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Populists’ ideological opposition to global governance is well recognized, yet whether and how these actors systematically undermine international organizations (IOs) remains unclear. We argue that a keymeans by which populists warp global governance is by distorting scientific information, which is necessary for global responses to many public health and environmental issues. Populists are motivated to withhold or misreport scientific information due to their anti-elite, pro-state sovereignty views. Using new data on the source and quality of information provided to IOs, we find that populist leaders are significantly less likely to provide scientific information to these organizations than other types of leaders. When they do offer such data, it is less accurate than the information supplied by other sources. Our findings suggest that populism may stymie international institutions’ ability to govern in areas of pressing international concern.

Global governance of artificial intelligence (AI) must grapple with four monumental challenges. AI is a tough problem to govern given the speed, scale, and uncertainty of its progress. Various aspects of the AI problem require governing because of the range of benefits, risks, and impacts on other global issues. Multilateral efforts on AI are nascent, as is national-level policy. And the multilateral system is under immense pressure from institutional gridlock, fragmentation, and geopolitical competition. No one global governance model for AI is perfect, or desirable. Instead, policymakers must pursue several governance models, each starting in a targeted and focused manner before evolving. They must make clear what policy outcomes are being sought and which institutional functions are needed to reach those outcomes. AI governance within regional and multilateral issue-based groupings would commit nations to action and test models for governing AI globally. And national champions will be critical to success. This pragmatic yet optimistic path will allow humanity to maximize the benefits of artificial intelligence applications and distribute them as widely as possible, while mitigating harms and reducing risks as effectively as possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2015, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS), formalizing an agenda for positive youth participation in peace and security. However, youth peace activists have been leading peacebuilding long before this institutional recognition. This article explores the dynamics of how advocates and institutional actors conceptualize and negotiate compromise. To do this, it draws on in-depth interviews with youth and adult YPS advocates, a critical analysis of documents related to the agenda, and extended participant observation. It explores and develops a notion of a field of youth-oriented peacebuilding, drawing on Bourdieu. This makes visible a more complex field of struggle, showing how compromise can help explain how youth actively negotiate their participation in formalized agendas and persist in their own peacebuilding ambitions. It argues for a more nuanced understanding of compromise to understand the affordances and limitations of youth agency and institutional agendas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The liberal world order is showing signs of disarray: two recent catastrophes in adjoining parts of the world (the Middle East and South Caucasus) have opened the fissures of the international governance gap; and the continuing ramifications of COVID-19 have already paralysed the world. On top of this post-pandemic disquietude, multiple conflicts this year are either in danger of precipitating or wars have already re-ignited over long-standing continuing conflicts, highlighting the failure of international governance institutions, including the UN system. In recent years, one of the central responses to the multilateral failures at multiple levels has been for states to form ‘narrower’ and ‘more flexible’ frameworks called ‘minilaterals’. Thus minilateralism has been contrasted through the lens of receding multilateralism, which has been a long-standing hallmark of the American-led liberal international order. This paper examines how far global governance would be dependent on minilateralism by exploring this growing trend in the Indo-Pacific and explores how minilateralism models can enhance international governance structures. This paper also attempts to analyse whether minilateralism is a product of regional fragmentation, or whether it can reinvigorate the comatose multilateralism. Then this paper posits that minilateralism helps rejig the chaotic multipolar order and thus re-invent global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article suggests that the business sector's engagement in climate governance is not only expanding but also providing them with an increasingly influential role in determining how climate risks are framed and addressed. Using the methodological tools provided by the poststructuralist hegemony and discourse theory, the article analyses how the World Economic Forum has framed climate change as a security issue through its Global Risks Reports and what forms of authority and practice are promoted by this understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This inaugural article delineates the vision and scope of the new section "Qualitative Comparative Policy Studies" of the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. The co-editors present the five key features of the section: the comparative, the transnational, the relational, the global, and the self-reflective. Concretely, they invite contributions on qualitative empirical research that (i) is comparative in its methods and interpretive framework, (ii) draws on the transnational dimension, (iii) considers the relational dimension of network governance, (iv) recognizes an unequal global setting, and (v) is self-reflective and interrogates international comparison as a governance tool. By definition, qualitative comparison is contextual comparison that differentiates between place and space and the temporalities of comparative policy analysis (period, timing, tempo, sequence, lifespan, and age). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarly attention to China's domestic experimentation and control measures applied to its population (e.g. the Family Planning Policy and Zero-Covid) has expanded. So, too, has the popularity of the Foucauldian concept of biopolitics, which refers to political strategies of governing based on a population's biological features. However, China's biopolitical rationales for its growing participation in global governance (全球治理 quanqiu zhili) beyond its borders have received less attention. This research focuses on the Arctic, a region where China does not claim territorial sovereignty but has significant involvement, to examine the Chinese state's exertion of biopolitical control over its outbound tourist population. Drawing on a review of policy texts and media reports, complemented by observations at an Arctic conference held in China and three field visits to the Arctic in 2018–2019, we show how China's interventions in Arctic tourism seek to transform Chinese tourists into a productive, self-disciplining population who practice and promote state logics of social and environmental responsibility. The paper contributes to the understanding of tourism governance in frontier regions with geopolitical significance, as well as the modern state's exterritorial power over its own citizens even when they are beyond its sovereign territory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a widespread belief among scholars and policy-makers that populism has fuelled a unilateralist backlash because of its emphasis on nationalism, popular sovereignty and identity politics. Although a few populist governments have indeed withdrawn from some international institutions, this 'disengagement hypothesis' needs to be scrutinized and unpacked. In this article, we develop a framework that distinguishes between four types of institutional disengagement—criticism, obstruction, extortion and exit—and show that populist governments use them in a fluid and tactical way to navigate between the radical and pragmatic imperatives of populist politics. Our comparative case-study of the Hungarian executive under Viktor Orbán (since 2010) and the Trump administration in the US (2017–2021) demonstrates that both governments have frequently used criticism, obstruction and extortion to disengage from international institutions but have only rarely exited from them. The article thus deepens our understanding of the impact of populism on both individual institutions and the multilateral order more broadly, and helps policy-makers develop strategies to counter the adverse effects of populism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proliferation of new and more diverse number of actors in the space industry in recent decades has created a more complex, decentralized, and unpredictable global governance of the space system. In the contemporary era, space activities are conducted by a diverse multitude of actors, engaging in a multiplicity of interactions across a variety of levels and arenas. Although there is a substantial body of literature addressing the global governance of space, few of these works have analyzed the multilevel governance of the current space system. The primary hypothesis of this research is that the governance of the space system has become more fragmented, decentralized, and distributed across multiple levels or arenas. This research emphasizes the necessity of utilizing systems approaches and an International Relations (IR) perspective to analyze the global governance of the space system. Therefore, the primary objective of this research is to examine the key characteristics of the 21st-century space system using a multilevel governance framework (MLG) and to assess the relevance and implications of each level. This paper contributes to the emerging field of global space governance by applying a MLG framework to the space system. The result is a comprehensive, multilevel analysis of the contemporary space system, identifying, describing, and explaining the role of the space actors in various levels of analysis (international, regional, national, and subnational). