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The question of Hegel's views on Buddhism and its place within his system must be asked again as the history of effects, transmission, and reception continues to unfold. This unfolding highlights not only Hegel's effect on the Western European reception and understanding of Buddhism (and its sharp orientalist critique), but also the canny use of Hegel's philosophy by certain members of the so‐called Kyoto School of Japanese neo‐Buddhist philosophy, who, though primarily concerning themselves with Heidegger, were notable in their creative use of Hegel's philosophy of spirit (especially Nishida, Nishitani, Tanabe, and Abe). Our present task is likewise to look back to Hegel's own writing on Buddhism through the lens of the history of its effects—that is, to read Hegel again with his legacy in mind—so that we might, as strange as it may perhaps seem, see things more clearly. Our goal is relatively modest, as it aims only to seek out and coordinate Buddhism within Hegel's history of philosophy. Thus, as we have a proximate goal in mind, we also have an order of importance with respect to Hegel's texts, which, of course, brings the Lectures on the History of Philosophy to the fore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of Hegel's views on Buddhism and its place within his system must be asked again as the history of effects, transmission, and reception continues to unfold. This unfolding highlights not only Hegel's effect on the Western European reception and understanding of Buddhism (and its sharp orientalist critique), but also the canny use of Hegel's philosophy by certain members of the so‐called Kyoto School of Japanese neo‐Buddhist philosophy, who, though primarily concerning themselves with Heidegger, were notable in their creative use of Hegel's philosophy of spirit (especially Nishida, Nishitani, Tanabe, and Abe). Our present task is likewise to look back to Hegel's own writing on Buddhism through the lens of the history of its effects—that is, to read Hegel again with his legacy in mind—so that we might, as strange as it may perhaps seem, see things more clearly. Our goal is relatively modest, as it aims only to seek out and coordinate Buddhism within Hegel's history of philosophy. Thus, as we have a proximate goal in mind, we also have an order of importance with respect to Hegel's texts, which, of course, brings the Lectures on the History of Philosophy to the fore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper addresses the role of disagreement in relation to the goals of metaphysical inquiry. In particular, I will discuss two reactions to Kant’s initial observation that metaphysics does not make any lasting progress: Kant’s own demand for a critical revision of metaphysics and Schelling’s ideas as presented in his 1821 lecture On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science. Kant’s account allows for an appreciation of metaphysical conflict as a necessary precondition for a critically revised system of pure reason. However, he thinks that such a system will ultimately replace all previous ones and thereby make further development of metaphysics obsolete. Although Schelling appropriates Kant’s notion of systematicity, he arrives at a positive evaluation of metaphysical disagreement as an expression of freedom which articulates itself within the history of metaphysics. I argue that Schelling’s view also entails that the history of metaphysics is an ongoing process rather than terminating in an ultimate system or a withdrawal from metaphysical inquiry. Thus, we get to see a) that Kant himself (not just his post-Kantian successors) entertains an account of the essential historicity of reason and b) how Schelling both preserves and transforms the Kantian legacy of a philosophical history of metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies the distinction that Owen Barfield drew between 'the history of thought' and 'the history of thinking' (or 'the evolution of consciousness') to standard accounts of the transition from traditional to modern logic. It shows that most standard accounts of the history of logic fail to account for changes in consciousness that underlie developments in the history of ideas, and therefore stand to be deepened and enriched by Barfield's insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1973, Dag Prawitz conjectured that the calculus of intuitionistic logic is complete with respect to his notion of validity of arguments. On the background of the recent disproof of this conjecture by Piecha, de Campos Sanz and Schroeder‐Heister, we discuss possible strategies of saving Prawitz's intentions. We argue that Prawitz's original semantics, which is based on the principal frame of all atomic systems, should be replaced with a general semantics, which also takes into account restricted frames of atomic systems. We discard the option of not considering extensions of atomic systems, but acknowledge the need to incorporate definitional atomic bases in the semantic framework. It turns out that ideas and results by Westerståhl on the Carnap categoricity of intuitionistic logic can be applied to Prawitz semantics. This implies that Prawitz semantics has a status of its own as a genuine, though incomplete, semantics of intuitionstic logic. An interesting side result is the fact that every formula satisfiable in general semantics is satisfiable in an axioms‐only frame (a frame whose atomic systems do not