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We revisit the notion of vicarious causation in Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) in order to first show that Harman has articulated two iterations of his account that are in tension with one another; one is found in his earlier paper “On Vicarious Causation,” while the other is contained in his later writings following the publication of Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything. This involves a critical assessment of his developing theory of metaphor in a way that encourages sympathetic revision in the service of improving his non-correlationist view of intra-objective relations.

Working in the framework of object-oriented ontology, Graham Harman claims that science strictly adheres to literal language as opposed to metaphorical language. In this article, I argue that such a distinction between literal and metaphorical language cannot be made cleanly in the context of contemporary physics. First, I identify aspects of scientific practice that point to non-literalism, which include non-linguistic elements of scientific discourse, the problem of interpretation of mathematical formulations of some theories, and the acceptance of incompatible theories that describe the same object. Second, I outline an argument that at least some theories in physics constitute complex metaphors based on Harman’s own definition.

Immanuel Kant is often conveyed as a Platonic or Newtonian thinker of the temporal, expressing time as an absolute and continuous repository wherein all objects occur. However, employing themes from his aesthetic writings, what happens when Kantian “sublime” time is reoriented towards a more discontinuous temporal register? This essay employs just such a reading, while also utilising Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), as a methodological device for rethinking both Kantian and object time as neither solely continuous nor discontinuous, but somewhere inbetween these two determinations, in what I term their “ontological ambience.” By doing so I offer a critique of both Kantian orthodoxy and Harmanian OOO, via a comparative analysis of (1) how Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger thematise Kantian temporality, and (2) how Harman develops their subsequent ideas about time. This schema provides post-Kantian philosophy with a provisional model for thinking posthuman time in new and productive ways: as ambient temporalities.

Graham Harman writes that the “basic dualism in the world lies…between things in their intimate reality and things as confronted by other things.” However, dualism implies irreconcilable difference; what Harman points to is better expressed as a dyad, where the two components imply one another and interact. This article shows that systems theory has long asserted the fundamental character of Harman’s dyad, expressing it as the union of internal structure and external function, which correspond exactly to what Levi Bryant, characterizing Harman’s views, refers to as the intra-ontic and the inter-ontic, respectively. After interpreting Harman’s dyad in terms of the ontology of systems theory, the article illustrates his dyad with a variety of examples, including conceptions about truth, ethics, value, and intelligence. The structure–function dyad is a spatial conception of a system as an object. It is usefully augmented with a temporal dimension, expressed in a third component or with an additional orthogonal dyad. Adding a temporal dyad to the structure–function dyad joins the idea of an event and/or process to the idea of an object.

Speculative Realism, New Realism or Postcontinental Realism is an eclectic current that comes to overcome the aporias and insufficiencies of continental philosophy from a perspective that could be attributed to the same problems as the idealist and constructivist perspective of continental philosophers. For the development of philosophy, it is important to engage in conversation with the authors of this movement. This article presents an approach to the successes and insufficiencies of the ontologies of two current authors such as Markus Gabriel and Graham Harman. The strengths and weaknesses of Markus Gabriel's neutral realism and Object-Oriented Ontology are presented, in this order. In the last section, by way of conclusions, the common points of the ontologies are pointed out and the idea of event is provided as a line of research that overcomes the aporias that emerge from the contrast between idealism and realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This essay aims to explore the impact of Object-Oriented Ontology (O.O.O) within the realm of pedagogy, critically examining its departure from humanistic and traditional paradigms. Simultaneously, it presents an alternative perspective on education that decenters the human as an inevitable ground. In a contrasting move, attention is directed towards Bruno Latour and Graham Harman, elucidating key facets of their ideas. This shift also signifies a departure from the conventional realm of “critical pedagogy”, as championed by Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire. However, it is crucial to acknowledge and appreciate the contributions and significance of Freire’s work. This essay adopts a left-wing stance, with no intention of launching moral attacks on Paulo Freire, as is sometimes witnessed when reactionaries and conservatives enter the academic arena. Criticisms within these pages focus on the content of Freire’s writings, tracing the trajectory from his seminal work, “Pedagogy of the Oppressed”, published in 1968, to his final piece, “Pedagogy of Autonomy” written in 1996. The aim is not to exhaust all arguments put forth by Freire but to engage with select ideas, since his oeuvre is extremely complex and full of different layers. It is essential to clarify that the critique presented here does not target the character of Paulo Freire but rather delves into some of the theoretical references behind the scenes, particularly the anthropocentrism associated with his ideas. Consequently, this essay emerges as an interdisciplinary endeavor, a conjunction between philosophy and social theory. What doors will this discussion open? What new field of possibilities awaits us? I invite you to dive into this debate, exploring the potential for an Object-Oriented Pedagogy (O.O.P) on the horizon.