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) evolve? Cooperation through IGOs is difficult to maintain, as membership dynamics change dramatically over time, leading to dissatisfaction with the status quo. This paper argues that IGO members states create new affiliated bodies, which I call linked intergovernmental organizations (LIGOs), to "re-contract" their cooperation. This helps IGOs adapt to changing membership dynamics, including the addition of new members and shifting constellations of power and preference. LIGOs are particularly useful for weak or formerly weak states seeking to alter the institutional status quo. Several features of LIGOs incentivize their creation: (1) they bypass difficult-to-enact reforms at existing IGOs; (2) flexible design features increase the voice of dissatisfied constituencies; and (3) they are politically viable for dissatisfied and status quo members of IGOs. To test my argument, I analyze original data on 1,200 LIGOs created between 1945 and 2012. Multivariate statistical analyses show that LIGOs are created in response to shifting membership environments that create demands for change at existing IGOs. I complement the quantitative analysis with case studies of two significant LIGOs: The International Development Agency (IDA) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). My theory suggests a dramatic rethinking of how international cooperation evolves and has broad implications for global governance in an increasingly multipolar world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UN-orchestrated Triple Nexus – a multilateral endeavour to provide humanitarian-development-peace responses in fragile and conflict-affected contexts – embodies several features of the emerging trend towards governance through regime complexity. Praised for its multi-actorness inclusivity and cross-policy experimentalism, the Nexus approach has been criticised as an attempt to replicate top-down, neo-liberal templates to govern crises in the peripheries. We analyse the new evidence provided in this Special Issue, connecting it to the debate on the future of multilateral governance, against the decline of the Liberal International Order (LIO). Guarding against naïve expectations of the Nexus as a panacea to bridge cross-policy gaps and bring about inter-agency cooperation amidst increased geopolitical tensions, we discuss its potential to become a venue for an enlarged conversation among traditional and new players. While also compatible with pluralist scenarios, a progressive variety of the Nexus may well emerge in the UN context, between Western and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) players. Their shared understandings of civil and political rights offer a promising avenue to advance some forward-looking Nexus components, supportive of individual and nature-based rights, to govern the increased complexity of the current multiplex order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bellagio Group for Accelerating AMR Action met in April 2024 to develop the ambitious but achievable 1–10-100 unifying goals to galvanize global policy change and investments for antimicrobial resistance mitigation: 1 Health; 10 million lives saved; and 100% sustainable access to effective antimicrobials. High profile political goals such as the Paris Agreement's objective to keep global warming well below 2° Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels, UNAIDS' 90–90-90 goal, and the Sustainable Development Goals challenge global norms, direct attention towards relevant activities, and serve an energizing function to motivate action over an extended period of time. The 1–10-100 unifying goals propose to unite the world through a One Health approach to safeguard human health, animal welfare, agrifood systems, and the environment from the emergence and spread of drug-resistant microbes and infections; save over 10 million lives by 2040 through concerted efforts to prevent and appropriately treat infections while preserving the vital systems and services that depend on sustained antimicrobial effectiveness; and commit to ensuring that antimicrobials are available and affordable for all, used prudently, and secured for the future through innovation. Compared to existing technical targets, these unifying goals offer advantages of focusing on prevention, encouraging multisectoral action and collaboration, promoting health equity, recognizing the need for innovation, and integrating with Sustainable Development Goals. By committing to 1 Health, 10 million lives saved, and 100% sustainable access to effective antimicrobials, we can protect lives and livelihoods today and safeguard options for tomorrow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how the distinction between complicated and complex education systems contributes to our understanding of global governance and how "soft power" concerned with gender is used in international development organisations' responses to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4, the global goal for education. Four global governance approaches which shape these organisations are distinguished: partnership building, gender mainstreaming, gender activism and contestation by global feminist movements. These strands of soft power have implications for how meanings of gender, education, power and accountability are interpreted. The work of three organisations – the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), the Gender at the Centre Initiative (GCI) and the Malala Fund – are reviewed to exemplify these global governance approaches. The analysis draws on a close reading of the organisations' published documents to build a history of how the gender concerns of SDG 4 came to be interpreted, negotiated, contested or ignored. The activities of the three organisations show considerable interplay between concepts of complicated and complex education systems. The discussion raises questions regarding what kind of work soft power in gender and education does in a context of huge and growing global inequalities and insecurities. In addition, the question is posed why there is still no institutional base to articulate a global feminist politics which confronts and seeks to dismantle unjust structures of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study interrogates how one of the least-studied regional intergovernmental organisations, the African Union (AU), operationalises or recontextualises the global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the process of developing its post-2015 education and development strategies. Employing critical discourse analysis and drawing on multidisciplinary theories, the author examines the emergence of the SDGs in Africa and the strategies used to make them hegemonic. The analysis indicates that the AU positions itself as an emerging education policy "node" negotiating between global development discourses and African needs and challenges. The strategies that the AU uses highlight potential issues in global governance. On the one hand, the AU positions itself as a victim of the unfair power relationships in global governance, by which international organisations and powerful economies maintain their institutional, structural and productive dominance. This seems to keep the AU "at bay" when it comes to decision-making at the global level. The AU consequently vows to become more critical and assertive, and to forge inclusive and fair relationships with its global partners. On the other hand, post-2015 African development strategies seem to benefit from global norms and make repeated references to scientific knowledge, expert ideas and best practices from the Western world. Overall, then, in order to carry out its role as a continental policy node vis-à-vis global expectations, the AU employs two apparently conflicting strategies: adoption and adaptation. These interpretations of the SDGs add more salience to both consensus and conflict-driven theories of global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Voluntary national reviews (VNRs) are an important component of the follow-up and review process for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Presented by countries at the annual United Nations High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), VNRs detail a country's self-reported progress to peers. This voluntary process has been criticised for its weak