contain proper rules). We draw a parallel between this seemingly paradoxical result and Skolem's paradox in first‐order model theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An inference can be seen as a speech act, in which one passes from a number of assertions called premisses to another assertion, the conclusion, which is presented as supported or justified by the premisses. To justify the assertion that appears as conclusion is the characteristic aim of an inference. Here, we confine ourselves to deductive inferences where the justification is taken to be conclusive. A short, natural explanation of what it is for a (deductive) inference to be valid is to say that it is valid if it succeeds in its aim, that is, if its premisses do (conclusively) justify the conclusion, given that premisses are justified. The paper is concerned with developing this explanation further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim here is to investigate assertion and inference as notions of logic. Assertion will be explained in terms of its purpose, which is to give interlocutors the right to request the assertor to do a certain task. The assertion is correct if, and only if, the assertor knows how to do this task. Inference will be explained as an assertion equipped with what I shall call a justification profile, a strategy for making good on the assertion. The inference is valid if, and only if, correctness is preserved from the premiss assertions to the conclusion assertion. Most of this is a spelling out of views on assertion and inference presented by Per Martin‐Löf in lectures since 2015. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a slightly edited transcript of a lecture given by Per Martin‐Löf on 26 October 2022 at the Rolf Schock Symposium in Stockholm. In 2020, the Rolf Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy was awarded to Dag Prawitz and Per Martin‐Löf, and the symposium was organised in their honour. The transcript was prepared by Ansten Klev and edited by the author. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The lecture spells out the difference between the validity of inference (‐figure)s and validity applied to demonstrations ('proof acts'). The latter notion is not an ordinary characterizing one; in Brentano's terminology it is a modifying one. A demonstration lacking validity is not a real demonstration, just as a false friend is no true friend. Throughout, the treatment makes crucial use of an epistemological perspective that is cast in the first person. Furthermore, the difference between (logical) consequence among propositions and the validity of inference from judgement to judgement is explained. Particular attention is paid to alleged issues of circularity in the definition of the validity of inference, and to the 'explosion' validity of inference from contradictory premisses. Drawing upon a version of the dialogical framework of Per Martin‐Löf, namely, 'When I say Therefore, I give others my permission to assert the conclusion', while stressing also the importance of the first person perspective, both difficulties can be neutralized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a dialogue between Lisa and Max on Dag Prawitz's work concerning the concept of deductive validity. Lisa first explains Prawitz's criticisms of the presently prevailing non‐epistemic analyses of validity. Then Lisa describes three different ways in which Prawitz attempted to develop an epistemic concept of validity. Max asks questions for clarification, raises some objections and compares Prawitz's three approaches with other lines of thought. Two inference rules are specially discussed: disjunction introduction and ex contradictione quodlibet. Max and Lisa view Prawitz's contribution as part of a variegated, ongoing research pursuing an explication of the concept of validity, which began with the Socratic and Platonic distinction between merely persuasive arguments and good arguments and with Aristotle's definition of syllogism. Throughout the history of philosophy, logicians have aimed at clarifying a pre‐theoretic idea of good deduction and have proposed, criticized, refined, adjusted precise theoretical concepts of validity. Prawitz has criticized current views about validity, has advanced new proposals and revised them. His work is an important chapter of the long pursuit of the concept of validity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores the relationship between conceptual engineering and the methodology of the Lvov-Warsaw School. While conceptual engineering is commonly seen as rooted in Rudolf Carnap's works and his method of explication, this paper argues that LWS predates and informs contemporary understanding of this methodology. The paper establishes that LWS not only engaged in but also systematically developed a method of conceptual revision aimed at enhancing clarity, precision, and coherence with specific theoretical frameworks. The analysis shows that LWS's approach to concepts combined both descriptive and normative methodologies to improve and adapt philosophical concepts to better address actual phenomena and certain theoretical or practical needs. This method, described by LWS members as ‘analysis and construction’, parallels contemporary conceptual engineering practices, particularly its so-called ‘narrow’ understanding focused on revising existing concepts rather than on merely introducing new ones. By tracing the historical trajectory of conceptual