Search

Copyright of Journal of Hangzhou Normal University (Social Sciences Edition) / Hang Zhou Shi Fan Da Xue Xue Bao She Hui Ke Xue Ban is the property of Editorial Office of Journal of Hangzhou Normal University (Humanities & Social Sciences Edition) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The World Anti-Doping Code (2021) includes a substance on the prohibited list if it meets at least two of the following: (1) it has the potential to enhance or enhances sport performance; (2) it represents an actual or potential health risk to the athlete; (3) it violates the spirit of sport. This paper uses a case study to illustrate points of tension between this code and enhancements that are appropriate to ban; we argue that there are banned drugs (e.g., acetazolamide and dexamethasone) the use of which we have good reason to not only permit but encourage for high-altitude sports. Drawing on lessons from this case study, we propose a reformulation of the Code that requires (1–3) be met but offers preferable ways of unpacking conditions (1) and (3) – and in a way that better preserves how the spirit of sport condition should be indexed to particular sports. Our formulation is inclusive enough to rule in drugs like acetazolamide and dexamethasone as permissible in high-altitude sports while at the same time ruling out problem cases – including many drugs already on the prohibited list. The result is an attempted alignment between the conditions specified and those drugs that should be banned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human enhancement, a principle promulgated by transhumanism and supported by rapid advances in technology, hints at the transition from Homo sapiens to Homo deus since, along with overcoming somatic and mental limitations, it promises the reach of immortality. Such a promise is fascinating to some, but disturbing to others, because it denials human finiteness. This article presents a theological meditation on human enhancement implications, making it clear that Christian perfection of the Gospel, “Be perfect as your Father is perfect” (Matthew 5, 48), does not coincide with transhumanist perfection, which responds more to techno-anthropocentric and neoagnostic criteria. An attempt to answer the question about what the most sophisticated man-machine cannot have will look at communion, interiority, wisdom, love, and spirituality as properly human notes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transhumanism, a movement advocating for human enhancement through emerging technologies, raises ethical and legal issues of great relevance in modern society. This approach challenges our understanding of human nature and sparks debates on fundamental rights such as equality, human dignity, and personal autonomy. In this discussion, we will examine how advancements in genetic engineering and enhancement technologies pose ethical dilemmas in addressing these fundamental rights, and how legislation and ethics must evolve to tackle these challenges [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technology qualifying as human mood enhancement can be developed, on the one hand, for the well-being and mental health of their users (therapy) and, on the other hand, for changing the mood of their users above levels of normality (enhancement). Such technology provokes debates concerning its societal, ethical and legal consequences for individuals and society as a whole. This paper's aim is twofold. It first aims to show an overview of the often-occurring arguments in the ethics debate about mood enhancement technology and outline which arguments should be considered relevant for supporting the legislative debate. The second aim of the paper is to highlight some of the main legal aspects concerning this technology through the human rights lens of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technology enables humans not only to adapt their environment to their needs but also to modify themselves. Means of Human Enhancement — embodied technologies to improve the human body's capabilities or to create a new one — are the designated means of adapting ourselves instead of the environment. The debate about these technologies is typically fought on ethical soil. However, alarmist, utopian, and science fiction scenarios distract from the fact that Human Enhancement is a historical and pervasive phenomenon incorporated into many everyday practices. In the vein of disentangling conceptual difficulties, we claim that means of Human Enhancement are either physiologically or psychologically embodied, rendering the merging with the human user their most defining aspect. To fulfill its purpose, an enhancement must pass the test-in-the-world, i.e., assisting with effective engagement with a dynamic world. Even if failing in this regard: Human Enhancement is the fundamental and semi-targeted process of changing the users relationship with the world through the physical or psychological embodiment of a hitherto external object and/or change of one's body. This can potentially change the notion of being human. Drawing on a rich body of theoretical and empirical literature, we aim to provide a nuanced analysis of the transformative nature of this phenomenon in close proximity to human practice. Stakeholders are invited to apply the theory presented here to interrogate their perspective on technology in general and Human Enhancement in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the challenges of humanism and education in the 21st century as