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Question 11 in Book 2 of John Buridan’s Questions on the Ten Books of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, concerns whether the good can be well divided into the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable. Aristotle, according to Buridan, claims that it can. But should we follow Aristotle in this respect? Buridan argues that we should not. In his view, the good is extensionally equivalent with the honorable, as well as with the useful and the with the pleasurable. But the relevant division is still important for our understanding of goodness, according to Buridan. He proposes a fitting attitude account of goodness. In its most general sense, the good refers to the desirable, that is, to that which is (or would be) a fitting object of desire. However, we can distinguish between three different ways in which things may be desirable: in themselves (in which case they are honorable), as means to some other good (in which case they are useful) and for ourselves (in which case they are pleasurable). On the substantive level, these always coincide. But that arguably does not follow from the more fundamental account of the nature of the good, according to Buridan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Social Sciences Research / Sosyal Bilimler Arastirmalari Dergisi is the property of ODU Journal of Social Sciences Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article asks the question "Why did Plato not write the 'unwritten doctrine'?" and answers it by citing a combination of two obstacles. The first derives from the limitations of the episteme available to an embodied soul about the essence of the good. Even if the dialectician has access to some kind of knowledge, the mismatch between the unchanging essence of the good and the precarious logoi which aim to identify it (and allow others some measure of access to it) can never fully be overcome. At best, Socrates (or Plato) can lead souls to an incomplete account of it: It is possible that even the most expert dialectician can only have a claim to knowledge, but no absolute certainty. Another obstacle lies in the audience or readership itself: No shortcut to understanding is possible, and yet a mere written presentation, which is all they have, is just such a shortcut, and so represents an empty promise. In memory of Charles H. Kahn (1928–2023), a letter of his from September 5, 1989, concerning the question "Why did Plato not write the 'unwritten doctrine'?" is published, along with some comments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle claims that cross-sense comparisons—that is, comparisons with respect to homonymous predicates—are impossible. At the same time, he uses such comparisons in arguments that are fundamental to his philosophical project, such as when he claims that happiness is better than instrumental goods. In this paper, I discuss how this tension arises, and I explain why the cross-sense comparisons Aristotle uses are nevertheless possible. Using evidence from the Protrepticus , I claim Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of comparisons: comparisons of degrees of a quality, and comparisons of the priority with which a quality applies. Only the latter admits of some cross-sense comparisons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to examine the problem of the possibility of value and the source of attributing value to actions in the context of the thought of the Ottoman scholar Shams al-DīnAhmad b. Mūsā al-Hayālī. The question of what is the approach to the issue of value in the Hanafi-Maturidi tradition vis-à-vis the Mu'tazila and Ash'arites is discussed with reference to al-Hayālī's views. al-Hayālī expressed his own thoughts in the commentary he wrote on his teacher Hızır Bey's ode called al-Qasīda al-Nūniyya. He especially examined the issue of husn and qubh in the interpretation of the lines of this ode: "Goodness and evil are religious, but / we say that they can be known by reason". In analyzing and interpreting his thoughts, Muhammad 'Umar b. al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Jalīl b. al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Jamīl al-Baghdādī al-Hanafī’s work titled alHawāshī al-Futūhiyya li-Sharh al-Nūniyya and Mehmet Emin Uskudārī's work titled Hāshiya 'alā Sharh al-Hayālī 'alā alQasīda al-Nūniyya are used. Ash'arites claimed that knowledge of value is not possible for humans and accepted that the source of our knowledge about good and evil is religion. Mu‘tazilite thinkers, on the other hand, associated good and evil with the essence of actions or with the attributes found in the essence of actions. Some Mu‘tazilite thinkers, such as the al-Jubbā’ī stated that the context and conditions in which actions are performed are also important in attributing value. Regarding value, Hanafī scholars from Bukhara stayed close to the Ash'arite understanding of value, while Māturīdīs stayed close to Mu‘tazilite ideas. Although Māturīdīs accepted that religion gives information about good and evil, they claimed that the value of some things could be known through reason. In our study, it has been shown that al-Hayālī’s basic approach is in favor of al-Māturīdī’s understanding of values. Attention has been drawn to the similarities between the Mu‘tazilite and Māturīdī scholars regarding the meanings of good and bad attributed to actions. It has been explained that good and evil have three meanings. First, goodness means that a person's deeds are praised in this world and rewarded in the afterlife. Evil means being blamed in this world and punished in the afterlife. Secondly, good