engineering back to LWS, this paper provides a deeper understanding of its foundational strategies and suggesting that LWS's methodology could serve as a guide for current and future philosophical projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is an in-depth review of the origin and development of Martin Heidegger's philosophical ideas with a main emphasis on his political anthropology. The basic concepts of Heidegger's philosophical system, as well as the social and political conditions of their formation and change, are examined in detail. In the text, lines are devoted both to the influence of Heidegger's philosophy and to the evaluations of it by the philosopher's contemporaries and later researchers. The idea that the story of Heidegger's life cannot be separated from his thinking is successfully defended, especially since his political ideas or delusions have a concrete origin in the social and conceptual processes of Europe in the middle of the 20th century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Eskişehir Osmangazi University Faculty of Theology is the property of Journal of Eskisehir Osmangazi University Faculty of Theology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Standard citation-based bibliometric tools have severe limitations when they are applied to periods in the history of science and the humanities before the advent of now-current citation practices. This paper presents an alternative method involving the extracting and analysis of mentions to map and analyze links between scholars and texts in periods that fall outside the scope of citation-based studies. Focusing on one specific discipline in one particular period and language area—Anglophone philosophy between 1890 and 1979—we describe a procedure to create a mention index by identifying, extracting, and disambiguating mentions in academic publications. Our mention index includes 1,095,765 mention links, extracted from 22,977 articles published in 12 journals. We successfully link 93% of these mentions to specific philosophers, with an estimated precision of 82% to 91%. Moreover, we integrate the mention index into a database named EDHIPHY, which includes data and metadata from multiple sources and enables multidimensional mention analyses. In the final part of the paper, we present four case studies conducted by domain experts, demonstrating the use and the potential of both EDHIPHY and mention analyses more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores Spain's positioning in the shifting currents of the later Enlightenment through the polemic works of lawyer and satirist Juan Pablo Forner. Forner's attempts to prove the existence of an autochthonous tradition of Spanish pragmatism and empiricism form an index of the penetration of intra‐Enlightenment debates into Spanish thought in the late eighteenth century. Forner, profoundly aware of tensions between Cartesian rationalism and Lockean sentimental empiricism across Europe, intervenes on the side of empiricism, insisting that Cartesianism is nothing but a guise of Scholastic hyperrationalism. The article disputes scholarly perceptions of Forner as a Christian reactionary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leibniz's metaphysics already justifies evil not only through the normative power of God, assuming that it is simultaneously the omnipotence of reason. For Kant, evil becomes definitively the sole problem of the rational being, human. While for Leibniz, the divine will had organized all practical relations of humans and movements of the physical world in such a way that the practical reason of all individuals is metaphysically constituted and evil is justified, Kant shifts the focus to the practical reason of humans as autonomous subjects. In this paradigm, God loses his metaphysical power, retaining only a moral role. Nietzsche and Musil build upon this context, yet surprisingly, they do not further advance this development. Instead, they reject the power of pure reason, which becomes absolute for Kant. Simultaneously, they draw on God's metaphysical power over evil to formulate their concept of the new evil that confronts us in the practical contexts of modern life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article examines the interpretations of Platonism in the philosophical systems of selected representatives of the Baden and Marburg schools of neo-Kantianism. Using the method of comparative analysis and focusing on epistemological, metaphysical-ontological, mathematical, and historical interpretations of Plato's idealism, I present the philosophical positions of the following Baden thinkers: Wilhelm Windelband, Emil Lask, Jonas Cohn, Karl Jaspers; and the following Marburg thinkers: Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, August Auffarth and Elisabeth Rotten. The choice of these philosophers is deliberate and related to different ways of interpreting ancient Platonic idealism. The historical-philosophical approach in this article consists in describing various ways of interpreting Plato's philosophy at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries in the circles of German philosophers inspired by the philosophy of Kant. I will address this research topic using a novel method, considering selected assumptions of the broadly understood intellectual environment associated with critical philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay aims to shed new light on the theoretical pertinence