accountability. Global governance literature, however, points to an increase in these "soft" governance mechanisms as well as the potential strategic benefits of this approach. Using a mix of logistic regression and document analysis, this study examined VNRs as a soft governance tool and a reflection of the governance mechanism of the SDGs. The authors examined the scope and content of VNR submissions from 2016 to 2022, with a deeper review of 2022, which focused on the global goal for education (SDG 4). Three types of soft governance – governing by goal-setting, by numbers and by morality – were used as lenses to make sense of the results. The authors' findings demonstrate the ability of soft governance tools to bring together diverse actors around a broad set of goals, and how the power of numbers can influence which indicators countries report on in their VNR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The World Bank has been called the most influential organization in education reform globally. Not only is it the single largest funder of education for international development, but it also produces knowledge, circulates discourse, and structures policymaking processes in ways that extend its influence far beyond its primary role as a bank. However, while much literature has been produced about the World Bank, the field of education lacks a systematic discussion of what has been reported about how the World Bank influences policy formation at the country level. Through the conduct of a theoretically informed systematic literature review of 70 publications, this article clarifies and provides examples for the numerous ways that the World Bank influences policy formation. In all, the article documents 11 pathways through which the World Bank influences policymaking. The article concludes by suggesting areas where research on the World Bank can be improved, namely, through more explicit attention to the theoretical and methodological approaches employed. The goal of this review is to encourage scholars to be more specific in their conceptualizations and discussions of World Bank influence, to go beyond general claims of policy imposition or agenda shaping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many contemporary efforts to govern global challenges are driven by combinations of numbers and futures. This special section proposes the novel concept of 'quantified futures' as a way of grasping this widespread entanglement. Because existing scholarship has largely treated quantification and futurisation as discrete governing technologies, their intersections have remained undertheorised and underexplored. In this introductory article, we discuss similarities between quantification and futurisation to build an integrated analytical framework that outlines how quantified futures operate across transnational policy domains by shaping the salience, scope and urgency of global challenges and their solutions. The special section at large cautions against overly optimistic expectations regarding the capacity of quantified futures to tackle global challenges. Rather, it underscores the need to enquire into the mutually reinforcing effects between, on the one hand, the growing use of quantified futures and, on the other hand, the increase and diversification of global challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, the OECD has gradually shifted its governing mechanism from promoting 'best practices' based on comparative data on pupils' cognitive skills to actively advocating for individual and collective well-being as an alternative and ideal future. This article focuses on the OECD's use of 'techno-scientific fictive scripts' as a strategy to promote happiness and well-being as solutions to anticipated crises, despite their conceptual ambiguity and token usage. It analyses how the OECD's recent 'Future of Education' projects have sought to steer its audience towards shared concerns and expectations of the future, while simultaneously asserting its technical expertise in future studies methodologies. It argues that by returning from endorsing data-driven policies to making futuristic claims using future studies methodologies, the OECD endeavours to redefine itself as both a pathfinder and a problem solver, simultaneously blending its human capital imperatives with technological inevitability in its vision of the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional concepts of legitimacy that often focus on a right to exercise coercion or a right to create moral obligations are not applicable to many political institutions. In particular, many global governance institutions rely on ways of providing governance that do not involve coercion or the creation of moral obligations. That is why this paper develops a novel concept of legitimacy as the right to function. This more general concept of legitimacy is able to help us make sense of many references to the term 'legitimacy´ in academic or practical-political debates that cannot be explained by traditional concepts of legitimacy. In addition, the use of the concept of legitimacy as the right to function opens up the conceptual space to accommodate important insights with respect to the normative criteria of legitimacy in global governance. For instance, as global governance institutions fulfil very different functions it is plausible that the criteria of legitimacy for different global governance institutions are not the same because in judgments concerning their legitimacy different rights are at stake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analysed the involvement of the G7 and G20 clubs in the settlement of international conflicts in 2020-2024 to identify discrepancies between the declared intentions and practical achievements of these forums. The study was found significant differences in the approaches and effectiveness of the G7 and G20 in peacekeeping. The G7, due to its more homogeneous composition and strong economic leverage, has demonstrated greater effectiveness in the short term, especially in responding to acute crises such as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. On the other hand, the G20, with its wider representation, has shown the potential to have a more systemic impact on global security in the long term by focusing on economic development as a means of conflict prevention. The analysis of approaches and tools revealed that the G7 relies more on economic sanctions and political pressure, while the G20 focuses on economic cooper- ation and development. Both clubs face challenges in reaching consensus and achieving ambitious goals, especially in the context of complex geopolitical conflicts. The study revealed a considerable gap between rhetoric and practice, especially in the areas of conflict resolution, counter-terrorism, and climate security. Declarative statements are often not backed up by effective actions, partly due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms and the need to reconcile diverse national in- terests. The results point to the need to rethink the role and working methods of the G7 and G20 in the context of current global challenges. The study proposed a more flexible and adaptive approach to peacekeeping that would account for both short-term crises and long-term stability factors. The significance of strengthening coordination between the G7 and G20, as well as with other international organisations, to achieve a synergistic effect in conflict resolution was emphasised. Understanding the potential and limitations of these international forums in the field of peacekeeping allows developing more effective strategies of state cooperation to overcome crises

Abstract The Bellagio Group for Accelerating AMR Action met in April 2024 to develop the ambitious but achievable 1–10-100 unifying goals to galvanize global policy change and investments for antimicrobial resistance mitigation: 1 Health; 10 million lives saved; and 100% sustainable access to effective antimicrobials. High profile political goals such as the Paris Agreement’s objective to keep global warming well below 2° Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels, UNAIDS’ 90–90-90 goal, and the Sustainable Development Goals challenge global norms, direct attention towards relevant activities, and serve an energizing function to motivate action over an extended period of time. The 1–10-100 unifying goals propose to unite the world through a One Health approach to safeguard human health, animal welfare, agrifood systems, and the environment from the emergence and spread of drug-resistant microbes and infections; save over 10 million lives by 2040 through concerted efforts to prevent and appropriately treat infections while preserving the vital systems and services that depend on sustained antimicrobial effectiveness; and commit to ensuring that antimicrobials are available and affordable for all, used prudently, and secured for the future through innovation. Compared to existing technical targets, these unifying goals offer advantages of focusing on prevention, encouraging multisectoral action and collaboration, promoting health equity, recognizing the need for innovation, and integrating with Sustainable Development Goals. By committing to 1 Health, 10 million lives saved, and 100% sustainable access to effective antimicrobials, we can protect lives and livelihoods today and safeguard options for tomorrow.

