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Seit dem Koreakrieg 1950-53 basierte die Sicherheitsarchitektur der lange Zeit als "Asien-Pazifik" bezeichneten Region auf einem US-geführten System bilateraler Allianzen, dem sogenannten Nabe-und-Speichen-System. Ein multilaterales System kollektiver Verteidigung, ähnlich der Nato in Europa, gab es in der Region bislang nicht. 2014 begann die Volksrepublik China unter Xi Jinping, eigene Ideen zur Neugestaltung des regionalen Sicherheitssystems zu entwickeln. Xi nannte das Nabe-und-Speichen-System ein Relikt des Kalten Krieges und forderte eine regionale Sicherheitsarchitektur "von Asiaten für Asiaten". Das Konzept "Indo-Pazifik" gilt weithin als strategischer Gegenentwurf zu einer sinozentristischen Neustrukturierung der Region. Dabei wird die Sicherheitsarchitektur mehrheitlich als antagonistische Ordnung verstanden, in der Sicherheit gegen und nicht mit China hergestellt wird. Diese Architektur ist stärker als bisher »asianisiert«: Nicht nur wächst die Bedeutung der US-Alliierten in der Region im Verhältnis zu Washington. Immer wichtiger werden auch bi- und minilaterale Partnerschaften außerhalb des Nabe-und-Speichen-Systems, etwa diejenigen mit Beteiligung von Staaten wie Indien oder Indonesien. Strukturell dominieren bilaterale Allianzen und Partnerschaften, die zunehmend um minilaterale Formate wie AUKUS oder Quad ergänzt werden. Für die EU und ihre Mitgliedstaaten bedeutet all dies, dass die Verwirk­lichung der Idee eines inklusiv ausgerichteten Indo-Pazifik in weite Ferne gerückt ist. Auch der effektive Multilateralismus, den die EU propagiert, gerät zusehends ins Hintertreffen, da die regionale Sicherheitsarchitektur sich mehr und mehr zu einem Nebeneinander bi- und minilateraler Kooperationsformate wandelt. (Autorenreferat)

Euro-Atlantic security has always been a priority in the international security environment, especially at the beginning of the 21st century, when mankind is facing a complex, dynamic and unpredictable security environment, one of profound economic and social imbalances. The conflict in Ukraine is, and will remain, a hot topic andthe maximuminterest because of its global political, social and economic-financial implications.

The security of Euro-Atlantic area must be analyzed and understood in the context of the international security environment specific to the beginning of the 21st century, an active and effervescent one, where hybrid threats and deep economic and social imbalances are real risks. The terrorism has been, is and will continue to be a topic of maximum interest. The approach of this phenomenon from the psychological perspective not only of those directly involved, but also of those affected after the attack, is of interest and very topical, in the context of the unprecedented technological and informational explosion.

In the West, Russia's nuclear deterrence strategy is often described as one of "escalate to deescalate". The thinking goes that Moscow is prepared to use nuclear weapons at an early stage in a conflict in order to "deescalate" and terminate the confrontation quickly in its favour. However, Russia's official military doctrine, nuclear exercises of the Russian military, and debates among political and military elites have so far pointed in a different direction. With the concept of "strategic deterrence", Russia has developed a holistic deterrence strategy in which nuclear weapons remain an important element. Yet, to gain more flexibility below the nuclear threshold in order to manage escalation, the strategy also conceptualises a broad range of non-military and conventional means. Given Russia's dwindling arsenal of conventional precision weapons due to its war against Ukraine as well as the strategic adaptation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia's strategy is likely to change: In the coming years, Russia's reliance on its non-strategic nuclear weapons will probably increase. These developments could both undermine crisis stability in Europe and further impede the prospects for nuclear arms control in the future.

Since the Korean War of 1950-53, the security architecture of the region previously referred to as the "Asia-Pacific" has been based on a US-led sys­tem of bilateral alliances known as the "hub-and-spokes" system. A multi­lateral system of collective defence, similar to NATO in Europe, has not existed in the region. In 2014, the People's Republic of China under Xi Jinping began to develop its own ideas for reshaping the regional security system. Xi called the hub-and-spokes system a relic of the Cold War and called for a regional security architecture "by Asians for Asians". The "Indo-Pacific" is widely regarded as a strategy to counter a Sinocentric restructuring of the region. The majority of actors involved conceives its security architecture as an antagonistic order in which security is estab­lished against, and not with, China. This architecture is more "Asianised" than before. The region's US allies are gaining significance in relation to Washington. What's more, bilateral and minilateral partnerships outside the hub-and-spokes system are becoming increasingly important, for example those involving states such as India or Indonesia. Structurally, bilateral alliances and partnerships dominate. They are in­creasingly supplemented by minilateral formats such as AUKUS or the Quad. For the EU and its member states, all this means that realising the idea of an inclusive Indo-Pacific has become a distant prospect. The effective multi­lateralism propagated by the EU is also gradually falling behind as the regional security architecture is increasingly being transformed into a web of bilateral and minilateral cooperation formats.