addressed by the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk in his Elmau Speech (1999). In this lecture, titled Rules for the Human Zoo, Sloterdijk argues that the traditional notion of humanism, specifically "humanism as a literary society," has reached its conclusion, necessitating the development of a new humanism appropriate for the contemporary era. However, the new concept of humanism emerging from what Sloterdijk terms the "anthropotechnic turn" appears to align with the discourses surrounding human enhancement that have emerged in the 21st century, thereby influencing the realm of education. The first half of this article reports on the significant concerns and criticisms expressed by the media at that time regarding this new humanism, which seems to be associated with eugenicist ideas. Taking a step further, this study critically examines the nature of the challenges around education implied by Sloterdijk, specifically the conflict between "friend of humans and friend of Übermensch", and explores the potential roles and responsibilities of education in the latter part of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The time to discuss, contemplate and philosophize about Transhumanism has inevitably come. Thanks to technology which continues to transform human lives in enormous ways. The length at which technology can go, and how far it can take humans is what transhumanism as a philosophy aims to explore. The significance of studying transhumanism lies not in personal beliefs but in the necessity to confront the profound questions surrounding technology’s influence on human life. Understanding transhumanism has become crucial in the contemporary world because radical transformations through technology are already underway. Consequently, contemplating transhumanism prompts critical thinking about the trajectory of humanity in the face of advancing technology. This exploration raises fundamental questions about the protection of human rights in an era where individuals are willing to undergo radical transformations. An intriguing question emerges about the reception of transhumanism: Could or should it be considered a right to which individuals may be entitled? Received: 22 May 2023 Accepted: 18 November 2023

This paper discusses two opposing views about the relation between artificial intelligence (AI) and human intelligence: on the one hand, a worry that heavy reliance on AI technologies might make people less intelligent and, on the other, a hope that AI technologies might serve as a form of cognitive enhancement. The worry relates to the notion that if we hand over too many intelligence-requiring tasks to AI technologies, we might end up with fewer opportunities to train our own intelligence. Concerning AI as a potential form of cognitive enhancement, the paper explores two possibilities: (1) AI as extending—and thereby enhancing—people's minds, and (2) AI as enabling people to behave in artificially intelligent ways. That is, using AI technologies might enable people to behave as if they have been cognitively enhanced. The paper considers such enhancements both on the level of individuals and on the level of groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the role of bioethics and law in the face of the development of meliorative intervention techniques on the genotype and the brain. With the development of the CRISPR/Cas9 technique in recent years, an individual could enhance his genetic conditions by manipulating his somatic cells. Similarly, with the new BCI techniques, an individual could connect his or her brain to an AI in order to stimulate and enhance certain brain areas. However, both bioethics and law seem to infer a general prohibition of meliorating interventions. What rational arguments support this prohibition? Is the human body an unavailable asset for the individual? Is individual freedom and autonomy unjustifiably limited by it? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technology qualifying as human mood enhancement can be developed, on the one hand, for the well-being and mental health of their users (therapy) and, on the other hand, for changing the mood of their users above levels of normality (enhancement). Such technology provokes debates concerning its societal, ethical and legal consequences for individuals and society as a whole. This paper’s aim is twofold. It first aims to show an overview of the often-occurring arguments in the ethics debate about mood enhancement technology and outline which arguments should be considered relevant for supporting the legislative debate. The second aim of the paper is to highlight some of the main legal aspects concerning this technology through the human rights lens of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the European Union.

In this article I claim that the genetic revolution, that is, the advent of a series of highly transformative and disruptive genetic technologies, will happen in the coming years. Given the importance of this historical event, I argue that we must think in advance about the socio-ethical dynamics this revolution could entail. To do this, I first explore the ways in which this genetic revolution might unfold, and the socio-ethical problems it will face. Then, I describe possible social dynamics that will appear in a post genetic revolution scenario, using the example of Ecuador, a multiethnic society that had an abrupt social and genetical transformation that could resemble in some ways what the genetic revolution might bring.