The introductory paper sets the stage for the research essays in the special issue. It provides an overview of the concepts of minilateralism and the context in which minilateralism has become an alternative form of collective action by states in the international arena, in particular in the Indo-Pacific region that has emerged as the new centre of gravity in world politics. How has minilateralism become a prominent feature of inter-state cooperation in the early twenty-first century, and how is it often used to complement (and in some cases, even substitute for) traditional international organisations, which are based on more liberal and inclusive multilateral norms and principles, but suffering from functional deficits? In a world of more diffuse power, how can minilateralism offer states an expanded toolset for pursuing their policy preferences and advancing their interests? At the same time, the paper also highlights the potential negatives of (or challenges to) minilateralism, including difficulties emanating from a narrowly framed agenda that perpetuates certain narratives, a leadership vacuum that could emerge from non-hierarchical arrangements, and questions about how to achieve support and legitimacy with low institutionalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Industrialism has produced enormous societal resources but its unequal distribution is largely responsible for widespread poverty. To make use of the societal wealth, the divorced financial, man-made, natural and human capitals have to be reintegrated, leading to more equitable global development. Such a transition is confronted with existing power structures and they must be questioned from a holistic perspective given the accelerating globalization toward a global entity. Historical experiences demonstrate that competition among nation-states and between capitals leads to the destruction of societal wealth and the emerging global entity enforces endogenous political and economic cooperation. Reducing hierarchies between financial, productive and human capital and their reintegration is bound to lead to a vigorous augmentation of human capital. Democratization within financial and productive capital will increase the productivity and creativity of human capital. As nation-states have lost influence, the development of human society rests on global democratic governance, which strongly modifies the inherited Bretton Woods Agreements and needs a Global Constitution based on human rights and democracy.

Il presente articolo esamina due indicatori giuridici predisposti dalla Banca Mondiale al fine di misurare annualmente il clima degli investimenti di tutti i Paesi del globo: l’ormai cessato Doing Business Reports (attivo tra il 2003 ed il 2020) e il nascituro Business Ready Project (la cui prima edizione sarà pubblicata nel settembre 2024). In particolare, il saggio mira a verificare se e in che misura, nella progettazione del nascente B-Ready, la World Bank sia stata in grado di mitigare i problemi e le inesattezze che hanno caratterizzato la vita e l’attività (nonché decretato la fine) del suo predecessore, i Doing Business. Da tale confronto, che si focalizzerà sugli elementi centrali e fondamentali delle due iniziative, sarà facile notare che le innovazioni introdotte nei B-Ready sono per lo più formali, e che ben poco è cambiato in termini di obbiettivi, argomenti misurati, strutture metodologiche e misure a salvaguardia dell’integrità rispetto agli antichi Doing Business. Al di là del superficiale rebranding, pare dunque ragionevole attendersi dal B-Ready un’influenza, un modo di operare e dei difetti assai simili a quelli che fino ad oggi hanno caratterizzato i Doing Business. / 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑒: 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 2003 𝑎𝑛𝑑 2020) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 (𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑏𝑒 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 2024). 𝐼𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟, 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑦 𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑤ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵-𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦, 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑤𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑎𝑠 𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑑) 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟, 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠. 𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛, 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠, 𝑖𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑏𝑒 𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵-𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠, 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑠, 𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝐷𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠. 𝐵𝑒𝑦𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑖𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵-𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦 𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝑎 𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠.

This article addresses the issue of discontinuity in the context of the multilevel nature of global governance and the relationship between the determinants of continuity and the sustainability of (sub)regional institutional arrangements. The main purpose of the discussion is to better understand continuity disturbances in the Weimar Triangle. These disturbances are expressed not only in fluctuations in the cooperation levels within the Triangle, but also in increasingly long periods of institutional inertia. The study is based on the assumption that the main reason for the disturbances in the continuity of the Weimar Triangle is the suboptimal emulation of the operating algorithms developed in the G7, that is, the sequences of principles, practices, and knowledge that Germany and France had internalized through their long-term socialization in the G7, and then transferred to the subregional level in order to ensure adaptability and receptiveness in the functioning of the Weimar Triangle.

