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The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of corruption on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Western Balkans countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Albania. Secondary data from The World Bank, Transparency International, and International Monetary Fund databases were utilized to complete this study for 2012-2020. The built model of multiple linear regression included four independent variables, namely: Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Western Balkan Corruption Ranking (WBCR), Exchange Rate (EXG), and Inflation Rate (INFL), as well as FDI as a dependent variable, and data effects were analyzed through the SPPS scientific research software program. The results found that if CPI and WBCR were to increase by one unit, FDI would decrease by 0.088, namely 0.624, while if EXG and INFL were to increase by one unit, FDI would increase by 0.165, namely 0.236. In order to fight corruption and potentially attract more foreign direct investment, the governments of these countries should work to harmonize their anti-corruption laws with those of the European Union. In order to prevent the negative consequences of FDI inflows, they should also maintain a balanced rate of inflation, which entails stabilizing exchange rate fluctuations.

Germany should pay more attention to risks in procurement, manufacturing and sales in China. First, China's population has been shrinking since 2022 and is rapidly ageing; this will cause its economic strength as well as production and consumption opportuni-ties to decrease. Secondly, the threat of a Taiwan invasion is rising and only mitigated by the globally integrated chip industry. Thirdly, China will increasingly shape standards in international payments and Central Bank Digital Currencies. This will raise its power for sanc-tioning other countries financially. Overall, while Germany should focus on further diversifying its economy, its exposure with regard to China is lower than commonly thought.

The war in Ukraine has not only dramatically changed Western perceptions of geopolitics, but also influenced risk assess-ments of economic interdependencies between Western economies and China. China has gradually emerged as an important, and in some cases indispensable, supplier to Western economies. The illusion of a gradual development and spread of Western values in the wake of the globalisation has failed. The paper discusses the challenges that China faces, i.e. the dramatic effects of demography, the misallocation of goods or its own dependencies on the West. The West cannot avoid the systemic conflict if it wants to remain a major global player, but it must clearly state its own interests.

Die künftige Rohstoffversorgung Europas ist mit einer Reihe von Herausforderungen verbunden. Dazu gehören die Diversifizierung europäischer Lieferketten, die Um­set­zung effektiver Nachhaltigkeitsstandards und nicht zuletzt der Abbau strategischer Abhängigkeiten von China. Wie werden im Jahr 2030 die europäisch-chinesi­schen Rohstofflieferketten aussehen? Dazu werden im Folgenden drei Szenarien durch­gespielt. Sie können politischen Akteuren helfen, plausible Vorstellungen von der Zukunft zu gewinnen und mögliche Entwicklungen gedanklich voneinander ab­zu­grenzen. Die Szenarien zeigen, welche Effekte politische wie sozio-ökonomische Faktoren auf die europäisch-chinesischen Lieferketten haben und wie sich europäische Akteure darauf einstellen können. (Autorenreferat)

Major Western leaders have been calling for "de-risking" from China, rather than "decoupling." But what exactly de-risking means and how it differs from decoupling, remains unclear. It is ultimately firms, not governments, driving trade and investment relations. But firms cannot account for unidentified risks by themselves. National security risks are for governments to define. Complex supply chain externalities might entail risks to production that are also difficult for firms to account for. Furthermore, firms may bet that governments will rescue them if a worst-case scenario happens, effectively socializing risks. In the EU, Germany is particularly exposed to China risk in terms of security, macroeconomic, and political exposure.

The EU's search for a new China strategy is driven by the fear of economic dependence on China. There are also concerns about reprisals, particularly in the form of economic sanctions. In offi cial statements, China rejects the use of sanctions and historical data show that it has used sanctions very rarely compared to the USA. On closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent that China does leverage its growing economic power to put pressure on other countries, albeit not in the form of offi cially declared sanctions. Against the background of empirical studies on the eff ectiveness of economic sanctions, we discuss the prospects of success of this policy. We show that the vulnerability of Western European countries has increased during the past few decades

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement creates the world’s largest free trade zone. The agreement has the potential to increase trade relations among its members and further promote the development of regional value chains in “Factory Asia”. This article presents the topics included in the recently concluded agreement, details the existing economic linkages between its members and discusses the expected consequences for its member states and third countries.