is what is fit for purpose, and bad is what is not fit for purpose. This also means that good is what is beneficial and bad is what is harmful. Thirdly, good is an attribute of perfection and evil is an attribute of deficiency. For example, knowledge is good because it makes people more perfect. Ignorance is bad because it leaves man in a deficient and low state. According to Mu'tazila, the goodness and evil of everything can be known through reason, while according to al-Māturīdī the goodness and evil of some things can be perceived through reason. In this context, Mu'tazilite and Māturīdī thinkers criticized the arguments of the Ash'arites, who accepted that religion is the source of value knowledge that necessitates responsibility. The article also discusses the relationship between the source of value and the liar paradox which arises from the combination of truth and falsehood in a single sentence. Believing that there is a solution to the liar paradox, al-Hayālī stated that al-Māturīdī’s understanding of value can be justified through this solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the soul's capacity to see God. This is the process by which a human subject can apprehend and define the nature of God on a philosophical and theological level. Two conceptually very close philosophers, Plato and Dionysius the Areopagite (pseudo-Dionysius), highlighted this metaphysical function. The article will look into light as a concept of the mind and an expression of God's nature. For Plato, God is the visible light, whereas for Areopagite, it is the invisible light. At the conceptual level, "God" will eventually combine the Platonic (Form of) Good(ness), or the "Good", with the Christian God, perceived and defined as Goodness, beauty, perfection, and virtue. In attempting to know God, the soul follows an ascending or descending path, and the concept of negation will play a crucial role in this metaphysical and theological function. It will eventually be shown that the Good is the essence of God and, at the same time, what defines his unique singularity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant’s philosophy directly addresses theological issues, one of which is the question of love for one’s neighbour. Its philosophical interpretation makes it possible not only to soften the rigorism of Kantian ethics, but also to resolve some of its characteristic paradoxes and to clarify the question of the concrete application of the categorical imperative. The article considers, in particular, the “paradox of method” used by Kant to define good and evil: evil is defined as reason’s abuse of its own freedom. It is precisely because of this understanding of evil that confidence in the moral quality of one’s own judgment becomes impossible. Kant even strengthens this point by introducing the notion of conscience as a self-judging reason, the latter being the strictest judge, whose verdict will always be accusatory. In order to avoid such undesirable conclusions, which leave no hope of justification in the face of the moral law, Kant introduces the concept of love for one’s neighbour as “a necessary addition to the imperfection of human nature”. True, such love, according to Kant, is impossible in respect to all people. But it is its presence in relation to some that allows us to overcome our own imperfection. Love for one’s neighbor precisely means voluntary recognition of the objective imperfection of one’s own subjective judgment about the morality and reasonableness of other people. And this recognition itself allows a person to rise to a moral height that would otherwise be inaccessible. In interpreting Kant’s ethics and, in particular, his concepts of reason and judgment, the author of the article relies on the concept of Joseph Simon, one of the leading modern German scholars of Kant studies in recent decades.

It is shown that over a fairly significant period of time, a group of scientists of Vinnytsia National Technical University under the program of the research laboratory “Problems of the Higher School” (SRL PHS), which was created by a joint order of the rector of the VNTU, Academician of the National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine Borys Mokin and the director of the Institute of Pedagogical Education and adult education of the National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine, Academician of the National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine Ivan Zyazyun, research was carried out of the processes of knowledge assimilation by the students of higher education institutions, which they received from teachers during lectures and practical classes in certain educational disciplines. A selection of scientific publications dedicated to the modeling of processes of forgetting information obtained by the students at lectures and practical classes, which was published during 2010-2021, is presented. It is shown that thanks to these studies, the “H. Ebbinghaus forgetting curve”, known to psychologists was initially expanded to “forgetting bands”, and the mathematical model of the process of forgetting information, proposed in L. M. Prysniakova’s monograph “Systemic analysis of personality behavior”, published in Dnipropetrovsk in 2007, supplemented by a synergistic component transformed to each of the six “forgetting bands”. A method of identifying equivalent mathematical models of the upper limits of the “forgetting bands” for people with excellent, good, average, bad and very bad memory synthesized in the previous works of the authors has been developed. Python programs to implement the developed method of identifying the upper