Abstract Introduction The wildlife trade is an important arena for intervention in the prevention of emerging zoonoses, and leading organisations have advocated for more collaborative, multi-sectoral approaches to governance in this area. The aim of this study is to characterise the structure and function of the network of transnational organisations that interact around the governance of wildlife trade for the prevention of emerging zoonoses, and to assess these network characteristics in terms of how they might support or undermine progress on these issues. Methods This study used a mixed methods social network analysis of transnational organisations. Data were collected between May 2021 and September 2022. Participants were representatives of transnational organisations involved in the governance of wildlife trade and the prevention of emerging zoonoses. An initial seed sample of participants was purposively recruited through professional networks, and snowball sampling was used to identify additional participants. Quantitative data were collected through an online network survey. Measures of centrality (degree, closeness, and betweenness) were calculated and the network’s largest clique was identified and characterised. To understand the extent to which organisations were connected across sectors, homophily by sector was assessed using exponential random graph modelling. Qualitative data were collected through semi-structured interviews. The findings from the quantitative analysis informed the focus of the qualitative analysis. Qualitative data were explored using thematic analysis. Results Thirty-seven participants completed the network survey and 17 key informants participated in semi-structured interviews. A total of 69 organisations were identified as belonging to this network. Organisations spanned the animal, human, and environmental health sectors, among others including trade, food and agriculture, and crime. Organisation types included inter-governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, treaty secretariats, research institutions, and network organisations. Participants emphasised the highly inter-sectoral nature of this topic and the importance of inter-sectoral work, and connections were present across existing sectors. However, there were many barriers to effective interaction, particularly conflicting goals and agendas. Power dynamics also shaped relationships between actors, with the human health sector seen as better resourced and more influential, despite having historically lower engagement than the environmental and animal health sectors around the wildlife trade and its role in emerging zoonoses. Conclusion The network of transnational organisations focused on the governance of wildlife trade and the prevention of emerging zoonoses is highly multi-sectoral, but despite progress catalysed by the COVID-19 pandemic, barriers still exist for inter-sectoral interaction and coordination. A One Health approach to governance at this level, which has gained traction throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, was shared as a promising mechanism to support a balancing of roles and agendas in this space. However, this must involve agreement around equity, priorities, and clear goal setting to support effective action.

Abstract Background There are only two major statements which define alcohol policy development at the global level. There has not been any comparative analysis of the details of these key texts, published in 2010 and 2022 respectively, including how far they constitute similar or evolving approaches to alcohol harm. Methods Preparatory data collection involved examination of documents associated with the final policy statements. A thematic analysis across the two policy documents was performed to generate understanding of continuity and change based on comparative study. Study findings are interpreted in the contexts of the evolving conceptual and empirical literatures. Results Both documents exhibit shared guiding principles and identify similar governance challenges, albeit with varying priority levels. There is more emphasis on the high-impact interventions on price, availability and marketing in 2022, and more stringent targets have been set for 2030 in declaring alcohol as a public health priority therein, reflecting the action-oriented nature of the Plan. The identified roles of policy actors have largely remained unchanged, albeit with greater specificity in the more recent statement, appropriately so because it is concerned with implementation. The major exception, and the key difference in the documents, regards the alcohol industry, which is perceived primarily as a threat to public health in 2022 due to commercial activities harmful to health and because policy interference has slowed progress. Conclusions The adoption of the Global Alcohol Action Plan 2022-30 potentially marks a pivotal moment in global alcohol policy development, though it is unclear how fully it may be implemented. Perhaps, the key advances lie in advancing the ambitions of alcohol policy and clearly identifying that the alcohol industry should not be seen as any kind of partner in public health policymaking, which will permit progress to the extent that this influences what actually happens in alcohol policy at the national level.

Introduction. The relevance of the research topic is due to the problems caused by the globalisation of society. Purpose and methods. The purpose of the article is a philosophical analysis of comprehensive changes in society under the influence of globalisation and determinants identification that influence the transformation of culture as a factor of modern society's existence into an “object” and “tool” of global governance. The methodological basis of the study is the dialectical principle of cognition, systemic, axiological, historical, typological, comparative and synergistic approaches. Results. The role and significance of culture in society as a means of formation, education, development, and humanisation are highlighted. The author analyses the socio-cultural reflections and contradictions of globalisation, which lead to the deformation of ethno-cultural identifications, which becomes an obstacle to the achievement of a true civilisational synthesis by humanity. The article reveals the essence of global governance and its subjectivity and identifies the reasons why culture is deliberately turned into an “object” and “tool” of this governance. The negative social consequences and metaphysical threats of turning culture into an “object” and “tool” of global governance, as well as possible means of counteracting this are identified. Conclusions. The scientific novelty of the research results lies in the disclosure of the socio-cultural essence of global governance and the identification of its negative consequences and threats to society, and the significance lies in the fact that they can be used in the practical activities of public authorities, as well as in the development of the theoretical and methodological foundations of the philosophy of socio-cultural management and global studies.

The global climate and biodiversity crises are closely intertwined, yet no policy instrument currently tackles both jointly. This is problematic, as the lack of international platforms for designing coordinated and coherent policy frameworks that align targets across the nexus of biodiversity and climate change poses risks to nature and people. Here, we argue that the successful implementation of both the Paris Agreement and the Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) requires a joint work programme between the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Such a joint work programme could fill the current global governance vacuum and address critical implementation gaps, while fostering innovation and synergies in climate and biodiversity action. Based on a review of existing work programmes under the UNFCCC and interagency and joint work programmes established with the CBD, we provide a concept of how this joint programme could be set up, ideas on the type of issues it should tackle and recommendations for successful implementation. Policy implications: The UNFCCC and CBD are unique platforms for providing the evidence to, and guiding the way through the changes we need, but higher levels of integration between the biodiversity and climate change agendas are needed to plug the implementation gap between the GBF and the Paris Agreement. The upcoming Conference of the Parties (COP) for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP16) present a clear policy window for the two conventions to introduce a formal governance structure, such as the one proposed in this contribution, that brings together ideas, people, organizations and processes necessary for joining the dots on how to both stabilize our climate and recover our nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multimodal transportation has been a widely used commercial resource by countries to facilitate the exchange of goods. This study focused on analyzing the challenges related to the practical application of the legal framework of the international multimodal transport contract. Despite efforts to establish uniform regulation in international markets, this framework