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Abstract: This study explores the pivotal concept of “objective possibility” within Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness, a concept that has received less attention compared to more prominent ideas such as reification or totality. Lukács frequently refers to “objective possibility” and related terms in essays like “What Is Orthodox Marxism?” and “Class Consciousness,” emphasizing its importance in understanding class consciousness theoretically. The term’s roots for Lukács derive from Max Weber’s methodological writings, which drew from John Stuart Mill and Johannes von Kries and applied to historical and social causation. However, Lukács diverges from Weber’s use, focusing not on counterfactual historical events but on latent historical tensions in the present that can be actualized through collective action. The study argues that Lukács integrates Weberian objective possibility with Marxist and Hegelian language, utilizing it within a modal social ontology. This approach allows Lukács to theorize key questions of class consciousness, historical action, and revolution. By drawing on Hegel’s dialectics of possibility, actuality, and necessity, as well as Marxian contradictions in material conditions, Lukács reconfigures objective possibility from a heuristic tool for the writing of history to an ontologically significant element in the field of historical action.

Richard Bourke brings Hegel back to the forefront of the debate with masterful theoretical clarity, philosophical acumen, historical accuracy, and impressive knowledge, presenting to us a vivid account of Hegel's political thought. In this brief note I discuss the central philosophical, hermeneutical, and historical concerns of the book while highlighting its principal contributions to the wider scholarship on Hegel, in the history of political thought, and to recent debates about revolutions in nineteenth-century Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article systematically reconstructs the key elements of the articulation of Marx’s new materialism by Karl Korsch, Weimar Germany’s anti-Stalinist and anti-Social Democratic Marxist heretic. After a brief biographical presentation, and a sketch of the topography of philosophical positions prior and contemporary to him, I develop a thematic presentation of Korsch’s reading of Marx’s materialist dialectics, this-sidedness, the coincidence of consciousness and reality, the problem of application, his salvaging of the category of content, the materialist conception of history and his efforts to produce a theory of the material reproduction of ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evald Ilyenkov's last book, Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism, was published in 1980 shortly after the author's tragic demise. In it he celebrated the 70th anniversary of Lenin's still controversial Materialism and Empirio-criticism (1909). Like Lenin's own book, this final contribution by Ilyenkov is often dismissed as mere polemic. But as Lev Naumenko noted in the original preface: "the fires of the ideological struggle have not weakened". Under the protective shield of "Leniniana", as Lev Naumov called it, Ilyenkov set out his approach to materialist dialectics as both the science of logic and the logic of revolution. I discuss the nature of Ilyenkov's motives, the place of Leninist Dialectics within his philosophical oeuvre and why the original manuscript was censored by the Politizdat publishers. I draw on memoirs by Ilyenkov's close colleague and friend Felix Mikhailov and intended co-author, Grigori Vodolazov. Their testimonies make evident that Ilyenkov's challenge to the myth of "two Lenins" was a thinly disguised attack on the technocratic anti-humanistic ideology that prevailed in the late 1970s Soviet Union. I propose that Lenin was inspired by Hegel's dialectic throughout his life through Russian writers as well as Marx and Engels. Ilyenkov explains how Lenin's EmpirioCriticism embodied dialectical concepts that cannot be described as crude materialism. Finally I suggest that Ilyenkov's cri de coeur still stands as a call to the future as a foundation demanding further exploration towards a contemporary theory of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article seeks to delineate the often misunderstood idea of speculation that has conceptually been converted from an epitome of pure thought into an economic category of profitability and self-interest. But to define speculation already means to pose a problem. In Augustine speculation designates the mutual relationship between reflection and the mirrored appearance of God's gaze. This dictates an unattainable task of catching God's gaze, which is more inward than my innermost self and which models our thoughts accordingly. Such extimate activity as defined by Lacan is the formal condition for the construction of visibility and is inscribed into contemplation. The article postulates that this fundamental discrepancy was also the foundation upon which Hegel carved a positive determination of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Logos: A Journal, of Religion, Philosophy Comparative Cultural Studies & Art (08687692) is the property of Logos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In organization studies, the prevailing understanding