While the world's attention is focused on Russia’s war against Ukraine and the inten­sifying conflict between the US and China, the security situation on the Korean Pen­insula has continued to deteriorate. North Korea is steadily advancing the expansion of its military capabilities and recently undertook significant changes in its nuclear doctrine. At the same time, the rapidly changing geopolitical context makes a reso­lution of the North Korean nuclear conflict even less likely. North Korea’s unilateral change of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula poses a serious challenge to the international community, which has few options to counter this threat that is far too dangerous to ignore. (author's abstract)

Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. won the Philippines' presidential election by a land­slide on 9 May and was officially sworn in on 30 June. During the election cam­paign, Marcos Jr. - the son of Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. who was ousted in 1986 - remained extremely vague when it came to describing his foreign and security policies. Some observers initially speculated that Marcos Jr. would con­tinue to pursue the foreign policy shift towards the People's Republic of China that had been estab­lished by his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte. Several weeks into Marcos Jr.'s presidency, however, a much more nuanced picture has emerged. It appears that the newly elected president is likely seeking to balance the Philippines' relations with China and the US to a greater extent than his predecessor. He therefore seems to be follow­ing in his father’s foreign policy footsteps. This could open up new opportunities for coopera­tion between the Philippines and Germany and the EU - provided that such collabo­ration considers the high degree to which Manila's current foreign policy agenda seems to be driven by domestic concerns and objectives. (author's abstract)

Objective/context: In 2008-09, nascent Union of South American Nations, UNASUR, agreed and formalized the creation of one of its most ambitious bodies, its Defense Council. The origin of this council was surprising as some rival states, as well as others whose security and defense interests were distant from each other, participated in it. Its performance was marked by this contradictory origin, which resulted in its failure a decade later, in 2018, with the division of UNASUR. This article proposes elements for a complementary explanation of the trajectory of the UNASUR Defense Council, pointing out geopolitical links. Methodology: This is an empirical case study that combines quantitative and qualitative analysis of both national capacities and contemporary geopolitical trends. It also includes the review of official documents and the presentation of processed results of semi-structured interviews with South American diplomats and military officers. Conclusions: The main contribution of this article is that it shows how global (de)concentration, the geostrategic (re)orientation of the United States and the contemporary geopolitical dynamics of the regional institutions, form an adequate set of causes for a structural explanation on the origin, performance and decline of the South American Defense Council. Originality: Unlike most of the giving explanations about the fate of the South American Defense Council, and UNASUR in general, focused mainly on domestic causes, this article presents a systemic and structural explanation that links institutional and institutional dynamics. South American security with global processes of greater scope. In addition, it reaches potentially replicable conclusions in other regions and periods from a combination of quantitative and qualitative research tools.

Der Ansatz, der Russlands Nuklearstrategie kennzeichnet, wird im Westen oft als "escalate to deescalate" beschrieben. Demnach sei Moskau bereit, in einem Konflikt frühzeitig Nuklearwaffen einzusetzen, um diesen zu seinen Gunsten zu beenden. Die offizielle Doktrin des Kreml, Nuklearübungen des russischen Militärs und die Debat­ten unter politisch-militärischen Eliten deuteten bisher jedoch in eine andere Rich­tung. Mit dem Konzept der "strategischen Abschreckung" hat Russland vielmehr ein Abschreckungssystem entwickelt, in dem Atomwaffen weiterhin wichtig sind. Doch soll eine breite Palette an nicht-militärischen bis hin zu konventionellen Mitteln mehr Flexibilität unterhalb der nuklearen Schwelle schaffen, um Eskalation zu managen. Dies dürfte sich angesichts von Russlands Schwierigkeiten mit dem Einsatz konven­tio­neller Präzisionswaffen im Ukraine-Krieg und der militärischen Neuaufstellung der Nato jedoch verändern: Die Rolle nicht-strategischer Nuklearwaffen in Russlands Abschreckungspolitik wird wahrscheinlich wieder wachsen. Dies wird nicht nur die Krisenstabilität in Europa schwächen, sondern auch die nukleare Rüstungskontrolle künftig zusätzlich erschweren. (Autorenreferat)

