This extended case note underscores a perplexing contemporary issue of public international law as it interacts or intersects with international arbitration law. The Federal Court of Australia was recently tasked to adjudicate an issue that once again exposed the nuanced question of whether the ICSID Convention preserves immunity from enforcement and execution, or only for the latter. The international case law on this point has been sparse, whereas one of the leading cases in comparative international law dates back to 1986 and comes from the Southern District of New York—the case of Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v. The Government of the Republic of Liberia. This note deals with the case between Eiser Infrastructure (later Infrastructure Services Luxembourg) and the Kingdom of Spain, which invited a nuanced comparative analysis of whether an ICSID award-debtor state can invoke the plea of sovereign immunity to shield against enforcement. Spain submitted that it would be futile for the court to convert an ICSID award into a judgment only to have that judgment rendered unenforceable on the grounds of immunity when execution is sought. According to Spain, a “zombie judgment†would be constituted. The first instance of the Federal Court of Australia, like the Southern District of New York, clarified and approved the distinction between enforcement and execution. But the second instance did not, and instead reasoned that making a judgment of the award was considered to fall within recognition proceedings. Conclusively then, the second instance deviated in reasoning from the first instance (and LETCO) but got the holding right. Thus, the Federal Court of Australia has both clarified the subject-matter and added confusion to it simultaneously. This author makes the point that recognition and enforcement are categorically and unequivocally pre-execution matters that fall within the realm of a local courts’ jurisdictional ambit by submission (or waiver). This note makes the broader point that judicial decisions stemming from the Australian courts, like French, U.S., and other trade-friendly nations’ courts, have a prominent role to play as subsidiary means of determining rules of public international law. Thus, the outcome in the Federal Court of Australia plays an important role in international comparative law.Spain also submits that if the applicants’ contention, that the effect of Arts 54(3) and 55 is to limit consideration of immunity to the time after a Centre award is registered as a judgment, was accepted it would lead to an absurdity – the court would be engaged in an exercise in futility by converting a Centre award into a judgment only to have that judgment rendered unenforceable on the grounds of immunity when execution is sought. Spain submits that, in other words, a “zombie judgment†is created and that it cannot have been the intention of the legislature to create a scheme in which the courts would participate in such an absurdity.[1] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]