of freedom has revolved around a specific concept of autonomy. However, we propose an alternative and normative concept of freedom, drawing inspiration from the philosophy of Hegel and a reinterpretation of his ideas by Robert Brandom. We begin by diagnosing the liberal conceptions of freedom as opportunity and autonomy that shape the predominant understanding of freedom at work within organization studies. We then follow Hegel and conceive freedom as the expansive realization of oneself through the commitment to meaningful constraints. In contrast to the dominant liberal notions of freedom, Hegel allows us to understand professional commitments and communal obligations at work as the medium of freedom. We argue that concrete freedom at work requires (a) that workers see their work as intrinsically valuable and (b) that neither they nor their employers are unconditionally free to define norms for how work is to be organized and pursued. We then demonstrate the theoretical implications of shifting from the liberal conceptions of freedom prevalent in organization studies to a Hegelian conception of freedom. The Hegelian theory leads to a more nuanced understanding of worker decision-discretion, motivation and the meaningfulness of work. Additionally, it has implications for research on bureaucracy and institutional logics. We end by considering the limits of the empirical applicability of our Hegelian theory, and by highlighting its normative value for practitioners and critical management scholars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite Hegel's thorough exploration of the interplay between politics, family dynamics, and the role of self‐consciousness in family processes, his work has been notably absent from discussions within family science and human development. This paper aims to bridge this gap by conducting a comprehensive review of Hegel's contributions, addressing historical issues, and presenting arguments for the relevance of Hegelian concepts in family research, including an overview of methodological possibilities. The paper begins with a concise introduction to Hegel's views on family and society, examining key theoretical concepts such as marriage and family capital. Following this, the discussion delves into the application of Hegelian notions of spirit and develops a list of family values based on my interpretation of Hegel's works. The conclusion underscores the importance of Hegelian thought, emphasizing its potential as an epistemological foundation for advancing family science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the so-called ‘irony debate,’ one of the most infamous polemics of modern intellectual history, G.W.F. Hegel accuses his German romantic contemporaries of being ‘nicht im Ernst’—not in earnest—with respect to irony. Given how this complaint is lodged alongside other, highly charged accusations (e.g. ‘hypocrisy,’ ‘absolute sophistry’ and ‘evil’), the unsurprising consensus among scholars today is that Hegel’s critique does injustice to the philosophically rich account of romantic irony. Acknowledging this vindication of romantic irony, however, I want to revisit and revise this criticism in a way that makes sense of the seemingly paradoxical claim that earnestness, rather than being the opposite of irony, is the very condition of it. Having clarified both the robust normativity of romantic irony as well as the specific shortcomings of Hegel’s critique in the first part of this paper, I then articulate what I call the ‘earnestness condition,’ or EC, according to which irony is in earnest when (a) it has substance, and (b) is grounded in its substance. Developing this account both advances a largely stalled scholarly discussion of the irony debate and develops a conceptual language useful for distinguishing between thick and thin kinds of irony in use today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I approach Hegel's philosophy under the banner of a "Keplerian Revolution", the implicit reference being, of course, to Kant's supposed Copernican philosophical revolution. Kepler had been an early supporter of the Copernican paradigm in astronomy, but went well beyond his predecessor, and so is invoked here in an attempt to capture some of the important ways in which Hegel attempted to go beyond the philosophy of Kant. To make these issues more determinate, however, Hegel's Keplerian orientation will not be presented in its contrast to Kant's "Copernicanism" as such, but as contrasted with that of another early follower of Copernicus, Giordano Bruno, and this Brunian orientation will be used to characterize Kant's philosophy as seen from Hegel's rival Keplerian point of view. Interpreting Hegel as a philosophical Keplerian will require that we broach those worrisome aspects of Kepler's astronomy, namely his support for Plato's cosmology and the tradition of the "music of the spheres", but this will be shown to have connections to Hegel's own approach to logic. This in turn will help shed light on the meaning of Hegel's form of idealism and, in particular, on its usually unacknowledged Platonic dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article features a leaked WhatsApp message to the British Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak. It was written by Mark E Avelli, a political consultant who sets out what has happened recently in the UK and