Ferdinand (genannt "Bongbong") Marcos junior gewann am 9. Mai mit einem Erd­rutschsieg die Präsidentschaftswahlen der Philippinen und wurde am 30. Juni offiziell vereidigt. Während des Wahlkampfs war der Sohn des 1986 gestürzten philippinischen Diktators Ferdinand Marcos senior in außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Fra­gen äußerst vage geblieben. Einige Beobachter spekulierten zunächst über eine Fort­führung der unter Amtsvorgänger Rodrigo Duterte vollzogenen außenpolitischen Hinwendung zur Volksrepublik China. Mittlerweile zeigt sich jedoch bereits ein deutlich nuancierteres Bild der zu erwartenden Außenpolitik unter Marcos jr. Der neugewählte Präsident dürfte in stärkerem Maße als sein Vorgänger eine Balance im Verhältnis zu China und den USA suchen. Er tritt damit in die außenpolitischen Fuß­stapfen seines Vaters. Ein solcher Kurs könnte Deutschland und der EU neue Koope­rationsmöglichkeiten eröffnen - sofern die Zusammenarbeit den in erster Linie innen­politisch motivierten Zielsetzungen der neuen Marcos-Regierung entspricht. (Autorenreferat)

Any conflict with a nuclear power like Russia carries the risk that nuclear weapons could be used, and President Vladimir Putin is aggressively exploiting such concerns. With its nuclear threats, the Kremlin is moving away from Russia’s doctrine that ascribes a protective role to its nuclear arsenal. In this way, Moscow aims not only to deter Western governments from providing more substantial support to Ukraine, but also to intimidate the Western public. However, as long as NATO does not inter­vene directly in Ukraine and the Russian regime does not feel existentially threatened, both intentional and unintentional nuclear use remain extremely unlikely. Never­theless, Moscow’s nuclear threats still entail significant negative consequences. If Russia succeeds in using nuclear deterrence to shield an offensive conventional war, this could further destabilise Europe and the global security order. (author's abstract)

Der Globale Militarisierungsindex (GMI) des BICC bildet alljährlich das relative Gewicht und die Bedeutung des Militärapparats von Staaten im Verhältnis zur Gesellschaft als Ganzes ab. Der Index wird durch das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) gefördert. Der GMI 2021 ist eine Jubiläumsausgabe. Der erste Teil des Berichtes reflektiert, wie gewohnt, auf Grundlage der neuesten Daten aktuelle Entwicklungen und Trends. Er umfasst 153 Staaten und basiert auf den aktuell vorliegenden Zahlen, in der Regel sind das die Daten des Jahres 2020. Die zehn Länder, die im GMI 2021 den höchsten Militarisierungsgrad aufweisen, sind Israel, Oman, Aserbaidschan, Kuwait, Armenien, Saudi-Arabien, Brunei, Bahrain, Singapur und Russland. Diese Staaten stellen dem Militär im Verhältnis zu anderen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen besonders viele Ressourcen zur Verfügung. Neben vornehmlich Staaten aus Konfliktregionen des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens, sind auch hier drei europäische Länder präsent, die jeweils in Gewaltkonflikte involviert sind. Drei weitere - die beiden EU-Mitglieder Griechenland und Zypern sowie die Ukraine - sind unter den Top 20 zu finden. Im regionalen Fokus Europa wird ein Gesamttrend des GMI 2021 besonders deutlich: Trotz des Absinkens des weltweiten BIP in Folge der Covid 19-Pandemie wenden Staaten in absoluten Zahlen und im Verhältnis zur Wirtschaftsleistung mehr Ressourcen für das Militär auf. Ein weiterer regionaler Fokus liegt diesmal auf Subsahara Afrika. Insbesondere in Westafrika verschlechterte sich die Sicherheitslage in den vergangenen Jahren dramatisch. Daher ist eine Betrachtung der Militarisierungsdynamiken auf dem Kontinent besonders interessant. So rangieren unter seinen Top 10 neben relativ stabilen Ländern wie Botswana, Namibia, Mauretanien, Angola, Gabun und Guinea-Bissau auch Staaten mit aktuellen Gewaltkonflikten wie Tschad, Südsudan und Mali. Der zweite Teil des GMI 2021 betrachtet die globale und regionale Entwi