Africa has become a major arena in the so-called 'multiplex world'. The growing presence of China in the last two decades along with other emerging countries has turned the continent into a space where multiple patterns of interaction between state and non-state actors can be observed. International debates have become polarised over whether this new South-South dynamics generate new dependency relations or whether they have a truly transformative potential. This article focuses on China's role in economic integration processes in the African region. Far from merely reproducing the neoliberal pattern, this interaction may highlight a certain convergence between the African regional integration project and China's strategy to promote strategies aimed at structural transformation, with investment in infrastructure being an example of this. However, the article considers that rather than a Chinese strategy of reinforcing African regional integration, this is an essentially bilateral and very pragmatic Chinese strategy that has some indirect returns on regional integration, and is actually showing some signs of decline.

The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union (CETA) due the contracting parties include a large number of involved countries, which fact creates an ambiguous possibility of various implications in the worldwide business practice considering the different national legal systems. In my paper I am using a deductive approach to the relationship between the theory and the research with an emphasis on the two research questions: Why the ISDS (Investor State Dispute Settlement) from CETA sparked the greatest attention?, and What is causing the legal discrepancy between the CETA’s provisions on hard copy and the possible implementation in business practice?. My paper is focused on the implications from the CETA’s concluding in the business practice, taking into consideration that CETA is a combination of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and possible threats.

China estimates the number of people of Chinese origin outside the People's Republic to be 60 million. Beijing considers them all to be nationals of China, regardless of their citizenship. Xi Jinping views overseas Chinese as playing an 'irreplaceable role' in China's rise as a world power. Beijing is working hard to harness overseas Chinese resources for its own goals in the fields of economics, science and technology, as well as diplomacy and soft power. Beijing also expects people of Chinese origin in Germany to deepen rela­tions between China and Germany. But not only that: As 'unofficial ambassadors', they are also expected to spread China's narratives to the German public, defend China's 'core interests', and help with the trans­fer of knowledge and technology to China. Nevertheless, there are limits to China's diaspora policy: Chinese migrants' reactions to China's ambitions are heterogeneous. They range from wil­lingness to cooperate to disinterest or open rejection. German actors should develop a comprehensive understanding of Chinese diaspora policy and the goals and practices associated with it. Just as in Beijing, diaspora policy should be perceived as an important component of Chinese foreign policy.Only on this basis can answers to China's ambitions be found wherever German interests, legal principles, or social values are affected - without at the same time exposing people of Chinese origin to general suspicion. German actors should also expand their engagement in communities of people with a Chinese migration background instead of leaving this field to Chinese authorities.

Intensifying US-Chinese rivalry will increase pressure on Germany to support a more hawkish US geo-economic policy. The new ­German government should give Washington support in as far as US policies seek to create an economic level playing field vis-à-vis China. Given its dependence on international trade and investment, Germany should seek to resist a broader politicization of inter­national economic relations.

In 2019, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement System (WTO-DSS) lost its quorum. Instead of the required minimum number of three members, the Appellate Body’s membership fell to one member only as the U.S. under Donald Trump blocked the appointment of new members upon the expiry of the terms of two incumbent ones. The Appellate Body’s paralysis produced a high level of shock in the EU. In this paper, we take a closer look at the U.S.’s decision to paralyze the WTO’s Appellate Body and the EU’s reaction to it. Its point is that it will not be easy to get the U.S. back on board as the factors that drove its decision predate the Trump era. Long before Trump, the tradeoff upon which the U.S. based its acceptance of the WTO-DSS unraveled. For U.S. policy makers, the EU is partly to blame for this as it undermined the system’s prompt compliance assumption. More important even is the claim that the system’s Appellate Body created new obligations for the WTO-members to the point where the acceptance of some WTO rules – notably regarding trade remedies – became politically unsustainable in the U.S. itself. ispartof: Politics And Governance vol:10 issue:2 pages:208-218 status: Published online