limits of the “forgetting bands” for people with excellent, good, average, poor and very poor memory were created. An algorithm for assigning specific people to one of the “forgetting bands” defined by the authors for people with excellent, good, mediocre, bad and very bad memory is proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to the study of such a unique phenomenon in corporate relations as trust. The author argues that the primary task in business relations is the intention of the parties to make the relationship trust-based through an agreement, to consolidate efforts, and to model jointly the relations with other shareholders (participants) of a corporation who are not parties to such an agreement, and with the company itself, that corresponds to the essence of corporate entrepreneurship. The article examines the approaches to the definition of fiduciary duty in the practice of courts in common law countries. The author focuses on the fact that in the countries of the Anglo-Saxon legal family of common law, both the legislator and the court as a law enforcement body systematically and consistently adhere to the position of not defining or even singling out qualifying features and describing fiduciary relations. The author substantiates that the recent attempt of the national legislator to enshrine the concept of fiduciary duty in the legislation on improvement of corporate governance through the same evaluation categories (good, fair and effective governance) does not contribute to legal certainty, but will have the opposite effect - it will give rise to corporate disputes and lack of uniformity in practice when resolving them by a court. It is argued that a corporate agreement forms the solidarity nature of relations between the parties to such an agreement. The author examines the understanding of the category of «trust» in economic science, its vision by leading foreign and domestic economists as a factor influencing investment inflows, efficiency of a business entity and the country's economy as a whole. The article gives reasons why it is inexpedient to understand, in particular, a limited liability company exclusively as a capital association. The author analyses trends in the business environment regarding the role of trust in business development and crisis management. Based on the study, it has been concluded that a corporation is interested in ensuring the stability of its shareholders, preserving personal trust (fiduciary) relations between the shareholders, and the regulation of relations between them may be determined, among other things, by a corporate agreement. It is concluded that trust is a constitutive element of a corporate agreement which forms the solidarity character of relations between its parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accurate knowledge and correct analysis of the thoughts and opinions of Islamic sages are dependent on identifying the contexts and factors of the emergence of thoughts and their effectiveness from the wisdom of their predecessors. Anthropology is one of the wisdom heritages of ancient Iran, whose essence can be seen in the opinions of Muslim sages and their philosophy (Masha philosophy, Ishraq philosophy, and philosophy of Sadra). Therefore, the philosophical analysis of good and evil in the field of anthropology is based on the meaning of good and evil in the wisdom of ancient Iran, which was very important in order to confirm the truth of this statement. In the present study, the authors analyze and apply the philosophical foundations derived from good. There is evil in Iranian wisdom with Islamic wisdom. The result is proof of the existence of common philosophical points in the historical application of Iranian, Ishraqi, and Sadrai ruling bases. Commonalities include the commonality of the concept of good and evil (light and darkness), the existence of human agency and his free will in finding good and evil, and the fact that angels are examples of good and demons are examples of evil. This is complete proof of the historical course of the thought of good and evil in terms of ontology and epistemology from Iranian wisdom to Sad [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Cases of divorce are on the increase across societies and within the Pentecostal churches. Pentecostal church doctrine disapproves of divorce, and the people experience discrimination consequently. Despite the overall impact divorce has on the spiritual well-being of the victims, Pentecostal churches do not provide sufficient support to them. Objectives: The objectives of the study were to explore the lived experiences of divorced people in Pentecostal churches and the impact divorce had on their spiritual well-being. Method: A qualitative phenomenological design was utilised. The study recruited six divorced people, three pastors and 24 men and women from three Pentecostal churches. Purposive and snowball sampling were used to select the sample. A thematic content analysis was used to analyse data. Results: The study revealed four major effects that divorced people face such as psychological and emotional effects, social effects, spiritual effects and economic effects. Conclusion: The study’s findings unearthed the impact that divorce has on the divorcee’s spiritual well-being. Although the Bible disapproves of divorce, some research indicates that divorce may have positive outcomes in some instances, and therefore, it should not always be viewed negatively. Contribution: The findings of the study would possibly assist Pentecostal church leadership in coming up with effective interventions that can support divorced members in the church.