of classical Indian logic and epistemology in Benedetto Croce's criticism of Western Aristotelian and modern logic. As a matter of fact, Croce gave a positive and extraordinarily enterprising evaluation of "Indian Logic" in his review of Hermann Jacobi's Indische Logik (1905) and in his book Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept (1996 [1909]). Yet Croce's significant and considerable evaluation of "Indian Logic" has remained neglected until today. This essay tries to clear the field of some prejudices that misled scholarly research on Croce and Indian philosophy, and it glosses in detail the "neglected" judgment on "Indian Logic" in Croce's Logic. In doing so, it critically discusses some epistemological questions starting from Croce's philosophy, such as the character of "natural induction," the relationship between language and thought, and the connection between historical languages and logical forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is believed that the origin of translation activities in Islamic thought dates back to the Umayyad period. These activities were first carried out during the reign of Khalid b. Yazīd (d. 85/704 [?]). In particular, the Greek texts of antiquity (antiquity) began to be translated. Initially, translations were made in the fields of medicine and chemistry. Later on, during the Abbasid period, the translation process, which was continued by the Caliph Abū Ja'far al-Mansūr (d. 158/775), eventually expanded the field of research with the establishment of the Bayt al-Hikma. Thus, translation activities continued systematically in the fields of philosophy, ethics, politics, physics, metaphysics, botany and zoology. As a result, the Greek heritage of antiquity was inherited by Islamic civilisation, and many translated texts were received by Islamic thinkers, which paved the way for discussions on them. This situation facilitated a better analysis and understanding of Greek texts and provided an opportunity to compare them with the views of Islamic thought. One of the areas translated was zoology. In this context, one of the thinkers who was influenced by zoological texts and included Greek zoology in his works was Amr b. Bahr al-Jāhiz (d. 255/869), a Muʿtazilite scholar and naturalist from Basra. In fact, al-Jāhiz included many animals and their characteristics in his seven-volume Kitāb al-Hayawān, which can be regarded as the zoologicalzoographic literature. He also mentioned animals from time to time in his other works. All his knowledge about living creatures is based on the Qur'an, hadiths, idioms, proverbs, poems of the Jahiliyya period, and experiences of Bedouins, animal trainers, dogs, pigeon and rooster owners, sailors and hunters. On the other hand, he makes many references to Greek zoology, especially to Aristotle (384-322 BC), whom he calls “Ṣāḥib al-Mantiq”. In Aristotle's Kitāb al-Hayawān, he mentions Aristotle's views on the vital processes of many species, such as pigs, birds, fish, elephants, snakes, insects, their status in their habitats, feeding methods and reproduction. Although al-Jāhiz accepted Aristotle as an authority in the field of zoology, he investigated the information he received from him. He consulted Bedouins, sailors and hunters who had experience with animals and tried to confirm the accuracy of Aristotle's ideas. He even tested Aristotle's ideas by conducting experiments and observations himself. This situation shows that sometimes al-Jāhiz did not take the information he received directly, but researched its accuracy and included it in his own work. In addition, al-Jāhiz also included the ideas of Greek thinkers such as Galen (d. 200 [?]) and Polemon (Aflimun) (d. 314 BC) about animals in his work. From this point of view, he was influenced by Galen's experiments on the digestive system of animals; he provided information on the digestive system of animals and how they digest food. In this regard, he mentioned the experiments of his teacher, Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm al-Nazzām (d. 231/845) on animals. Examples include observations such as feeding stones to ostriches, the resistance of animals such as dogs, wolves, lions and horses to digesting food and bones or measuring the endurance of some animals by giving them a drink. He also mentioned Polemon's views on pigeons and how their living conditions should be. He emphasised what a good and beautiful pigeon should look like and where it can best live out its life, such as in the field. It can be concluded from this that al-Jāhiz consulted Polemon’s ideas because of his interest in pigeons and their ubiquitous use in his time. The knowledge he acquired from his own culture, from many different sources, and the information he received from Greek thinkers enabled him to accumulate a deep and wide zoological knowledge. Thus, his accumulation of knowledge influenced many people after him. In fact, the knowledge he transmitted, especially from Greek zoology, was included in the works of Kamāluddin al-Damīrī (d. 808/1405) Hayāt al-hayawān and Zakariyyyā al-Qazwīnī (d. 682/1283) ʿAjāʾib al-makhlūqāt wa gharāʾib al-mawjūdāt. Like al-Jāhiz, they called Aristotle “Ṣāḥib al-Mantiq” and referred to his views. This situation shows that al-Jāhiz served as a bridge to transfer Greek zoology to later periods. This study attempts to determine how al-Jāhiz received the Greek zoological heritage and how he incorporated it into his own work. It will also discuss the extent to