how he suggests Sunak should act if he wants to remain unsuccessful. That sounds counter-intuitive but not when framed by the revolutionary political theory embraced by the consultant: success is rooted in understanding that victory is not to be acquired by saying and doing the right thing, but the opposite. Only when we understand that nobody actually wants political power and the responsibility that inevitably comes with it, do the actions of politicians make any kind of sense. Or for those keen on a short consulting takeaway to use in teaching political leadership: 'fail fast and keep failing'. The focus here is obviously on the UK, but for readers in other countries that are led or used to be led by similar leaders, this article provides an explanation for why we keep electing people who appear to have no idea what they're doing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commentators oft cite the rather grand claim that for Hegel there was no concept of individual personality, subjectivity nor personal autonomy in Ancient Greece. Hegel’s claim is either taken as orthodox and making sense in the Hegelian historical system as a whole and so little discussed; or is flatly ignored as the worst kind of metaphysical obfuscation; a response a little too comfortable for liberal thinkers. Neither reaction is entirely satisfying. Not enough attention has been paid to it, especially for the vast majority of social and political thinkers who would find it at least contentious, so the present paper aims to assert its significance both for Hegelian politics as a whole and to pay enough attention to it in order to make it very difficult for those who find it a contentious statement to continue to ignore it. One wants to ask what it might mean for one’s self-understanding to be so radically different that, as a human being, I understand myself as first and foremost (and perhaps completely) not as a subjective individual. It is conceptually very difficult to be a self-conscious individual -- in even a minimal sense -- without some idea of being an atomic, individual unit. It is the claim of the following argument that a full understanding of this distinction, between ancient and modern self-understandings, would lead to a revision of Hegel’s liberal credentials, though not entirely for liberal reasons.

Even if the present work has a purely critical-reconstructive approach to Hegelian thought in the various phases of his philosophical activity, it intends to show in detail the very close and intrinsic connection between the system and the concept of right both from a phenomenological and epistemic point of view. Since the beginning of Hegel's reflection, a close and repeatedly in-depth dealing with the juridical theme and in particular that of Person has been documented precisely because it represents the foundation of a 'substantialization' of the subject in its objectivity which finds in the will the constitutive moment of its same freedom. Alternatively, the subject would be inexorably relegated to the more or less natural indeterminacy of its own formal subjectivity without true content. At the level of secondary literature, based on what it has been possible to consult, it appears that the analysis has bene focused rather on the separate content of Recht's Hegelian concept and its articulations while the connection with the system has not been made at least sufficiently explicit and seems mantained rather in the background. As just hinted at, Hegel’s philosophy of right is a pivotal element inside his system and his theoretical evolution since his early thinking activity. Its concept is essentially what can be called ‘substance’, namely objectivity concerning the subjective finite subject and determining its real infinity, wherein its will by aspiring to it its will finds its authentic (initial) freedom. The concept of right is necessarily treated both phenomenologically so that the finite spirit experiences this juridical will in the Wirklichkeit of its apparent form, and epistemologically so as to present its true philosophical concept or idea inside the science of the objective spirit.

Panentheism and pantheism represent one of the most profound, even startling parallels across the world’s great metaphysical traditions about which the present article seeks to explore and carry out a comparative study of certain Eastern and Western philosophers with special reference to the views of two chief exponents of Advaita Vedanta of Indian philosophy, Shankara and Ramanuja. Both these terms, touch on the relation of God and the universe with the difference that the former seems to be rigid, motionless, and abstract and lacks a kind of religious fervor in its approach, while the latter is presumed to be concrete and palpable and seeks to reconcile philosophical thinking with the demands of religious feelings as well. God in pantheism is compared to the God of Spinoza, the Neutrum of Schelling, and Shankara's concept of indeterminate Brahman. In contrast, in the West Hegelian Absolute, and Ramanuja's qualified Brahman in Indian tradition, both are accredited with panentheism in which a personal God, identity-in-and-through-difference, has all auspicious qualities. Though these philosophers are from totally different temperaments and cultures, their philosophical method has certain similarities that have been examined in this work.