still does not fully meet the needs of participants in these transactions, therefore, it weakens social tendencies towards interconnection, providing additional weaknesses to national subsystems. International organizations such as MERCOSUR, CAM, ALADI, SICA, OAS, the United Nations (through its Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), and UNCITRAL have worked on formulating solutions to the main controversies that have arisen in this process. However, this has resulted in an incomplete, fragmented, and inefficient legal framework, which primarily benefits the member countries of these international organizations issuing regulations. Additionally, these solutions cannot always be extrapolated as general rules or effective solutions for the consequences of non-compliance with contractual clauses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation: China does not participate in the development co‐operation reporting mechanism of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development's (OECD) development co‐operation reporting mechanism, nor does it voluntarily publish overseas development finance data. Despite recent quantitative research on China's foreign aid to other sectors, such as health, no precedent exists for quantifying China's international education co‐operation (IEC). Purpose: This article will use AidData's Chinese Official Finance Dataset (AidData 2.0) to estimate the IEC using the OECD's internationally standardized definitions of development finance and frameworks for classifying IEC projects. Approach and methods: We thoroughly examined all types of IEC projects, including official finance projects other than those that meet the definition of official development assistance (ODA). In our comparative analysis of educational aid between China and traditional donors, we focused on ODA‐like projects and examined the number of projects and funding amounts to determine China's IEC priorities. Findings: The result shows that, between 2000 and 2017, China's IEC commitments totalled 1,524 education‐related international projects, representing 12% of the total international finance project portfolio, most of which are in Africa. Compared to the OECD framework, China prioritized higher education (n = 784, 51%) and education facilities and training (n = 244, 16%). An estimate of cumulative funding between 2000 to 2017 showed that China was the 10th largest donor of education aid to African countries, behind France, the World Bank, Germany, the United States, the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands. Policy implications: The findings of this study help our understanding of China's IEC finance. With China's involvement in education development aid growing in recent years and donors looking for solutions to developing countries' debt crises, this will allow for more effective collaboration, co‐ordination, and resource mobilization for both donor and recipient countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminal policy designed to fight against corruption focuses on individual deviant behaviour in order to remove the “bad apples”. This approach is insufficient because it does not address situations where corruption is a central element of the governance model, as a result of becoming a key factor in the decision making process in public institutions and private organizations at the local, regional, national and international levels. This article analyzes the characteristics and functioning of institutional and organizational corruption and complex (transnational) corruption networks, which are often closely related to each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conceptualizing city networks as institutionalized organizations allows unveiling the internal dynamics beneath their increasing dynamism in global politics. The article taps into the insightful yet uncharted theoretical framework of sociological institutionalism to analyze United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG). The logic of appropriateness of unity in diversity drives the process of institutionalization of UCLG, constructing the common and unifying identity of the membership, while simultaneously controlling the potential multiple struggles deriving from the myriad of members' self-interests in an organization fraught with diversity. The process of identity construction of UCLG members as global policy actors revolves around the legitimacy that stems from their governmental nature, democratic mandate, and proximity to their communities. Yet the call to unity in diversity cannot be upheld without the definition and implementation of rules that organize the interactions among members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the lack of representation and inclusion of perspectives from the Global South in the field of International Relations (IR). It highlights the dominance of Western perspectives and theories in IR, while marginalizing critical theories and perspectives from the Global South. The article argues for the need to incorporate diverse perspectives and theories from the Global South to create a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of international relations. It also discusses the implications of Western norms and institutions in global governance and the need to challenge colonial/Western narratives in IR. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of evolving IR theory to reflect global changes and the rise of emerging countries in the Global South. [Extracted from the article]

There is increasing interest in how anticolonial actors advanced a norm of racial equality in mid-century formations of liberal international order (LIO). Less attention, however, is afforded to simultaneous epistemic conflicts over the scientific object of 'race' and their political effects. During postwar order-building and alongside political struggles for racial equality, there was wide and deep scientific debate on the analytical utility of race as a means to categorize human diversity. Race, I demonstrate, was rendered as epistemically ambiguous, caught between social scientists and philosophers who understood it as a social construct akin to ethnicity and natural scientists who maintained a biological basis. This split was not confined to academic debate but shaped political and normative struggles over the institutionalization of racial equality in LIO. Adopting an object-oriented approach, I argue that the epistemic ambiguity of race generated political effects, at once permitting the reproduction of colonial logics in LIO as well as providing latitude for strategies of resistance. Rather than a linear causal effect, I empirically map the work that epistemic ambiguity performed in the creation of mid-century international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The populist backlash against international organizations (IOs) is well known, but to what extent do populists engage with IOs, and what form does this engagement take? We theoretically draw a distinction between public versus private forms of interactions with IOs. We hypothesize that more concealed types of engagement appeal to populists because they allow populists to use the benefits IOs offer, while avoiding the domestic costs associated with visible involvement. We test our theory using novel data based on archival documentation from the International Monetary Fund and find strong evidence that populists prefer private participation. The study advances scholarship on the international dimensions of populism, with implications for IO legitimacy and accountability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do governing actors in international politics become legitimised? Current approaches to the study of legitimation do not fully account for the complexities of governance in contemporary international and global politics because they pre-specify 'sources' of legitimacy and treat change in audience expectations towards rightful rule as exogenous to legitimation processes. Instead, this article synthesises existing models of legitimation with relational theory to argue that constellations of institutional complexities necessitate an analytical focus on audiences and their expectations as embedded in governance networks. It then provides a relational theory of legitimation, emphasising the mechanisms undergirding legitimation: legitimation should be conceptualised as a process of congruence-finding between actors' normative expectations. A governance relation might be influenced towards greater or lesser congruence via several mechanisms working at the level of the relation and the wider network, with more congruence giving rise to stabler governance practices. In this way, the theory builds upon legitimation scholarship by developing pathways to investigate legitimation across the varied contexts of international politics: it avoids a normative background theory of legitimacy sources and provides an improved framework for understanding change in the legitimacy of institutions over time by considering endogenous mechanisms of legitimation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International soft law is not legally binding, but nevertheless it embodies mainstream values and influences the formation of hard law in global governance. Marine fisheries