The article aims to explore the ways in which scholars from Poland and Ukraine engage with Graham Harman’s philosophical work1 . The introductory part briefly describes Harman’s ontology and demonstrates the link connecting Harman with Polish and Ukrainian intellectual environments. Harman’s object-oriented ontology (OOO) states that objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality and cannot be reduced either to what they are made of or to what they do, that is, either to their constituents or to their effects. The connection with Poland and Ukraine goes back to the theory of objects suggested by the Polish philosopher Kazimierz Twardowski, whom Harman names among the predecessors of his ontology and who influenced both Polish and Ukrainian intellectual milieus. The next part of the article examines the history of the reception, identifying its key events and publications. The reception in Poland proves to be much more substantial than in Ukraine. A common tendency is determined: a conflation of Harman’s OOO and speculative realism by mistakenly ascribing the features of the former to the latter (broader concept), which suggests that speculative realism is being received through the lens of Harman’s project. The next part establishes the key discursive points that are used to map Harman’s ideas within the contemporary philosophical landscape. They can be summarised by the terms antianthropocentrism and antireductionism. The final part analyses the strategies for applying Harman’s theory showing that it can become the lens for interpretation and direct our attention to nonhumans and the hidden, inexplicable dimension of things or provide an ontological grounding for semi-literary and literary discourses. The methodology of this application, though, needs further development and clarification. Overall, in Poland, two of Harman’s books and two articles have been translated, and at least two books, one Ph.D. dissertation, and around two dozen articles discuss or apply his ideas. Apart from philosophy, his OOO is used for discussing literature, video games, films, humanities in general, education, management processes, antique studies, and ecocriticism. In Ukraine, one of Harman’s articles has been translated, and around ten articles and one collective monography engage with his philosophical project. Some of the Ukrainian works also apply Harman’s OOO in contexts that are not strictly philosophical, namely, in literary criticism, urban studies, film studies, and humanities in general. This paper can be of use to researchers studying OOO and its reception in different countries. In addition, it can help Ukrainian and Polish scholars who want to discuss or use OOO to familiarize themselves with the previous reception in their countries, thus facilitating domestic philosophical interaction.

The present paper compares the author’s original proposal called ecorhythmology with contemporary ecophilosophies. After briefly outlining the background and results of more than two decades of research, it examines the seminal theses of Object Oriented Ontology (Graham Harman), Action Network Theory (Bruno Latour) and the concept of being ecological (Timothy Morton) from an ecorhythmological perspective. Taking stock of interesting similarities and correspondences, this analysis also raises new questions, to which the author proposes different solutions. The paper presents two critiques of the reductionism of string theory and compares Harman’s theory of metaphor with the concept of art based on gestural resonance. Further investigations connect Latour’s redistribution of agency to the intersubjective relationship between the human and non-human, and relate hybridity to proximity. In the second part of the paper, Morton’s different temporalities are juxtaposed with rhythmic dimensions, and finally, the article makes a difference between the casual, political and ethical approaches to the phenomenon of tuning. The stakes are always learning and relearning what kind of contact making can lead to greater peace in difficult human – non-human coexistence.

Abstract Tim Ingold, while extending the radical undertaking of vitalism, with its Nietzschean matrix, puts the decentering undertaken by this philosophical tradition on a more solid foundation, opening up a new space of interobjective relations. Instead of an epistemic plunge into human categories, the goal is to move towards a broader ontological space, including other sites of meaning, such as chairs, spirits, animals, baskets, and many others. Unlike more classical anthropology, with its well-delimited Anthropos as an inevitable transcendental horizon, Ingold suggests a world where humans are not protagonists, but rather provisional negotiators within a large mesh of subjectless experiences. The model proposed in this essay distances itself from the plane of (neo)-Kantian speculation, converting its contours into something less orthodox by making room for a possible Object-Oriented Anthropology (O.O.A).