Does Hegel embrace pantheism? He faced accusations from his orthodox peers who adhered to Pantheism, a phrase that was commonly associated with atheism during his day. This study presents a counterargument to the assertion made by several contemporary orthodox contemporaries that Hegel is pantheistic. Hegel can be classified as a semi-pantheist. The manuscript is divided into three distinct sections. In the initial segment, I examine pantheism as posited by Spinoza, the pioneering contemporary pantheist whose contributions exerted a profound influence on other German thinkers, including Hegel. In the subsequent part, an examination of Hegel's pantheism will be conducted through an analysis of the concept of God or the Absolute. In the third section, an analysis is conducted on Hegel's notion of the features of the Absolute, and a comparison is made with Spinoza's God or Nature in order to ascertain if Hegel can be classified as a pantheist. It is believed that Hegel has a dissenting stance towards conventional pantheism, particularly that of Spinoza. Therefore, it can be inferred that Hegel's pantheism differs from Spinoza's. Hegel can be classified as a semi-pantheist.

In Paul Auster’s The Music of Chance and Mr. Vertigo, characters who resemble free individuals turn into slaves. In both novels, the major characters find meaning in life by willingly submitting to a superior power. Both characters who exhibit traits of passivity become slaves as they experience weightlessness or levitation. This article uses a qualitative approach and thematic analysis to identify and analyze the theme of slavery in the two novels. It explores Nash’s reliance on chance, his fear of freedom, and his potential for becoming a slave, and examines the relationship between master and slave in Mr. Vertigo from a liberal humanist point of view. This study is the first of its kind to explore the theme of slavery in Auster’s novels. Furthermore, it delves into the metaphoric meaning of levitation. While Walt and Nash appear as free agents, they are in fact slaves. Instead of clarifying the real imbalance in the relationship between the characters, the texts conceal and romanticize their master-slave associations. Paradoxically, the masters are portrayed as comic characters in The Music of Chance, and Nash feels free when he is imprisoned. Moreover, in Mr. Vertigo, the master who tortures Walt physically and mentally is portrayed as a father figure and a sympathetic character. The texts valorize weightlessness, passivity, and submission to a superior power, and thus can be considered reactionary.

The investigation into the foundations of social critique has increasingly gained importance in the tradition known as Critical Theory. In this context, I will analyze Lukács’ work, particularly History and Class Consciousness, to comprehend the foundation he provides for social critique, rooted in the adoption of Marxism as a method. I posit that the escalating disjunction between the critique of the object and the critique of theory is attributable to the deepening social fragmentation engendered by capitalist structures. This inherent characteristic underscores the imperative for a cohesive amalgamation of epistemic and socio-ontological critique. To elucidate Lukács’ model of critique, I will give particular attention to the chapter “What Is Orthodox Marxism?”. By doing this, I aim to elucidate Lukács’ assertion that the Marxist method facilitates a harmonious integration between the epistemic and socio-ontological dimensions of life, once it incorporates crucial categories such as historicity, totality, reciprocal action, and mediation. Furthermore, his method underscores the symbiotic relationship between some elements of the political economy and the German philosophical tradition, which shapes Lukács’ conceptualization of critique.

Este estudo busca esclarecer as teses sobre o Fim da Arte de Danto e Hegel, assim como a tese do Fim da História, articulando-as para proporcionar um diagnóstico do presente. Ao compreender a tese do Fim da Arte de Danto, é possível reexaminar o alcance de sua influência hegeliana. Além disso, entendendo a peculiaridade do Fim da História em Hegel, podemos reconsiderar a tese de Danto sobre o Fim da Arte. Assim, os fins com os quais estaríamos às voltas seriam indícios de que ainda não saímos dos confins da modernidade. Espera-se que a reflexão proposta permita apontar uma nova forma de pensar o futuro, tanto da arte como do mundo.