When Israel signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 reactions were diverse. Experts were divided - some fearing a deepening of regional divisions, others hoping for a positive impact on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Two years later normalisation has intensified, but differs in degree and scope. Israel's normalisation process has strengthened her acceptance in the region and reaches beyond security issues. While Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates lead these dynamics, eager to benefit from exchange in science and technology, in Morocco the United States' recognition of the latter's sovereignty over the Western Sahara has hardened Rabat's position on that issue. With Sudan, the process has not developed beyond contact between the Israeli government and the internationally contested military leadership. Normalisation is not a decisive factor for Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. On the contrary, it was not an incentive in the past for Israel to make concessions; clashes with the Palestinians in Gaza or recently on the Temple Mount could not derail the process either. The real test, however, would be another Palestinian intifada or a return to the annexation plans of early 2020. Iran remains an important uniting factor which has led to a shared threat perception. Nevertheless, the Gulf monarchies and Israel differ in approach towards Iran. While Arab-Israeli joint military exercises mark a historical shift, talks about a military alliance in the Middle East with Israeli (and US) involvement are premature. The European Union and its member states should build on these positive dynamics and look at developments in the region not merely through the lens of the MEPP. Trilateral projects with Israel and Arab partners are a good starting point here. Also, Europe should become more involved in the broader Middle East through strategic dialogue with partners in the region as well as the US on the new order in the making.

Every year, BICC's Global Militarisation Index (GMI) maps the relative weight and importance of a country's military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The Index is financially supported by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The GMI 2021 is an anniversary edition. Its first part reflects, as usual, current developments and trends based on the latest available data. It covers 153 countries and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases, data for 2020). The ten countries with the highest levels of militarisation in the GMI 2021 are Israel, Oman, Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Armenia, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Bahrain, Singapore and Russia. These countries allocate particularly high levels of resources to the military compared to other areas of society. Besides countries primarily from conflict regions in the Middle East, three European countries can also be found here, all of which are involved in violent conflicts. A further three - Greece and Cyprus, both EU member states, and Ukraine - are among the Top 20. In the regional focus on Europe, one overall trend of the GMI 2021 becomes particularly clear: Despite the decrease in global GDP as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, countries are spending more resources on the military in absolute terms and as a proportion of their economic output. Another regional focus this time is on Sub-Saharan Africa. In West Africa, in particular, the security situation has deteriorated dramatically over the past few years. Therefore, it is particularly interesting to look at the dynamics of militarisation on that continent. Alongside relatively stable countries, such as Botswana, Namibia, Mauritania, Angola, Gabon and Guinea-Bissau, countries with current violent conflicts, such as Chad, South Sudan and Mali, can be found among the Top 10. The second part of the GMI looks at the global and regional development of militarisation over the past 20 years. This overall view of global militarisa

Während die Weltöffentlichkeit auf Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine und den sich verschärfenden Konflikt zwischen den USA und China blickt, hat sich die Sicher­heits­lage auf der koreanischen Halbinsel weiter verschlechtert. Nordkorea treibt den Ausbau seiner militärischen Fähigkeiten kontinuierlich voran und hat jüngst seine Nukleardoktrin signifikant modifiziert. Der sich rasch verändernde geopolitische Kontext macht zugleich eine Lösung des Atomkonflikts noch unwahrscheinlicher. Pjöngjang hat den Status quo auf der koreanischen Halbinsel unilateral verändert. Diese neue Realität anzuerkennen ist zwar politisch nicht unumstritten. Doch sind Fortschritte in der Nordkorea-Frage kaum vorstellbar, solange die internationale Gemeinschaft weiter von unbegründeten Erwartungen ausgeht und an dem illusorischen Ziel festhält, das Land zum Verzicht auf seine Atomwaffen zu überreden oder zu zwingen.