which he was influenced by Aristotle and whether or not he accepted his views as they were. As a result of the study, it will be understood that al-Jāhiz transmitted the information he received, sometimes directly, sometimes by testing its accuracy, and even by resorting to experimentation and observation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Near East University Islamic Research Center / Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi İslam Tetkikleri Merkezi Dergisi is the property of Journal of Near East University Islamic Research Center and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Husserl’s theory of fulfilment conceives of empty acts, such as symbolic thought, and fulfilling acts, such as sensory perceptions, in a strict parallel. This parallelism is the basis for Husserl’s semantics, epistemology, and conception of truth. It also entails that any true proposition can be known in principle, which Church and Fitch have shown to explode into the claim that every proposition is actually known. I assess this logical challenge and discuss a recent response by James Kinkaid. While Kinkaid’s proposal saves one direction of the parallel for semantics, it gives up the parallelism for truth. I spell out a different response which meshes naturally with Husserl’s account of meaning. If the parallelism is restricted to a class of basic propositions, the truth of non-basic propositions can be defined inductively, without leading to the paradox. I then discuss objections that have been raised against a similar proposal by Dummett. The result is that exegetically plausible and popular interpretations of Husserl’s correlationism are indeed challenged by Church and Fitch. But when taking into account the ‘logical adumbration’ of propositional blindspots, truth and possible fulfilment can be connected without paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Life Education is the property of Life Education Center, National Taiwan University & Taiwan Life Education Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Islamic Civilization Studies / İslam Medeniyeti Araştırmaları Dergisi (IMAD) is the property of Islam Medeniyeti Arastirmalari Dergisi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nouvelles Perspectives en Sciences Sociales is the property of Editions Prise de parole and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Chinese construction of the science of philosophy takes as its basic form the narrative of the history of philosophy. The introduction into Chinese philosophy of the normative character of philosophy and its problem framework via the narrative of the history of philosophy has to some extent enabled the practice of philosophy to remain separate from the norms and methods of traditional Chinese thought. Philosophical norms and problem frameworks from the West have changed the happenings of the historical world towards the eternal Dao of the classical world into intellectual texts, and have transformed the situationbased expressive strategy that develops the principles of things in the world of concrete experience into concepts and categories. As a consequence of these two positions, the ground of Chinese philosophy, based as it is on the history of philosophy, may not only be separated from the everlasting world of experience of the classics, but may also be divorced from the present experience of the modernization process. If we start from an analysis of the historicity of the Chinese intellectual tradition and its classical character, Chinese philosophy has obtained the possibility of returning to experience by means of parsing jishi yanli, a way of thinking that uses the investigation of things to fathom principles. The pathway of integrating philosophical thinking and experience will enhance and stimulate the contemporary value of the classics. More importantly, regarding the unique methods and strategies of expression in traditional Chinese thought as a general philosophical approach can facilitate the promotion of the construction of a world philosophy oriented toward current experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Bulletin of the L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University. Historical Sciences. Philosophy. Religion Series is the property of L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The present article examines the interpretations of Platonism in the philosophical systems of selected representatives of the Baden and Marburg schools of neo-Kantianism. Using the method of comparative analysis and focusing on epistemological, metaphysical-ontological, mathematical, and historical interpretations of Plato’s idealism, I present the philosophical positions of the following Baden thinkers: Wilhelm Windelband, Emil Lask, Jonas Cohn, Karl Jaspers; and the following Marburg thinkers: Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, August Auffarth and Elisabeth Rotten. The choice of these philosophers is deliberate and related to different ways of interpreting ancient Platonic idealism. The historical-philosophical approach in this article consists in describing various ways of interpreting Plato’s philosophy at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries in the circles of German philosophers inspired by the philosophy of Kant. I will address this research topic using a novel method, considering selected assumptions of the broadly understood intellectual environment associated with critical philosophy.