Graham Harman, an American contemporary philosopher, is the founder of object-oriented ontology (OOO). In his 2016 book, Immaterialism, he offeres a theoretical framework for studying social phenomena using OOO. According to this theory, the traditional distinction between subject and object is eliminated in favor of a more realistic vision, in which everything from human beings to animals and arti- ficial entities are 'objects' as far as they have similar stages of living: birth, maturity, decadence, and death. We tried to examine this theoretical framework in film studies by taking the film Dance with Me!, (2019, Persian: "Jahan, ba man beraghs!") as a study case. The methodology of this article is a description-analysis based on observations and library resources. In this paper, we try to sketch out how the film's protagonist, Jahan, as an object in his last stage of living, undergoes! actions and reactions to other objects (characters, animals, properties, etc.) to make sense of his life as a symbiosis.Immaterialism provides a framework to analyze things as they are, as well as their effects on other things. Unlike other theoretical frameworks used in film studies, such as Lacanian psychoanalysis, OOO's main goal is that the critic does not need to find events, accidents, or actions in the films to apply prior knowledge to them. In other words, while other methodologies try to confirm their own limits by abstracting them from the narrative, immaterialism lets audiences see what is deliberately conveyed in the narrative, even if it does not contribute to or amount to the level of dialectical progress of the narration. Dance with Me!, unlike "art movies" that are produced for global or western audiences, is a film that targets local cinemagoers in Iran. Its director, Soroush Sehat (1965), has a long experience in scriptwriting, direction, and acting in Iranian TV and cinema. In this paper, we take the characters as objects that interact in order to create momentum in the narration. Jahan (a Persian name meaning 'world', dropped out of the film's English name), is regarded as a thing at its last stage of life that has some important interactions with other things, from his family and friends to his domestic animals and properties. But, as its name suggests, the film is not simply a biographical drama about someone dying but instead it is trying to portray an improvised cinematic dance. Dormant objects, which according to immaterialism are things present before any interaction with other things, are considered in this paper to have great importance. Instead of trying to prove something or confirm some psychoanalytic realities, here we simply try to address dormant things that may have or not have obvious effects on the plot or the protagonist's consciousness but make a difference, provoke curiosity, and provide a spot in which metaphor becomes possible. So, while we care about what happens and how the narration goes on, we also have an eye on what remains dormant and escapes from the normative restrictions of cinematic narration in Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tim Ingold, while extending the radical undertaking of vitalism, with its Nietzschean matrix, puts the decentering undertaken by this philosophical tradition on a more solid foundation, opening up a new space of interobjective relations. Instead of an epistemic plunge into human categories, the goal is to move towards a broader ontological space, including other sites of meaning, such as chairs, spirits, animals, baskets, and many others. Unlike more classical anthropology, with its well-delimited Anthropos as an inevitable transcendental horizon, Ingold suggests a world where humans are not protagonists, but rather provisional negotiators within a large mesh of subjectless experiences. The model proposed in this essay distances itself from the plane of (neo)-Kantian speculation, converting its contours into something less orthodox by making room for a possible Object-Oriented Anthropology (O.O.A). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article deals with Graham Harman's object-oriented ontology (OOO). It explores the tensions in Harman's quadripartite notion of the object and how aesthetics provides an indirect mode of access to the object. This principally comes by way of metaphor and theatricality, the rift and transposition of the sensual from the real. A good illustration of these concepts can be found in Sofia Coppola's film Lost in Translation. Reading Lost in Translation through OOO, we can see the theory enacted, and understand how the of the spectator interacts with the film, the reader with theory. Through this aesthetic prism we can approach the both the object of the film and the theory even in the face of their very retreat. All objects, films, theories, and even this article, become lost in translation. Everything, in any relation, is condemned to mediation. Nevertheless, there are still remain intimations of the real to be had both beyond and through the sensual and literal. This article is an attempt to explore this relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Graham Harman's Object-Oriented Ontology prioritises aesthetics as first philosophy, and finds increasing interest from those working across art, architecture and the humanities in general. This article tests the application of Harman's ideas by applying them to a thorny issue related to the domain of serial art, and serially developed drawing in particular. The issue concerns the productive role of the beholder in constituting the serial artwork as a unified thing, wherein it appears manifestly deeper than the sum of its physical parts. Referring to an artwork produced by contemporary artist Stefana McClure, I build upon prior propositions on serial art put forward by Christy Mag Uidhir and Nicolas de Warren to make the case for seeing serially. This uses Harman's understanding of aesthetics to claim that imagined iterations constitute an integral element to serial drawing, brought into play when the beholder reflects upon the loose relationship between the array of qualities the artwork palpably presents and its withdrawn reality as a unified object. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the approach that sustains this entire essay, besides my own trajectory as a researcher, the path moves away from the orthodox tradition, the more Kantian one, incorporating in Social Theory a philosophical line for a long time forgotten, by including figures such as Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), the founding father, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and many others. They would be the famous authors of vitalism, also known as philosophers of life (Lebensphilosophie), philosophers of process, or philosophers of affect. What are the implications when these figures invade the field of Social Theory, which characteristics can be found and, mainly, which advantages when compared with their more orthodox side and their insistent commitment to Kantian philosophy and its transcendental by-products (power, culture, ideology, discourse, etc)? Following this and other questions, six points will be considered as representative of what we call here an Object-Oriented Social Theory (O.O.S.T.).