Este texto tem por objetivo investigar a leitura que Danto faz da estética de Hegel, principalmente de sua tese acerca do fim da arte. Danto reaplica o desenvolvimento histórico da arte narrado por Hegel em sua estética ao seu próprio contexto e vê, especialmente na arte pop, a realização da tese do fim da arte. Além disso, sua atuação crítica também é altamente influenciada pela estética hegeliana, na medida em que ele busca replicar o procedimento interpretativo de Hegel em suas análises. Contudo, apesar de seus méritos na compreensão da arte contemporânea, essa leitura de Danto é feita de maneira parcial, de modo a sustentar suas próprias teses, deixando de lado importantes implicações sistemáticas do texto hegeliano.

The present article tries to show the originality of Lukács’s theory of Actuality (Wirklichkeit) by comparing it with the same notion in Hegel’s Logic. It results that Lukács’s interpretation of Marxism and the Russian Revolution depends on a clear and independent theoretical position with regard to Hegel and his Idealistic theory of Modality. Particular importance is given to the new conception of the Dialectical interplay between the notions of Objective Possibility and Historical Necessity.

Germany’s content moderation law—NetzDG— is often the target of criticism in English-language scholarship as antithetical to Western notions of free speech and the First Amendment. The purpose of this Article is to encourage those engaged in the analysis of transatlantic content moderation schemes to consider how Germany’s self-ideation influences policy decisions. By considering what international relations scholars term ontological security, Germany’s aggressive forays into the content moderation space are better understood as an externalization of Germany’s ideation of itself, which rests upon an absolutist domestic moral and constitutional hierarchy based on the primacy of human dignity. Ultimately, this Article implores American scholars and lawmakers to consider the impact of this subconscious ideation when engaging with Germany and the European Union in an increasingly multi-polar cyberspace.

This essay focuses on the notion of “profound act” in the short story “Hegel y yo” (1971; Material de los sueños, 1974) by José Revueltas. In the first part, the protagonist’s discourse is analyzed in the light of the comparison between the Hegel-character (with whom the protagonist dialogues) and the Hegel-philosopher; it will be seen, then, how Revueltas’ Hegel is configured as an obscene reverse of the German philosopher. In the second part, the interpretation of the “profound act” will be complexified on the basis of the materialist interpretation that Vladimir Lenin and Louis Althusser make of Hegel’s Science of Logic. At the end of the analysis, it will have been demonstrated how the Revueltian notion of “profound act” alludes to a process that defines the perversion of historical becoming converted into the murder of difference which, as remembrance, always returns materially. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: In his work Mord – Selbstmord oder die Bildung des Selbstbewußtseins (Murder – Suicide or the Formation of Self-Consciousness), Wolfgang Loch analysed from a primarily philosophical perspective the psychological logic of a suicidal patient who was only by chance unable to carry out his suicide plan. The patient’s central problem was his dependence on an overpowering object (his mother), from which it seemed that murder or suicide were the only possible ways to free himself. It is in this context that I present the analytical psychotherapy of a patient whose inability to come to terms with her own life finally manifested itself in a persistent suicidal tendency from which there seemed to be no way out – any apparent progress in the therapy was nullified by a subsequent negative therapeutic reaction. After my own long and difficult inner process, at which point the idea of ending the treatment became concrete and I was able to talk about it, there emerged a kind of interval space between analysis and non-analysis. At some point after the decision to end treatment was made, she told me about an impulse she had had to murder a woman, which she then rejected in a state of complete shock. Afterwards, her torturous suicidal thoughts and impulses dissolved. My paper is an attempt to understand this experience in terms of the mental space opened up by Loch. Finally, I outline the end of the treatment and her separation from me in terms of her coming into the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The text examines the interconnection between tragedy, logic, and action in Hegel's works, notably in "Outlines of the Philosophy of Right." Hegel correlates tragedy with negativity and reconciliation, influenced by ancient tragedy and Christian consciousness. Tragedy serves as a means for self-knowledge, where negativity and death are pivotal in unveiling the spirit's truth. Hegel's philosophy is enriched by the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles, depicting the ethical crisis in Athens and the ensuing reconciliation of opposing ethical forces. Hegel identifies tragic elements in Christianity, a religion that perceives death and contradiction not as endpoints but transitional phases in reality. Christian religious consciousness, marked by finitude and sin, seeks reconciliation between the mutable and immutable. Hegel's practical philosophy is grounded in a distinctive ontological logic, with