have become important arenas of global governance, in which developing states are crucial participants. The interactions between soft law and hard law in global marine fisheries can be mainly summarized as follows: soft law can be the precursor for hard law and be implicitly introduced into hard law to enhance normativity; hard law can also be incorporated into soft law. This paper explores the IUU fishing case to illustrate the significant role of soft law on international fisheries law and identify gaps in global marine fisheries governance. The development of international instruments to combat IUU fishing within FAO undergoes a process from voluntary to legally binding with the engagement and promotion of some developed states for their benefits. But IUU fishing concept is defective in its drafting as well as in practical application and indicates the value of emphasizing conservation over economic and social development, which is contrary to the principle of sustainable development and fails to meet the requirements of the developing states. The paper suggests to fill this gap by converting existing values in soft law to foster fishing rules that benefit all states and provide some insights towards this direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globally, migrants encounter numerous challenges in their destination countries, including being denied access to essential services and economic prospects due to restrictive laws that undermine their ability to contribute to the achievement of the 2030 global agenda. While there is a clear and urgent requirement to incorporate migration into development plans at all levels, the integration at the local government level is still incomplete and uncertain. This research utilises the concept of global governance and a qualitative case study approach to provide an explorative analysis of the challenges associated with integrating migration into municipal development plans. A total of 20 individuals engaged in municipal development planning were interviewed. The data was also collected by reviewing municipal strategic plans, and a thematic analysis approach was employed for data analysis. The study findings indicate that the lack of up-to-date migration data, negative attitudes towards migration, and insufficient coordination among parties responsible for development planning are the primary obstacles to integrating migration into municipal development planning. The exclusion of migrants has significant ramifications for municipal planning. Not only does it contradict the 2030 global goal, which recognises migrants as catalysts for sustainable development, but it also renders municipal planning inadequate and unsustainable. These discoveries helped in creating the Migration and Municipal Development Planning Framework. The framework has substantial implications for municipal planning since it delineates the actions local municipalities could take to incorporate migration issues into development planning and highlights the expected outcomes. The framework makes a unique and valuable contribution to the existing knowledge by providing a new viewpoint on the relationship between migration and sustainable development at the local government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, scholars and activists have been asking queer questions about transitional justice. Queer perspectives advocate for the recognition of anti-queer violence within transitional justice; the inclusion of LGBTQIA+ people in transitional justice processes; and the development of queer decolonial critiques of transitional justice. Informed by this research agenda, I develop a queer perspective to the global governance of transitional justice. I analyse documents from the UN, the International Center for Transitional Justice and the International Criminal Court. Representing mechanisms from across global transitional justice, I trace the (cis-heteronormative, colonial, carceral) violence of transitional justice and its institutionalization at the global level. I reflect on the queer tensions and (im)possibilities of global transitional justice, a site that is violent but holds transformative potential. The global governance of transitional justice must be queered to expand its social, political and conceptual remit, and to seek more radical, liberatory worlds within and beyond formal justice mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Data regulation has been framed as a global battle between the market-driven US, the state-driven Chinese, and the rights-driven EU models. We argue that Japan is pursuing a distinct fourth, consensus-driven approach. It is based on soft regulation and aims at striking a balance between privacy concerns and commercial and public interests in the usage of data. The concept of consensus is deeply rooted in Japan's legal tradition. Its application to data regulation is apparent in the domestic certification scheme for information banks and the international initiative 'Data Free Flow with Trust'. We also show that Japan's COVID-19 countermeasures relied on data strategies fully compatible with its consensual regulatory model. By combining rights-driven and market-driven aspects, Japan can potentially mediate between the EU and the US regimes. Japan's approach also offers an attractive alternative for countries that do not want to pick a side in the Sino-American competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transnational city networks have generally been portrayed as a more inclusive and egalitarian mode of international organizing. However, recent research has questioned these assumptions and highlighted the dynamics of power, domination and control at the heart of the functioning of these networks. These studies have also suggested a North–South power dynamic in global city networks, which seems to deny any significant agency to Global South cities in these networks. In this paper, I seek to qualify this view by analysing the manifestation of agency by an African city in a major transnational city network. I show how, despite finding itself at the bottom of the global city hierarchy, the City of Johannesburg was able to capitalize on the visionary leadership of its Mayor and a favourable domestic political alignment to direct the affairs of the United Cities and Local Governments and in the process shape global discourse on urban development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a novel systematic exploration of ways and extents that institutional characteristics shape legitimacy beliefs toward multistakeholder global governance. Multistakeholderism is often argued to offer institutional advantages over intergovernmental multilateralism in handling global problems. This study examines whether, in practice, perceptions of institutional purpose, procedure, and performance affect legitimacy assessments regarding this form of global governance. The analysis focuses on the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), one of the largest and most institutionally developed global multistakeholder arrangements. Evidence comes from a mixed‐methods survey of 467 participants in ICANN. We find that this representative sample accords high importance in principle to many institutional features, and also rates the actual institutional operations of ICANN quite highly on various counts. Moreover, many institutional characteristics associate significantly with participants' legitimacy beliefs toward ICANN. However, not all institutional qualities have this significance, and the relevance of individual‐ and societal‐level circumstances indicates that institutional sources do not provide a full explanation of legitimacy. The article contributes refinements to theory of legitimacy in global governance; demonstrates the value of mixed‐methods survey work in this field; supplies unique original data and analysis; and identifies implications for the politics of (de)legitimation around multistakeholderism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This commentary addresses the challenges and opportunities of renewing multilateral cooperation, including at the UN Summit of the Future. It argues that despite pessimism given global political divisions, significant potential exists for reform. Recent successes demonstrate the efficacy of networked multilateralism, in which coalitions of states supported by nongovernmental organizations played pivotal roles. The piece suggests such coalitions can help Member States renew the multilateral system based on fair representation, increased contributions from emerging powers, shared responsibility among major powers, and inclusion of nongovernmental actors. It emphasizes the need for world leaders to address pressing challenges and restore trust in multilateral systems by showing they can deliver fair, inclusive, and effective solutions. The author offers a framework to guide global governance reform—which defends the old, governs the new, strengthens the borrowed, and renews the blue—and ensure the UN remains a relevant and central body in global governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The wildlife trade is an important arena for intervention in the prevention of emerging zoonoses, and leading organisations have advocated for more collaborative, multi-sectoral approaches