Die große wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeit von China ist spätestens nach den militärischen Drohgebärden Pekings gegenüber Taiwan als gravierendes Problem erkannt und soll möglichst bald reduziert werden. Das Gegenteil fand jedoch im ersten Halbjahr 2022 statt. Die deutschen Direktinvestitionsflüsse nach China waren noch nie so hoch. Auch die Importe aus China und das deutsche Defizit im Handel mit China erreichten ein Allzeithoch. Dagegen schwächte sich das deutsche Ausfuhrwachstum nach China stark ab und Chinas Exportanteil sank erneut. Der chinesische Markt soll offenbar immer mehr durch Produktion vor Ort statt durch Exporte bedient werden.

Die COVID-19-Krise hatte erhebliche Auswirkungen auf die Grenzregion Polen - Deutschland. Der Beitrag untersucht, ob die Pandemie tatsächlich den Abstand zwischen der Grenzregion als strukturschwacher Region und dem Rest von Deutschland erhöhen wird, oder ob die Krise sogar eine Chance bietet. Hierzu wurden neben einer Online-Befragung ebenfalls Experteninterviews durchgeführt und ausgewertet. Die Zielregion ist vergleichsweise gut durch die Krise gekommen, jedoch sollte die Region die Chance nutzen und bereits begonnene Veränderungen wie Digitalisierung und Flexibilisierung weiter vorantreiben. The COVID-19 pandemic is a humanitarian tragedy with millions of deaths worldwide. However, this virus is also a tremendous economic challenge. There is some evidence that vulnerable groups and regions are in particular at risk of suffering from unemployment, insolvency and other economic hardships during the pandemic. We analyse the economic consequences on one of the poorest regions, the borderland between Germany and Poland. Based on statistical analysis, an online survey of entrepreneurs and key-informant interviews, we can conclude that the consequences of the pandemic are not as disastrous for the region as expected. The instruments of mitigating the economic challenges (including support for enterprises, unemployment insurance and support for temporary under-utilisation of "Kurzarbeitergeld") were quite successful. The survey partners even see some improvements, in particular in the field of digitalisation. All agree that the flow of information and cooperation between Poland and Germany should have been more intensive to reflect the manifold economic and personal interdependencies between the two countries.

Vor dem Hintergrund der Reise von Bundeskanzler Scholz nach Peking müssen Deutschland und die EU ihre Haltung gegenüber China grundlegend überdenken. Dies umso mehr, als die Kommunistische Partei Chinas (KPCh) auf dem jüngsten Parteitag ihre unangefochtene autoritäre Macht weiter gefestigt hat. Um auf eine mögliche Eskalation der geopolitischen Spannungen mit China vorbereitet zu sein, muss Deutschland Lehren ziehen und kritische Abhängigkeiten sowie Unternehmensrisiken überprüfen.

For all the complexities of India’s politics, Prime Minister Narendra Modi seemed to have his economic path cut out for him. His ‘Achche din aane waale hein’ (good days are coming) campaign, which had won him a resounding election victory in 2014 for his first term, suggested that Modi’s primary goal was growth and development for his country and people, and hence also an agenda of economic reform. Focusing specifically on India’s negotiations in the context of the WTO, I show in this paper that India has continued to hold on to its former trade policy priorities and negotiation positions and adopted even more hard-line positions in some cases. Interestingly though, the same policy priorities and negotiation patterns that had ill-served India in the past may now no longer be a liability. This is only in part a credit to the Modi administration per se. Rather, it is mainly due to the rise of the phenomenon of “weaponized interdependence”, which in turn legitimizes—sometimes even necessitates—the securitization of foreign economic policy, and more specifically, trade politics. Taken in this changing context and as other countries also adopt a more market-cautionary approach, India’s historic and oft-reviled trade scepticism and reluctance to integrate in global value chains may yet allow it to have the last rhetorical laugh.