Abstract Vaccinations are instances of Human Enhancement (HE) because, as biotechnologies, they are capable of augmenting the human body’s capacities. We hypothesized that vaccination refusal, as observed during the COVID-19 pandemic, indicates a belief system that also determines attitudes toward HE. Rejection of both may be linked to well-known motives: invasiveness and alleged unnaturalness. We tested the relationship between these two phenomena by conducting two online surveys (N = 314 and N = 300; 81.5%/85.7% vaccinated against SARS-CoV-2 and 18.5%/14.33% not). We also examined if getting enhanced (vaccinated) can induce a relational change toward the environment. Study 1 suggested that greater willingness to use methods to enhance cognitive abilities was more likely when methods must be infrequently used and were deemed natural and non-invasive. An affirmative attitude toward naturalness correlated negatively with the willingness to use. Interaction effects suggested increased importance of naturalness and invasiveness associated variables for unvaccinated participants. Interacting with vaccination status, affirmative attitudes toward naturalness were negatively associated with attitudes toward vaccinations and HE. Qualifying vaccination as HE did not reliably predict attitude toward vaccination or HE. Getting vaccinated led to psychological relief. We explored predictors of vaccination intention. Study 2 showed that unvaccinated perceived the vaccine as less natural but as invasive as vaccinated participants. Perceived naturalness and invasiveness were decisive for vaccination refusal. Findings suggest that rejecting vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 may indicate motives associated with rejecting other HE means and may be a valuable behavioral sample to assess a person’s broader belief system.

This contribution focuses on the role played by digital technologies in transforming the human condition. Digital technologies are presented as a particular form of Human Enhancement already in place, in contrast with the transhumanist positions. Transhumanists trace in GRIN (geno-, robo-, info-, nano-) technologies the conditions for desirable future human enhancement in terms of physical and cognitive performance and capabilities. Analysing the perspectives addressed by the Digital Humanities and taking into account theories on the Post-Human, our purpose is presenting digital technologies as foundational elements of an enhancement already in place, capable of realising the elements of interrelation, synchronicity, hybridisation of the authentic Post-human being.

The idea of moral bioenhancement has been discussed in recent years by ethicists and philosophers. While such discussion covers many different issues on Earth, they have not yet been considered in the context of future human space missions. In this paper, we discuss the bioethics of biomedical moral enhancement for space whether it is possible, probable, and preferable. We show that the ethical context of moral bioenhancement for space differs from analogical contexts on Earth. We point out that space exploration policy should take into account the possibility of moral bioenhancement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay encourages fellow scholars to consider critical organizational studies of post-human technologies. While these nascent technologies hold many promises, they also risk exacerbating several unacceptable organizational features that have been regularly documented, discussed and combated in Organization over the past 30 years. These features include, among other evils, corporate domination and colonization; further erosion of organic solidarity; entrenchment of inegalitarian imaginaries; and impoverished lifeworlds oriented toward instrumental efficiency alone. In order to steer them democratically, we need reflexive empirical studies of post-human technologies in connection with big societal issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the standpoint of disability advocacy, further exploration of the concept of well‐being stands to be availing. The notion that "welfarism" about disability, which Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane debuted, qualifies as helpful is encouraged by their claim that welfarism shares important commitments with that advocacy. As becomes clear when they apply their welfarist frame to procreative decisions, endorsing welfarism would, in fact, sharply undermine it. Savulescu and Kahane's Principle of Procreative Beneficence—which reflects transhumanism, or advocacy of radical bioenhancement—morally requires parents to choose the child who will, in all probability, have "the best life." Assuming the emergence of potent biotechnologies, procreative decision‐making would be highly standardized, for prospective parents would be morally obliged to maximize select capacities, including intelligence, self‐control, and hedonic set‐point, in their children. Welfarism, applied to reproduction, is staunchly objectivist about what course is incumbent on decision‐makers, giving no credence to first‐personal values, aspirations, and experiences. Though this dismissal of individual perspectives applies to everyone, its implications for disability advocacy are especially severe. With that advocacy in view, greater attention to "well‐being" should, therefore, be severed from the welfarism of Savulescu and Kahane. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Law & Emerging Technologies (JOLETS) is the property of Journal of Law & Emerging Technologies (JOLETS) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Human beings are internally inconsistent in various ways. One way to develop this thought involves using the language of value alignment: the values we hold are not always aligned with our behavior and are not always aligned with each other. Because of this self-misalignment, there is room for potential projects of human enhancement that involve achieving a greater degree of value alignment than we presently have. Relatedly, discussions of AI ethics sometimes focus on what is known as the value alignment problem, the challenge of how to build AI that acts in accordance with our human values. We argue that there is an especially close connection between solving the value alignment problem in AI ethics and using AI to pursue certain forms of human enhancement. But in addition, we also argue that there are important limits to what kinds of human enhancement can be pursued in this way, because some forms of human enhancement—namely moral revolutions—involve a kind of value misalignment rather than alignment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vaccinations are instances of Human Enhancement (HE) because, as biotechnologies, they are capable of augmenting the human body's capacities. We hypothesized that vaccination refusal, as observed during the COVID-19 pandemic, indicates a belief system that also determines attitudes toward HE. Rejection of both may be linked to well-known motives: invasiveness and alleged unnaturalness. We tested the relationship between these two phenomena by conducting two online surveys (N = 314 and N = 300; 81.5%/85.7% vaccinated against SARS-CoV-2 and 18.5%/14.33% not). We also examined if getting enhanced (vaccinated) can induce a relational change toward the environment. Study 1 suggested that greater willingness to use methods to enhance cognitive abilities was more likely when methods must be infrequently used and were deemed natural and non-invasive. An affirmative attitude toward naturalness correlated negatively with the willingness to use. Interaction effects suggested increased importance of naturalness and invasiveness associated variables for unvaccinated participants. Interacting with vaccination status, affirmative attitudes toward naturalness were negatively associated with attitudes toward vaccinations and HE. Qualifying vaccination as HE did not reliably predict attitude toward vaccination or HE. Getting vaccinated led to psychological relief. We explored predictors of vaccination intention. Study 2 showed that unvaccinated perceived the vaccine as less natural but as invasive as vaccinated participants. Perceived naturalness and invasiveness were decisive for vaccination refusal. Findings suggest that rejecting vaccination against SARS-CoV-2 may indicate motives associated with rejecting other HE means and may be a valuable behavioral sample to assess a person's broader belief system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2019, a Chinese court sentenced Jiankiu He, the scientist who used genome editing to create three babies via in vitro fertilization (IVF), to three years in prison for practicing medicine without a license. The court claimed that He violated Chinese law when he forged ethical review documents and misled doctors into unknowingly implanting genetically altered embryos into two women the previous year. He stated that he had taken a leave from his university prior to starting the clinical stage of his project, and that he financed that part of the study from his own personal savings, therefore seemingly absolving his university and Chinese authorities of any responsibility in the affair. But to many observers, it seems inconceivable that Jiankui He could have engaged in this research without at least tacit government approval. This paper explores the sources of funding for He's experiment, in an attempt to clarify what Chinese authorities knew or should have known – and whether it is conceivable that He could have completed the clinical phase of the project with no direct government knowledge. It then analyzes the roles that China's science policy and scientific culture played in enabling He to act as he did. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing field of neurotechnology (NT) is becoming more and more accessible in terms of reduced costs, increasing availability and reliability of materials, and ways to implant devices. As in other engineering fields such as bio-or information technology, there is a growing community of pioneering hackers who (self-)experiment with NT and develop novel applications. While most debates about NT, its goals and ethical ramifications are usually conducted by professionals in the field (neuroscientists, −engineers, −ethicists), little is known within these institutional frameworks about the motivations, goals and visions of neurohackers and how they view ethical ramifications of NT therapeutics vs. human enhancement. In this study we draw on qualitative interviews with 13 of these neurohacking pioneers, who are interacting with NT from a grassroots perspective (i.e., a bottom-up and community/subculture-oriented approach), and shed light on: how they understand themselves in the context of human enhancement; what the role of invasive NTs is when it comes to identifying as a cyborg; if their practices show a clear distinction between therapy and enhancement; whether human enhancement is always about performance, optimization and functionality; and to which extent neurohackers contribute to “mainstreaming” NT.