to governance in this area. The aim of this study is to characterise the structure and function of the network of transnational organisations that interact around the governance of wildlife trade for the prevention of emerging zoonoses, and to assess these network characteristics in terms of how they might support or undermine progress on these issues. Methods: This study used a mixed methods social network analysis of transnational organisations. Data were collected between May 2021 and September 2022. Participants were representatives of transnational organisations involved in the governance of wildlife trade and the prevention of emerging zoonoses. An initial seed sample of participants was purposively recruited through professional networks, and snowball sampling was used to identify additional participants. Quantitative data were collected through an online network survey. Measures of centrality (degree, closeness, and betweenness) were calculated and the network's largest clique was identified and characterised. To understand the extent to which organisations were connected across sectors, homophily by sector was assessed using exponential random graph modelling. Qualitative data were collected through semi-structured interviews. The findings from the quantitative analysis informed the focus of the qualitative analysis. Qualitative data were explored using thematic analysis. Results: Thirty-seven participants completed the network survey and 17 key informants participated in semi-structured interviews. A total of 69 organisations were identified as belonging to this network. Organisations spanned the animal, human, and environmental health sectors, among others including trade, food and agriculture, and crime. Organisation types included inter-governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, treaty secretariats, research institutions, and network organisations. Participants emphasised the highly inter-sectoral nature of this topic and the importance of inter-sectoral work, and connections were present across existing sectors. However, there were many barriers to effective interaction, particularly conflicting goals and agendas. Power dynamics also shaped relationships between actors, with the human health sector seen as better resourced and more influential, despite having historically lower engagement than the environmental and animal health sectors around the wildlife trade and its role in emerging zoonoses. Conclusion: The network of transnational organisations focused on the governance of wildlife trade and the prevention of emerging zoonoses is highly multi-sectoral, but despite progress catalysed by the COVID-19 pandemic, barriers still exist for inter-sectoral interaction and coordination. A One Health approach to governance at this level, which has gained traction throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, was shared as a promising mechanism to support a balancing of roles and agendas in this space. However, this must involve agreement around equity, priorities, and clear goal setting to support effective action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: There are only two major statements which define alcohol policy development at the global level. There has not been any comparative analysis of the details of these key texts, published in 2010 and 2022 respectively, including how far they constitute similar or evolving approaches to alcohol harm. Methods: Preparatory data collection involved examination of documents associated with the final policy statements. A thematic analysis across the two policy documents was performed to generate understanding of continuity and change based on comparative study. Study findings are interpreted in the contexts of the evolving conceptual and empirical literatures. Results: Both documents exhibit shared guiding principles and identify similar governance challenges, albeit with varying priority levels. There is more emphasis on the high-impact interventions on price, availability and marketing in 2022, and more stringent targets have been set for 2030 in declaring alcohol as a public health priority therein, reflecting the action-oriented nature of the Plan. The identified roles of policy actors have largely remained unchanged, albeit with greater specificity in the more recent statement, appropriately so because it is concerned with implementation. The major exception, and the key difference in the documents, regards the alcohol industry, which is perceived primarily as a threat to public health in 2022 due to commercial activities harmful to health and because policy interference has slowed progress. Conclusions: The adoption of the Global Alcohol Action Plan 2022-30 potentially marks a pivotal moment in global alcohol policy development, though it is unclear how fully it may be implemented. Perhaps, the key advances lie in advancing the ambitions of alcohol policy and clearly identifying that the alcohol industry should not be seen as any kind of partner in public health policymaking, which will permit progress to the extent that this influences what actually happens in alcohol policy at the national level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public views on international organizations (IOs) have become a matter of central concern. While actors in world politics increasingly try to legitimize or delegitimize IOs, scholars have begun investigating such phenomena systematically. This paper provides the most comprehensive IO (de)legitimation study to date. Building on cueing theory, and considering input as well as output legitimacy, I examine the isolated and combined effects of delegitimation and self-legitimation on public perceptions of IOs. I concentrate on government criticism and citizen protests as two salient practices of delegitimation. In investigating self-legitimation, I focus on IOs' public statements and institutional reforms. I study public opinion on the UN, World Bank, and WHO, as IOs of different functional scopes and levels of salience. In 2021, I conducted survey experiments on more than 32,000 citizens in ten countries worldwide (Australia, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Kenya, South Korea, and Turkey) – weighted by age, gender, region, and education. My main findings are: Delegitimation by governments and citizen protests has some limited effectiveness, depending on the IO in question. While IO self-legitimization statements and reforms in themselves do not boost public support for IOs, they are generally effective at neutralizing delegitimation attempts by governments and citizen protests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is significant and growing interest in better understanding hierarchy in the international system, especially in relation to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Acknowledging the existence of hierarchy in a system implies that there are different social positions (higher/lower), but not why or how a specific differentiation came to be used, nor how it is structured, contested or resolved. This article is interested in contributing to these questions, particularly in the context of heterarchical settings (where more than one hierarchy is present), which is also not fully understood. It uses the first years of the International Labour Organization (ILO) as a springboard to reflect upon hierarchy within the so-called 'civilized' group of countries in the immediate aftermath of World War I. This IGO was the first to (1) introduce statistical data to rank countries, with criteria designed to 'objectively' gauge industrial power and (2) establish a geographic allocation of countries in its main decision-making body's structure. Non-European countries and non-great powers had critical roles in establishing these novel ways of dealing with hierarchies and their institutional design in IGOs. One hundred years later, these discussions still resonate with several ongoing cases of contestation in IGOs over 'fair' hierarchical structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the development of indicators measuring attacks on education through a case study of the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA). As GCPEA and its partners have brought the problem of attacks on education to the attention of global civil society, they have engaged in contestation to define attacks on education and construct indicators to track the relevant violations. These debates are significant in that indicators are a tool of global governance that shape policymaking and resource allocation. The discussion draws on the author's decade of experience working among groups focused on the protection of education, including direct involvement developing indicators on attacks on education, and on three sets of qualitative interviews. It analyses how resource limitations, organisational agendas, challenges of measurement and verification, and global power dynamics exert pressure towards a more narrow understanding of attacks on education. This limits the transformative potential of the protecting education agenda. The discussion illustrates that EiE actors must consider the ways that they measure their work in ongoing conversations about creating a decolonial and more equitable field of practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]