A succession of disruptions to world trade have put the reorganisation of inter­national supply chains high on the political agenda. The difficulties began with the trade war between the United States and China, deepened with the Covid-19 pan­demic and culminated in the sanctions and export controls imposed by Western countries after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The increased risk of interruption of supplies forces businesses today to price in political factors and respond to political demands. However, realistic timeframes for reconfiguring supply chains are largely incompatible with the rapid responses expected by political decision-makers, espe­cially where chains are long and complex. A process needs to be developed for dealing more effectively with political supply chains risks. It should be transparent for all involved. (author's abstract)

China schätzt die weltweite Zahl der chinastämmigen Menschen außer­halb der Volksrepublik auf 60 Millionen Personen. Peking betrachtet sie, unabhängig von ihrer Staatsbürgerschaft, allesamt als Angehörige Chinas. Auslandschinesen spielen aus Sicht Xi Jinpings eine "unersetzliche Rolle" für Chinas Aufstieg zur Weltmacht. Peking bemüht sich intensiv darum, auslandschinesische Ressourcen für eigene Zielsetzungen in den Be­reichen Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Technik sowie Diplomatie und Soft Power nutzbar zu machen. Auch von Menschen chinesischer Herkunft in Deutschland fordert Peking, die Beziehungen zwischen China und Deutschland zu vertiefen. Aber nicht nur das: Sie sollen als "inoffizielle Botschafter" auch Chinas Narra­tive in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit verbreiten, Chinas "Kerninteressen" verteidigen und beim Wissens- und Technologietransfer nach China helfen. Chinas Diasporapolitik sind gleichwohl Grenzen gesetzt: Die Reaktionen chinesischer Migranten auf Chinas Ambitionen fallen heterogen aus. Sie reichen von der Bereitschaft zur Kooperation bis hin zu Desinteresse oder offener Ablehnung. Deutsche Akteure sollten ein umfassendes Verständnis der chinesischen Diasporapolitik und der damit verknüpften Ziele und Praktiken ent­wickeln. So wie in Peking auch sollte die Diasporapolitik als wichtiger Bestandteil der chinesischen Außenpolitik wahrgenommen werden. Erst auf dieser Basis können dort, wo deutsche Interessen, Rechtsprinzipien oder gesellschaftliche Werte berührt sind, Antworten auf Chinas Ambitionen gefunden werden - ohne damit zugleich Menschen chinesischer Herkunft einem Generalverdacht auszusetzen. Auch sollten deutsche Akteure ihr Engagement in Communities von Menschen mit chinesischem Migrationshintergrund ausbauen, anstatt dieses Feld chinesischen Behörden zu überlassen. (Autorenreferat)

India has risen internationally since the 1990s. The most important reasons for this success are its economic reforms since 1991 and new inter­national constellations since the East-West conflict. Both have earned the country a significantly greater say on global issues, but India's rise is quite fragile due to a range of structural deficits at the national level. Despite economic successes India is in many areas one of the G20's poor­est performers. India's rise is in Germany's and Europe's interest. The world’s largest democracy is considered to be a partner in shared values and fellow cam­paigner for a rules-based international order and as a promising market. In addition, India, Germany and Europe increasingly share geopolitical interests. India is seen as a mainstay of future German Indo-Pacific policy. A number of domestic developments in India adversely affect the foun­dations of cooperation. Since 2014 a decline of democratic procedures and institutions has been apparent and the new economic policy of self-reliance proclaimed in 2020 is based more on partial protectionism than on further integration into the world market. That is why, to manage expectations realistically, German and European policy should be geared more towards common interests than to values. (author's abstract)

As Cuba enters 2022, economic crisis and social tensions loom large. This chapter reviews the external difficulties that interact with and reinforce the island's domestic issues. Looking beyond the immediate situation it reflects on underlying international pressures and constraints that will shape the options for the Cuban nation over the next decade. Its analysis encompasses Cuba's relations with the US and with the EU, as well as those with Venezuela, Mexico, China, Russia and Canada, and it asks to what extent Cuban-made COVID-19 vaccines can re-boost the country's soft-power projection. Putting the Cuban case in comparative perspective, the island’s regime - and its international profile - are in many ways still unlike any other, and predictive schemas based on false analogies risk being misleading.