Un hombre de pensamiento agudo y humilde, que siempre escuchaba la realidad, así era B. Häring. Nunca encerrado en un sistema rígido, ha dejado que su reflexión evolucione y se mantenga al día. Este dinamismo del teólogo Redentorista es evidente para quienes estudian sus obras ordenándolas cronológicamente. Uno de los temas claves en los que se revela un pensamiento en evolución es la conciencia moral, objeto de estudio de esta contribución. El punto de partida del análisis es el Manual La ley de Cristo, donde ya está presente una visión de conciencia dinámica y "responsable". En su posterior maduración, también a la luz de las indicaciones del Concilio Vaticano II, Häring combinará el tema de la conciencia con los puntos centrales de su pensamiento: la libertad, la responsabilidad y la fidelidad creativa, proporcionándonos una interesante descripción de este lugar interior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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What is it for a judgement, action, or character state to be itself a good thing, so genuinely worth pursuing? Readers of Plato's Republic discover that that it is by standing in the right relation to the Form of the Good that other things are, or become, good. In her recent monograph, Plato's Sun-Like Good, Sarah Broadie inverts the standard interpretive strategy by focusing primarily on the role of the Good in dialectic, and drawing conclusions about its metaphysical status on that basis. In this paper, I argue that the metaphysically radical features of the Good on her reading – that it is undefinable and not an object of knowledge for the guardians – are ultimately undermined by her full account of the Form, in particular of the way that it endows 'the things known' with their reality, as well as relating to its participants as participand. I also argue that her preferred interpretation of the guardians' objects of knowledge in the sun-analogy as action-types is conceptually and textually problematic, and should be rejected in favour of her dispreferred - yet ultimately deeply insightful - interpretation of these objects as Forms that the Good makes known and fully real. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Tikrit University for Humanities is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This research aimed to ascertain the prerequisites for the advancement of the slow food movement in Iran. Employing both quantitative and qualitative methods, it adopted a descriptive and survey-oriented design. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 experts well-versed in the extension of slow food, employing a snowball sampling technique. The interview data underwent coding and analysis employing open coding, axial coding, and selective coding methods. The study encompassed experts and managers in agricultural extension and education across the nation. For statistical analysis, a structural equation model and confirmatory factor analysis were employed, utilizing SMART PLS 3 and SPSS 26 software. The goodness-of-fit index (GoF) was utilized to evaluate the comprehensive validity of the research model. From a qualitative perspective, six primary facets of the slow food model emerged: 1. Extension strategies in harmony with slow food principles; 2. Methods of extending the slow food movement; 3. Supportive policies for slow food propagation; 4. Intervening conditions; 5. Causal conditions (triggers and applications) of the slow food paradigm; and 6. Outcomes resulting from the adoption of the slow food ethos. These facets collectively comprised a total of 38 sub-components. Through analysis of the structural equation model, key facets with substantial operational weight and significant influence on the promotion of slow food were identified. These prominent components encompass disease prevention, the organization of festivals and exhibitions, the revision of laws, the shaping of individuals' lifestyles, the enhancement of food tourism capacity, and the optimization of human resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considered the correlation between freedom, conscience, and self-fulfillment. The analysis began with the properties of human action and how action differs from happening. The primary theme was an exposition of freedom which lies at the root of “man-acts.” The fundamental meaning of freedom is self-dependence, but there is a deeper meaning. Freedom is independence from the objects of choice that is achieved by rising above oneself (vertical transcendence) to choose the bonum honestum, the true good that fulfills the self. Freedom, therefore, ultimately depends on truth and especially on moral truth that is apprehended by conscience. Conscience transforms that normative truth into concrete duties that objectivize the bona honesta. Only when someone follows a moral duty understood and accepted as such can he reach the summit of freedom and authentic self-determination.

This paper aims to present the specific functioning of the emotion of hatred from the point of view of the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of emotions. This perspective is particularly relevant to the issue at hand because of its holistic and integral view of understanding human beings, including their emotional functions. In this paper, I consider the issue of the emotion of hatred in relation to other emotions against the backdrop of the structure of human action. When analyzing how hatred functions, I consider the notion of good and evil, which are linked to emotions and acts of will that play a vital role in the sphere of emotions. By correctly channeling one’s will towards the good, one is able to notice hatred arising within, and thus reflect upon it. Understanding how the emotion of hatred functions is essential for further research into how it is expressed.

This article explores the soul’s capacity to see God. This is the process by which a human subject can apprehend and define the nature of God on a philosophical and theological level. Two conceptually very close philosophers, Plato and Dionysius the Areopagite (pseudo-Dionysius), highlighted this metaphysical function. The article will look into light as a concept of the mind and an expression of God’s nature. For Plato, God is the visible light, whereas for Areopagite, it is the invisible light. At the conceptual level, “God” will eventually combine the Platonic (Form of) Good(ness), or the “Good”, with the Christian God, perceived and defined as Goodness, beauty, perfection, and virtue. In attempting to know God, the soul follows an ascending or descending path, and the concept of negation will play a crucial role in this metaphysical and theological function. It will eventually be shown that the Good is the essence of God and, at the same time, what defines his unique singularity.