Desde inicios del siglo xx la filosofía parecía haber despachado la legitimidad del realismo, llamando a la descripción del mundo dentro de los límites de nuestra subjetividad. El agotamiento y los problemas de esta premisa filosófica han sido finalmente enunciados y señalados por el realismo especulativo. En el presente artículo mostramos de qué manera tres de sus representantes más reconocidos, Meillassoux, Harman y Gabriel, llevan a cabo esta tarea. Pero para evitar una posición ingenua, este realismo se expresa de forma especulativa, es decir, a partir de argumentos lógicos, matemáticos y abstractos que no carecen de problemas. Después de una breve exposición de sus filosofías, presentamos problemas centrales en ellas que se derivan de una falta de reflexión sobre los recursos lógicos y matemáticos que emplean explícita o implícitamente. Mostramos que la constante en todos ellos consiste tanto en un desconocimiento de las paradojas de autorreferencia que ponen en juego, como en la falta de una teoría de relaciones reales que explique las relaciones sujeto-objeto y objeto-objeto. Concluimos con una breve referencia a Fréredic Nef para mostrar qué puntos debería considerar una teoría general de relaciones.

Jason Schwartz's two books so far, A German Picturesque (J998) and John the Posthumous (2013), have garnered very little criticism, which is no wonder if as stated by Ben Marcus in his foreword to A German Picturesque, Schwartz's fiction "slips from apprehension" written as it is in "aphasic English cleansed of obvious meaning" (A. German Picturesque viii, ix). The overly descriptive nature of the prose might in part account for this, lending the books ekphrastic contours that deprive them of properly narrative contents. Yet, far from making Schwartz's books more transparent or immediate, this ekphrastic bias rather tends to obfuscate the texts, frustrating the reader's understanding as soon as the descriptive belies its own pretenses and artificiality. By radicalizing its ekphrastics, Schwartz's fiction enhances its own materiality, not to say ontology, and eventually foregrounds its brokenness, as it were. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the philosophy of Tristan Garcia to theorize about religion and to identify religion as an object without essentializing it (scientistic reduction) or reducing it to culture (as in critical theory). It proposes a radical speculative ontology for analyzing religion in opposition to late-liberalism's determining effects on the study of religion. In juxtaposition with Graham Harman's object-oriented ontology and Quentin Meillassoux's speculative philosophy, Garcia's philosophy offers a unique perspective about the irreduction of religion and classification within religious studies, especially through his philosophy of intensities. His perspective on the concatenation of human and nonhuman objects and their assemblages compliments and builds upon the current scholarship in material religion. In particular, his philosophy of intensities enables religion and religions to be dispersed into countless temporal instances and evaluated in limitless levels of intensity in a classificatory system set to avoid reductionism and neoliberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Veritas is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the approach that sustains this entire essay, besides my own trajectory as a researcher, the path moves away from the orthodox tradition, the more Kantian one, incorporating in Social Theory a philosophical line for a long time forgotten, by including figures such as Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), the founding father, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and many others. They would be the famous authors of vitalism, also known as philosophers of life (Lebensphilosophie), philosophers of process, or philosophers of affect. What are the implications when these figures invade the field of Social Theory, which characteristics can be found and, mainly, which advantages when compared with their more orthodox side and their insistent commitment to Kantian philosophy and its transcendental by-products (power, culture, ideology, discourse, etc)? Following this and other questions, six points will be considered as representative of what we call here an Object-Oriented Social Theory (O.O.S.T.). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article constitutes an extended review essay of Thomas Lemke’s book Foucault and the Government of Things: Foucault and the New Materialisms published by New York University Press in 2021. A shorter version of this article was published as a book review in Social Forces (http://doi.org/10.1093/soac037, 22nd April 2022). This longer extended version is being published here with the permission of Oxford University Press, who publish Social Forces. In performing this review, the article seeks to outline and assess Lemke’s thesis to incorporate Foucault as a part of the new materialist approach to the social and physical sciences. As my own work has located Foucault as a materialist since the 1990s, I relate Lemke’s endeavour to my own and conclude that my approach has distinct advantages that his lacks. At the same time, however, his account presents some novel and insightful dimensions which can profitably be added to mine, strengthening the case for Foucault’s materialism overall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conceptualization of the notion of subjectivity within the Anthropocene finds in Rosi Braidotti’s posthumanism one of its most explicit and profuse modulations. This essay argues that Braidotti’s model powerfully accounts for the Anthropocene’s subjectivity by conceiving the “self” as a transversal multiplicity and its relationality to the “others” and the “world” as non-hierarchized by nature–culture distinctions; however, by being ontologically grounded on a neo-Spinozistic monism, Braidotti’s model blurs the notions of finitude, agency, and change, obscuring the possibility of critical dissent while decreasing the overall theory’s consistency. An alternative ontological model capitalizing on these elements can be found in Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) and its notion of withdrawal. By associating OOO’s non-onto-taxonomical pluralism with Braidotti’s posthuman subjectivity, this essay aims at ontologically discretizing the latter in order to overcome these limitations. Grounded on this association and invoking a narrative imaginary propelled by the Greek terms xenos (guest-friend) and xenia (hospitality), the article paves the way for a form of subjectivity deviating from Braidotti’s ecological model and defined as xenological, arguing that, within the context of the Anthropocene, it constitutes an adequate alternative to Braidotti’s subjectivity.