dialectics as a core element, not a function of subjective thinking but the animating essence of matter. The focus of the article is Hegel's stance on the manifestation and reconciliation of freedom, assessing the relationship between individual will and universal practical law. He critiques the limited legal perspective of individual freedom, advocating for a deeper, ethical interpretation of freedom. This view is distanced from common sense and consensus and rooted in speculative understanding developed through scientific and philosophical methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Tabayyun is the property of Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores the death of God narrative through the lens of kenosis, drawing insights from thinkers such as Marcel, Heidegger, Vattimo, and Girard. It investigates the implications of kenotic thought for contemporary religious and philosophical discourse, exploring various interpretations of kenosis, ranging from Altizer and Žižek's apocalyptic views to Vattimo's more hopeful perspective. Through critical engagement with these viewpoints, this paper advocates for a nuanced understanding of kenosis inspired by Hegel, one that bypasses both radical theology and excessive optimism. Methodologically, this study adopts a hermeneutic approach, analyzing key texts and engaging in philosophical dialogue. This paper concludes that rethinking kenotic thought could provide a robust framework for grappling with the death of God in the contemporary context, offering avenues for ethical reflection, social critique, and speculative renewal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to establish that capital punishment is not rational and cannot be rationalized without suicidally destroying the very ground on which lawful and rational punishment bases itself. It argues that in capital punishment, just as in any lawful punishment, the criminal is both held (humanly) rational and therefore culpable. But, unlike other forms of punishment, in capital punishment, the condemned is at the same time, held as irrational and irredeemable, beyond reform, and therein outside the ambit of rationality and humanity. In this sense a fundamental aporia is reached in rationalizing capital punishment because of the contradiction between the basis of punishment (the human as rational) and its operational logic (the condemned person as beyond reform therein irrational). Expressed another way, the judge proclaims a form of infallibility in their reasoning where the incorrigibility of the judgment is horrifically demonstrated and ironically reflected (and projected) in the incorrigibility of the condemned. This broad argument is pursued in two parts; one part interprets canonical texts such as Hobbes, Hegel and Foucault, while the second part interprets the Supreme Court of India's jurisprudence around the death penalty. While these are very different discourses it will be shown that they share much common ground in their expressing—and negotiating—the fundamental problem as described above. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Christa Wolf's Sommerstück (1989) through the lens of modernist utopian thinking and genre-theory. The novel challenges the common-sense definition of utopia as an imagined paradisiacal state and the idyll as an idealized vision of communal harmony, complicating the question of dwelling within a utopian idyll at the specific historical conjuncture that preceded the Mauerfall. Interrogating the function of fantasy and the structure of mirage in idealized moments of crystallization with reference to Jameson's opposition of idyll to utopia, the article contends that utopian impulses in Sommerstück aim to replace the harsh reality of East Germany through the idealization of the quotidian. Although lampooned by Hegel in the Aesthetics as lacking development and the many-sidedness of human interests evinced in epic poetry, the idyll is nonetheless positioned as the prosaic ground for romance and on a continuum with hybrid forms of epic. The article charts the temporal structure of development and progression inherent in the formalism of the genre in terms of the temporal structure of utopian striving. I first identify the temporal structure of idyll and utopia as outlined in the narrative. Of paramount importance is how the narrative, despite being rooted in a specific historical context, attempts to create a utopian vision of social relations as at once timeless and evolving. The shifting relationship between utopian ideals and a changing political reality becomes a focal point for thinking the inseparability of the idyllic from the utopian. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, anti-utopian elements of the negative ideal – the remnants of the old society of control and surveillance – were rendered more prominent to the observers of the divide. From a certain vantage point, then, one could say that the phenomenon of utopia is one of perspectival and spectatorial distance; it intersects with the idyllic mirage of a harmonious collocation in a state of innocence where different societal ideals and classes merge into indistinction. The article deepens the analysis of utopia by considering it within broader frameworks of genre-theory and German idealist thinking, suggesting that the quest for a perfect society may involve control, assimilation, and power struggles – dystopian themes highlighted by the novel when reread in light of catastrophe and a critical reevaluation of the meaning of dwelling at 'the end of history.