According to political minimalism, a debate is considered political when it revolves around the question “What shall we do?” This account suggests that certain issues related to human enhancement technologies (HETs), which have traditionally been addressed in the realm of applied ethics, could be better approached from a political standpoint. However, this raises the question of who constitutes the “we” – the communities that face the political challenges posed by HETs. We argue that there is a global human community that directly faces at least some of these challenges, and this fact underscores the relevance of a cosmopolitan perspective. While some authors have already advocated for a cosmopolitan approach in addressing issues such as poverty or climate change, they often do so from a moral outlook, without adequately distinguishing between ethics and politics. In contrast, we assert that HETs present compelling arguments in favour of cosmopolitanism as a political stance. In support of this claim, we consider two cases: the pills that would allow people to eat at will without gaining weight, and the choice between different types of cognitive enhancers.

Neurotechnologies offer both therapeutic and enhancement potential. In this article, we demonstrate how ethics guidelines can help with critical reflection on their potential for enhancement. We do this through the case of the hippocampal cognitive prosthesis. This prothesis developed in the US, has primarily therapeutic ends, with scope for enhancement. This technology raises several ethical issues, including as related to identity and memory, autonomy and authenticity. In the first section, we outline what we mean by enhancement, and introduce neurotechnologies generally and the hippocampal cognitive prosthesis specifically, with an introduction to generally relevant ethical issues. In the second section, we outline ethical issues pertinent to the hippocampal cognitive prosthesis and explore how ethics guidelines can help to promote essential critical reflection on a technology like this. Through all this, our emphasis is to balance between technological optimism and caution, especially where technologies have enhancement potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is little debate regarding the acceptability of providing medical care to restore physical or mental health that has deteriorated below what is considered typical due to disease or disorder (i.e., providing "treatment"—for example, administering psychostimulant medication to sustain attention in the case of attention deficit disorder). When asked whether a healthy individual may undergo the same intervention for the purpose of enhancing their capacities (i.e., "enhancement"—for example, use of a psychostimulant as a "study drug"), people often express greater hesitation. Building on prior research in moral philosophy and cognitive science, in this work, we ask why people draw a moral distinction between treatment and enhancement. In two experiments, we provide evidence that the accessibility of health-related interventions determines their perceived descriptive or statistical normality (Experiment 1), and that gains in descriptive normality for such interventions weaken the moral distinction between treatment and enhancement (Experiment 2). In short, our findings suggest that the tendency to draw a moral distinction between treatment and enhancement is driven, in part, by assumptions about descriptive abnormality; and raise the possibility that normalizing novel biomedical interventions by promoting access could undermine people's selective opposition toward enhancement, rendering it morally comparable to treatment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors of this article critically consider selected transhumanist views of new perspectives on humanity in the cosmic future. Their focus is on philosophical and ethical thinking about the futuristic concepts of Cyborgs and Cosmic Beings promoted by Ted Chu. They weight up the possible negative consequences of radical human enhancement and analyse the utilitarian roots of the conceptions discussed. The theory of planetary and cosmic personality appears to be a safer alternative to radical human enhancement but they also pinpoint drawbacks to the theory. The authors conclude that a more conservative and authentic approach to human enhancement is found in the truly human enhancement proposed by Nicholas Agar and consider life-centred ethics an appropriate ethical standpoint in the search for humans' place in the cosmic future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For most theologians, theology should ultimately be used by the laity and/or the public. However, the religion and science debate has not focused on the divide between theologians and the laity. In this case study I examine the debate among theologians about human enhancement. I focus on the extent to which the structure of the debate in a “mediating organization” between the theologians and the public coincides with the structure of the debate among the theologians. I conduct a survey of participants in the organization, and find that the basic divides among the theologians are largely replicated. These results, when combined with studies of the theologians themselves and the laity, provide a more holistic understanding of the future debate about human enhancement.