This article constitutes an extended review essay of Thomas Lemke’s book Foucault and the Government of Things: Foucault and the New Materialisms published by New York University Press in 2021. A shorter version of this article was published as a book review in Social Forces (http://doi.org/10.1093/soac037, 22nd April 2022). This longer extended version is being published here with the permission of Oxford University Press, who publish Social Forces. In performing this review, the article seeks to outline and assess Lemke’s thesis to incorporate Foucault as a part of the new materialist approach to the social and physical sciences. As my own work has located Foucault as a materialist since the 1990s, I relate Lemke’s endeavour to my own and conclude that my approach has distinct advantages that his lacks. At the same time, however, his account presents some novel and insightful dimensions which can profitably be added to mine, strengthening the case for Foucault’s materialism overall.

This article mounts a defense of my and Slavoj Žižek’s co-edited anthology, Subject Lessons: Hegel, Lacan, and the Future of Materialism, against the two main criticisms of it made throughout Graham Harman’s article “The Battle of Objects and Subjects”: (1) that we and our fellow contributors are guilty of gross overgeneralization when we classify thinkers from various schools of thought – among them New Materialism, object-oriented ontology, speculative realism, and actor–network theory – under the broad rubric of the “new materialisms”; and (2) that despite our pretensions to the mantle of materialism, our Lacano-Hegelian position is actually a full-blown idealism. In responding to and attempting to refute these criticisms, I make the case that our Lacano-Hegelian model of dialectical materialism is an “extimate materialism.”

This is a largely theoretical essay that, in conversation with Graham Harman’s energetic view of objects and Ben Lerner’s idiosyncratic theory of poetry, articulates the basic tenets of a “flat aesthetics” and then moves on to tease out this aesthetics’ ramifications in terms of form, reading thereof, and politics. When the object’s ontological dignity is acknowledged, as flat ontology does, and further, when literature too is dealt with as an object whose “intransitive” objecthood is recognized, literary form, Moraru argues, no longer reflects an elsewhere, a beyond, or other transcendent place, meaning, or design. Instead, this form deflects clarifying light “prismatically,” illuminating other objects, the bigger ensembles into which they are arranged, as well as the potential for new arrangements and worlds. Drawing from Lerner’s Hatred of Poetry, the article’s closing segment explains how this potentiality is already embedded in form qua object and sprouts dialectically from the limits within which literary forms inherently coalesce.