US and EU trade relations exhibit a set of chronic and secularly unsustainable imbalances, in which new Schumpeterian leading sectors and catch-up growth create growing tension in the asymmetrical and somewhat hierarchical US–EU relationship. These imbalances exhibit two distinct cycles interrupted by a clear structural break in the 1970s and an emerging cycle after the 2008–2010 crises. Each cycle has seen rising US current account or trade deficits with Europe provoke some financial or political crisis. Each crisis produced a US-led solution producing even greater imbalances in the next cycle, with concomitant stress on the asymmetric US–EU relationship. The EU and particularly the northern eurozone economies typically have relied on export surpluses for growth. But relying on export surpluses for growth reinforces EU dependence on the US and the US dollar at a time when US domestic politics are increasingly hostile to trade deficits and tension with China is rising.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known broadly as "Lula") has defeated incumbent Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil's presidential election. As the Global South giant emerges from the isolation and loss of influence imposed by Bolsonaro's right-wing anti-globalist agenda, how can Germany and Europe best engage it with a view to resuming a key strategic partnership? Brazil's relations with the EU and Germany are at a historical postwar low. Normative differences with a Bolsonaro government driven by extreme right-wing domestic constituencies have stalled trade and climate negotiations, led to clashes on human rights and deforestation, and caused what were once regular high-level contacts to ebb to a trickle. The election itself was decided by a razor-thin margin and marred by voter suppression, contestations of its legitimacy, and pervasive electoral violations by Bolsonaro. The incumbent has not formally conceded, and his supporters were still in the streets a week after the vote. Assistance in asserting the functioning of the country's democratic institutions is urgently needed. Lula will realign the country with its multilateral diplomatic traditions and seek to reinstate social policies cancelled by Bolsonaro, such as poverty reduction, human rights, and safeguards for minorities, as well as environmental protection and sustainable development. This will align Brazil increasingly with Europe. But today's scenario is different from Lula's first two terms in office between 2003 and 2011: the National Congress is hostile to Lula's agenda, there is no commodity boom, and a polarised and unequal international system has less room for the rise of an emerging power. Germany and Europe should actively and regularly engage Brazil and assist in its moves to consolidate its democracy, combat inequality, protect the rainforest and safeguard minority rights. To do so, it should use trade policy as an incentive, reinforce civilian control over the armed forces, engage subnational partners, and assist in combatting fake news.

As a region, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is the world's largest grain importer. Approximately 30 per cent of global exports of wheat and barley, 20 per cent of corn, and a whopping three-quarters of sunflower oil come from Ukraine and Russia. The aggression against Ukraine is thus disrupting global food trade and affecting food security in the MENA. The war is also raising questions about future food systems and their water footprint. In the Arab world, dependence on Ukraine and Russia for imports of wheat, the world's largest source of calories, is at 50 per cent - among the highest globally. The greatest vulnerability exists in Egypt, Lebanon, and Sudan. Imports will actually need to rise from pre-war levels if population growth and dietary changes towards meat and dairy products are taken into consideration. For lack of water, food self-sufficiency is not an option in the MENA. Food imports constitute "virtual water" - that is, the water used to produce a commodity and thus embedded in it. Virtual water can be imported by MENA countries via the food trade and has mitigated water scarcity by adding a "second Nile River" to the region's water balance. The global food crisis of 2007/2008 spurred MENA countries to attempt to alleviate their import vulnerabilities bilaterally, via investments in land and in value chains, but reliance on the multilateral international trading system remains. The reaction to the current crisis can build on lessons learnt since then, with coping capacities unevenly distributed between the region's richer oil exporters and poorer countries. Avoiding new export restrictions such as those that occurred during the global food crisis of 2007/2008 is crucial. Western attempts to stabilise the multilateral food trade could help the MENA to source alternative supplies. This might also offer an opportunity to mend fences between the West and MENA at a time when closer energy cooperation is essential and an ambivalent stance in the MENA towards Russia has caused irritation in the West.