Human activity is fundamentally embedded in and constituted by technology. In this regard, technology influences not only how people experience the world, but also which possibilities for action offered by the environment (affordances) can be perceived and ultimately acted upon. As having socio-cultural and normative aspects, affordances are deeply relational to the technological human form of life. Postphenomenology describes several human-technology relations and their perception and action mediating effects. Therefore, it provides a suitable framework to examine how technology mediates the perception of affordances and leads to different behavioral outcomes. Technology can reveal hitherto hidden affordances but can also result in the manipulation and concealment of action possibilities. Both aspects can be deliberately controlled by using a particular technology and/or interfering with the technological hermeneutic process. Technological mal-functions, limitations, purposeful corruption, or human error can disrupt the hermeneutic qualities of technology and may lead to false conclusions about affordances and respective maladaptive behavioral outcomes. Technology can also be applied to humans to form “better” versions of them. One consequence of these so-called Human Enhancement technologies is the emergence of different affordances for the enhanced individual and the possible establishment of new affordances inside a form of life. Manipulating the perception and emergence of affordances through technological mediation or Human Enhancement can have severe political and ethical consequences. It is necessary to engage in an open debate about the perception and action mediating power of technology and the human reliance on them in our current and future form of life.

Scuba diving offers new possibilities for being human. The diving equipment, making it possible to breathe and move about underwater, temporarily transforms divers into a kind of cyborgs, that is, integrated human–machine organisms. This transformation is here outlined by looking at both the experiential and structural aspects of recreational scuba diving. Though drawing on the occasional part-taking in scuba diving activities of different kinds over a period of fifteen years, the empirical examples in this article mainly come from a short-term ethnographic fieldwork in the small island nation of Palau in Western Micronesia. Scuba diving here emerges as a profoundly human form of cyborgism, enhancing both organic functioning and experiential possibilities, altogether creating a deeper feeling of meaningfulness in life for participants. An analysis of recreational scuba diving thereby opens up for a new way of thinking about not only cyborgism, but also the relationship between humans and technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As space travel and intentions to colonise other planets are becoming the norm in public debate and scholarship, we must also confront the technical and survival challenges that emerge from these hostile environments. This paper aims to evaluate the various arguments proposed to meet the challenges of human space travel and extraterrestrial planetary colonisation. In particular, two primary solutions have been present in the literature as the most straightforward solutions to the rigours of extraterrestrial survival and flourishing: (1) geoengineering, where the environment is modified to become hospitable to its inhabitants, and (2) human (bio)enhancement where the genetic heritage of humans is modified to make them more resilient to the difficulties they may encounter as well as to permit them to thrive in non-terrestrial environments. Both positions have strong arguments supporting them but also severe philosophical and practical drawbacks when exposed to different circumstances. This paper aims to show that a principled stance where one position is accepted wholesale necessarily comes at the opportunity cost of the other where the other might be better suited, practically and morally. This paper concludes that case-by-case evaluations of the solutions to space travel and extraterrestrial colonisation are necessary to ensure moral congruency and the survival and flourishing of astronauts now and into the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]