In recent months, the implementation of Germany's Indo-Pacific policy from September 2020 has started to take shape. With maritime security concerns as principal drivers, naval deployments have taken centre stage. Yet, as the voyage of the frigate Bayern exemplifies, the German approach - similar to other European policies - suffers from contradictions which are hidden under the "rules-based order" label. Adopting terminology that originated in Australia and Japan, also the German "Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific" employ a variation of the rules-based order concept for describing what they seek to preserve. Symbolically powerful naval deployments aimed at safeguarding the "freedom of navigation" through Southeast Asian waters have spearheaded the implementation of the Guidelines, while overshadowing their many other dimensions. The conflation of legitimate concerns about Chinese expansion in the South China Sea with questionable projections of China's linear path to hegemonic power and concomitant courting of "like-minded" "value partners" altered the Guidelines' characteristically European emphasis on inclusivity, de-escalation, and the rule of international law. The rules-based order has come to signify the common interest among a diverse group of powerful states in curbing Chinese influence. This complicates the question of which shared "values," "rules," and conceptions of "order" are at stake. The increasingly wider usage of "rules-based order" has also led to policymakers glossing over the fact that they have themselves been part of, and are driving, the scramble for new spheres of influence. German policymakers must admit that talking about the rules-based order raises more questions than answers. This is also a precondition for getting clear about whether they seek to help contain China. To play a stabilising role, they and other European governments must listen to what the many less-powerful actors in the Indo-Pacific have to say, and clearly articul

Religion has become increasingly contentious in recent years. Faith-based discrimination, hostility and violence seem to have increased worldwide. But how can faith lead to conflict? In this article, we test the impact of two important dimensions of religion that have been neglected in previous research: the belief in 'one true religion' and perceptions of threats by other religious groups. Putting these two potential drivers to the test, we conducted a representative survey experiment with 972 respondents in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Results show that one of the tested dimensions, perceptions of threats by others, increases the support to use violence to defend one's own group. This is particularly the case for religiously intolerant respondents with characteristics such as pre-existing threat perceptions, unfavorable views on intermarriage, or belief in the superiority of their own faith. In contrast, we find relatively weak evidence that the prime of 'one true religion' increases the readiness to use violence. Our findings have important implications for policy: We conclude that appeals by leaders to threats by others and intolerance toward other faiths can contribute to more conflict. Political and religious leaders should refrain from capitalizing on such notions and should promote tolerance towards other faiths instead.

What are the societal and political consequences of the recognition of armed non-state actors (ANSAs) in the context of asymmetric conflicts? Based on a discussion of diverse contemporary examples the three authors present the state of research on recognition dynamics. They shed light on the ambivalences of recognition practises and "thick recognition" in asymmetric conflicts, revealing dilemmas and unintended consequences. They recommend further empirical research and knowledge transfer among practitioners, researchers, and policymakers to better understand the dynamics and draw benefits for international security and conflict management.

The Ukraine crisis poses two particularly uneasy questions for Turkey: How to uphold a power balance in the Black Sea? And how to manage its relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West? So far, Ankara’s policy towards Moscow consists of both deter­rence and dialogue. In regards deterrence, Turkey is closer to the non-EU members of NATO such as the US and the UK. Meanwhile, Turkey’s policy of dialogue is similar to that of EU members, most notably Germany. However, while there is a certain degree of similarity between the stances of Turkey and some Western countries in the current crisis, their convergence of interests has not yet resulted in any meaningful coopera­tion. In the short term, the parallel track of deterrence and dialogue still gives Turkey some leeway to continue its multi-vector manoeuvring. The Ukrainian imbroglio is, however, a manifestation of a crisis concerning the current European security order, or more precisely the lack thereof, thus making it necessary to define the role of not only Russia but also Turkey in any European design for a new security architecture. (author's abstract)

Jeder Konflikt mit einer Atommacht wie Russland birgt die Gefahr, dass Kernwaffen tatsächlich eingesetzt werden. Sorgen um dieses Risiko macht sich Präsident Wladimir Putin offensiv zunutze. Mit seinen nuklearen Drohungen rückt der Kreml von Russlands bisheriger Doktrin ab, die dem eigenen Atomarsenal eine Schutzrolle zu­schreibt. Moskau will auf diese Weise nicht nur westliche Regierungen davor ab­schre­cken, die Ukraine noch substantieller zu unterstützen, sondern auch die Öffent­lich­keit des Westens einschüchtern. Solange aber die Nato nicht direkt in der Ukraine interveniert und sich das russische Regime nicht existentiell bedroht sieht, bleibt ein beabsichtigter ebenso wie ein unbeabsichtigter Nukleareinsatz extrem unwahrscheinlich. Dessen ungeachtet haben Moskaus Drohmanöver erhebliche Negativfolgen. Ge­lingt es Russland, unter dem Schild nuklearer Abschreckung erfolgreich einen kon­ventionellen Krieg zu führen, könnte dies Europa und die globale Sicherheitsordnung weiter destabilisieren. (Autorenreferat)