The study presents the Russian historical-philosophical process in the context of the discovery of a new object, themes, personae, set of reactions and formation of a product for the intellectual community. The author's reliance on philosophical empirical material and appropriate hermeneutics in its processing allows the author to highlight those factors that influenced individual and collective reception. The author sees as a convenient case study the “discovery” by the Russian philosophical community of the early 20th century of both American philosophy in general and C.S. Peirce in particular. Since the beginning of the 19th century, Russian thinkers have turned their attention to American philosophy in all the diversity of its manifestations. Russian intellectuals paid special attention to American pragmatism and everything associated with it. In Russia, in addition to translations, numerous reviews of foreign publications on this topic are appearing. Of particular interest to us in the Russian “collective reflection” of American ideas is the system of preferences for ideas, texts, events, and names. The point is that what might have been a priority for a European thinker, for a Russian one turned out to be on the “periphery” of his consciousness, as well as vice versa. While James appeared among the priority figures for Russian thinkers, Peirce was in his “shadow”. Using rich empirical material, the author shows all the stages of Peirce’s image formation in the Russian intellectual community. The research shows that “image” of Peirce, which represents not so much the thinker himself, but characterizes the intellectual community that turned to him. The results of the study may be useful both for contemporary foreign and Russian interpreters of Peirce and for historians of philosophy who are rethinking the past and forming in the present new objects of reception and reflection.

Introduction. The problem of incomplete coincidence of views of K. Marx and F. Engels has long been raised in marxology. On this topic, D. McLellan, M. Ryubel, K.N. Lubutin and P.N. Kondrashov spoke. However, they were limited to political economy and ontology. We will discuss the views of classics on the origin of private property and the state.Methodology and sources. In this article the textual analysis of the works «Origin of family, private property and state» by F. Engels and «Forms preceding capitalist production» and «Manuscripts of 1844» by K. Marx is taken. The author a dopts a historical-comparative approach, combining the ideas of the classics with those of later Marxist schools.Results and discussion. F. Engels explains the appearance of the state by class contradictions. However, it does not distinguish the concept of «class» from the concept of «estate» and ignores the fact that in the pre-capitalist era an individual opposed another individual as a representative of a community that provided a certain standard of living. In a paragraph entitled «Forms Preceding Capitalist Production» in the «Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1861», K. Marx describes how the state emerged as an organizer of forced community works. This coercion was determined not by socio-political factors but by natural factors. Labor created not only a social product, but also the very relationship of domination. We show the semantic connection of this concept with that which was embodied K. Marx in «Economical-philosophical manuscripts of 1844».Conclusion. In classical Marxism there is no unified concept of the origin of the state and private property; the concepts of K. Marx and F. Engels differ from each other in the interpretation of the role of labor in this process. F. Engels attributes a passive role to labor. For K. Marx, the role of labor is active: labor itself creates its opposite, private property, and with it the state, which arises and exists due to the limitations of labor.

Tsenay Serequeberhan's hermeneutics has been crucial to the development of African philosophy. Initially employed as a pathway through the ethno- and professional philosophical debates, scholars have engaged how Serequeberhan's hermeneutics grapples with one's own place within a socio-historical world in service of liberation/self-determination. However, this scholarship mainly has focused on his adaptation of Gadamer's 'effective-historical consciousness' for his own concept of heritage. This consequently leaves his concept of a 'lived existence' – which is equally crucial – under-examined. This paper probes what a 'lived existence' entails and its essentiality when explicating how one even begins to authentically think, which is the groundwork to Serequeberhan's hermeneutics. This deepens why his concept of heritage matters as a starting point for self-determination. Addressing this lacuna, this article asks, where does philosophy begin and where should it go, particularly when rationality has been historically denied? Serequeberhan's point of departure to answer this question proposes Heidegger's concept of thinking itself to arrive at a notion of existence; contrariwise to most African scholars who employ a Sartrean existentialism via Frantz Fanon. As such, this paper gives an in-depth exploration of Serequeberhan's initial reading of Heidegger, and then unfolds how he appropriates Heidegger to craft his notion of 'lived existence'. The upshot this is twofold: First, a broader understanding of Serequeberhan's project, its non-existentialist view of existence; Second, it describes how he specifically tailors his 'lived existence' to undergird his hermeneutical approach to heritage as a prescriptive, activist project which dynamically addresses the postcolonial situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses Adam Smith's and Sophie de Grouchy's accounts of sympathy to show how they arrive at strikingly different views on whether inequality is a threat to, or precondition of, social order. Where many scholars have recently sought to recover Smith's egalitarianism, I instead focus on how his account of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments naturalises socioeconomic inequalities, while also highlighting the wider