus of U.S. foreign and security policy. Necessarily preliminary, it is intended as an initial contribution to the discussion rather than a definitive review of the subject.

Private contractors have become an essential but highly problematic element in the U.S. military s total force structure. The Army in particular relies heavily on contractors to perform duties that free up Soldiers for combat roles. The vast majority of these civilian employees provide logistical and technical support. They build facilities, do laundry, and staff dining halls on U.S. bases at home and abroad. While some of these contractors have been involved in issues of waste, fraud, and abuse, these issues do not have a significant effect on the conduct of contingency operations, especially counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. The same cannot be said of a small subset of military contractors known as private military security contractors (PMSCs). PMSCs provide armed security personnel to support contingency operations abroad. They provide heavily armed personal security details for the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), construction contractors, nongovernmental and international organizations (NGOs and IOs), and even private individuals. They also supply static security guards for bases and other facilities, and escort supply convoys in conflict zones. These activities have embroiled them in escalation-of-force and other incidents that have undermined mission goals and objectives. Reigning in security contractors thus presents a major challenge for the U.S. Government in general and the Army in particular. This monograph examines the role of PMSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to derive general lessons on employment of security contractors in future contingency operations, particularly COIN campaigns. Three broad questions underlie this analysis. First, what tasks can be safely outsourced to private companies? Second, how should the government manage contractors in conflict zones?

The United States has a history of conducting large, conventional, firepower centric wars to achieve victory. This tactic hindered the U.S. approach to counterinsurgency since Vietnam. The U.S. consistently failed to recognize it was fighting an insurgency and instead tried to fight the American Way of War. The inability of the military to recognize an insurgency and provide a consolidated, comprehensive, and coherent COIN strategy began in the 1960s and continued through today. This inability has proven to be a significant failure for U.S. strategic interests around the world. From Vietnam until today, the U.S. has failed to learn the essential lesson: large, conventional units cannot do nation building or COrN operations due to their size, their inability to conduct decentralized operations, and their reliance on heavy firepower., The original document contains color images.