Eine lange Reihe von Störungen des Welthandels in den letzten Jahren hat eine Reorganisation der internationalen Lieferketten auf die politische Tagesordnung gebracht. Die Unregelmäßigkeiten begannen mit dem Handelskrieg zwischen den USA und China, setzten sich fort mit der Covid-19-Pandemie und den dadurch ver­ursachten Unterbrechungen der Versorgungsketten und kulminierten zuletzt nach Russlands Einmarsch in der Ukraine wegen der darauf folgenden Sanktionen und Exportkontrollen. Das Risiko einer Unterbrechung der Lieferbeziehungen zwingt die Unternehmen mittlerweile in viel stärkerem Maße als früher dazu, politische Fakto­ren nicht nur "einzupreisen", sondern auch auf Vorgaben der Politik zu reagieren. Allerdings sind die realistischen Fristen für den Umbau von Lieferketten, besonders wenn diese sehr komplex und lang sind, kaum kompatibel mit den kurzen Reak­tions­zeiten, die von der Politik erwartet werden. Es gilt ein Verfahren zu entwickeln, mit dem politische Lieferkettenrisiken effektiver bearbeitet werden können und das für alle Teilnehmer transparent ist. (Autorenreferat)

Cuando Cuba entra en el año 2022, se avecinan crisis económicas y tensiones sociales. Este capítulo hace un recorrido por las dificultades externas que interactúan con los asuntos domésticos de la isla y los refuerzan. Más allá de la situación inmediata, reflexiona sobre las restricciones y las presiones internacionales subyacentes que configurarán las opciones para la nación cubana durante la próxima década. El análisis abarca las relaciones de Cuba con los Estados Unidos y con la Unión Europea, así como con Venezuela, México, China, Rusia y Canadá, y plantea en qué medida las vacunas contra la COVID-19 fabricadas en Cuba pueden relanzar la proyección del poder blando del país. Desde una perspectiva comparada, el régimen isleño y su perfil internacional siguen siendo en muchos sentidos diferentes de cualquier otro, y los esquemas predictivos basados en analogías falsas corren el riesgo de inducir a errores. As Cuba enters 2022, economic crisis and social tensions loom large. This chapter reviews the external difficulties that interact with and reinforce the island' domestic issues. Looking beyond the immediate situation it reflects on underlying international pressures and constraints that will shape the options for the Cuban nation over the next decade. Its analysis encompasses Cuba's relations with the US and with the EU, as well as those with Venezuela, Mexico, China, Russia and Canada, and it asks to what extent Cuban-made COVID-19 vaccines can re-boost the country's soft-power projection. Putting the Cuban case in comparative perspective, the island’s regime - and its international profile - are in many ways still unlike any other, and predictive schemas based on false analogies risk being misleading.

Russlands Vernichtungskrieg in der Ukraine wird die Weltlage grundlegend verändern. Auch wenn die Weltgemeinschaft die Invasion der Ukraine als eine Verletzung des Völkerrechts gebrandmarkt hat, hat die russische Regierung Fürsprecher durch wirtschaftlich und strategisch bedeutende Länder (wie China, Indien, Brasilien, Südafrika). In aller Welt werden die Bruchlinien größer. Der Westen, die USA, Europa, Japan, die OECD-Welt geraten in eine Abwärtsspirale. Dies zeigt sich wirtschaftlich und politisch - trotz der Anpassungsmaßnahmen der europäischen Länder, trotz der neugewonnen Einheit der NATO. Denn alles was Deutschland, Frankreich und die EU und die G7 tun, kommt vorerst zu spät.