Josiah Royce is remembered mainly as an absolute idealist. Through his confrontation with "Bradley's regress", this paper will show that he was actually trying to combine a bold form of monism with a pluralism of real, discrete individuals. His commitment to the actual infinite is used both to turn Bradley's regress into the generative mechanism of individuality within the Absolute, and to abolish the ontological difference between the Absolute itself and the individuals it contains. The "flat absolutism" resulting from this operation will be compared to the contemporary "flat ontologies" of Manuel DeLanda and Graham Harman, whose pluralism and commitment to "external" relations are shown to be just some of the ways in which a robust sense of individuality can be defended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of phenomenology's sometimes overtly antithetical relation to realism, recent literature in speculative realism draws heavy on phenomenological sources in order to strengthen its position. This article aims to look at Martin Heidegger's remarks on the relation between the human being and its world through the lens of Graham Harman's proposed litmus test concerning what constitutes 'real realism'. For a philosophical position to pass this test, a position must put object-object-relations on the same level as human-world-relations. With the help of Hans Jonas' theory of the meaning of metabolism, I will hold that Heidegger's own interpretation of his notion of care indeed places an all too restrictive emphasis on the human-world-relation, which unjustly excludes other living beings. However, while this means that animal-world-relations - or even amoeba-world-relations - should indeed be placed on the same level as human-world-relations, I see no evidence in Heidegger that suggests the need to broaden the scope further to include object-object-relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of the ongoing debate on the ontology of education, where instrumentally defined functions and aims are seen as external to what education is and the focus is on defining "the educational," Tomasz Szkudlarek explores a reverse route in an attempt to see, first, what is "the instrumental" before asking how it operates in education. He assumes that instrumentality may be an ontological phenomenon if we adopt a relational ontology where "things" are always and essentially related to other things, also functionally and instrumentally. To examine this path, Szkudlarek starts with Martin Heidegger's understanding of tools, also in its radicalized version proposed by Graham Harman, and contrasts their conceptions with the phenomenology of tools focusing on their aesthetic value. Through this juxtaposition, educational instrumentality appears as more complex and problematic than much of the current critique assumes, and tools appear as active and seductive elements of the educational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If someone asks a classical Social Theorist "how do you define your field of research?", he will probably get a flood of answers, with various shades, colors and even smells, but there is always something on the horizon, an insistent and unavoidable trace. Like any member of the humanities, he is supposed to study the behavior of humans and anything associated with them, right? So we are supposed to study things like language, culture, ideology, power, class, gender, and so on. It does not matter if you are a structuralist, pragmatist, or postmodernist, it does not even matter your background methodological choices, since there is always a humanism lurking in the epistemic shadows. The "human" in Social Theory, therefore, is not just a moving piece of matter, a simple primate walking around with its complex signs, but a transcendental structure, a kind of persistent and dangerous matrix, at least when used without caution. The aim of this essay is to map this displacement, its ups and downs, as well as to suggest all its unexplored contours, while bringing in the Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) of the American philosopher Graham Harman as a possible way out of what we call here "epistemic paranoia". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Este artículo busca traer a nuestro presente en marcha y a nuestra filosofía presente la pregunta de Arthur S. Eddington: ¿qué es una mesa? Usaremos la distinción sellarsiana entre imagen científica e imagen manifiesta (entre ciencia y mundo de la vida) para ver si se puede conseguir una reconciliación en clave ontológica. Para tal objetivo, traeremos a la discusión los planteamientos de Graham Harman, filósofo contemporáneo englobado dentro del realismo especulativo, cuya ontología pide una vuelta a los objetos mismos, alejándose de la clásica distinción entre sujeto y objeto. Nuestra principal aportación en este artículo es la de juzgar la pertinencia de lo que hemos denominado la solución tercerposicionista de Harman para dar una respuesta novedosa al problema de Sellars.