Aristotle opens the first chapter of the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics as follows: "Every art and every inquire, and similarly every action as well as undertaking, seem to aim at some good. Hence people have right defined that the good is that at which all things aim". The article indicates and elucidates the difficulties found in the quoted statement on the basis of translation and commentary by Sebastian Petrycy of Pilzno. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research stems from the importance of taking care of the Qur'anic terminology, because it helps to reflect on the Qur'an and benefit from it, as well as to ward off any problems that occur. Among the terminology in this: the term imams, and it means: everyone who is followed and advanced in matters is right or wrong, and when it passes through the listener This term is thought - often - that it refers to the imams of goodness only, and I have made it clear that it enters into the call to good as well as evil, The research dealt with the Quranic expressions that share the meaning of imams or leadership and presidency and what is going on in their meaning, and who are the imams of good in the Qur'an, and who are the imams of evil, and what are their purposes and the consequence of their call. And I concluded that the term imams means the Prophet sent, as well as his follower, and the leaders of disbelief may be called their masters and followers. Places, and I recommended in the conclusion of the research to warn young people from the leaders of evil and their imams, because this era and what was widespread in it of following falsehood, one of its effects was the concealment of the advocates of evil and their imams under the names of an accident and attractive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sets out to investigate the modal uses of the lexeme hɒ3 'good' in the Jidong Shaoxing variety of Wu and to reconstruct its grammaticalization pathway. Modal meanings of hɒ3 include circumstantial possibility, deontic possibility and necessity, and epistemic possibility. These meanings can be summarized as 'can', 'may', and 'should', respectively. The modal meanings of hɒ3 are derived from its meaning of 'fit to' rather than 'good'. We propose here that hɒ3 first extended to express circumstantial possibility, and then further extended to denote deontic modality and participant-internal possibility in two separate directions: (i) circumstantial possibility > deontic modality, and (ii) circumstantial possibility > participant-internal possibility. The epistemic use of hɒ3 is proposed as the final stage of the lexeme's modal extension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Humanities Journal of University of Zakho (HJUOZ) is the property of Humanities Journal of University of Zakho and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The digital revolution has led to growing smart goods, which today have become an important economic and social element. This has prompted the European Union to lay down provisions on the basic elements of the sale of goods, including material conformity of digital goods, in order to make the most of the existing capacity and economic growth of its member countries. The issue of material conformity of goods with the contract has always played a central role in domestic and international sales transactions. The mentioned directive, contrary to the domestic laws of most countries, provides a single concept of goods conformity and implements the same performance guarantee in case of non-conformity. But in Iranian law, there is no specific regulation on the subject of goods conformity, and it sporadically provides subtle distinctions on the subject of goods conformity, which has caused differences between lawyers and court opinions, and as a result, the lack of development of cross-border transactions. Therefore, the purpose of the present study is to determine the seller's obligations regarding the material conformity of digital goods with the contract by examining the aforementioned instructions and to analyze this situation in Iranian law. These studies showed that in the sale of digital goods, the subjective and objective requirements of conformity, in addition to the physical component of the goods, must also be present in its digital component, and the seller is committed to providing updates. However, there is no explicit text in this regard in Iranian law, but traces of these requirements can be found in scattered laws.

Predestination, good and evil, human responsibility, and mission. The background of this article is the challenge that Paul deals with in Romans, namely predestination and the reference to good and evil in theology. It seems as if God ordained good and evil. God is, however, holy and totally good. Sources by Augustine, Calvin, Weaver, Van de Beek and others highlight the questions in this regard. The central implications of the cross of Jesus, as well as the issue of human responsibility are extremely relevant in this regard. The objectives are to give a sound theological evaluation of the question of good and evil from the perspective of reformed theology in interaction with Scripture. Interaction with Scripture and theologians leads to a literature study and thereafter exegetical, hermeneutical and systematic theology issues are addressed. The results established that different positions are taken, but God is just and not the author of sin. This implicates a clear view on mission: reject sin and turn to God. The conclusions are: God is holy, but all mankind should reject evil and accept that God is the fountian of good. Mission is the act of the Triune God (missio Dei) in Jesus Christ, through the Holy Spirit, to lead sinners from darkness to God. The good in Jesus Christ, by his death on the cross and in his resurrection, overcame evil. Contribution: The article illuminates the issue of good and evil in a new way and offers insight into its significance for the mission. This has significance for the current missiological engagement.