Der von Russland im Februar begonnene Angriffskrieg auf die Ukraine hat die bisherige europäische Sicherheitsordnung zerstört. Bereits jetzt muss die von der Bundesregierung proklamierte Zeitenwende in der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik eine neue Ordnung ins Auge fassen und gestalten, um erfolgreich zu sein. Schlüsselfaktoren sind die Einigkeit Europas in strategischen Politikfeldern sowie Russlands Positionierung gegenüber dem Rest Europas. Die drei Zukunftsoptionen - Konfrontation, Koexistenz oder Kooperation - identifizieren die Grundlagen für ein starkes Europa.

’Security,’ according to the conventional definition, is defined as protection against foreign military assaults (traditional security). However, the current emergence of non-traditional security concerns related to health, environment, and energy requires an updated definition and involvement of a hegemonic organization for security maintenance purposes. An international organization already exists, named the Security Council of the United Nations, which is tasked with ensuring peace and global security. As technology and biotechnology advance, they could affect the earth’s inhabitants in various ways. The Security Council has the essential role of responding to current and future global security crises; however, through a glance into the history, the Security Council’s stagnation to respond is a result of its perilous structure and ambiguity in Chapter VII, which omits its full potential in terms of obligations to address global security crises. Therefore, the Security Council reforms seem necessary in order to prevent the world from descending into the dark ages because of the pragmatism of permanent members’ competition. Actors maintain a goal of trying to isolate and constrain their opponents by spontaneous and unanticipated measures within the structure of the Security Council. This ultimately does not leads to regaining the damaged originality of the security council and the United Nations by blocking it to respond strictly and effectively to security concerns. If not, consequently, the UN member states might pursue individual or regional actions to address non-traditional and traditional security concerns and defend their interests, as they currently started to do and were doing before forming the international system.

The purpose of this study was to see whether the Taliban regime poses a threat to the international community. The research primarily examined the threats that the formation of a theocratic regime in Afghanistan poses to neighboring countries and the international community. With regards to research methods, a document analysis method was used to obtain valid information and to analyze and describe the complex situation in Afghanistan. A wide array of documents and scholarly articles were analyzed to obtain reliable and objective information. This research revealed that the Taliban has not changed at all and still rules Afghanistan with medieval methods and strategies. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the economic situation has deteriorated considerably and people face severe hardship. Therefore, hundreds of thousands of Afghans want to leave their homeland and migrate to the West. The Taliban violates constantly human rights and discriminates against women, ethnic and religious minorities. The Taliban has transformed Afghanistan into a narco-state. Neighboring countries fear that Afghanistan might become a hotbed of terrorism and extremism again.

Research on public opinion and international security has extensively examined attitudes toward nuclear weapons, but the diffusion of basic knowledge about nuclear weapons among the everyday citizens has nevertheless been mostly missed. This study proposes a working definition and advances a measurement model of knowledge on nuclear weapons in the general public. It analyzes data from two novel surveys conducted in 2018 (N = 6559) and 2019 (N = 6227) where respondents from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom answered a web survey on attitudes and factual knowledge on nuclear weapons. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analytic models are used to examine the dimensionality and to assess the measurement invariance of a scale of knowledge about nuclear weapons. A bifactor measurement model, where a strong general factor represents the construct of interest and specific factors account for the presence of testlets due to questionnaire design, is established and validated. Configural, metric, and scalar invariance are established across the eight samples. The findings indicate that knowledge about nuclear weapons in the general, non-expert public can be reliably measured cross-nationally.

The 1975 nuclear cooperation agreement between Brazil and West Germany had a considerable impact on the mid-Cold War nuclear non-proliferation regime. This article analyses Bonn's interests in that agreement, as well as the negotiation process leading to it and third-party pressures on both countries. It also covers the follow-up negotiations with Urenco partners for a safeguards agreement. Based on extensive archival research and secondary literature, the author delineates three main West German interests in concluding the 'Brazilian Atomic-Deal': (1) strengthening the ruling socio-liberal coalition; (2) boosting the West German nuclear industry; and (3) making viable the jet-nozzle technology.