Dark theology as a theoretical approach emerged during debates on human rights and inclusion in Orthodox theology. It is realized at the junction of such disciplines as ecclesiology, political theology, philosophy, and social theory. It is based on the tools of object-oriented ontology (OOO), one of the branches of the philosophy of speculative realism. The author proposes a theoretical framework by which we can talk about God and supernatural entities as real objects included in public discourses through the collective imagination. The article discovers the basic theoretical (ontological, epistemological, and aesthetic) principles of dark theology as they apply to ecclesiology and political theology. Additionally, it discusses the existence of church dark actors who do not come within the field of vision of the theological mind (ecclesiology) illuminating ecclesial space. The author concludes by proposing a concept of reassembling the Church based on Bruno Latour's notion of the 'collective'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The empirical-transcendental debate in philosophy of technology, as debates go, took a turn toward the counterposing of the two perspectives, 'empirical'-pragmatic-pragmatist versus 'transcendental'-critical. Postphenomenology aligns itself with the former standpoint, and it is in this spirit that commentators have criticized it for its too-instrumentalist stance and lack of overarching, i.e., transcendental orientation. But the positions may have become too starkly delineated in order for the debate to reach any breakthrough: a seemingly unbridgeable gap yawns between the stances of 'technology with a small "t"' and 'Technology with a capital "T."' Is there any way to reorient the debate? In this paper I propose to do so by considering whether there would be some way of arriving from one end of the spectrum to the other—crossing the gap. Exploring the purported wasteland in between "technology" and "Technology" by way of object-oriented ontology (OOO)—Harman, Morton—we can find it actually filled with countless gaps, adhering to every thing. Following the radical insights of OOO, we'd have to attest to a 'thing-transcendentality.' The 'gap,' then, that seemed so threatening and all-encompassing, becomes smeared out, levelled down to a multiplicity of perspectives. And this casts the debate, with its purported strict tension between 'empirical' and 'transcendental' positions, in fresh terms, opening up new ways for studying how the two interrelate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aesthetic theory of Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) revolves around the concept of allure, a nonliteral experience of an object’s displacement from its qualities that draws attention to a deeper reality. But applying allure to aesthetic interpretation is hampered in two ways. First, OOO necessarily moves between the constrained viewpoint of experience and a more global perspective. Yet mixing these “inside” and “outside” views can risk ambiguity. Second, the phenomenological difference between the parts and qualities of an object must be clarified before Harman’s model of wholes and parts can be incorporated into OOO aesthetics. Addressing these two ambiguities will make it possible to further develop OOO’s resources for aesthetic commentary. For instance, one conclusion is that allure itself has two varieties: a tension between the object and its qualities (“allusion”) and a tension between the whole and its parts (“collusion”). These options parallel Harman’s twofold critique of reductionism. Another conclusion is that the literal needs an explanation within the framework of OOO insofar as it is a genuine feature of experience.

The ontological abyss that separates real objects from sensual objects is one of the central principles of Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO), which has its most explicit and profuse modulation in Timothy Morton’s notion of rift. This article argues that, despite succeeding in explaining the radical difference that inhabits every object, Morton’s rift fails to explain the object’s unification, rendering the overall theory inconsistent. An alternative approach that accounts simultaneously for disjunction and conjunction between essences and appearances can be found in Eugenio Trías’s philosophy of the limit, a term widely ignored in OOO despite its deeply non-relational conception of the reality of things. The article further argues that the reinterpretation of Trías’s twofold liminal approach in light of OOO successfully addresses the inconsistencies found in Morton’s rift, paving the way for a theory of limits within Harman’s ontological framework.

The primary aim of this essay was to elucidate the unique philosophical concept of “the non-interpretive”, which Masaya Chiba, one of the most prominent philosophers in East Asia, formulated mainly by bridging the theories of Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman, who have generally been reckoned as two of the most pivotal proponents in the contemporary philosophical movement dubbed Speculative Realism. In order to achieve the aim, the first part clarified the chief arguments and doctrines of Meillassoux’s Speculative Materialism and Harman’s Object-Oriented Philosophy. Thereupon, the second and main part investigated how Chiba invented the concept, what it precisely meant, and what insights it could offer for us. The concluding section summarized the chief arguments of this paper and sketched a worldview which we could adopt in order to survive the turbulent epoch of alternative facts and post-truth.

Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology has employed a variant of occasionalist causation since 2002, with sensual objects acting as the mediators of causation between real objects. While the mechanism for living beings creating sensual objects is clear, how nonliving objects generate sensual objects is not. This essay sets out an interpretation of occasionalism where the mediating agency of nonliving contact is the virtual particles of nominally empty space. Since living, conscious, real objects need to hold sensual objects as sub-components, but nonliving objects do not, this leads to an explanation of why consciousness, in Object-Oriented Ontology, might be described as doubly withdrawn: a sensual sub-component of a withdrawn real object.

