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There is a growing consensus that cultural variables play an integral role in conflict mitigation. Whether one believes we are truly in a long war, in which capturing hearts and minds is integral, or whether one thinks that a major combat operation is looming on the horizon, cultural knowledge and understanding of the area of operation are instrumental to success. The recently developed and implemented Human Terrain System (HTS) Project was designed to play an important role in developing cultural knowledge for the U.S. military and is critical to mission success and the moral prosecution of warfare. But this program is new and, admittedly, not perfect. Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) were designed to play a key, on-the-ground role in bridging the cultural and personal identity gap between western military forces and the foreign cultures in which they operate. This is an extremely important but often overlooked aspect of just war theory. A deeper understanding of not only adversarial but friendly culture and personal identity formation allows the U.S. military to better discriminate between friend and foe and to build deeper relationships with local leaders. These measures create a more precise and humane war effort than if the United States was forced to rely solely on indiscriminate, blunt, and largely kinetic options. The U.S. military does not have the ability to veto a political decision to go to war or abscond from any order to engage overseas. Having said this, the U.S. military does have a great say in how a campaign will be conducted and HTS was designed to play an integral role in ensuring that a campaign is conducted as morally and unobtrusively as possible., Published in Parameters, v41 n3 p19-31, Autumn 2011.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has emphasized the importance of developing language skills and knowledge of foreign cultures to meet current and future needs and is investing millions of dollars to provide language and culture predeployment training to its general purpose forces. DoD also has noted that such training should be viewed as a long-term investment and that training and personnel systems should better account for the knowledge and skills of service members acquired through training to help manage its forces. The committee report accompanying a proposed bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 5136) directed GAO to review language and culture training for Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces. For this report, GAO evaluated the extent to which these services did the following: (1) captured information in training and personnel systems on the completion of language and culture predeployment training and proficiency gained from training, and (2) developed plans to sustain language skills acquired through predeployment training. GAO analyzed service documents and interviewed cognizant officials. GAO made recommendations intended to improve the availability of information on training completion and proficiency and help DoD plan for sustainment training. DoD generally agreed with the recommendations, but stated that the definition of significant language training was not intended to describe training for initial skills. However, DoD noted that current guidance does not preclude language proficiency testing at this stage., Report to Congressional Committees.

Operational culture is a new wave of study enjoying much enthusiasm and popularity within most Western contemporary armies. Governed by the mission at hand, "operational culture" encompasses those aspects that can influence the outcome of a military operation, or conversely, those military actions that influence the cultural balance within an area of operations. As such, the correct application of operational culture is critical for any military force to favorably shape its own operating environment. In the Australian Army today, no cultural training is currently formalized. Individuals or units notified for deployment have to invent their own training objectives and this lack of institutional training necessitates adaptation while on operations. The decision on training objectives, how much training to conduct and how to adapt while on operations is largely left to the commander's discretion. To improve organizational paradigms resulting in enhanced shaping capabilities, the Australian Army needs to define cultural capabilities that will function in future warfare and train individuals and units to be able to fulfill that capability.

The Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) accessions process does not serve either the needs of the Army or the cadets attempting to get one of their top branch choices. The accessions process overvalues certain aspects of a cadet's background and puts no value on other aspects that could indicate a cadet's potential. In order to get and retain those cadets who are best suited to be Military Intelligence Officers, the accessions process must be changed to better reflect the key competencies of an MI Officer.

In conducting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), working with coalition partners, and projecting influence worldwide, the Armed Forces of the United States will continue to be sent to the far corners of the earth to perform wide-ranging missions such as stability operations, nation building, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. These types of operations all require competencies far beyond the traditional warfighting skills. All leaders in the military, whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic level, need training, education, and new skill sets to function as "warrior-diplomats." If cultural knowledge is critical for the U.S. armed forces to both defeat adversaries and work successfully with allies, what is being done and what can be done by the U.S. Army to address this shortcoming? This paper shows how a lack of cultural knowledge has hindered U.S. military and diplomatic efforts, identifies gaps in current Army methods of providing cultural knowledge, and reviews historical examples of the value of cultural knowledge in military operations. Following a survey of cultural and language training programs currently implemented in the Army, the author concludes with recommendations for developing and employing a more culturally adept force., USAWC Strategy Research Project.

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union elevated the United States to a hyper superpower status, globalization in terms of modernity, economics, security, and culture would dramatically affect its ascendancy. While globalization extended the reach of modernity and economics, it also fueled an insidious radical Islamic culture that would identify new security concerns extending beyond traditional boundaries. For a short moment America appeared able to implement foreign policy with little external influence. But the events of 9/11 and other acts of terror around the globe would reveal a geopolitical climate not easily overcome; and one impossible to overcome without a firm understanding of foreign cultures and languages. If America is to maintain its position of global leader well into the 21st century, the development of a national educational framework for understanding foreign cultures and languages is critical. This knowledge of culture and language will prove especially important in the development of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the military, and the Army in particular, must genuinely understand the cultures and languages of the places they are sent if they are to successfully carry out U.S. foreign policy., USAWC Strategy Research Project.

Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) requires more than just superior technology, firepower, and "stand-off" capability. Fighting a 4GW adversary requires boots on the ground, functional language and cultural awareness to facilitate the collection of actionable intelligence, the ability to know when and how to go kinetic, and more importantly, when to show restraint and patience. The training of friendly indigenous forces, initiation of civil affairs projects to restore and improve living conditions, and building relationships with locals are significant factors in the effort to win the "hearts and minds" campaign. However, gaining all-important language skills and cultural awareness is a challenge facing U.S. military forces, and the subject of this paper. Until recently, when language and cultural awareness training occurred, it was limited, conducted "just in time" prior to deployment, and followed by on-site orientation and "on-the-job" training in theater. The Army Special Operations school has long recognized the value of more rigorous, extended language and culture training. Other long-term language and culture training initiatives have been announced by the President to help address the needs of "the long war." Whether such efforts will provide sufficient language and cultural expertise in the U.S. military is open to debate. There is another source of these skills, however, if the military can just can tap into it. America's "melting pot" should provide a sufficiently large talent pool with the requisite language and cultural skills -- the military just needs to take steps to maximize its ability to recruit from it. This paper examines the need for language and cultural proficiency in the U.S. military, the effectiveness of current efforts to gain relevant language and cultural skills, long-term strategies proposed by the current Administration, and the prospects for and potential barriers to their success.

Joint intelligence doctrine focuses too much on traditional adversaries in combat situations and does not adequately address issues of foreign culture. In addition, intelligence doctrine for process and planning does not adequately direct the joint force commander's (JFC) intelligence establishment to prepare reports on the characteristic features of foreign peoples that include information on their civilization, beliefs, and social institutions. This lack of information leaves the commander and his forces vulnerable when they must operate in foreign societies or with foreign groups. These groups include the indigenous populations in the joint operations area as well as the foreign forces in a coalition. To better support the commander across the range of military operations the military must expand joint intelligence doctrine to include cultural intelligence. This paper analyzes the focus of current joint intelligence doctrine and its lack of consideration for foreign cultures. The author asserts that the JFC should possess the best in-depth and current analysis on foreign cultures, information that provides him with a true understanding of the cultures of the foreign groups with which he and his forces will interact. The author makes specific recommendations on how to incorporate cultural analysis into joint intelligence doctrine.