inegalitarian implications of his analysis. I demonstrate that Grouchy was alert to these implications and reveal how her own account of sympathy challenges the moral psychology underlying Smith's position on inequality. By reconstructing Grouchy's response to Smith, I illustrate how retrieving the insights of long‐overlooked thinkers can reorient the way we understand key debates in the history of philosophy, since Grouchy was far more concerned than Smith with exposing how economic inequality imperils the prospects of relating to one another as equals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main aim of the article is to show how panpsychism, that is, the idea the everything in the world is endowed with a soul, was varied even during the periods in the history of philosophy when it flourished. In the Renaissance, I focus on Francesco Patrizi: he coined the term, which originally meant that everything is ensouled. The article starts by an investigation of Patrizi's attempt to trace panpsychism back to the most ancient thinkers. His conclusions are, in general, in agreement with current scholarly assessment of early Greek philosophers, whose views I attempt to reconstruct in a kind of survey. A closer comparison, however, shows significant differences between Patrizi's and today's account of the most ancient conception of panpsychism. While Patrizi uses the concept to state that the world as a whole is ensouled, early Greek philosophers understood it to mean that every thing in the world possesses a particular soul. From a broader perspective, it is clear that, while Patrizi builds on the notion of all-embracing ancient philosophy, modern scholarship assumes a more historical account of ancient thought characterised by a gradual progress from simple, more empirically based concepts, to more complex and metaphysical ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the significance of J. G. Herder's analogical thinking in the history of comparative practices. It shows how Herder's comparative method, of positing one phenomenon as another in its own singular and inimitable manner, emerges from his concept of God and nature as informed by Baruch Spinoza, as well as his study of scientific and cultural phenomena, including the active mechanisms of poesis as sensory perception. While Herder's concept of comparison and his analogical practices influenced prominent thinkers contemporary to him such as J.W. Goethe, the specificity of his comparative method has been overlooked by scholars past and present, such as Michel Foucault, as Herder's approach resists assimilation in histories of comparativism centered on nineteenth-century projects of comparison. Yet his outlook on the tension between difference and identity offers fresh insight into relations between distinct cultures and entities without effacing their particularity or placing them in static hierarchies. Herder's comparative method provides new perspectives on contemporary debates on the benefits of and dangers of historical analogies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Sociology of philosophy is the name of a theory-based, empirical sociological subdivision, whose basic approach is praxeological: doing philosophy involves a variety of socially situated practices that in some cases result in philosophical arguments and doctrines fixed in text. Constellation research is an approach developed by the German philosopher Dieter Henrich (1927–2022) for investigations into the history of philosophy. It combines a historical and a systematic intent and interest. Constellation research has primarily been tried out on the rapid development of post-Kantian idealism in Germany in the 1790s. The approach has some obvious similarities with different approaches within the sociology of philosophy. The article first gives a condensed presentation of constellation research as a research program. In a second step, it tries to sort out similarities and dissimilarities with key concepts, topics and approaches within the sociology of philosophy. The argument put forward is that constellation research can provide the sociology of philosophy with some novel ideas and that the sociology of philosophy may prove to be a useful resource to constellation research. In short, there is a potential for cross-fertilization between the two approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to construct a concept of subjectivity from Nietzsche's philosophy. To do so, the article is divided into three moments: the first presents the concept of history in the German thinker's thought, starting from his critique of interpretative one-dimensionality and his proposal of hermeneutic openness of history; the second revisits the concept of becoming, thus exposing how it is associated with amor fati to construct a vision of Nietzsche's being-in-the-world; and finally, the last moment deals with the concept of the child, which is taken as the ultimate transformation of the spirit and, from there, as the best principle for thinking of a form of life that is truly free. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers ponder on how to do philosophy and how to do it well. This pondering has divided metaphilosophers' concern about philosophical methodology into two groups, which we could label "pro‐history" and "pro‐intuition." The claim (and belief) of philosophers who are in the "pro‐history" group can be found in this sentence by Robert Pasnau (2011): "The discipline of philosophy benefits from a serious, sustained engagement with its history." Those in the "pro‐intuition" group believe that for philosophy not to slide into the realm of irrelevance it must rely on intuitions to make sense of our present ontologies, rather than study history of philosophy. This paper argues that both proponents of the pro‐history and those of the pro‐intuition approach are wrongheaded. It argues for what it calls protohistory. Protohistory here refers to the method of doing philosophy in which the intuitions of philosophers are informed by the history of philosophy (though not directly influenced by it but indirectly informed by it). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]