Religion is often taught as a topic within culture and scholars have increasingly argued alongside J. Z. Smith's position that religion cannot be taught as a thing-in-itself. This essay not only challenges that assumption, but it also addresses how religion can be taught and understood as a nonhuman entity outside of thought and in-itself. Within the developing literature about material religion, this essay will use Graham Harman's object-oriented ontology to theorize about learning how one might teach religion as an agentic thing-in-itself. Harman's unique speculative philosophy enables teaching to embrace material religion and things as agents, while creating a framework of assemblages and a social ontology to express the modern academic nature of "religion." This is an argument for teaching religion as religion, while emphasizing diversity, pluralism, and the nonhuman world of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite exerting considerable influence on other academic disciplines and mainstream environmental thought, object-oriented ontology has attracted little critical engagement from academic philosophers as a philosophy in its own right. Here, I address one aspect of this oversight by exploring Timothy Morton's claim that "being ecological" – cultivating the anticolonial and nonanthropocentric mindset to disrupt environmental crises – requires an object-oriented purview. Working against the backdrop of the Anthropocene, I firstly reconstruct Morton's two main arguments for the power and ecological promise of object-oriented ontology. With some help from (eco)feminist theory, I then argue that, despite its radically nonanthropocentric façade, object-oriented ontology retains some problematic aspects of the dualistic thinking that it rightly pits itself against. More specifically, because object-oriented ontology retains the absence/presence binary of the subject/object dualism as one of its basic metaphysical commitments, it appears destined to perpetuate an insidious anthropocentrism by either fetishizing or collapsing the alterity of the nonhuman things it aims to rethink. Object-oriented ontology seems, therefore, poorly suited to the task that Morton sets for it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Object-oriented ontology (OOO) is a philosophy that asks us to step outside the human-centric view of the world to recognize that objects have realities of their own. Although we cannot directly access a thing-in-itself, we can still come to know something about it through an indirect access that Graham Harman suggests is provided by aesthetics, specifically the metaphor. In the metaphor, we step into the place of the object-in-itself (that withdraws) and experience a taste of its reality. This main purpose of this article is to show that the visual arts—specifically Haim Steinbach’s art works—offer a different way to know objects. Steinbach “arranges” found objects on shelves; this emphasis on “arrangement” raises questions about the nature of the space between objects. I argue that it is this space between objects (rather than the indirect contact with objects) that grants us some access to the thing-in-itself. By relating the spaces between objects to silence, I show that it is in these spaces that objects speak. In other words, the theatricality of the metaphor Harman privileges for understanding the object only exists in a silence that emerges from the spaces between objects.

One of the main criticisms of object-oriented ontology in its current formulation by Graham Harman is that it includes a notion of time that, upon closer inspection, renders the overall theory inconsistent. I argue that while this is indeed the case, Harman’s notion of time can be modified in a way that leaves the framework of object-oriented ontology intact. More specifically, Harman’s theory of time as a single surface tension between sensual objects and their qualities should be expanded into a theory of time as a twofold of related yet irreducible temporalities. Such a theory can already be found in Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense. I argue that much of the latter theory is already tacitly presupposed in Harman’s ontology, and show that the proposed modification successfully addresses the most salient criticisms that have been voiced at Harman’s notion of time.

This article begins by addressing a critique of my book Immaterialism by the archaeologists Þóra Pétursdóttirr and Bjørnar Olsen in their 2018 article “Theory Adrift.” As they see it, I restrict myself in Immaterialism to available historical documentation on the Dutch East India Company (VOC), and they wonder how my account might have changed if I had discussed more typical archaeological examples instead: wrecked and sunken ships, released ballast, deserted harbors, distributed goods, and derelict fortresses. In response, I argue that my account was not therefore non-archaeological, since ruins are the topic of archaeology only by accident: the real subject of the discipline is what Marshall McLuhan describes as “cold media,” in the sense that they are low in information. McLuhan’s distinction between hot and cold media is shown to be surprisingly analogous to Aristotle’s difference between continua and discrete substances, and some consequences are drawn from this analogy.

Philosophical critiques are prone to relapse into a sort of entrenchment in which the basic elements of a philosophy are kept from exposure, so that instead of advancing, philosophy easily becomes compartmentalized into specific trends. This article thus seeks the conditions of a non-entrenched, open-field philosophical critique in general and, in particular, of an open-field critique of Harman’s OOO (object-oriented ontology). For that purpose, the idea of precariousness is introduced, which is then confronted with some ideas concerning philosophical critique and practice, in particular those of François Laruelle. Since we can find in Harman’s OOO an outline of what we call here an open-field critique, the field of combat against Harman will be the one concerning the idea of an open field itself.

This essay looks to re-evaluate sculptor Richard Serra’s famous claim that “to remove the work is to destroy it.” Using OOO, and particularly Graham Harman’s interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s tool analysis, in order to analyze the now famous moment when Tilted Arc was de-installed from Federal Plaza, Manhattan in 1989, this paper argues that the work was not in fact destroyed but rather that its ontological autonomy was even more absolutely revealed in that moment as such. Although it is the case that art objects and sites are prone to discursive co-construction and evaluation, it is this analysis’ claim that they both are possessive of a deep, substantive form also, a form resistant to appropriation. Tilted Arc therefore revealed something even more insidious and dangerous to those who opposed it than the power of art to speak back to its surroundings. Rather, it uncovered the substantive objecthood of the site itself.