Rawls regarded the priority of the right over the good as the characteristic feature of Kantian constructivism. I have four goals in the paper. First, I try to refute Rawls's reading of Kant on the relation between the right and the good. Second, I fill out Kant's picture of the rational natures that have intrinsic value: They have the law of duty within, are predisposed to respect themselves and others who have the law of duty within, and belong to a community of rational natures. Third, I argue that because Kant thought that the right and the good were coeval, he is not a constructivist, but a kind of realist. Finally, I use my examination of the good, the intrinsically valuable in Kant, to reject any temptation to regard his ethics as dependent on his teleological claim that human nature is the end of nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Hare argues that Kant, in his Third Critique, offers an aesthetic argument for God's existence that shares premises with his famous moral argument. Karl Ameriks demurs, expressing skepticism that this is so. In this paper, I stake out an intermediate position, arguing that the resources of Kant provide ingredients for an aesthetic argument, but one distinctly less than a transcendental argument for God or an entailment relation. Whether the argument is best thought of as abductive in nature, a C-inductive argument, or a Pascalian natural sign, prospects for its formulation are strong. And such an argument, for its resonances with the moral argument(s), can work well in tandem with it (them), a fact not surprising at all if Kant was right that beauty—in accordance with an ancient Greek tradition—exists in close organic relation to the good. More generally, along the way, I argue that the sea change in Kant's studies over the last decade or so should help us see that Kant is an ally, rather than foe, to aesthetic theodicists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we want to show truth and beauty as good, as they are characteristics that are identified with being, that is, transcendental; reveal some characteristics of the perfect being in imperfect entities. This is possible from the thought of Thomas Aquinas, because God, who is the one who creates, in doing so transmits something of his own being to his work; just as the artist is reflected in some respect in his work. In the case of God, this reflection is called vestige, and has an analog character. However, it allows a rational incarnated creature to discover it through the contemplation of the universe, which transforms creation into a hierophanic phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In my study, I investigate some questions related to Plato’s discussion of the origins of Evil in the individual’s soul and of the possible solutions to the presence of Evil in it. The lack of the correct equilibrium between the parts of the soul exposes the individual to the moral degeneration; conversely, exclusively the correct equilibrium between the parts of the soul leads the individual to the correct composition between the parts of the soul. In particular, exclusively the development of the rational part of the soul, and its consequent leadership over the other parts, brings the individual to the right formation of the soul. The development of the rational part of the soul will not come about by itself: it needs an appropriate education, which can be reached only after a long and difficult process. The development of the rational part of the soul can be reached only through the disciplines preparing the philosophical education and through the philosophical education itself. The development of the rational part of the soul brings the individual nearer to the dimension of Being, thus opening for the individual a new dimension of experience, of knowledge and of life. At the same time, the philosophical education diminishes the attention of the individual’s soul for the dimension of Becoming. The cultivation and strengthening of the rational part bring about a progressive diminution of the force of the other parts of the soul, in particular, of the appetitive part of the soul. I concentrate my analysis on passages of Plato’s Republic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Towards the end of the 20th century, the word "solidarity" became one of the most important and famous words, not only in the sphere of Euro–Atlantic civilization but the word was also readily used in political milieus. In the religious sphere, and especially in the Judeo–Christian tradition, the anthropological, ethical as well as biblical sense of this important concept was emphasized. This sense was recalled in the postulate: Bear one another's burdens. Never one against the other, but always one and the other, one together with the other. In this day and age, solidarity as a source of inter-human hope poses a real challenge and task for us because we are experiencing such great migrations of people who—for a variety of reasons, frequently very painful ones, and among them the devastating ravages of war—leave behind their places of residence and go into exile. In my study, I will try to show how, in the contemporary world of philosophy and socio-political changes, a modern sense of the concept of "solidarity" has been generated. In order to achieve this goal, I will refer to the anthropological and ethical thoughts of two Polish philosophers—Karol Wojtyła and Józef Tischner. It was these two thinkers who introduced us to the contemporary school of solidarity, reminding us that the fulfillment of solidarity still lies ahead of us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Er(r)go: Teoria, Literatura, Kultura is the property of Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Slaskiego and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Lubelski Rocznik Pedagogiczny is the property of Maria Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)