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper engages with Slavoj Žižek's notion of the 'vanishing mediator,' by taking a closer look at his study of the Hegelian 'night of the world.' It specifically probes into the notion of the divine madness that becomes the 'Ground' for the sane, subjective God of The Bible to Word the universe into being. Following this, it proceeds to bring the aforementioned into discourse with Bloodborne, which, in one of its endings, presents the curious case of the next stage of human evolution, i.e., a transcendence into Godhood, which occurs during a similar night. The paper, in essence, presents a dramatic stage for this madness to play out in its reading of Bloodborne, while tracing its vestiges using a postsecular-psychoanalytical lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new avant-garde art of the mid-nineteenth century and beyond firmly rejected the old normative aesthetics as inadequate. It effectively addressed the theoretical gap by introducing manifestos and other public creative programs. Suddenly the obsolete aesthetics fell into a deep crisis and was forced to seek - through various new paradigms - a close, immediate contact with avant-garde artistic achievements. On this path of theoretical renewal, it has been moving faster or slower ever since. Aesthetics cannot exist outside the world of art. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I raise three questions regarding the status and function of Absolute Knowing in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. First, can Hegel’s Absolute Knowing be understood as an epiphany? Secondly, how does epiphany make sense of the teleological elements that activate and mobilise the movement towards Absolute Knowing? And thirdly, how does such an interpretation shift the focus from a closed reading of Hegel’s text – that views Absolute Knowing as consummately realised – to an open reading that keeps the Absolute within its purview, but also seeks to foreground its aporias? I pursue these questions through an examination of the key constituents of knowledge: the subject of knowledge, its object, and the process through which knowledge is attained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I analyze Hegel's interpretation of Plato's political philosophy (specially the Republic) in certain passages of two specific works: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts and Die Vorlesungen über Platon. I consider two axes of analysis: private property and subjective freedom. The main goal of the paper is to describe the relationship that Hegel establishes with Plato, or at least with the Republic. I show that this dialogue presents nuances with respect to the two axes mentioned and that these nuances imply differences of analysis regarding the Hegelian reading. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the foreword to the Science of Logic (WdL) from 1812. It answers the following questions: what is WdL about? What is the logic in the Science of Logic? Is the term "logic" just a substitute for "metaphysics" or, rather, is WdL the inception of a completely new discipline, quite different from metaphysics in the traditional sense? I reach the conclusion that, in WdL, logic is the development of the concept expressed as social freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Oftentimes, reality seems to us a chaos that we try to control with our theories. This article starts from the antithetic standpoint, inspired by Antonio Rosmini's works: reality is intelligible, and originates our thinking. From this perspective, any research that tries to reach the truth is determined by the real, not the contrary. Moreover, interdisciplinarity, far from being a solipsistic enterprise, aims at achieving truth and guaranteeing scientific advancement. Here, we analyze the distinctive character of Rosminian encyclopedism and his principles for preventing human errors. We then clarify why it is impossible to achieve perfection, and why such an impossibility is not problematic for the interdisciplinary dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The study concerns itself with the consequences of the view that liberal democracy is the conclusion to government form – as hypothesized by Francis Fukuyama in "The End of History?" Through examining the phenomenon of metarecognition, the ideological victory of democracy, that was seemingly evident in 1990, is sought to be explained as to how its totality was reversed. This reversal is a product of the reflective spirit interfering with the sought after effect of arguing for a specific government form. Recognition, as a previously desired symptom of undertaking an ideological identity, transitions into it's primary purpose. This shift in the nature of identity has seen authoritative and collective movements reemerge following the hypothesized conclusive paradigmatical shift to liberal democracy from the fall of the Soviet Union. The paper analyzes how liberal democracy has returned to equal footing with collective government systems in terms of satisfying the desire of recognition in an effort to understand the nature of future political development. The previous uniqueness of liberal democracy has become negated in its interaction with the human subconscious. Further political change must only then satisfy the condition of being modern in the sense of forcing a reflective spirit upon the individual.